Judgment : R. Subhash Reddy, J. 1. In this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 14.06.2002, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench at Hyderabad, in O.A.No.80 of 2002, and also the order of punishment imposed in the disciplinary proceedings against him, dated 11.12.2001, passed by the 1st respondent in File No. C-14012/3/2001-Adv.4023-27. 2. Petitioner herein, while working as Superintendent of Central Excise, was posted as Superintendent, Ramantapur Range-II in November 1994. He worked as such for the period from 14.11.1994 to 08.12.1994. In his jurisdiction, there is a Company by name M/s.Sri Chandra Tobacco Ltd. (SCTL), Hyderabad, which was involved in the business of manufacturing cigarettes. The petitioner was transferred from Ramantapur Range-II to Moulali Range after serving for only 24 days in Ramantapur Range-II. 3. When the respondents have introduced voluntary retirement scheme and when option of petitioner for such retirement was not accepted, he approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad, by filing O.A.No.1905 of 1999 and the Tribunal, vide judgment dated 03.03.2000, declared that the action of respondents therein in not accepting the voluntary retirement of petitioner as illegal and held that the petitioner herein shall be deemed to have retired from service on 31.07.1999. The department has accepted the same and the judgment of Tribunal has become final and was implemented. 4. When the petitioner was in service, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him in exercise of powers under Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, and in the disciplinary proceedings, a charge memo dated 31.12.1997 was issued in C.No.II/10-A/5/97-CIU, wherein, the following articles of charges were framed against him: "That the said N. Ram Reddy, Superintendent, during the period from 14-11-94 to 08-12-94, while functioning as the Superintendent of Central Excise, Ramanthapur II Range of Hyderabad II Division, for monetary consideration, did not exercise proper control over the only factory in the physical control Range, which resulted in loss of revenue on the quantity of unaccounted cigarettes produced and cleared without payment of central excise duty by M/s.Sri Chandra Tobacco Ltd., Hyderabad (SCTL) during the period he was in charge of the Physical control range; that he failed to exercise proper supervisory control over the officers under his charge who were in physical control of the factory of M/s.SCTL, Hyderabad, while unaccounted cigarettes were produced and cleared from the factory; thus N.Ram Reddy, Supdt. Central Excise failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Government servant and thereby he contravened the provisions of Rule 3(1)(i), 3(1)(ii) and 3(1) (iii) of the CCS Conduct Rules 1964, and rendered himself liable for action under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules 1965; Shri N.Ram Reddy also failed to take all possible steps to ensure the integrity and devotion to duty of Government servants working under his control and authority and thereby he contravened the provisions of Rule 3(1)(i) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules 1964 and rendered himself liable for action under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules 1965." 5. Petitioner has replied to the said charge memo, vide his explanation dated 28.01.1998. The said explanation was not accepted and inquiry was conducted by appointing the inquiry officer, who has submitted his report holding that the charges framed against the petitioner-officer were not proved. In the inquiry report dated 30.11.2000 prepared by the Commissioner for Departmental Inquiries, the following findings are recorded: "However, in the absence of the diary mentioning the CO as a recipient of money paid and in view of the denial on the part of the witnesses (SW.1) that he had ever made a payment to the CO it cannot be concluded that the CO received monetary consideration from M/s.SCTL (refer cross-examination of SW.1). As regards the role/responsibility of the CO towards detection of evasion, the statement given by the CO during his general examination is significant. The CO has stated that he held the charge only for 24 days. This aspect of the CO's statement has not been contested by the prosecution. The PO this contest has stated that when other officers were generally posted for 6 months and beyond, why was the CO transferred from that range only in 23 days. The PO has attributed this to the possibility that the administration got to know that the CO had allowed M/s.SCTL to resume their clandestine activity. Thus the PO has concluded that the Administration transferred the CO along with other Inspectors in a very short period. The statement of the PO is only speculative with no evidence to support his theory. Also, the statement almost amounts to developing on the allegations. Therefore, the contention of the PO cannot be treated as valid. Thus the PO has concluded that the Administration transferred the CO along with other Inspectors in a very short period. The statement of the PO is only speculative with no evidence to support his theory. Also, the statement almost amounts to