JUDGMENT : - Dharam Chand Chaudhary, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 25.8.2000, passed by learned District Judge, Kullu in civil appeal No. 50 of 1998/71 of 2000, dismissing thereby the appeal and confirmed the judgment and decree dated 2.4.1998, passed by learned Senior Sub Judge, Lahaul and Spiti at Kullu in Civil Suit No.156 of 1991. 2. The appeal has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the findings of the Courts below are based on mis-construction of Sections 104 and 113 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 holding that the property in dispute was sold by defendants on acquiring ownership rights within 10 years and thereby observing that the sale deed was invalid? 2. Whether the fact that 10 years had elapsed during the pendency of the case the principle “feeding the estoppel” applied in the present case and the plaintiff was entitled for ownership and possession even if his title to the property in dispute was incomplete when the suit was filed? 3. Whether the learned District Judge has misconstrued the basic documents of title Exts.PW-2/A, PW-6/D, DW-6/A and DW-9/A and also Jamabandis Exts.P-2, D-5 and also the Khasra Girdwaries Exts. D-8 and D-9 showing that the plaintiff purchased the suit property from Phunchog Angrup on 29.9.91? 3. The bone of contention in the present lis is a small piece of land measuring 0-0-12 biswansis, part of the land entered in Khasra No.188, Khatta/Khatauni No.422/596, situated in Phati Dhalpur Kothi Maharaja, Tehsil and District Kullu, denoted by Khasra No.188/1 in the Tatima (spot map) prepared by Patwari Halqa. The appellant, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff, has filed the suit for possession thereof. The demolition of the pillars allegedly erected thereon by defendant No.1 for the construction of stairs to his building. By way of decree of permanent prohibitory injunction, defendant No.1, Bhagwat Guru, predecessor-in-interest of present respondents 1(a) to 1(d), hereinafter referred to as the defendants was sought to be restrained from causing any sort of interference in the remaining land entered under Khasra No.188/2 measuring 0-5-8 biswa and also restraining the deceased defendant from raising further construction on the land bearing Khasra No.188/1 aforesaid allegedly encroached upon by him by erecting concrete pillars thereon. 4. 4. The suit land allegedly was in the joint ownership and possession of Ashok Kumar, respondent No.2, hereinafter referred to as defendant No.2 and one Shri Phunchog Angrup in equal share. Jamabandi Ex.P-2 for the year 1986-87 has been pressed into service in respect of such contentions in the plaint. The plaintiff purchased ½ share of the suit land vide Registered sale deed No.1615 Ex.PW-2/A, dated 28.9.1991 for consideration i.e. Rs.16,000/- and as such become owner-in-possession of the suit land. Deceased defendant Bhagwat Guru when started causing interference in the ownership and possession of Phunchog Angrup, he filed civil suit No.134/89 against the said defendants for the decree of permanent prohibitory injunction. Defendant No.1 (since dead) has, however, encroached upon a portion of the suit land denoted by Khasra No.188/1 during the pendency of the suit. The suit land to the extent of his share was sold by Phunchog Angrup to the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. She preferred an application under Order 1 Rule 10 for her impleadment in civil suit No.134/89 aforesaid, however, dismissed by learned trial Judge with the observations that since she has purchased the same during the pendency of the suit, she may prefer a separate suit on independent and separate cause of action. Since the deceased defendant allegedly started causing interference again on and w.e.f. 3.12.1991, hence the present suit. 5. The suit was contested by defendant No.1. In addition to the preliminary objections qua the maintainability and locus standi of the plaintiff to maintain the suit, it is submitted that he is coming in peaceful and continuous possession of the suit land right from the year 1973. The same is part and parcel of his building namely Bijleshwar View Guest House constructed partly over a portion thereof in 1975. Also that well before 1972, his predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the suit land. He, therefore, is not bound by the false entries in the revenue record. In fact the previous owners namely Mohan Dass and his brothers had been using and cultivating the suit land and also making construction thereon. They raised objections, however, he ignored the same and later on they asked defendant No.1 to purchase the suit land. He refused to do so because they had left with no right nor were in possession thereof. They raised objections, however, he ignored the same and later on they asked defendant No.1 to purchase the suit land. He refused to do so because they had left with no right nor were in possession thereof. It has, therefore, been submitted that he has become owner of the suit land by way of adverse possession and the suit has, therefore, been sought to be dismissed. 