Judgment A.B. Chaudhari, J. 1. Rule. Rule returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of the parties. Following is the question of law, which is required to be answered in the present matter: "Whether in the wake of outer limit of period of three months, giving right to the appellant for filing appeal under section 85(3-A) of the Service Tax-Chapter V of Finance Act, 1994, the Appellate Court would be empowered to entertain an appeal or condone the delay beyond the outer limit of three months or 90 days, provided by the said Act? Answer: No." Section 85(3-A) of the Act reads thus: "85. Appeals to the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals): (1) to (3)..... (3A) An appeal shall be presented within two months from the date of receipt of the decision or order of such adjudicating authority, made on and after the Finance Bill, 2012 receives the assent of the President, relating to service tax, interest or penalty under this Chapter: PROVIDED that the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of two months, allow it to be presented within a further period of one month." 2. Perusal of the above provision, in particular sub-section (3-A) and its proviso, clearly shows that the period of two months is provided for filing of appeal before the Appellate Authority. However, the Appellate Authority, if satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the said period of two months, has power to allow filing of appeal within a further period of one month. Thus, total period that is allowed by this provision is or outer limit for preferring appeal is three months i.e. two months as a matter of right and next one months for sufficient cause. It is clearly seen that beyond the said outer limit of three months, there is no enabling provision for the Appellate Authority to either entertain the appeal or condone the delay. In our opinion, that is the plain reading of the provision. 3. We are fortified, in our view by Three Judges Bench judgment of the Apex Court in (Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Pvt. Ltd. & anr.); (2009)5 S.C.C. 791 , in particular para 19 thereof, which reads thus: "19. In our opinion, that is the plain reading of the provision. 3. We are fortified, in our view by Three Judges Bench judgment of the Apex Court in (Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Pvt. Ltd. & anr.); (2009)5 S.C.C. 791 , in particular para 19 thereof, which reads thus: "19. The said decision in Popular Construction Co. case arose under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The question which arose for consideration in that case was whether provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to an application challenging an award under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In that case, award was filed by the appellant-Union of India in the Bombay High Court on 29.3.1999. The appellant filed an application challenging the award on 19.4.1999 under section 30 read with section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Subsequently, the application was amended by inserting the words "Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996" in place of "Arbitration Act, 1940". The application was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 26.10.1999 on the ground that it was barred by limitation under section 34 of the 1996 Act. The Division Bench rejected the appeal and upheld the findings of the learned Single Judge. The said order was challenged in this Court." 4. As a sequel, we hold that the Appellate Authority under section 85(3-A) of the Act does not have authority to condone the delay beyond 90 days, that being the outer limit as per the said provision. In the result, we pass the following order. ORDER Writ Petition No. 2906/2014 is rejected. Rule discharged. No order as to costs.