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2014 DIGILAW 237 (TRI)

Gita Saha v. Rekha Rani Saha

2014-06-23

DEEPAK GUPTA

body2014
JUDGMENT Deepak Gupta; CJ. 1. This appeal by the claimants is directed against the award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals dated 06.07.2006 passed in Title Suit(MAC) No. 469 of 2001 whereby the claim petition was dismissed. 2. The claimants filed the claim petition under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, the Act) claiming that the deceased Suresh Chandra Saha, husband of claimant Smt. Gita Saha and father of claimants 2 and 3, Sri Rakhal Saha and Smt. Laxmi Saha was a business man aged about 45 years and earning Rs. 5,000/- per month. It was alleged that the deceased Suresh Chandra Saha was travelling in truck No. TR-02-1569 on 11th February, 2000. According to the claimants he was travelling in the truck as owner of the goods. Some extremist gave a signal to the truck to stop but the driver did not stop the vehicle and tried to drive this truck at a high speed and then the extremists started firing on the truck. As a result of the firing Suresh Chandra Saha and other co-passengers were injured by the bullet injuries and Suresh Chandra Saha succumbed to his injuries on the way to Amarpur Hospital. 3. The learned Trial Court mainly dismissed the claim petition on the ground that the accident was not arisen out of the use of the motor vehicle but had occurred due to extremist violence. As far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, this Court in Sri Dilip Ch. Nath and Another Vrs. Managing Director, TRTC: MAC App No. 122 of 2004 decided on 13.08.2013 has held even if an accident occurred due to extremist violence then also it can be said to have arisen out of a motor vehicle accident. However, in this case there is no evidence to show that the driver of the vehicle was negligent in any manner whatsoever. The only witness examined is the widow who was admittedly not present at the spot. Even if the allegations in the claim petition are read that there is no allegation of negligence by the driver whatsoever. In fact, there is no clear proof of negligence. The only allegation is that the vehicle was driving rashly and negligently at a high speed. The vehicle did not crash nor did it have an accident. Even if the allegations in the claim petition are read that there is no allegation of negligence by the driver whatsoever. In fact, there is no clear proof of negligence. The only allegation is that the vehicle was driving rashly and negligently at a high speed. The vehicle did not crash nor did it have an accident. What happened was that the extremists opened fire and then the driver tried to flee away. This would not amount to negligence under any circumstances whatsoever. 4. Sri S.K. Dutta, learned counsel for the appellant contends that this is a case filed under Section 163A under no fault liability and, therefore, negligence is not required to be proved. Attention of Sri Dutta was drawn to the judgment of the Apex Court in Deepal Girishbhai Soni and others Vrs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Baroda: (2004) 5 SCC 385 wherein the question which arose for consideration was whether a petition under Section 163A of the Act would be maintainable where the income of the deceased or the injured was more than Rs. 40,000/- per annum. The Apex Court after quoting all the relevant provisions of the Act held as follows: 41. Section 140 of the Act dealt with interim compensation but by inserting Section 163-A, the Parliament intended to provide for making of an award consisting of a predetermined sum without insisting on a long-drawn trial or without proof of negligence in causing the accident. The Amendment was, thus, a deviation from the common law liability under the Law of Torts and was also in derogation of the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act. The Act and the Rules framed by the State in no uncertain terms suggest that a new device was sought to be evolved so as to grant a quick and efficacious relief to the victims falling within the specified category. The heirs of the deceased or the victim in terms of the said provisions were assured of a speedy and effective remedy which was not available to the claimants under Section 166 of the Act. 42. Chapter XI was, thus, enacted for grant of immediate relief to a section of people whose annual income is not more than Rs. The heirs of the deceased or the victim in terms of the said provisions were assured of a speedy and effective remedy which was not available to the claimants under Section 166 of the Act. 42. Chapter XI was, thus, enacted for grant of immediate relief to a section of people whose annual income is not more than Rs. 40,000/- having regard to the fact that in terms of Section 163-A of the Act read with the Second Schedule appended thereto, compensation is to be paid on a structured formula not only having regard to the age of the victim and his income but also the other factors relevant therefor. An award made thereunder, therefore, shall be in full and final settlement of the claim as would appear from the different columns contained in the Second Schedule appended to the Act. The same is not interim in nature. The note appended to column 1 which deals with fatal accidents makes the position furthermore clear stating that from the total amount of compensation one-third thereof is to be reduced in consideration of the expenses which the victim would have incurred towards maintaining himself had he been alive. This together with the other heads of compensation as contained in column Nos. 2 to 6 thereof leaves no manner of doubt that the Parliament intended to lay a comprehensive scheme for the purpose of grant of adequate compensation to a section of victims who would require the amount of compensation without fighting any protracted litigation for proving that the