JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30.03.2002 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan, in Civil Appeal No.64-N/13 of 2001, whereby he reversed the judgment and decree dated 08.08.2001 passed by learned Sub Judge, Rajgarh, District Sirmaur, in Civil Suit No. 33/1 of 2000. 2. The brief facts of the case are that respondents (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs) had filed a suit against the appellants (hereinafter referred to as the defendant) with respect to land comprised in Khata-Khatauni No.49min/98, Khasra No.386/302, measuring 2-19 bighas, situated in mauza Kanog Dhandharel, Pargana Giripar, Tehsil Rajgarh, District Sirmaur, H.P. ( hereinafter referred to as the suit land). The case of the plaintiffs was that they were owners in possession of the suit land while the defendant had no right, title or interest therein and had been threatening to interfere in the suit land. 3. The defendant contested the suit by filing the suit and denied the stand of the plaintiffs that the defendant had no right, title or interest in the suit land. The defendant stated that he was a tenant on the suit land for the last more than 30 years from the time of his predecessors on payment of ‘20/- per annum. The defendant had already filed proceedings before the Assistant Collector Ist Grade, Rajgarh on 22.01.2000 for correction of the revenue entries which were pending before him. The defendant during demarcation carried out by Kanungo on 11.01.2000 came to know about the revenue entries of the suit land in favour of the plaintiffs and, in these circumstances, filed proceedings before the Assistant Collector Ist Grade, Rajgarh. Accordingly, he prayed for dismissal of the suit. 4. The learned trial Court on 07.03.2001 framed the following issues:- 1.Whether the plaintiffs are owner in possession of the suit land, as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the defendant is causing interference in the suit land, as alleged? OPP 3.Whether the land in suit is coming in possession of the defendant as tenant, as alleged? OPD 4.Whether the court has no jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit as the matter is already subjudice before Assistant Collector Ist Grade, Rajgarh, as alleged? OPD5.Relief. 5. After recording evidence, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiffs. OPP 3.Whether the land in suit is coming in possession of the defendant as tenant, as alleged? OPD 4.Whether the court has no jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit as the matter is already subjudice before Assistant Collector Ist Grade, Rajgarh, as alleged? OPD5.Relief. 5. After recording evidence, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the appeal was carried before the learned lower appellate Court, who vide his judgment and decree dated 30.03.2002 has been pleased to set aside the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court and consequently suit of the plaintiffs has been ordered to be decreed, thereby a decree for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiffs’ possession over the suit land, dislodging their possession and encroaching upon any part of the suit land, has been granted. It is this judgment and decree which is under challenge in the present appeal. 6. The appeal was admitted on 16.05.2002 by this Court on the following substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether suit for permanent prohibitory injunction filed by the plaintiffs is maintainable when there is no legal evidence on record to prove their possession on the suit land and presumption of truth attached to Jamabandies Ex.P-4, Ex.PX1, Ex.PX and Ex. PW-1/A has been rebutted by the defendant by leading independent evidence? 2.Whether learned Additional District Judge has erred in not considering the case of the defendant that he is tenant on the suit land merely on the ground that defendant has not filed any cross-objections in the first appellate Court when otherwise suit of the plaintiffs was dismissed?3. Whether the learned Additional District Judge has misconstrued, misinterpreted and misapplied the evidence on record in reversing the judgment, decree dated 8.8.2001 passed by learned Sub Judge? Since these questions are interconnected and interlinked, I propose to decide the same by common reasoning. 7.I have heard Shri Karan Singh Kanwar, Advocate, for the appellants and Shri Bhupender Gupta, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Neeraj Gupta, Advocate, for the respondents and gone through the records. Since these questions are interconnected and interlinked, I propose to decide the same by common reasoning. 7.I have heard Shri Karan Singh Kanwar, Advocate, for the appellants and Shri Bhupender Gupta, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Neeraj Gupta, Advocate, for the respondents and gone through the records. Shri Karan Singh Kanwar, Advocate, at the outset, pointed out that the judgment and decree passed by learned lower appellate Court appears to be based on conjectures and surmises and in the teeth of such findings would contend that learned lower appellate Court has completely misread, misinterpreted and misapplied the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence on record while reversing the judgment. He further stated that when the suit for permanent prohibitory injunction filed by the plaintiffs was not maintainable, especially, when there was no legal evidence on record to prove their possession on the suit land and presumption of truth in the present case could not be attached to the jamabandies since the defendant had rebutted this presumption by leading cogent, convincing and independent evidence. Even otherwise, learned lower appellate Court had, infact, ignored the entire case of the defendant only on the ground that learned trial Court had held the defendant not to be a tenant over the suit land which findings had attained finality. 