JUDGMENT R.G. Ketkar, J. 1. Heard Mr. Mustafa, learned counsel for appellant and Mr. Aanand Bhandari, learned Counsel for Respondents, at length. 2. By this appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, C.P.C.) original Defendant No. 2 has challenged Judgment and Decree dated 23rd January, 1990 passed by learned III Additional District Judge, Aurangabad in Regular Civil Appeal No. 102/1985. By that order, the learned District Judge partly allowed the appeal instituted by original plaintiffs (Respondent Nos. 1 to 9) and held that the plaintiffs No. 1, 2 and 6 are entitled to 1/4th share in half portion of the property sold by defendant No. 1-Bhikarchand and they are also entitled to 1/4th share in 35 gunthas land. Plaintiffs No. 7 and 9 are entitled to equal share in 35 gunthas land. The plaintiffs shall be placed in joint possession with defendant No. 2. The learned District Judge declared that sale-deed dated 8th April, 1969 (Exhibit-65) executed by defendant No. 1-Bhikarchand in favour of defendant No. 2 (appellant herein) is null, void and not operative in respect of shares of the plaintiffs as declared above. The parties shall be hereinafter referred to as per their status in the trial court. The facts and circumstances of the case, giving rise to filing of the present Second Appeal, briefly stated are as under. a) The plaintiffs instituted a suit for partition and separate possession of their 13/14th share in respect of land bearing Gat No. 826, in all admeasuring 24 acres and 36 gunthas, situate at village Andhari, Tq. Sillod, District Aurangabad; and for declaration that sale-deed dated 8th April, 1969 executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2, is null, void, inoperative and ineffective against the plaintiffs. The controversy in this appeal is in respect of 14 Acres 8 Gunthas out of 24 Acres 36 Gunthas of Gat No. 826 (suit land). b) It is the case of the plaintiffs that Survey No. 167/1, which was given Gat No. 826, is an ancestral property of the plaintiffs. c) Defendant no. 1 is father of plaintiff No. 1 and husband of defendant No. 6. Namdeo, since deceased, is brother of defendant No. 1. Plaintiff No. 7 is on and defendant No. 8 is daughter of deceased Namdeo. Plaintiff No. 9-Banabai is widow of deceased Namdeo. c) Defendant no. 1 is father of plaintiff No. 1 and husband of defendant No. 6. Namdeo, since deceased, is brother of defendant No. 1. Plaintiff No. 7 is on and defendant No. 8 is daughter of deceased Namdeo. Plaintiff No. 9-Banabai is widow of deceased Namdeo. Plaintiffs No. 3 to 5 are daughters of defendant No. 1. It is the case of the plaintiffs that deceased Namdeo, defendant No. 1 and plaintiffs were in joint family and the property was also joint till death of Namdeo, which took place on 5th August, 1969. Defendant No. 1 was addicted to bad vices, and without the consent of other coparceners, sold the suit land in favour of defendants No. 2 for a consideration of Rs. 2,000/- on 8th April, 1969. The suit land is Bagayat land and its market value, at the relevant time, was not less than Rs. 45,000/-. On 14th February, 1979, they came to know about the sale transaction. There was no legal necessity for defendant No. 1 to sell the suit land in favour of defendant No. 2. Defendant No. 1 was not competent to alienate the property. The consideration derived from the sale transaction was not utilized for the family benefit. Defendant No. 2 had instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 6/1979 for perpetual injunction against them and defendant No. 1 in respect of the suit land. Defendant No. 2 instituted that suit on the basis of title derived from sale-deed dated 8th April, 1969. The suit was compromised between defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 The said compromise is not binding on them. Though under the sale-deed dated 8th April, 1969, 12 acres and 18 gunthas land was sold to defendant No. 2, he, however, illegally and unauthorizedly, occupied the land admeasuring 14 acres and 8 gunthas. The plaintiffs, therefore, prayed for partition and separate possession of their 13/14th share along with the share in well water and Mango trees and for declaration that the sale-deed dated 8th April, 1969 is null and void, inoperative and ineffective against the plaintiffs. The said suit was instituted on 23rd January, 1980. d) Defendant No. 2 resisted the suit by filing written statement at Exhibit-49. He admitted that the suit land is the ancestral property. It was contended that it was incorrect and false that defendant No. 1, being elder, was Karta and Manager