6. On the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Judge has framed the following issues:- 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to decree of possession as prayed for? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction as prayed for? OPP 3. Whether the suit is not maintainable and competent as alleged? OPD-1 4. Whether the defendant No.1 has become owner of the land in suit by way of adverse possession as alleged OPD 5. Whether the plaintiff has no locus-standi to file the suit? OPD 6. Whether the plaintiff is owner in possession of the land in suit as alleged? OPP 7. Whether the defendant No.1 is entitled to special costs? If so to what extent. OPD 7-A. Whether in the alternative the plaintiff is entitled for the decree of possession of the entire suit land, as prayed for? OPD 8. Relief. 7. After holding full trial issues No. 1, 2, 6 & 7-A were answered against the plaintiff whereas issues No. 3, 5 and 7 against the defendant. It was held that the plaintiff has failed to prove the plea of adverse possession over the suit land, however, the suit was dismissed on account of the plaintiff was neither found to have proved her title over the suit land nor possession hence, the Court below has concluded that no decree for possession of entire suit land or a portion thereof can be passed against defendant No.1. 8. 8. The judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court was further assailed in the Court of learned District Judge, Kullu in an appeal, which, however, was dismissed vide judgment and decree impugned in the present appeal on the grounds inter alia that on conferment of proprietary rights with respect to the suit land upon Mohan Dass, Sham Dass and Bansi Dass, they acquired title in the suit land and sold the same to Shri Balak Ram vide sale deed Ex.DW-6/B. Said Shri Balak Ram in turn sold the suit land to Phunchog Angrup, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff. The title of the plaintiff in the suit land, therefore, is duly proved and the defendants having evaded their rights in the suit land, the Court below instead of decreeing the suit has dismissed the same on wholly conjectural grounds. The documents Ex.PW-2/A, Ex.PW-6/B, Ex.PW-6/A, Ex.DW-9/A, Jamabandis Ex.P-2, Ex.D-5, Khasra Girdwaries Ex. D-8 and Ex.D-9 documents of title have been misread and misconstrued, which allegedly vitiated the findings. The findings that extract of Document Writer’s Register Ex.DW-9/A, by which Mohan Dass has sold his property to one Talwe Ram is not established to be a sale deed and rather only an agreement to sell are erroneous. The order Ex.D-1 passed by Collector was wrong because Assistant Collector IInd Grade was competent to decide mutation under Section 104 of HP Tenancy and land Reforms Act and as such the sale was perfectly legal and valid. Otherwise also, even if it is assumed that the order qua conferment of proprietary rights was rightly set aside, the plaintiff being bonafide purchaser was entitled to succeed in the suit. The provision of Section 104 and 113 of the HP Tenancy and Land Reforms Act and Rules 27 and 28 of the 1975 Rules framed thereunder have been misread and misconstrued and wrong inferences drawn. It was not open to the contesting defendant to raise such plea. Her predecessor-in-interest Phunchog Angrup was in possession of the land in dispute. The plea of adverse possession raised by the defendant was therefore, rejected by the Courts below. The plaintiff, in these circumstances was entitled to the relief of injunction. The inference drawn by the Courts below being based on mere surmises and conjectures and misreading of oral and documentary evidence has vitiated the findings and rendered the impugned judgment and decree legally and factually unsustainable. The plaintiff, in these circumstances was entitled to the relief of injunction. The inference drawn by the Courts below being based on mere surmises and conjectures and misreading of oral and documentary evidence has vitiated the findings and rendered the impugned judgment and decree legally and factually unsustainable. The same, therefore, has been sought to be quashed and set aside. 