developing on the allegations. Therefore, the contention of the PO cannot be treated as valid. Thus it transpires that the period/tenure of the CO was a very short one, lasting for only 23 days. The PO has argued that connivance for one day, 23 days or long a period is immaterial, so long as there is connivance. There is no doubt that there would have been connivance, without which there could not have been evasion of Central Excise duty over such a long period. However, there is no direct evidence to prove that the CO was involved in the connivance. Further more, the allegations cannot be established even on the basis of preponderance of probability as the period, as stated above, was simply too short. Thus it is held that the allegations have not been established. FINDINGS Charges are held as not established." 6. After receipt of the inquiry report, the 2nd respondent has issued show cause notice dated 09.06.2001 in C.No.II/10-A/5/97-CIU (Hyd.III), to the petitioner, to show cause as to why the inquiry report should not be rejected for the reasons recorded therein and why suitable penalty should not be imposed on him. To the said show cause notice, petitioner has filed a further detailed explanation on 25.06.2001. To the said show cause notice, petitioner has filed a further detailed explanation on 25.06.2001. In the said explanation, petitioner has raised several contentions viz., under CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, there is no provision for issuance of show cause notice by the 2nd respondent as much as he had retired from service; fresh allegations were made which are not subject matter of inquiry and charge memo; the inquiry officer's report with regard to loss of revenue was not based on any evidence; the charge memo itself was vague and self-contradictory; reliance cannot be made on the statements of witnesses which were recorded behind the back of petitioner; inquiry officer's report was not supplied before arriving at decision; loss of revenue was not determined by the adjudicating authority; discrimination was shown against him as some of the officers whose names were figured in the documents, were not charge-sheeted and finally pleaded that personal hearing in the matter was not afforded to him, and accordingly, requested for dropping the proceedings against him. After receipt of explanation with the aforesaid contentions, which was submitted to the 2nd respondent, the 1st respondent has passed final order dated 11.12.2001, imposing the penalty of 10% cut in pension and also for forfeiture of 50% of gratuity admissible to the petitioner. 7. Questioning the validity of such order, raising various grounds, the petitioner has filed an application in O.A.No.80 of 2002 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench at Hyderabad. The Tribunal, by impugned order dated 14.06.2002, dismissed the said O.A., confirming the order passed by the disciplinary authority. Challenging such order passed by the Tribunal and also the order passed by the disciplinary authority, the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 8. Heard Sri G.Mohan Rao from M/s.Mohan Vinod and Associates, appearing for petitioner and Sri P.Vishnuvardhan Reddy, learned Assistant Solicitor General, appearing for respondents, and also perused the material on record viz., the memorandum of charge memo, explanation offered by the petitioner, the inquiry officer's report, the 2nd show cause notice issued by the 2nd respondent and the explanation offered by the petitioner to such show cause notice, the final orders passed by the disciplinary authority, the order of the Tribunal and also the separate counter affidavit filed before this Court. 9. 9. In this writ petition, it is contended by Sri G.Mohan Rao, learned counsel for petitioner that the respondents have passed the final order in disciplinary proceedings in gross violation of mandatory provisions under the Central Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1965 and also the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972. It is submitted that though disciplinary proceedings were initiated mainly on the allegation of lack of proper supervision on M/s.Sri Chandra Tobacco Pvt. Limited for monetary consideration, when the same was denied, a regular inquiry was conducted by appointing an inquiry officer and the inquiry officer who conducted the inquiry, has recorded findings that the charges were not proved. Inspite of the same, the show cause notice dated 09.06.2001 was issued by recording certain findings against the petitioner without giving him any opportunity. It is submitted by the learned counsel that when the disciplinary authority is not accepting the findings recorded by the inquiry officer, it is always open for him to come to a different conclusion by recording tentative reasons for such difference, but it is not open for the disciplinary authority to record findings straightaway against him, particularly going beyond the scope of the charges framed in disciplinary proceedings. It is further submitted by the learned counsel that though the respondents have obtained advice from Union Public Service Commission (UPSC), a copy of such advice is not furnished, which amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice. It is further submitted that as the petitioner is retired from service pursuant to the declaration made by the Tribunal in the O.A. filed by him, there is no authority for issuance of any show cause notice or for passing any orders against him, by the 2nd respondent. It is contended that the authority who is competent to pass final orders only can issue show cause notice but not the 2nd respondent, but in the instant case, show cause notice is issued by the 2nd respondent and the 1st respondent has passed final order, which is contrary to Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972. It is contended that the authority who is competent to pass final orders only can issue show cause notice but not the 2nd respondent, but in the instant case, show cause notice is issued by the 2nd respondent and the 1st respondent has passed final order, which is contrary to Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972. Lastly, it is contended by the learned counsel that inspite of several contentions raised in the explanation offered to the 2nd show cause notice, neither the disciplinary authority nor the 2nd respondent have considered such contentions raised by the petitioner and in a routine and mechanical manner, by adopting the advice of UPSC in verbatim, disciplinary authority has passed orders. It is further submitted that inspite of raising such contentions, the Tribunal did not go into the same in proper perspective and rejected the O.A. 10. On the other hand, it is submitted by Sri P.Vishnuvardhan Reddy, Assistant Solicitor General, appearing for respondents that while the petitioner was working as Superintendent of Central Excise at Ramantapur Range-II, he failed to exercise proper control for collection of excise duty from M/s.Srichandra Tobacco Pvt. Ltd., and due to such lapse, huge excise duty was evaded by the said Company. It is submitted that as the respondent authorities have recorded findings based on the evidence on record and further, as the disciplinary authority's order is approved by the Tribunal, there are no grounds to interfere with the same in this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 11. In this case, it is to be noticed at the outset that the petitioner was incharge of Superintendent of Central Excise at Ramantapur Range-II only from 14.11.1994 to 08.12.1994. From a perusal of the charge memo, it is clear that the allegation made against the petitioner is that he failed to exercise proper supervisory control over M/s.Srichandra Tobacco Pvt.Ltd., which was under his jurisdiction and the same was for monetary considerations, which amounts to misconduct under Rule 3(1)(i), 3(1)(ii) and 3(1)(iii) of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, and thus, he rendered himself liable for punishment under the said Rules. When charges levelled against the petitioner were denied, inquiry was proceeded with by appointing an inquiry officer and the inquiry officer in clear terms, in his report dated 30.11.2000, has recorded a finding that the petitioner was holding the charge only for 24 days and there is no evidence against him in proof of charge framed in the disciplinary proceedings and has categorically held that there is no evidence to show that the petitioner/charged officer has received monetary consideration from M/s.Srichandra Tobacco Pvt. Ltd. By recording so, it is held that the charges are not proved. It is also not in dispute that such inquiry conducted against the petitioner is governed by the provisions under Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. For the purpose of deciding the issues which fall for consideration in this case, it is apatite to refer to Rule 15 of the said Rules, which reads as under: "15. Action on the inquiry report : (1) The Disciplinary Authority, if it is not itself the Inquiring Authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, remit the case to the Inquiring Authority for further inquiry and report and the Inquiring Authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further inquiry according to the provisions of Rule 14, as far as may be. (2) The Disciplinary Authority shall forward or cause to be forwarded a copy of the report of the inquiry, if any, held by the Disciplinary Authority or where the Disciplinary Authority is not the Inquiring Authority, a copy of the report of the Inquiring Authority together with its own tentative reasons for disagreement, if any, with the findings of Inquiring Authority on any article of charge to the Government servant who shall be required to submit, if he so desires, his written representation or submission to the Disciplinary Authority within fifteen days, irrespective of whether the report is favourable or not to the Government servant. (2-A) The Disciplinary Authority shall consider the representation, if any, submitted by the Government servant and record its findings before proceeding further in the matter as specified in sub-rules (3) and (4). (2-A) The Disciplinary Authority shall consider the representation, if any, submitted by the Government servant and record its findings before proceeding further in the matter as specified in sub-rules (3) and (4). (3) If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in Clauses (i) to (iv) of Rule 11 should be imposed on the Government servant, it shall, notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 16, make an order imposing such penalty; Provided that in every case where it is necessary to consult the Commission, the record of the inquiry shall be forwarded by the Disciplinary authority to the Commission for its advice and such advice shall be taken into consideration before making any order imposing any penalty on the Government servant. (4) If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge and on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in Clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 11 should be imposed on the Government servant, it shall make an order imposing such penalty and it shall not be necessary to give the Government servant any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed. Provided that in every case where it is necessary to consult the Commission, the record of the inquiry shall be forwarded by the Disciplinary Authority to the Commission for its advice and such advice shall be taken into consideration before making an order imposing any such penalty on the Government servant." From the perusal of the aforesaid Rule, particularly Rule 15(2) of the Rules, it is clear that if the inquiring authority is not the disciplinary authority, and if the disciplinary authority is not in agreement with the findings recorded by the inquiring authority, the disciplinary authority has to record tentative reasons for such disagreement on the articles of charges framed against the employee and only after considering the explanation to be offered on such disagreement, it is open for the disciplinary authority to record his own findings by recording reasons for such disagreement. In this case, it is to be noticed that after receipt of inquiry report dated 30.11.2000, the 2nd respondent has issued notice dated 09.06.2001 in C.No.II/10-A/5/97-CIU(Hyd.III), to show cause as to why the inquiry report should not be rejected and also as to why penalty should not be imposed. A copy of such show cause notice is placed on record. From a careful perusal of the inquiry report, it is clear that the 2nd respondent has accepted the scope of the charges framed in the inquiry proceedings and recorded his own findings even before opportunity is given to the petitioner. It is apposite to refer to certain aspects contained in the show cause notice dated 09.06.2001, which read as under:- "After going through the case records and other material on file, it appears that the Inquiry Officer has not correctly arrived at the conclusion for the following reasons :-" ... "From this, it is evident that the Charged Officer was responsible for the failure of supervision which resulted in the clearance of cigarettes without payment of duty resulting in loss of revenue."..."He has also never tried to check the private records of the factory such as machine log book, Supervisor's note book, Machine Cards etc., at any stage. This would have very easily given him an idea that some of the machine which were otherwise shown as idle were perhaps actually being used for illicit manufacture of cigarettes."...."Thus, the nexus of the Charged Officer with the aforesaid illicit clearances is clearly established."..."From the foregoings, it is evident that the Charged Officer as Superintendent incharge of M/s.SCTL failed to exercise proper control over the affairs of the factory which resulted in loss of revenue. He also has not exercised proper supervisory control over the subordinate officers working under him. Regarding the charge that the charged officer's omissions/commissions were for a monetary consideration, I am inclined to agree with the findings of the Inquiry Officer." 12. From the aforesaid aspects, which are extracted, it is clear that the 2nd respondent, after receipt of inquiry report, has issued a show cause notice, but in the said show cause notice, he has agreed with the finding recorded by the inquiry officer that the omissions and commissions alleged against the petitioner were not for monetary considerations. At the same time, he has recorded findings at the stage of issuing show cause notice itself. At the same time, he has recorded findings at the stage of issuing show cause notice itself. Whether the 2nd respondent can issue such show cause notice with findings as referred above without any opportunity to the petitioner, requires consideration at this stage. By a reading of Rule 15(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, it is clear that the disciplinary authority himself is empowered to differ with the findings recorded by the inquiry officer, by recording tentative reasons after giving an opportunity to the delinquent/ employee. From the findings recorded in the show cause notice dated 09.06.2001, issued in C.No.II/10-A/5/97-CIU (Hyd.III), it cannot be said that such findings are tentative reasons to differ with the findings recorded by the inquiry officer. 