accident occurred owing to negligence on the part of the driver of the motor vehicle or any other fault arising out of use of a motor vehicle. A perusal of these two sections clearly shows that the Apex Court held that Section 163A was enacted to grant immediate relief to that section of people whose annual income was not more than Rs. 40,000/-. Furthermore, the Apex Court held as follows: 53. Although the Act is a beneficial one and, thus, deserves liberal construction with a view to implementing the legislative intent but it is trite that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court would not travel beyond the same and extend the scope of the statute on the pretext of extending the statutory benefit to those who are not covered thereby. (See Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation, Trichur v. Ramanuja Match Industries,: (1985) 1 SCC 218 ). In conclusion the Apex Court held as follows: 67. We, therefore, are of the opinion that Kodala (supra) has correctly been decided. However, we do not agree with the findings in Kodala (supra) that if a person invokes provisions of Section 163-A, the annual income of Rs. 40,000/- per annum shall be treated as a cap. In our opinion, the proceeding under Section 163-A being a social security provision, providing for a distinct scheme, only those whose annual income is up to Rs. 40,000/- can take the benefit thereof. All other claims are required to be determined in terms of Chapter XII of the Act. 5. Thus, the Apex Court in no uncertain terms held that Section 163A being a social security provision provides for a distinct scheme only to those whose annual income is up to Rs. 40,000/-. All other claims are required to be determined in terms of Chapter 12 of the Act. Therefore, this petition which was filed under Section 163A cannot be entertained since admittedly the income of the deceased is claimed to be Rs. 5,000/- per month or Rs. 60,000/- per year. 6. Shri Dutta has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Sarla Verma(Smt.) and Others Vrs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another: (2009) 6 SCC 121 wherein the Apex Court made the following observation: 34. The Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 was amended by Act 54 of 1994, inter alia inserting Section 163A and the Second Schedule with effect from 14.11.1994. Section 163A of the MV Act contains a special provision as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis, as indicated in the Second Schedule to the Act. The Second Schedule contains a Table prescribing the compensation to be awarded with reference to the age and income of the deceased. It specifies the amount of compensation to be awarded with reference to the annual income range of Rs. 3,000/- to Rs. 40,000/-. It does not specify the quantum of compensation in case the annual income of the deceased is more than Rs. 40,000/-. But it provides the multiplier to be applied with reference to the age of the deceased. The table starts with a multiplier of 15, goes upto 18, and then steadily comes down to 5. 3,000/- to Rs. 40,000/-. It does not specify the quantum of compensation in case the annual income of the deceased is more than Rs. 40,000/-. But it provides the multiplier to be applied with reference to the age of the deceased. The table starts with a multiplier of 15, goes upto 18, and then steadily comes down to 5. It also provides the standard deduction as one-third on account of personal living expenses of the deceased. Therefore, where the application is under section 163A of the Act, it is possible to calculate the compensation on the structured formula basis, even where compensation is not specified with reference to the annual income of the deceased, or is more than Rs. 40,000/-, by applying the formula: (2/3 x AI x M), that is two-thirds of the annual income multiplied by the multiplier applicable to the age of the deceased would be the compensation. Several principles of tortious liability are excluded when the claim is under section 163A of MV Act. 7. It would be pertinent to mention that relying upon the last portion of the afore-quoted portion, Sri Dutta submits that the Apex Court has now held that even where the income is more than Rs. 40,000/- a claim under Section 163A is maintainable. I am unable to accept this contention. The Apex Court in Sarla Verma's case was not dealing with a petition filed under Section 163A and reference to Section 163A was made only with a view to emphasize the fact that deduction of 1/3rd for the personal expenses of the deceased have got statutory recognition. Furthermore, Sarla Verma's judgment has been delivered by a Bench of two Judges whereas the judgment in the Deepal Girishbhai Soni(supra) is by a Bench of three Judges. In Deepal Girishbhai Soni's case the matter had been referred to the Larger Bench specially with regard to the provisions of Section 163A of the Act whereas in Sarla Verma's case this was not the case. 8. In my view, this Court has bound to follow the judgment of the Larger Bench delivered in the Deepal Girishbhai Soni's case wherein it has been held in no uncertain terms that, that section of society whose annual income more than Rs. 40,000/- is not entitled to file a petition under Section 163A of the Act. 8. In my view, this Court has bound to follow the judgment of the Larger Bench delivered in the Deepal Girishbhai Soni's case wherein it has been held in no uncertain terms that, that section of society whose annual income more than Rs. 40,000/- is not entitled to file a petition under Section 163A of the Act. Taking a lenient view of the matter, the Court was willing to treat this application under Section 166 of the Act also but in a petition filed under Section 166 of the Act negligence has to be proved and in this case there is no proof of negligence. 9. Therefore, I find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. Send down the LCRs forthwith.