of the joint family. The said suit was instituted on 23rd January, 1980. d) Defendant No. 2 resisted the suit by filing written statement at Exhibit-49. He admitted that the suit land is the ancestral property. It was contended that it was incorrect and false that defendant No. 1, being elder, was Karta and Manager of the joint family. It was further denied that defendant No. 1 and his elder brother Namdeo remained joint in the property till death of Namdeo on 5th August, 1969. The allegation of the plaintiffs that no partition in respect of the suit land had taken place amongst the co-parceners, was totally incorrect and false and it was accordingly denied. It was submitted that Namdeo was separated from defendant No. 1 and both brothers were enjoying the portion of the suit property independently. Accordingly, under the ownership, their names were entered by the competent revenue authorities and mutation entry was also sanctioned in their name, showing 8 Annas share of each brothers in 7x12 extract in respect of the suit land. Defendant No. 1 and Namdeo sold the area admeasuring 12 acres and 18 gunthas for consideration of Rs. 2,000/- on 8th April, 1969 with share in the mango tree from the eastern side to land Survey No. 167. Since then, defendant No. 2 is in continuous possession over the land. Defendant No. 1 and Namdeo had sold 1 acre and 30 gunthas land. Accordingly, they executed a Sauda-Pawati on 26th February, 1971. On that basis, Consolidation Officer entered name of defendant No. 2. Thus, defendant No. 2 became owner and actual possessor of the land to the extent of 14 acres and 8 gunthas. Accordingly, in new Gat number (Gat No. 826). Defendant No. 2's name was entered in 7/12 extract. Defendant No. 2 further contended that the Sauda pawti dated 26th February, 1971, is not traceable at present and the same will be filed later on, or secondary evidence will be given after obtaining permission of the Court, if the said document is not traced. Defendant No. 2 further contended that defendant No. 1 was competent and was entitled to alienate the suit land for legal necessity, i.e. for performing marriages of his daughters; for making payment of Government debts and also dues of private persons. Defendant No. 1 and Namdeo jointly executed the sale-deed of the respective shares in the suit land. Defendant No. 2 further contended that defendant No. 1 was competent and was entitled to alienate the suit land for legal necessity, i.e. for performing marriages of his daughters; for making payment of Government debts and also dues of private persons. Defendant No. 1 and Namdeo jointly executed the sale-deed of the respective shares in the suit land. Defendant No. 2 also asserted that compromise was arrived at in Regular Civil Suit No. 6/1979 on 17.2.1979. The plaintiffs ought to have challenged the compromise. Since the plaintiffs have not challenged the compromise during prescribed period of limitation, they are estopped by their conduct. Reference was also made about the agreement that took place in Regular Civil Suit No. 6/1979 where under, it was agreed that defendant No. 2 will execute a registered sale-deed in respect of 1 acre and 7 gunthas land in favour of defendant No. 2 in that suit, after accepting Rs. 15,000/-. However, defendant No. 1 told defendant No. 2 (plaintiff in that suit) that the amount should not be written in the compromise as he wanted to show less amount in the registered sale-deed, likely to be executed by defendant No. 1 in their favour, i.e. defendants in Regular Civil Suit No. 6/1979 to save stamp duty. e) In the additional written statement, defendant No. 2 asserted that plaintiff and defendant No. 1 are bound by the earlier settlement/compromise, which operates as res judicata and rule of estoppel also applies. In pursuance of the sale-deed, defendant No. 2 has made improvement in the land. The present suit is instituted by the plaintiffs in collusion with defendant no. 1. f) On the basis of pleadings of the parties, learned Trial Judge framed necessary issues. Parties led their evidence. After considering the evidence on record, learned Trial Judge held that the plaintiffs have proved that the suit land was ancestral property of the plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 and deceased Namdeo till 5th August, 1969 and at the time when the sale-deed was executed in favour of defendant No. 2 on 8th April, 1969. The plaintiffs failed to establish that defendant No. 1 had no right to alienate the entire suit land; that the plaintiffs failed to establish that they are entitled to 13/14th share in