13. In the judgment relied on by the learned counsel for petitioner in Yoginath D.Bagde Vs. State of Maharashtra & another (1999) 7 SCC 739 ), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while confirming the earlier view taken by it in the case of Punjab National Bank & others Vs. Kunj Behari Misra (1998) 7 SCC 84 ), has categorically held that the disciplinary authority before forming its final opinion, has to convey the charged employee its tentative reasons for disagreeing with the findings of the inquiry officer. Even in the said case, when findings are arrived at in the show cause notice itself, the same was disapproved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Further, in the said case, it is held that even in the absence of any provision in the Rules, an opportunity of hearing is also to be given. In paragraphs 28 and 29 of the aforesaid judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "28. In view of the provisions contained in the statutory rule extracted above, it is open to the disciplinary authority either to agree with the findings recorded by the enquiring authority or disagree with those findings. If it does not agree with the findings of the enquiring authority, it may record its own findings. Where the enquiring authority has found the delinquent officer guilty of the charges framed against him and the disciplinary authority agrees with those findings, there would arise no difficulty. So also, if the enquiring authority has held the charges proved, but the disciplinary authority disagrees and records a finding that the charges were not established, there would arise no difficulty. Where the enquiring authority has found the delinquent officer guilty of the charges framed against him and the disciplinary authority agrees with those findings, there would arise no difficulty. So also, if the enquiring authority has held the charges proved, but the disciplinary authority disagrees and records a finding that the charges were not established, there would arise no difficulty. Difficulties have arisen in all those cases in which the enquiring authority has recorded a positive finding that the charges were not established and the delinquent officer was recommended to be exonerated, but the disciplinary authority disagreed with those findings and recorded its own findings that the charges were established and the delinquent officer was liable to be punished. This difficulty relates to the question of giving an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer at that stage. Such an opportunity may either be provided specifically by the rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution or the disciplinary authority may, of its own, provide such an opportunity. Where the rules are in this regard silent and the disciplinary authority also does not given an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer and records findings different from those of the enquiring authority that the charges were established, "an opportunity of hearing" may have to be read into the rule by which the procedure for dealing with the enquiring authority's report is provided principally because it would be contrary to the principles of natural justice if a delinquent officer, who has already been held to be "not guilty" by the enquiring authority, is found "guilty" without being afforded an opportunity of hearing on the basis of the same evidence and material on which a finding of "not guilty" has already been recorded. 29. We have already extracted Rule 9(2) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 which enables the disciplinary authority to disagree with the findings of the enquiring authority on any article of charge. The only requirement is that it shall record its reasoning for such disagreement. The rule does not specifically provide that before recording its own finding, the disciplinary authority will given an opportunity of hearing to a delinquent officer. The only requirement is that it shall record its reasoning for such disagreement. The rule does not specifically provide that before recording its own finding, the disciplinary authority will given an opportunity of hearing to a delinquent officer. But the requirement of "hearing" in consonance with the principles of natural justice even at that stage has to be read into Rule 9(2) and it has to be held that before the disciplinary authority finally disagrees with the findings of the enquiring authority, it would give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer so that he may have the opportunity to indicate that the findings recorded by the enquiring authority do not suffer from any error and that there was no occasion to take a different view. The disciplinary authority, at the same time, has to communicate to the delinquent officer the "TENTATIVE" reasons for disagreeing with the findings of the enquiring authority so that the delinquent officer may further indicate that the reasons on the basis of which the disciplinary authority proposes to disagree with the findings recorded by the enquiring authority are not germane and the finding of "not guilty" already recorded by the enquiring authority was not liable to be interfered with." 14. Further, in the judgment in the case of S.P.Malhotra Vs. Punjab National Bank & others (2013 (4) SLR 537 (S.C), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "8. Kunj Behari