8. On the other hand, Shri Bhupender Gupta, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr.Neeraj Gupta, Advocate, would submit that, firstly, there was no entry in the revenue records supporting the claim of the defendant and secondly there was no G.P.A. executed in favour of Ghanotu Ram as the same was not proved on record. Therefore, the statement of this witness i.e. DW-1 cannot be construed to be a statement made on behalf of a party and since the party has failed to state material facts and appear as a witness so as to afford an opportunity to the opposite party to cross-examine, therefore, an adverse inference ought to be drawn against him. He further contended that once the plea of tenancy raised by the defendant has failed, therefore, it was all the more obligatory for the defendant to have proved as to in what capacity he was claiming himself to be in possession of the suit land. In case he had been claiming himself to be in possession of the suit land as a trespasser, then the nature of the possession would definitely be ‘illegal’. In case he had been claiming himself to be in possession of the suit land as a trespasser, then the nature of the possession would definitely be ‘illegal’. However, in case he was claiming himself to be in possession of the suit land on the strength of tenancy, then despite such tenancy having not been proved, the possession would essentially be ‘permissive’. According to him, the defendant has failed to prove either of them and, therefore, cannot be held to be in possession of the suit land. 9.Shri Bhupender Gupta, Senior Advocate, for the plaintiffs- respondents, has then taken me through the records of the proceedings initiated before the Assistant Collector Ist Grade, Rajgarh. A bare perusal of these proceedings would show that the same, infact, have been withdrawn by the defendant-appellant. It is conceded by learned counsel for the defendant-appellants that despite appellants having withdrawn the application under Order 23 Rule 1 CPC and having sought specific permission to file the proceedings afresh, the appellants till date has not preferred any application of the like nature. The learned counsel for the respondents has further contended and rightly so that there was presumption of regulatory of official acts under Section 114(e) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Therefore, in this view of law, the revenue records produced by him would be presumed to be true. 10.The learned trial Court in paragraph-13 of the judgment held as follows:- “.....No doubt, the suit land is shown in possession of the plaintiffs right from the year 1978-79 but the oral evidence adduced by the defendant categorically suggest that the suit land was in possession of the defendant from the time of predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs and he only has been cultivating the suit land, therefore, the entries standing in the aforesaid jamabandies showing possession of the plaintiffs do not appear to be true....” Similarly, in paragraph-14 of the judgment, the trial Court held as under:- “Otherwise also, Ld. Assistant Collector Ist Grade Rajgarh is seized of the enquiry pertaining to the possession. The pendency of said proceeding has not been disputed by the plaintiffs. Once a dispute was there regarding possession, the plaintiffs were required to wait for the outcome of the proceedings pending before Ld. Assistant Collector Ist Grade Rajgarh is seized of the enquiry pertaining to the possession. The pendency of said proceeding has not been disputed by the plaintiffs. Once a dispute was there regarding possession, the plaintiffs were required to wait for the outcome of the proceedings pending before Ld. Assistant Collector....” 11.It is also relevant to note that learned trial Court though had dismissed the suit, however, it had also recorded findings against the defendant that he had failed to prove his tenancy though he was held to be in possession. The entire evidence has to be evaluated and seen in the light of the findings recorded by the learned trial Court to the effect that the defendant had not been able to prove his tenancy though he was in possession and such findings have attained finality since neither any appeal nor cross-objections were filed by the defendant before learned lower appellate Court. Now the only question which requires to be determined in the present appeal as to whether the defendant/appellant has been able to prove on record his possession. 