the suit land. The plaintiffs failed to establish that defendant No. 1 had no right to alienate the entire suit land; that the plaintiffs failed to establish that they are entitled to 13/14th share in the suit land. That, defendant No. 1 and Namdeo sold the suit land for legal necessity and for the benefit of their family. That, defendant No. 2 failed to prove that the Court has no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. The issue as to whether the principles of res judicata as also principles of estoppel apply to this suit was answered by holding that these issues do not survive. Consistent with these findings, the learned Trial Judge dismissed the suit. 3. Aggrieved by that decision, the plaintiffs preferred Regular Civil Appeal before the District Court. By the impugned order the learned District Judge allowed the appeal. It is against this decision, original defendant No. 2 has preferred this second appeal. The Second Appeal was admitted on 2nd March, 1990, as Grounds No. VI to IX, XI, XV and XVI raise substantial questions of law, which read as under,- "(VI) That the Hon'ble learned Lower Appellate Court mis-appreciated the evidence in respect of existence of legal necessity to sell the half area of survey No. 167 to the Respondent No. 2 under a registered sale-deed with consideration. (VII) That the Hon'ble learned IIIrd Additional District Judge, Aurangabad committed an illegality in decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs to the extent of half area of the land in dispute of the share of respondent No. 1 that is sold by him by registered sale deed to the respondent No. 2 ignoring the principles of Hindu law in respect of purchase made by stranger after the due enquiries and with valuable consideration and who is a bonafide purchaser. The learned IIIrd Additional District Judge, Aurangabad is not justified in partly reversing the Judgment, order and Decree of the Trial Court in their respect. (VIII) That when it is admittedly in evidence that there were outstanding loans against the loan sold and when it is held that at least the outstanding loans of the Government dues are proved concurrently by both the Courts below, then the Hon'ble learned IIIrd Additional District Judge, Aurangabad is not justified in reversing the conclusion of the Trial Judge on the point of existence of legal necessity to sell immovable property. (IX) That the Hon'ble learned IIIrd Additional District Judge, Aurangabad should have appreciated that the actual application of the monies and for meeting the legal necessities, is not required to be proved by a stranger/bonafide purchaser, but such a stranger/bonafide purchaser is required to prove only the existence of legal necessity for a Karta of the joint Hindu Family coparcenary to sell the joint Hindu property and that such stranger/purchaser made enquiries about the existence of such legal necessity. This principle has been overlooked by the Hon'ble learned III Additional District Judge, Aurangabad that has resulted into wrong, illegal and erroneous Judgment, Order and Decree in the IInd Appeal. (XI) That, at any rate the Hon'ble learned IIIrd Additional District Judge, Aurangabad ought to have realized that the respondent no. 1 was and is under pious obligation to pay back the loan amount against the lone in dispute that was incurred by his late father by obtaining the same from the Government. Therefore, even if there was or is any legal necessity but as there was pious obligation to pay back the debt outstanding against the deceased father and against the security of the land in dispute and as the land in dispute is sold, in such circumstances and others, so therefore the sale is justifiable even on the theory of pious obligation of a Hindu son to repay the antecedent debt. Therefore, the appeal could not have been allowed by the learned Hon'ble Appellate Lower Court. (XV) That the Hon'ble learned Lower Appellate court should have realized that the other sons of the respondent No. 1 were not in existence and were not even in the womb of their mother when the land in dispute was sold by registered sale-deed to the present Appellant by the Respondent No. 1 and deceased Name. As such, the Hon'ble learned IIIrd Additional District Judge, Aurangabad could not have fixed the shares of the other coparceners taking into consideration those persons also. As such, the Hon'ble learned IIIrd Additional District Judge, Aurangabad could not have fixed the shares of the other coparceners taking into consideration those persons also. (XVI) That the Hon'ble learned Lower appellate Court