Misra (supra) itself was the case where the Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer on 12.12.1983 and passed the order on 15.12.1983 imposing the punishment, and immediately thereafter, the delinquent officers therein stood superannuated on 31.12.1983. In Kunj Behari Misra (supra), this court held as under: "19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge, then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The report of the enquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer." (Emphasis added) The Court further held as under: "21. Both the respondents superannuated on 31-12-1983. During the pendency of these appeals, Misra died on 6-1-1995 and his legal representatives were brought on record. More than 14 years have elapsed since the delinquent officers had superannuated. It will, therefore, not be in the interest of justice that at this stage the cases should be remanded to the disciplinary authority for the start of another innings." 9. The view taken by this Court in the aforesaid case has consistently been approved and followed as is evident from the judgments in Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., AIR 1999 SC 3734 ; State Bank of India & Ors. v. K.P. Narayanan Kutty, AIR 2003 SC 1100 ; J.A. Naiksatam v. Prothonotary and Senior Master, High Court of Bombay & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 1218 ; P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank of India & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 2064 ; and Ranjit Singh v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 3685 : [ 2006 (3) SLR 82 (SC)]."" 15. In view of the aforesaid judgments, we are of the view that in this case, as the 2nd respondent has issued notice dated 09.06.2001, in C.No.II/10-A/5/97-CIU (Hyd.III), by recording findings even before giving an opportunity to the petitioner, the same is illegal and arbitrary and the final order of disciplinary authority based upon such show cause notice, is also illegal. 16. It is also the specific case of petitioner that the 1st respondent has not considered the detailed explanation offered by the petitioner to the show cause notice dated 09.06.2001 before passing final order. 16. It is also the specific case of petitioner that the 1st respondent has not considered the detailed explanation offered by the petitioner to the show cause notice dated 09.06.2001 before passing final order. It is the contention of the learned counsel for petitioner that though the petitioner has raised several tenable contentions in the explanation filed to the show cause notice dated 09.06.2001, without considering the same, in a routine and mechanical manner and being carried away by the advice given by the Union Public Service Commission, the 1st respondent has passed the impugned order. It is brought to our notice that in verbatim, the advice given by the UPSC tallies with the wording in the final order of disciplinary authority. In the counter filed before this Court by the Additional Commissioner, it is stated that mere tallying of words does not mean that there was no application of mind. It is true that by mere tallying of words, it cannot be said that there was no application of mind, but when we look at the advice given by the UPSC and the order passed by the respondents, it is clear that major portion of the order is the extract from the advice of UPSC. Several objections were raised by the petitioner in a detailed manner in response to the notice dated 09.06.2001, but such aspects were not at all dealt with by the respondents in the final order. We are of the view that the respondents have not considered such aspects and the order under challenge is passed in a routine manner. Further, the contention of the learned counsel that the copy of advice was also not furnished to the petitioner, deserves acceptance in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & others Vs. S.K.Kapoor (2011) 4 SCC 589 ). In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the order of dismissal passed in the disciplinary proceedings without supplying a copy of the report of UPSC is held to be illegal. Learned counsel for petitioner has also placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of Gujarat High Court in the case of Union of India & others Vs. Learned counsel for petitioner has also placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of Gujarat High Court in the case of Union of India & others Vs. Harishankar Dixit (2012 (7) SLR 394 (Guj.), in which, a Division Bench of Gujarat High Court has taken the same view, namely, the UPSC report is to be furnished to the delinquent/officer before passing the order of penalty in the disciplinary proceedings, if such report is made basis for passing such orders. In this case, it is submitted that as the copy of UPSC report is not furnished, the order of disciplinary authority is liable to be set aside even on the said ground. 