Judgment : R. Mahadevan, J. 1. This writ appeal has been filed challenging the order dated 07.02.2012 passed in W.P(MD) No.39009 of 2004. 2. Brief facts leading to the filing of this writ appeal, are as follows: 2.1. According to the appellant, the second respondent who was working as a Conductor under the petitioner Corporation, prevented a fellow driver from attending to the duty on 11.05.2000 at 09.50 a.m., and also took away the key of his TVS 50 Moped, while threatening him to return to his house. The appellant issued a charge memorandum subsequent to the said allegation, which was refuted by the second respondent. Thereafter, an enquiry was held and the second respondent had participated in the same and the Enquiry Officer arrived at a conclusion that the charges against the second respondent were proved. Later, a second show cause notice came to be issued to the second respondent and he had also submitted his explanation. Ultimately, the appellant dismissed the second respondent from service. Subsequently, the appellant sought approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, by filing Approval Petition No.180 of 2003 before the first respondent, who rejected the same. Challenging the same, the appellant had filed the writ petition. 2.2. The learned Judge of this Court held that the first respondent had rightly rejected the said Approval Petition stating that the provisions under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, were not complied with by the appellant, for the reason that as per the said provision, the second respondent ought to have paid one month's wages, however, the amount paid to the second respondent was less than his one month's wages. Accordingly, the learned Judge of this Court rejected the writ petition filed by the appellant. Aggrieved over the same, the appellant is before this Court. 3. Mr.A.P.Muthu Pandian, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the second respondent was dismissed from service after conducting a fair domestic enquiry and he was rightly paid the one month's wages, however, the learned Judge did not appreciate the calculation arrived at by the appellant to be paid to the second respondent. According to him, the appellant had complied with the provisions of Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and hence, he prayed for setting aside the order of the learned Judge of this Court. 4. According to him, the appellant had complied with the provisions of Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and hence, he prayed for setting aside the order of the learned Judge of this Court. 4. On the contrary, Mr.A.Rahul, learned Counsel for the second respondent contended that it was not correct to state that the second respondent was paid one month wages to which he was entitled to and therefore, the appellant had not complied with the provisions as per Section 33(2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the learned Judge had rightly dismissed the writ petition and hence, no interference is warranted at the hands of this Court. 5. We have considered the rival submissions and perused the materials available on record. 6. It is useful to refer to Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which reads as follows: "33. Conditions of service, etc., to remain unchanged under certain circumstances during pendency of proceedings.- (1) ***** ***** (2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute or, where there are no such standing orders, in accordance with the terms of the contract, whether express or implied, between him and the workman],-- (a) alter, in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute, the conditions of service applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or (b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, or discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman: Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer." 7. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision would leave no doubt in the mind of this Court that any workman who shall be discharged or dismissed, should be paid the wages for one month and an application seeking approval of such action shall also be made before the authority concerned. 8. This Court, in Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Madurai) Limited, rep. 8. This Court, in Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Madurai) Limited, rep. by its Managing Director v. The Joint Commissioner of Labour (Conciliation), Office of the Commissioner of Labour, Teynampet, Chennai -6 [W.A(MD)No.1056 of 2013, decided on 09.10.2013], had an occasion to deal with the similar issue and held as follows: "19. On a careful consideration of respective contentions and also this Court taking note of the facts and attendant circumstances of the present case, in right earnest comes to an irresistible and inescapable conclusion that the two conditions of proviso to Clause (b) of Section 33(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act are to be satisfied by a party viz., (i). that the workman was paid one month's wages, (ii). that the employer made an application for approval of his action to the appropriate authority. 20. However, in the instant case on hand, both the First Respondent and the Learned Single Judge, while passing the orders in Approval Petition No.180 of 2003 dated 12/4/2004 in the Order dated 7/2/2012 had come to a resultant conclusion that the ingredients of Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act (in regard to the payment of one month wages) was not complied with by the Appellant. Also that, the Learned Single Judge in the Order dated 7/2/2012 in the Writ Petition had also observed that 'though the First Respondent held that the enquiry was held fairly and properly and charges have been proved, the First Respondent was right in rejecting the Approval Petition on the ground that Section 33(2)(b) of the Act was not complied with. In effect, both the First Respondent as well as the Learned Single Judge had concurrently held that the ingredients of Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act were not complied with. The said concurrent finding of fact arrived at by the First Respondent, as well as the Learned Single Judge which n the considered opinion of this Court do not suffer from impropriety, material irregularity or patent illegality in the eye of law. Resultantly, the Writ Appeal fails." 9. We are of the considered view that the case on hand is squarely covered by the above decision of this Court and accordingly, the order passed by the learned Judge of this Court warrants no interference by this Court. 10. In fine, this writ appeal fails and the same stands dismissed. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is dismissed. We are of the considered view that the case on hand is squarely covered by the above decision of this Court and accordingly, the order passed by the learned Judge of this Court warrants no interference by this Court. 10. In fine, this writ appeal fails and the same stands dismissed. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is dismissed. No costs.