should have realized that the earlier Regular Civil Suit filed by the present Appellant on the strength of this titled of ownership in respect of land in dispute based on registered sale-deed and for issuing of perpetual injunction so that the defendants of earlier suit bearing R.C.S. No. 6/79 of the court of civil Judge, Junior Division, Taluka Sillod should not interfere in his possession over that land and against the present respondent no. 9, respondent no. 6, respondent no. 1 and respondent no. 8 operate as Judgment by admission on account of compromise in between those parties as the title of the present Appellant and his entitlement to possession were admitted by the Decree of earlier Suit No. 6/79. Hence these present respondents be estopped from challenging the title of the Appellant by way of representing the suit bearing R.C.S. No. 3/80 out of which the present Second Appeal arises. The jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Lower Trial Court was ousted because of the reason of existence of Judgment on compromise in between the parties of R.C.S. No. 6/79. Hence, the present suit was not maintainable in respect of those parties and in respect of the land in dispute." 4. The plaintiffs have filed Cross-Objection St. No. 7009/1990, as plaintiffs No. 7 to 9 were not given any share in the share of Namdeo. 5. In support of this appeal, Mr. Mustafa submitted that the learned Trial Judge dismissed the suit by holding that defendant No. 2 proved that there was legal necessity, compelling defendant No. 1 to sell the suit land in his favour. He invited my attention to (i) the recitals in the sale-deed dated 8th April, 1969 (Exhibit-65) (ii) evidence of DW No. 2-Nandu Pawar at exhibit 81(iii) written statement filed by defendant No. 2 at Exhibit-49 and in particular paragraph 4 thereof. DW 2 Nandu Pawar at the relevant time, was working as a Clerk in Tehsil office (Tagai section) (iv) evidence of PW No. 1-Banabai Namdeo at Exhibit-60, and in particular paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Cross-examination. In paragraph 4, PW No. 1 admitted that she came to know that the sale-deed was executed after one month of its execution. DW 2 Nandu Pawar at the relevant time, was working as a Clerk in Tehsil office (Tagai section) (iv) evidence of PW No. 1-Banabai Namdeo at Exhibit-60, and in particular paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Cross-examination. In paragraph 4, PW No. 1 admitted that she came to know that the sale-deed was executed after one month of its execution. In other words, PW No. 1 admitted that she acquired knowledge about execution of the sale-deed sometime in May 1969. In paragraph 5, she admitted that plaintiff No. 9 was married. Marriage of plaintiff No. 9 was solemnized before 4-5 months. Marriage of plaintiff No. 1 was solemnized before 3-4 years. Marriage of plaintiff No. 6-Kesharbai was solemnized before ten years. Thus, defendant No. 2 had discharged the burden of proving legal necessity that compelled defendant No. 1 to sell the suit land by executing the sale-deed. 6. Mr. Mustafa submitted that having regard to the evidence of P.W. 1 Banabai that she came to know about the execution of sale deed after one month (in May, 1969), the Suit instituted by the plaintiffs in the year 1980 is clearly barred by limitation. He invited my attention to paragraph 3 of the Written Statement, wherein the defendants specifically raised plea of limitation. He invited my attention to the evidence of P.W. 2 Guneshwar S/o Bhikarchand and in particular paragraph 4 thereof. In paragraph 4, P.W. 2 deposed that area of G. No. 826 is actually 12 Acres 18 gunthas. Due to the mistake in consolidation proceedings, defendant No. 1 has encroached upon the area to the extent of 1 Acre 30 gunthas land out of G. No. 825. Defendant No. 2 has instituted R.C.S. No. 6/1979 in respect of the suit land against his father Bhikarchand, mother Yamunabai and others. The Suit ended in compromise. He submitted that plaintiff ought to have challenged the compromise arrived at in R.C.S. No. 6/1979. He further submitted that G. No. 825 and 826 were formed out of S. No. 167 admeasuring 14 Acres 8 gunthas. Namdeo was allotted 12 Acres 18 gunthas and Bhikarchand was allotted 12 Acres 18 gunthas. There was partition between Namdeo and Bhikarchand. The present Suit is in respect of land admeasuring 12 Acres 18 gunthas. As against this, in the year 1969, claim was only in respect of 1 Acre 7 gunthas. Namdeo was allotted 12 Acres 18 gunthas and Bhikarchand was allotted 12 Acres 18 gunthas. There was partition between Namdeo