12.In case claim of the plaintiffs is seen, the plaintiffs have set up a plea of ownership and possession and not only this, the plaintiffs are shown to be owners in possession of the suit land. One of the plaintiffs, Lachhmi Singh, appeared as PW-1 and produced and got exhibited on record jamabandi for the years 1978-79 Ex.P-4, 1983-84 Ex. PX-1, 1988-89 Ex.PX and 1993-94 Ex.PW-1/A. He has further deposed that that the suit land was owned and possessed by him along with his brother and son. This deposition finds corroboration from the said jamabandies where plaintiffs figure as co-owners and in joint possession of the suit land. However, on the other hand, the name of the defendant does not appear in the possession column. Section 45 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act reads as under:- “45. This deposition finds corroboration from the said jamabandies where plaintiffs figure as co-owners and in joint possession of the suit land. However, on the other hand, the name of the defendant does not appear in the possession column. Section 45 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act reads as under:- “45. Presumption in favour of entries in records-of­rights and [ periodical) records.- An entry made in a record of rights in accordance with the law for the time being in force, or [a periodical] record in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter and the rules thereunder, shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved or a new entry is lawfully substituted therefor: Provided that notwithstanding anything contained in this section any entry made, [ in the areas comprised in Himachal Pradesh immediately before 1st November, 1966] [during the period between the first day of April, 1948 and the first day of April, 1956] in record of rights or in [ a periodical] record whereby the land is shown as under self cultivation shall not be presumed to be true: [Provided further that the record-of-rights and periodical record, prepared by means of computerization in the prescribed manner shall be presumed to be true and shall be deemed to have been prepared under this chapter.]” 13.Thus, once the presumption of truth is attached to the revenue entries, heavy burden lies upon the defendant to rebut this presumption. At this stage, it is important to note that the defendant himself did not step into the witness box and, infact, examined his nephew Ghanotu Ram, who has claimed himself to be the attorney of the defendant, has nowhere in his statement maintained that he was attorney of the defendant and, therefore, was competent enough to depose in this case. Therefore, the statement of Ghanotu Ram will be construed only as a witness and not for and on behalf of the party itself i.e. the defendant. At this stage, this Court is left with no option but to draw an adverse inference against the defendant under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which reads as under:- “114. Therefore, the statement of Ghanotu Ram will be construed only as a witness and not for and on behalf of the party itself i.e. the defendant. At this stage, this Court is left with no option but to draw an adverse inference against the defendant under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which reads as under:- “114. Court may presume existence of certain facts.- The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. (g) That evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it; 14. It is settled law that where a party to the suit does not appear in the witness box and state his own case on oath and further does not offer himself for cross-examination by other side, a presumption under Section 114(g) would arise that the case set up by him was not correct as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ishwar Bhai C.Patel alias Bachu Bhai Patel versus Harihar Behera and another (1999) 3 SCC 457 wherein it has been held as under:- “17. Admittedly respondent No. 1 had an account in the Central Bank of India Limited, Sambalpur Branch which his father, namely, respondent No. 2, was authorised to operate. It is also an admitted fact that it was from this account that the amount was advanced to the appellant by respondent No. 2. It has been given out in the statement of respondent No. 2 that when the appellant had approached him for a loan of Rs. 7,000/-, he had explicitly told him that he had no money to lend whereupon the appellant had himself suggested to advance the loan from the account of respondent No. 1 and it wa s on his suggestion that the respondent No. 2 issued the cheque to the appellant which the appellant, admittedly, encashed. This fact has not been controverted by the appellant who did not enter the witness box to make a statement on oath denying the statement of defendant (respondent) No. 2 that it was at his instance that respondent No. 2 had advanced the amount of Rs. This fact has not been controverted by the appellant who did not enter the witness box to make a statement on oath denying the statement of defendant (respondent) No. 2 that it was at his instance that respondent No. 2 had advanced the amount of Rs. 7,000/- to the appellant by issuing a cheque on the account of defendant (respondent) No. 1. Having not entered into the witness box and having not presented himself for cross-examination, an adverse presumption has to be drawn against him on the basis of principles contained in illustration (g) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872. 18. As early as in 1927, the Privy Council in Sardar Gurbaksha Singh v. Gurdial Singh, AIR 1927 PC 230, took note of a practice prevalent in those days of not examining the parties as a witness in the case and leaving it to the other party to call that party so that the other party may be treated as the witness of the first party. Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as under :- “Notice has frequently been taken by this Board of this style of procedure. It sometimes takes the form of a manoeuvre under which counsel does not call his own client, who is an essential witness, but endeavours to force the other party to call him, and so suffer the discomfiture of having him treated as his, the other party’s, own witness. This is thought to be clever, but it is a bad and degrading practice. Lord Atkinson dealt with the subject in Lal Kunwar v. Chiranji Lal (1910) ILR 32 All 104), calling it “a vicious practice, unworthy of a high-toned or reputable system of advocacy.” 19. They further observed as under :- “But in any view her non-appearance as a witness, she being present in Court, would be the strongest possible circumstance going to discredit the truth of her case.” 20. Their Lordships also took note of the High Court finding which was to the following effect :- “It is true that she has not gone into the witness box, but she made a full statement before Chaudhri Kesar Ram, and it does not seem likely that her evidence before the Subordinate Judge would have added materially to what she had said in the statement. 21. They observed :- “Their Lordships disapprove of such reasoning. 21. They observed :- “Their Lordships disapprove of such reasoning. The true object to be achieved by a Court of justice can only be furthered with propriety by the testimony of the party who personally knowing the whole circumstances of the case can dispel the suspicions attaching to it. The story can then be subjected in all its particulars to cross- examination.” 22. This decision has since been relied upon practically by all the High Courts. The Lahore High Court in Kirpa Singh v. Ajaipal Singh, AIR 1930 Lahore 1, observed as under :- “It is significant that while the plaintiffs put the defendant in the witness-box they themselves had not the courage to go into the witness-box. Plaintiffs were the best persons to give evidence as to the “interest” possessed by them in the institution and their failure to go into the witness-box must in the circumstances go strongly against them.” 23. This decision was also relied upon by the Bombay High Court in Martand Pandharinath Chaudhari v. Radhabai Krishnarao Deshmukh, AIR 1931 Bombay 97, which observed as under :- “It is the bounden duty of a party personally knowing the facts and circumstances, to give evidence on his own behalf and to submit to cross-examination and his non­appearance as a witness would be the strongest possible circumstance which will go to discredit the truth of his case.” 24. The Lahore High Court in two other cases in 1934, namely, Bishan Das v. Gurbakhsh Singh, AIR 1934 Lahore 63 (2) and Puran Das Chela v. Kartar Singh, AIR 1934 Lahore 398 took the same view. 25. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Devji Shivji v. Karsandas Ramji, AIR 1954 Patna 280, relying upon the decision of the Privy Council in Sardar Gurbakhsh Singh v. Gurdial Singh (AIR 1927 PC 230) (supra) and the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gulla Kharagjit Carpenter v. Narsingh Nandkishore Rawat, AIR 1970 MP 225 have also taken the same view. The Madhya Pradesh High Court also relied upon the following observation of the Calcutta High Court in Pranballav Saha v. Sm. Tulsibala Dassi, AIR 1958 Cal 713 :- “The very fact that the defendant neither came to the box herself nor called any witness to contradict evidence given on oath against her shows that these facts cannot be denied. The Madhya Pradesh High Court also relied upon the following observation of the Calcutta High Court in Pranballav Saha v. Sm. Tulsibala Dassi, AIR 1958 Cal 713 :- “The very fact that the defendant neither came to the box herself nor called any witness to contradict evidence given on oath against her shows that these facts cannot be denied. What was prima facie against her became conclusive proof by her failure to deny.” 26. The Allahabad High Court in Arjun Singh v. Virender Nath, AIR 1971 All 29 , held that :- “the explanation of any admission or conduct on the part of a party must, if the party is alive and capable of giving evidence, come from him and the Court would not imagine an explanation which a party himself has not chosen to give.” 27. It was further observed that :- “If such a party abstains from entering the witness box it must give rise to an inference adverse against him. 28. A Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court also in Bhagwan Dass v. Bhishan Chand, AIR 1974 P & H 7, drew a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act that if a party does not enter into the witness box, an adverse presumption has to be drawn against that party. 29. Applying the principles stated above to the instant case, it would be found that in the instant case also the appellant had abstained from the witness box and had not made any statement on oath in support of his pleading set out in the written statement. An adverse inference has, therefore, to be drawn against him. Since it was specifically stated by respondent No. 2 in his statement on oath that it was at the instance of the appellant that he had issued the cheque on the account of respondent No. 1 in the Central Bank of India Ltd., Sambalpur Branch, and the appellant, admittedly, had encashed that cheque, an inference has to be drawn against the appellant that what he stated in the written statement was not correct. In these circumstances, the High Court was fully justified in decreeing the suit of respondent No. 1 in its entirety and passing a decree against the appellant also. In these circumstances, the High Court was fully justified in decreeing the