9. Having gone through the record available and taking into consideration the rival submissions, it is crystal clear that no question of law, muchless substantial questions of law, is involved in the present appeal, as in my considered opinion, both the Courts below have appreciated the given facts and circumstances and also oral as well as documentary evidence available on record in its right perspective and as such there is no question of the findings so recorded perverse or the judgment and decree legally unsustainable. The suit land admittedly was of ‘Devta Gahari’, and in the possession of Shri Dila Ram, predecessor-in-interest of Mohan Dass etc. aforesaid in the capacity as tenant, on payment of rent in the form performing ‘Puja’ (worship) and 0.60 paisa per annum. It finds recorded so in Ex.D-5 Jamabandi for the year 1971-72, Ex.D-8 Khasra Gardawari from Kharif 1972 to Rabi 1978 and Ex.D-9 from Kharif 1978 to Rabi 1982. They acquired proprietary rights, reference whereof finds mentioned in Jamabandi Ex.D-5 for the year 1971-72, in remarks column. This mutation however, was rejected vide order dated 29.8.1983. The proprietary rights were ultimately conferred upon Mohan Dass, Sham Dass and Bansi Dass under Section 104 (3) of the HP Tenancy and Land Reforms Act 1972, published in the Rajpatra on 4.10.1975. Therefore, it is on publication of the Act, all rights, title or interest in the suit land stood extinguished and vested in the tenants aforesaid, free from all encumbrances in 1975. Section 113 of the Act barred the transfer of such ownership rights atleast for a period of 10 years. Therefore, the owners S/Shri Mohan Dass, Sham Dass and Bansi Dass could have not sold the same for a period of 10 years. Learned lower appellate Court has dealt with this aspect of the matter in paras 17 to 22, which read as follows:- “17. It is in such circumstances material for consideration whether three brothers Mohan Das etc. Therefore, the owners S/Shri Mohan Dass, Sham Dass and Bansi Dass could have not sold the same for a period of 10 years. Learned lower appellate Court has dealt with this aspect of the matter in paras 17 to 22, which read as follows:- “17. It is in such circumstances material for consideration whether three brothers Mohan Das etc. were owners and validly transferred title qua suit land to Balak Ram or were still tenants in view of remand order of Collector Kullu, setting aside the mutation of ownership in their favour. Such question can well be appreciated, having regard to the provisions of Section 104 of the Act of 1972 and the rules made thereunder. Suffice to say before noticing provision of Section 104 of the aforesaid Act of 1972 that a tenant in possession under Act of 1972 was not competent to transfer tenancy rights to a third person and he could have relinquished the tenancy rights only in favour of the State Government. Therefore, due to such law as tenants all the three brothers Mohan Das etc. could not have validly passed tenancy rights to DW-5 Balak Ram. If Mohan Das etc., are assumed to have acquired proprietary rights by operation of law, even then such rights could not have been transferred due to the bar created by Section 113 of the Act of 1972. Section 104(3) of the Act of 1972 is relevant for the present case and it provides:- Section 104 – XXXXX (2) XXXX (3) All rights, title and interest (including a contingent interest, if any) of a landowner other than a land owner entitled to resume land under sub-section (1) shall be extinguished and all such rights, title and interest shall with effect from the date to be notified by the State Government in the official Gazette vest in the tenant free from all encumbrances. Provided that if a tenancy is created after the commencement of this Act, the provision of this sub section shall apply immediately after the creation of such tenancy.” 18. Act of 1972 was published in the H.P. Rajpatra on 4.10.1975. So it means all right, title or interest of land were extinguished and vested from such date in the tenant free from encumbrances. Act of 1972 was published in the H.P. Rajpatra on 4.10.1975. So it means all right, title or interest of land were extinguished and vested from such date in the tenant free from encumbrances. This provision of sub section (3) of Section 104 of the Act of 1972 is linked with rule 27 and 28 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Rules 1975 (hereinafter to be described as ‘Rules’). Rule 27 of the Rules provides:- 27. Procedure for conferment of proprietary rights on tenants covered by sub section (3) of Section 104.—All rights, title and interests in the tenancy land of land owners who have already under their personal cultivation 3 acres un-irrigated or 1½ acres irrigated land shall vest in the non occupancy tenants with effect from the commencement of these Rules. Similarly, the proprietary rights of tenancy land of the non-occupancy tenants on the Government land shall also vest in the tenants from the commencement of these Rules.” 