and Bhikarchand. The present Suit is in respect of land admeasuring 12 Acres 18 gunthas. As against this, in the year 1969, claim was only in respect of 1 Acre 7 gunthas. He, therefore, submitted that plaintiff ought to have instituted Suit for partition and separate possession. Mr. Mustafa also relied upon Sections 101 to 104 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and contended that the plaintiffs have not adduced any evidence and discharged the burden while challenging the sale deed dated 08/04/1969. He submitted that the Courts below failed to consider this vital aspect. He invited my attention to the order dated 02/03/1990 admitting the Appeal. He submitted that though the ground of limitation is not specifically framed, in view of proviso to Section 100(5) of C.P.C., this Court has ample power to frame the ground of limitation as it raise substantial questions of law and this point goes to the root of the matter. 7. In support of his submissions, Mr. Mustafa relied upon the following decisions: (I) Srikrishn Das Vs. Nathu Ram, 1927 (29) BOMLR 825 (II) Sunder Das and Ors. Vs. Gajananrao and Ors., (1997) 9 SCC 701 (III) Sakharam Mahadji Rajegore and Ors. Vs. Datta Vithalrao Rajegore and Ors., 2010 (6) Mh. L.J. 225. 8. In the case of Srikrishn Das (supra), this Court held that, where a purchaser acting in good faith, upon due inquiry, is able to show that the sale itself was justified by legal necessity he is under no obligation to inquire into the application of any surplus and is not bound to make repayment of such surplus to the members of the family challenging the sale. 9. In the case of Sunder Das (supra), it was held that father as karta of joint Hindu family is legally entitled to alienate the property of the joint family and interest of minor member of the family for his own requirement unless it is shown that the transaction was tainted by any immoral or illegal purpose. Recital contained in sale deed that sale of the ancestral house was for family necessity and no evidence led to rebut the clear recital. Recital contained in sale deed that sale of the ancestral house was for family necessity and no evidence led to rebut the clear recital. It was held that seller who was presumed to be well acclimatised with court proceedings (as he was an Upper Division Clerk in Civil Court at the relevant time) standing by the transaction and the recitals in the sale deed, it was held that the transaction was not tainted by any immoral conduct. 10. In the case of Sakharam (supra), it was held that karta of the family, including father, can sell the property for legal necessity or for benefit of the family estate. It is well settled that legal necessity does not mean actual compulsion; it means pressure upon the estate which in law may be regarded as serious and sufficient. 11. On the other hand, Mr. Bhandari supported the impugned orders. He submitted that what was sold to defendant No. 2 was 12 Acres 18 gunthas. However, factually he is found in possession of 14 Acres 7 R. Namdeo had died in the year 1969 and defendant No. 2 has come out with the case of Sauda Pawti dated 26/02/1971. The said Sauda Pawti is not produced on record. He also invited my attention to the sale deed dated 08/04/1969, wherein recital is to the effect that the suit land is sold for meeting private expenses. He submitted that defendant No. 2-purchaser has not established the legal necessity. In support of this submission, he invited my attention to the evidence of D.W. 2 Nandu, as also the decision of Apex Court in the case of Smt. Rani and Anr. V/s. Smt. Santa Bala Debnath and Ors., AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1028 to contend that legal necessity does not mean actual compulsion. It means pressure upon the estate which in law may be regarded as serious and sufficient. The onus of proving legal necessity may be discharged by actual necessity or by proving that he made proper and bonafide enquiries about the existence of necessity and that he did all that was reasonable to satisfy himself as to existence of necessity. He submitted that perusal of evidence of defendants shows that they have not discharged the burden to establish existence of legal necessity. 12. He submitted that perusal of evidence of defendants shows that they have not discharged the burden to establish existence of legal necessity. 