suit of respondent No. 1 in its entirety and passing a decree against the appellant also. 15.Similar observations have been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vidhyadhar versus Manikrao and another (1999) 3 SCC 573 which reads as follows:- “17.Where a party to the suit does not appear in the witness-box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross-examined by the other side, a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is not correct as has been held in a series of decisions passed by various High Courts and the Privy Council beginning from the decision in Sardar Gurbaksh Singh v. Gurdial Singh AIR 1927 PC 230. This was followed by the Lahore High Court in Kirpa Singh v. Ajaipal Singh AIR 1930 Lah 1 and the Bombay High Court in Martand Pandharinath Chaudhari v. Radhabai Krishnarao Deshmukh AIR 1931 Bom 97. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gulla Kharagjit Carpenter v. Narsingh Nandkishore Rawat AIR 1970 MP 225 also followed the Privy Council decision in Sardar Gurbaksh Singh case. The Allahabad High Court in Arjun Singh v. Virendra Nath AIR 1971 All 29 held that if a party abstains from entering the witness box, it would give rise to an adverse inference against him. Similarly, a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bhagwan Dass v. Bhishan Chand AIR 1974 P&H 7 drew a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872 against a party who did not enter the witness box.” 16.DW-1 Ghanotu Ram stated that his uncle Matha was hard of hearing and having low vision being 80 years of age. It is further stated by him that the land had been in Matha’s possession for 25-30 years and it was ploughed and cultivated by us. At the end of his cross examination, he specifically states that currently no-one is in possession of the suit land which clearly belies his claim of being in cultivating possession. Cross-examination of Ghanotu Ram further reveals that the defendant’s land adjoins the suit land and there is a dispute of boundary. 17.DW-2 Amar Singh is the Numberdar of mauza concerned, who testified that the defendant was in possession of the suit land as a tenant for the last 30 years. Cross-examination of Ghanotu Ram further reveals that the defendant’s land adjoins the suit land and there is a dispute of boundary. 17.DW-2 Amar Singh is the Numberdar of mauza concerned, who testified that the defendant was in possession of the suit land as a tenant for the last 30 years. However, during cross-examination, this witness admitted that a suit for partition was instituted by the plaintiffs against him and that a partition had, infact, taken place between him and plaintiffs and this land had fallen to the share of the plaintiffs. It is also admitted by him that even in Tehsil he had appeared as a witness in favour of Matha and against the present plaintiffs. Therefore, on the face of such vital admissions, it can be safely presumed that the relations of DW-2 with the plaintiffs were far from being cordial or in other words can be termed to be sour. The learned lower appellate Court has rightly observed that his deposition cannot, therefore, be taken without a pinch of salt. Even this witness admits that there is a boundary dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendant. 18.DW-3 Nain Singh has testified that Matha had been ploughing the suit land for the last 25-30 years in lieu of the crop ‘Batai’ (rent as half to be paid). During cross-examination, he mentioned the area of the suit land as 1/2 or 3/4 bigha which measurement does not tally with the area mentioned in the plaint. What is more interesting is the fact that this witness in the later part of his cross-examination clearly admits that he does not know the khasra number of the present suit land nor the area thereof. 19.The learned lower appellate Court has rightly concluded that the evidence produced by the defendant is hazy, scanty and discrepant and not sufficient to rebut the presumption of truth attached to the revenue records. It may be further stated that learned lower appellate Court has given clear, cogent and convincing reasons for disagreeing with the conclusion drawn by learned trial Court. It may be further stated that learned lower appellate Court has given clear, cogent and convincing reasons for disagreeing with the conclusion drawn by learned trial Court. 20.The learned lower appellate Court has rightly and correctly decreed the suit of the plaintiffs by holding that the plaintiffs has successfully proved their possession over the suit land and were, therefore, entitled for a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction declaring that the defendant had failed to rebut the presumption of truth attached to the jamabandies by leading, cogent and convincing evidence. The learned Additional District Judge had considered the matter independently and in accordance with law without being influenced by the findings of the trial Court to the effect that the defendant though was not held as a tenant but held in possession of the suit land which findings have not been challenged by the defendant. The learned Additional District Judge rightly construed, interpreted and applied the evidence on record while reversing the judgment passed by the Sub Judge. The substantial questions of law, noticed hereinabove, are accordingly answered against the appellants. 21.Consequently, the appeal being devoid of any merit is hereby dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.