19. Then under Rule 28 of the Rules revenue officer was required to attest mutation in presence of the parties in favour of non-occupancy tenant on whom proprietary rights under Section 27 of the Rules were vested. 20. Though vesting of proprietary rights on tenants is automatic under Section 104(3) of the Act of 1972. But such automatic conferment on coming into operation of the Act was subject to the provisions of Rule 27 of the Rules and after settlement of the claim of land-owner and tenant mutation was required to be attested by the revenue officer by virtue of Rule 28 of the Rules. Scheme of Section 104 of the Act of 1972 reveal that a land owner was made entitled to resume land from a tenant not more than half of the tenancy land. First option was to be exercised by the tenant which portion of the land he wanted to retain and which to surrender to the landowner if he applied for resumption. Such resumption was subjected to certain conditions as enumerated in Section 104 of the Act of 1972. They are not relevant for the purpose of the present appeal. Therefore the record is not deemed to be burdened by reproducing entire provisions of Section 104 of the Act of 1972. Only summary of it is reproduced to understand and dispose of the appeal. 21. The case is to be now looked from two angles. They are not relevant for the purpose of the present appeal. Therefore the record is not deemed to be burdened by reproducing entire provisions of Section 104 of the Act of 1972. Only summary of it is reproduced to understand and dispose of the appeal. 21. The case is to be now looked from two angles. Firstly, if three brothers Mohan Das etc. had become owners of the land before selling their interest to Balak Ram or were still tenants. If they are taken to have become owners of the land by virtue of provisions of sub section (3) of Section 104 of the Act of 1972, then they could not have transferred the land during the period of ten years from the date of acquiring proprietary rights as provided by Section 113 of the Act of 1972. The provision is as under: - 113. Bar of transfer of ownership rights.- No land in respect of which proprietary rights have been acquired under this chapter shall be transferred by sale, mortgage, gift or otherwise during a period of ten years by a person from the date he acquires proprietary rights. Provided that nothing contained in sub section (1) shall apply to the transfer of land made for a productive purpose with the prior permission of the State Government in a prescribed manner. Provided further that nothing in this subsection shall apply to the land mortgaged with the Co-operative Societies established under the Himachal Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act 1968 or with a bank (3 of 1969). (2) Any transfer of land made in contravention of sub-section (1) shall be void and no registering authority shall register any document evidencing such transfer under the Indian Registration Act, 1908.’ 22. Bare look of Section 113 shows that a tenant becoming owner of the land can transfer it within ten years of becoming owner after obtaining prior permission of the State Government. In other words tenant becoming owner cannot transfer land within ten years of becoming owner. If transfers, would be avoid, contrary to express provision of the law and public policy. If we take that mutation No.2153 was rightly sanctioned on 12.6.81 by Assistant Collector IInd Grade, Kullu, infavour of Mohan Das, Sham Das and Bansi Das conferring on them ownership rights qua the suit land and that this order was never set aside by the Collector, Kullu in appeal. If we take that mutation No.2153 was rightly sanctioned on 12.6.81 by Assistant Collector IInd Grade, Kullu, infavour of Mohan Das, Sham Das and Bansi Das conferring on them ownership rights qua the suit land and that this order was never set aside by the Collector, Kullu in appeal. Three brothers Mohan Das, Sham Das and Bansi Das due to the bar created by Section 113 of the Act of 1972 could not have sold this land to Balak Ram as the sale was within ten years of their becoming owner. Hence, the sale was against public policy and express provision of the law. Therefore, would be void. With a risk of repetition alternatively if it is taken that Mohan Das etc. were still tenants, in view of order Ex.D-1 dated 29.8.83 of the Collector Kullu, they could not have transferred the tenancy rights to a third person. From this angle also the transaction is bad in law as relinquishment of tenancy could have been effected in favour of the State and not to third person.” 