Madan Lal v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Jaunpur
2014-08-06
ANJANI KUMAR MISHRA
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Anjani Kumar Mishra, J.—Heard Sri RC Pal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri SR Tiwari, who appears for the contesting respondents. 2. The petitioner has filed this writ petition seeking writ of certiorari for quashing the judgement and order dated 8.4.1986 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Jaunpur (the DDC) in Revision Nos. 54/556 & 55/557 dated 8.4.1986. 3. The facts of the case briefly states are as follows: The writ petition arises out of an objection under Section 9 A(2) of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act filed by the contesting respondent. The dispute between the parties pertains to land of Khata No. 64 and 68 which were recorded in the name of the Kunj Behari and Ram Khelawan in the basic year. Prior to start of consolidation operations, Kunj Behari and Ram Khelawan, who were recorded tenure holders, executed a sale-deed of their share in the disputed khatas on 16.1.1965 in favour of Samarjeet and Laljeet. Another sale-deed was executed by Bhagwat of his 1/8 share in favour of Samarjeet and Laljeet on 18.6.1967. The village was brought under consolidation operations by a notification under Section 4 of the Act on 20.3.1972. 4. The case of the contesting respondent is that they filed objections under Section 9A(2) of the Act on the start of consolidation operations claiming on the basis of the aforesaid two sale-deeds executed in their favour. It is further their case that their names were ordered to be recorded on the basis of sale-deed dated 18.6.1967 which was executed in their favour by Bhagwat. As regards other objection filed claiming on the basis of sale-deed dated 16.1.1965 said to have been executed by Kunj Behari and Ram Khelawan in their favour, it is stated that the objection was misplaced and therefore they were constrained to file a fresh objection on 22.6.1972. 5. The Consolidation Officer (the CO) by his order dated 12.8.1972 dismissed the second objection as barred by time which order was affirmed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation (the SOC) vide his order dated 28.1.1974.
5. The Consolidation Officer (the CO) by his order dated 12.8.1972 dismissed the second objection as barred by time which order was affirmed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation (the SOC) vide his order dated 28.1.1974. The consequential revision filed by the contesting respondents against the order dated 19.1.1973 and 28.1.1974 were allowed by the DDC vide his order dated 8.4.1986 and the contesting respondents were ordered to be recorded over the land in dispute in place of Kunj Behari and Ram Khelawan in pursuance of the sale-deed dated 16.1.1965 executed by them. 6. The case of the petitioner namely Madan Lal is that Ram Khelawan and Kunj Behari executed a sale-deed of their entire share in his favour in 1979 after having obtained permission from the SOC for executing the sale-deed. It is further his case that this sale-deed was executed after the objections have been dismissed by the SOC on 19.1.1973, chaks have been carved out and possession thereupon had been delivered to the various tenure holders. It is, therefore, submitted that the petitioner was a necessary party in the revision which was filed without impleading him and was heard without any notice or information to him and therefore the order is ex parte and is liable to set aside on this ground alone. It has further been submitted by Sri RC Pal on behalf of the petitioner that the shares of the parties had already been determined in the year 1973 by order dated 19.1.1973 and thereafter, he purchased the share of Ram Khelawan and Kunj Behari and was therefore a necessary party to the proceedings and his right was affected by the DDC without affording opportunity of hearing to him. 7. Sri Tiwari, Counsel for the respondent in rebuttal has submitted that Ram Khelawan and Kunj Behari had already executed a registered sale-deed in favour of the respondent on 16.1.1965 and under these circumstances; they could not have executed another sale-deed of the same property in favour of the petitioner, as on the date of the said sale-deed of 1979 in favour of the petitioner, they possessed no saleable interest in the property in question. He, therefore, submits that the order passed by the DDC is a perfectly correct order which requires no interference and the impugned order is liable to be affirmed. 8.
He, therefore, submits that the order passed by the DDC is a perfectly correct order which requires no interference and the impugned order is liable to be affirmed. 8. I have considered the rival submissions made by the counsel for the parties and perused the record. 9. In so far as the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that the order impugned is ex parte against him and therefore illegal, is concerned, it would be relevant to refer to the objection of the contesting respondents claiming on the basis of the registered sale-deed dated 16.1.1965 executed by Kunj Behari and Ram Khelawan. The CO rejected this objection as barred by time on 10.8.1973. This order was affirmed by the SOC on 23.1.1974 against which one of the revisions wherein the order impugned has been passed was filed. 10. It is admitted case of the petitioner that the sale-deed in his favour was executed in 1979. It is, therefore, quite evident that thus sale-deed was executed during pendency of the revision before the DDC filed against the order dated 23.1.1974 and such sale was a transfer pendente lite. It is no one’s case that the vendor of the petitioner namely Kunj Behari and Ram Khilawan were not parties before the revisional Court and an order passed against them would not bind a transferee pendente lite. 11. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the order passed by the DDC is ex parte order or that the petitioner was a necessary party in the revision filed by the contesting respondents. For the same reason, even if the sale-deed in favour of the petitioner was executed after obtaining permission of the SOC, the same shall not confer any right or title upon the petitioner. In any case the vendors of the petitioner having executed sale-deed in favour of the respondents, prior in time and which have been accepted, the petitioners’ vendor had resalabe interest left to transfer to the petitioner in 1979. 12. In view of above, there is no merit in the contentions raised by the counsel for the petitioner. 13. The writ petition is devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs. —————