12. As far as ground of limitation is concerned, in the first place, he submitted that it is a mixed question of law and facts. Defendant No. 2 did not specifically contend as to on what ground Suit is barred by limitation. Having regard to the prayers made in the Suit, the period of limitation is 12 years as contemplated in Article 109 of the Limitation Act. In support of this submission, he relied upon the decision of Apex Court in the case of Baljinder Singh V/s. Rattan Singh, (2008) 16 SCC 785. He submitted that the sale deed is executed on 08/04/1969. In pursuance thereof, defendant No. 2 was put in possession in 1969 and the present Suit is instituted in 1980, which is well within 12 years and, therefore, the Suit is not barred by limitation. He submitted that after appreciating the evidence on record, the learned District Judge held that defendant No. 2 did not establish legal necessity. He, therefore, submitted that no case is made out for invoking powers u/s. 100 of C.P.C. 13. Mr. Bhandari further submitted that respondents No. 1-A to 1-E, 2 to 4 and 6 have filed cross objections. He submitted that the learned District judge ought to have held that appellants No. 1, 2 and 6 therein are entitled to 1/4th share each in half portion of the property sold and that they are further entitled to 1/4th share each in 35 gunthas land. Appellants No. 7 and 9 therein are entitled to 1/4th share each in 35 gunthas land. He further submitted that in execution proceedings, appellants have raised these objections. They were over-ruled by the executing Court. Against that decision, they have preferred Civil Revision Application in this Court and the same is pending. He, therefore, submitted that it may be clarified that decision in this Second Appeal will not come in the way of these respondents while agitating this issue in Civil Revision Application. 14. I have considered rival submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties. I have perused the material on record and the original record. 15. As noted earlier, the Appeal is admitted as grounds No. (vi) to (ix), (xi), (xv) and (xvi) raise substantial questions of law. 14. I have considered rival submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties. I have perused the material on record and the original record. 15. As noted earlier, the Appeal is admitted as grounds No. (vi) to (ix), (xi), (xv) and (xvi) raise substantial questions of law. Grounds No. (vi) to (ix) and (xi) pertain to legal necessity. It is, therefore, necessary to find out whether defendant No. 2-purchaser has discharged the burden and has established that sale deed in his favour was effected due to legal necessity. Defendant No. 2 has relied upon the evidence of D.W. 2 Nandu, as also the evidence of P.W. 1 Banabai. D.W. 2 Nandu Pawar deposed that Ramchandra Maroti of Andhari obtained Tagai from Tahsil Sillod for well amounting to Rs. 2,000/-(Rupees Two Thousand only) in the year 1954-55. As on 19/03/1969, the outstanding recovery of Tagai from Ramchandra Maroti was Rs.1,429.10 (Rupees One Thousand Four Hundred Twenty Nine and paise Ten only) (principal amount-Rs. 570/- and interest Rs. 859.10). Ramchandra Maroti has deposited interest on 31/03/1969 and outstanding amount on 31/03/1969 was Rs. 1,029.10 (Rupees One Thousand Twenty Nine and paise Ten only). 16. As far as evidence of P.W. 1 Banabai is concerned, she deposed that marriage of plaintiff No. 9 Mira was solemnized before 4-5 months. The marriage of plaintiff No. 1 Dnyanesh was solemnized before 3-4 years. The marriage of plaintiff No. 6 Kesharbai was solemnized before 10 years. Her deposition was recorded on 09/10/1984. 17. The learned District Judge has considered this aspect in paragraphs 15 and 16. After considering the evidence on record, the learned District Judge observed that, no doubt, there was outstanding amount of loan of Tagai. However, there was no pressing demand for recovery of said loan. There was neither any attachment nor any notice for sale of the suit land. At the most, it can be said that there was dues and the said dues are from 1954-55. The liability was not pressing liability. In the case of Smt. Rani and another (supra), the Apex Court has held that legal necessity does not mean actual compulsion. It means pressure upon the estate which in law may be regarded as serious and sufficient. The liability was not pressing liability. In the case of Smt. Rani and another (supra), the Apex Court has held that legal necessity does not mean actual compulsion. It means pressure upon the estate which in law may be regarded as serious and sufficient. The onus of legal necessity may be discharged by the alienee by proof of actual necessity or by proof that he made proper and bonafide enquiries about the existence of the necessity and that he did all that was reasonable