17. There is yet another ground raised by the petitioner viz., the orders passed by the authorities are not in conformity with the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972. In this case, it is to be noticed that inquiry was initiated when the petitioner was in service and during the pendency of the proceedings, when his option for voluntary retirement was not accepted, he approached the Tribunal by filing O.A.No.1905 of 1999, in which, a declaration was issued that he deemed to have been retired from service with effect from 31.07.1999. In that view of the matter, by the time even before final orders are passed, he has retired from service, in which event, the 1st respondent alone is the competent authority to pass orders. In this connection, Rule 9 (2)(a) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 is relevant, which reads as under: "9(2)(a) : The departmental proceedings referred to in sub-rule (1), if instituted while the Government servant was in service whether before his retirement or during his re-employment, shall, after the final retirement of the Government servant, be deemed to be proceedings under this rule and shall be continued and concluded by the authority by which they were commenced in the same manner as if the Government servant had continued in service. Provided that where the departmental proceedings are instituted by an authority subordinate to the President, that authority shall submit a report recording its findings to the President." From a reading of the aforesaid Rule, it is clear that the departmental proceedings referred in Sub-rule (1) are instituted when the Government servant was in service and even after retirement, they can continue the proceedings in the same manner as if the Government servant is continued in service. But from a reading of the proviso, it is clear that if proceedings are initiated by the authority subordinate to the President, such authority shall submit a report to the Hon'ble President, recording its findings. In this case, it is the case borne out from the record that after receipt of report of the inquiry officer, the 2nd respondent himself has issued notice dated 09.06.2001, seeking to show cause as to why the inquiry report should not be rejected and penalty should not be imposed. Explanation was offered to the 2nd respondent to the said show cause notice, but curiously, the impugned order dated 11.12.2001, is passed by the 1st respondent imposing the penalty. It is clear that such procedure adopted by the respondents runs in violation to Rule 9(2)(a) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. From a reading of the said Rule, it is clear that if departmental proceedings are initiated when the Government servant was in service, even after retirement, they can be continued as if such Government servant is continued in service, but at the same time, in the event of proceedings initiated by inquiring authority subordinate to the President of India, it is obligatory on the part of such authority to submit a report recording its findings to the Hon'ble President, who alone is the competent authority to pass orders. In that view of the matter, in the present case, after receipt of report prepared by the inquiry officer, the 2nd respondent on his own, has issued the show cause notice, by which time, the petitioner had already retired from service, as such, the 2nd respondent had no authority to issue notice dated 09.06.2001 either to differ with the findings recorded or to impose any penalty. In the case on hand, curiously, though 2nd respondent has no authority, has issued notice dated 09.06.2001, for which, several objections were taken, but without considering the same, ultimately final orders came to be passed by the 1st respondent, as such, the said order runs contrary to the proviso to Rule 9(2)(a) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. Even on the said ground, the order under challenge is liable to be set aside. From a reading of the order of the Tribunal, it is clear that though the petitioner has raised several valid grounds, the same were not considered in proper perspective as per the Rules either under CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 or CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, but simply recorded a finding that the petitioner had an opportunity by way of explanation to the show cause notice. 18. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the Tribunal has not considered the valid objections and grounds raised by the petitioner questioning the validity of the order passed by the disciplinary authority and the disciplinary authority also has passed such order contrary to the basic principles which are to be complied in the departmental inquiry proceedings. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that this writ petition is fit to be allowed. 19. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the order dated 14.06.2002, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench at Hyderabad, in O.A.No.80 of 2002, and the proceedings dated 11.12.2001, issued by the 1st respondent in File No.C-14012/3/2001-Adv.4023-27, are hereby set aside. Consequently, we direct the respondents to pay to the petitioner, the forfeited amount of 50% of gratuity and the withheld pension of 10% within a period of two months from the date of receipt of this order. Writ petition is allowed with directions as indicated above. No order as to costs. Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.