10. Mohan Dass and his brothers could have not sold the land within ten years of acquiring proprietary rights. Therefore, the sale deed Ex.DW-6/B, dated 1.1.1983 being violative of Section 113 read with Section 104 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, confers no right, title or interest upon the vendee, i.e. Shri Balak Ram. Prior to that the suit land has been shown to be sold to one Talwe Ram pursuant to power of attorney Ex.DW-6/A, by Shri Mohan Dass and on behalf of his brothers Sham Dass and Bansi Dass. Extract of the petition writer’s Register is Ex.DW-9/A, however, held to be not a genuine document and legally admissible in evidence by learned lower appellate Court and rightly so in view of the judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court, in Sadhu Ram versus S.P. Karwal & Others, 1993 (2) SLJ 1874, in which it has been held that the production of Register of petition writer to prove the rent note being secondary evidence cannot be considered to be the proof thereof. Shri Balak Ram sold his share in the suit land bearing Khasra No.188 to Phunchog Angrup, when there was no legal and valid transfer of the land in his favour. Therefore, without any title, he could have also not transferred the same to Phunchog Angrup. Shri Balak Ram sold his share in the suit land bearing Khasra No.188 to Phunchog Angrup, when there was no legal and valid transfer of the land in his favour. Therefore, without any title, he could have also not transferred the same to Phunchog Angrup. In turn Phunchog Angrup could have also not transferred the land to the plaintiff, though sale deed Ex.PW-2/A was executed. 11. Interestingly, Shri Balak Ram was not put in possession of the suit land by his predecessors-in-interest Mohan Dass etc. as he stated while in the witness box as DW-5. Not only this, his testimony goes to show that he had to sell the land in dispute only on account of being in the possession of deceased defendant Bhagwat Guru. Therefore, sale of the land without any title and being not in possession is nullity and creates no right, title or interest in the plaintiff and for that matter her predecessor-in-interest, Phunchog Angrup and Balak Ram etc. The documentary evidence reveals that the land was sold within ten years of conferment of proprietary rights, which could have not been done being barred under Section 113 of HP Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. Nothing is brought to the notice of this Court nor any arguments addressed as to how the principle ‘Feeding the estoppel’ is applicable in the case in hand. 12. The present is also not a case where the documents such as sale deeds Ex.PW-2/A, Ex.DW-6/B, Ex.DW-6/A and Ex.DW-9/A and for that matter Jamabandis Ex.P-2, D-5 and also Khasra Gardawari Ex.D-8 and D-9 have been misread and misconstrued. The documents more particularly the sale deed being contrary to the provisions of the HP Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, as discussed hereinabove, cannot be said to have transferred the title of the suit land in the name of the persons, in whose favour the same were executed. The documents more particularly the sale deed being contrary to the provisions of the HP Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, as discussed hereinabove, cannot be said to have transferred the title of the suit land in the name of the persons, in whose favour the same were executed. The entries in the record of rights viz Jamabandis and Khasra Gardawaris, no doubt, contain the factual position with respect to the possession of the suit land viz initially with the tenants and later on proprietary rights confer upon them even if taken as it is of no help to the plaintiff’s case, who no doubt as per the sale deed Ex.PW-2/A, was put in possession of the suit land, however, never came in possession thereof on the spot nor for want of the evidence it is so proved because her husband and attorney PW-1, did not utter even a single word in this behalf, whereas the evidence consisting the own statement of deceased defendant Bhagwat Guru and that of the witnesses examined on behalf of the defendants goes to show that it is the deceased defendant, who remained in possession thereof throughout. Both Courts below, therefore, have not committed any illegality and irregularity nor the present is a case where the evidence available on record has been misread or misconstrued. The legal provisions have also been rightly applied in the given facts and circumstances of this case. All the questions of law formulated, therefore, stand answered accordingly. 13. In view of the above, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed accordingly. Pending application, if any, shall also stand disposed of.