to satisfy himself as to the existence of the necessity. Perusal of the recitals in the sale deed shows that the property was sold for meeting private expenses. It, however, does not refer to either Govt. debt or debt obtained privately. No material is produced on record by the defendant No. 2 as regards the legal necessity at the time of the execution of the sale deed dated 08/04/1969. No material is also produced by defendant No. 2 to show that he had made proper and bonafide enquiries and he did all that was reasonable to satisfy himself as to the existence of the necessity. If the tests laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Smt. Rani and another (supra) are applied to the present case, I do not find that the learned District Judge committed any error in holding that the defendant No. 2 did not establish expenses of legal necessity. 18. Mr. Mustafa submitted that the Suit is clearly barred by limitation. P.W. 1 Banabai admitted that she acquired knowledge about the sale deed within one month from its execution. The sale deed was executed on 08/04/1969 and she acquired knowledge about it in May, 1969. The Suit is filed in the year 1980, which is clearly barred by limitation. I do not find any merit in this submission. Article 109 of the Limitation Act reads as under,: Article No. Description of suit Period of limitation Time from period begins to run 109 By a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law to set aside his father’s alienation of ancestral property. Twelve Year When the alienee takes possession of the property 19. It is not in dispute that the suit land is the ancestral property and the plaintiffs are Hindu governed by Mitakshara Law. Twelve Year When the alienee takes possession of the property 19. It is not in dispute that the suit land is the ancestral property and the plaintiffs are Hindu governed by Mitakshara Law. It is also not disputed that alienation is made by defendant No. 1 Bhikarchand who is father of plaintiffs No. 1 to 5. Article 109 of the Limitation Act lays down period of 12 years and the time from which period begins to run is when the alienee takes the possession of the property. In the instant case, in pursuance to the sale deed dated 08/04/1969, defendant No. 2 took possession on 08/04/1969. The Suit is instituted in the year 1980, which is well within 12 years and, therefore, can not be said to be barred by limitation. I, therefore, do not find that the learned District Judge committed any error in decreeing the Suit. 20. Mr. Mustafa submitted that, in any case, plaintiffs should have filed Suit challenging the compromise entered into between the parties in R.C.S. No. 6/1979. The compromise was entered into on 17/02/1979. The submission is stated to be rejected. Basically the plaintiffs have instituted the Suit for declaration that the sale deed dated 08/04/1969 be declared as null and void, inoperative and ineffective against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have also sought partition and separate possession of their 13/14th share in the suit land. I, therefore, do not find any merit in the submissions of Mr. Mustafa. 21. Mr. Mustafa also relied upon Sections 101 to 104 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and contended that the plaintiffs have not adduced any evidence and discharged the burden while challenging the sale deed dated 08/04/1969. He submitted that the Courts below failed to consider this vital aspect. I do not find any merit in this submission. As noted earlier, burden was on defendant No. 2 to establish legal necessity. For the reasons already recorded, I have held that defendant No. 2 did not establish legal necessary. 22. As far as submission of Mr. Bhandari as regards shares is concerned, it is evident that respondents have raised objection before the executing Court. Executing Court has over-ruled objections so raised. The respondents have instituted Civil Revision Application and the same is pending in this Court. 22. As far as submission of Mr. Bhandari as regards shares is concerned, it is evident that respondents have raised objection before the executing Court. Executing Court has over-ruled objections so raised. The respondents have instituted Civil Revision Application and the same is pending in this Court. In view thereof, notwithstanding the disposal of the Second Appeal, all the contentions raised by the respondents in that Civil Revision Application are expressly kept open. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. Appeal fails and the same is dismissed. The Cross Objections are partly allowed.