Judgment Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 07.07.2001 passed by learned District Judge, Sirmaur, District Sirmaur, in Civil Appeal No.26-CA/13 of 2000 whereby he affirmed the judgment and decree dated 01.01.2000 passed by learned Sub Judge 1st Class, Nahan, District Sirmaur, in Civil Suit No.79/1 of 1998. 2. The predecessor-in-interest of the respondents (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs) had filed a suit for compensation against the appellants alleging that he together with his father was in actual and physical possession of the land comprised in Khata Khatauni No.129min/182min, Khasra No.660/342, measuring 1-5 bighas on partition of Shamlat Deh land of Village Trilokpur (hereinafter referred to as the suit land). It was alleged that plaintiff had spent a sum of Rs.20,000/- for constructing a room over the suit land, but on 22.07.1997, the defendant No.3 along with police officials, Tehsildar and seven P.W.D. labourers trespassed over the suit land and demolished the room constructed by the plaintiff. On these allegations, compensation of Rs.1,00,000/-was claimed on account of loss of room, besides mental agony, inconvenience and loss of reputation. 3. The appellants-defendants resisted the suit by raising preliminary objections regarding maintainability, locus-standi, want of cause of action and the jurisdiction of the Court. It was alleged that father of the plaintiff was one of the co-sharers of the suit land and this land had been kept in joint holdings of all the co-sharers as per order dated 27.08.1974 passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Nahan. Since the land was ‘Shamlat’ the plaintiff could not have taken exclusive possession of the same, much less raised any construction over it. This act was in utter disregard and violation of Section 163 of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1954 (in short ‘the Act’). The proceedings against plaintiff were initiated and the structure was declared to be illegal and consequently demolished in accordance with the procedure prescribed under law. 4. On 21.12.1998, the learned trial Court framed the following issues:- 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for compensation of Rs.1 Lakh as prayed for? OPP. 2. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD. 3. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action and locus standi to file the suit? OPD. 4. 4. On 21.12.1998, the learned trial Court framed the following issues:- 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for compensation of Rs.1 Lakh as prayed for? OPP. 2. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD. 3. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action and locus standi to file the suit? OPD. 4. Whether the construction of the plaintiff was demolished in view of the proceedings under Section 163 of H.P. Land Revenue Act, if so its effect? OPD. 5. Relief. 5. The parties led evidence and after hearing, the learned trial Court partly decreed the suit of the plaintiff by awarding a sum of Rs.30,000/- as compensation. 6. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, the defendants filed an appeal before the learned lower appellate Court, who vide his judgment and decree dated 07.07.2001 has been pleased to affirm the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court and consequently the present appeal. 7. The appeal was admitted by this Court on 27.12.2001 on the following substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether the Courts below had jurisdiction to entertain the matter in view of the bar created under the H.P. Land Revenue Act? 2. Whether non-framing of issue regarding ejectment of the plaintiff from the suit land has vitiated the findings of the Courts below? 3. Whether mis-reading of document Ext.PW1/A and Ext.DW3/A has vitiated the findings of the Courts below? Since these questions are interconnected and interlinked, I proceed to deal with the same through common reasoning. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records. Shri Virender Kumar Verma, learned Additional Advocate General, has strenuously argued that since the matter relates to order passed under Section 163 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred. This contention has no merit, the frame of the suit suggests that the suit was simpliciter for possession wherein no reference has been made to the order passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Nahan, on 21.07.1997 pursuant to which the demolition was carried out. Further, trial Court held this order to be arbitrary and against the settled principle of law and was, infact, termed to be an abuse of process of law. 9. Further, trial Court held this order to be arbitrary and against the settled principle of law and was, infact, termed to be an abuse of process of law. 9. Even the learned lower appellate Court has held that the order was not passed on the date on which it was purported to have infact been passed. It has been further held that notice appears to have been issued on 20.07.1997 requiring the plaintiff to appear before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade on 21.07.1997. The order dated 21.07.1997 has already been exhibited as Ex.DW3/A which suggests that the proceedings were initiated on 20.07.1997 and decided on 21.07.1997. The report on the backside of the notice issued on 20.07.1997 suggests that since the plaintiff was not available at his house, a copy of the notice was affixed at his house while there is no mention in the order dated 21.07.1997 that the plaintiff was, infact, served or unserved, but has been shown to be absent. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that no proceedings were taken place under Section 163 of the Act and these proceedings were, infact, manipulated. 10. The learned Courts below have rightly held that there is no valid order and, therefore, the order dated 21.07.1997 was not required to be challenged by the plaintiff and the Civil Court on the basis of this order had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the case of compensation as set out by the plaintiff. Even otherwise, looking into the nature of the allegations and the relief claimed in the suit, I am of the view that it was the Civil Court alone which had the jurisdiction to try and adjudicate the suit. 11. Insofar as non-framing of issue regarding ejectment of the plaintiff from the suit land as urged by the learned Additional Advocate General is concerned, this question was squarely covered under issues No.2, 3 and 4. Now, it does not lie in the mouth of the defendants to question the issues so framed. I am further fortified in taking this view because the defendants who, were the appellants before the learned lower appellate Court had not even raised this question before the learned lower appellate Court and, therefore, are clearly now estopped from raising the same. 12. I am further fortified in taking this view because the defendants who, were the appellants before the learned lower appellate Court had not even raised this question before the learned lower appellate Court and, therefore, are clearly now estopped from raising the same. 12. The learned Additional Advocate General argued that there is complete misreading of copy of order dated 21.07.1997 of the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and Ex.PW1/A. Insofar as the misreading of Ex.DW3/A is concerned, I have already hereinabove discussed the matter in detail. Ex.PW1/A is the copy of jamabandi for the year 1993-94 which shows the land to be in possession of the owners and classified as ‘shamlat-deh-hasb-rasd’. From further perusal thereof, it appears that vide mutation No.493 in pursuance to possession of ‘shamlat-deh’ the suit land to the extent of 62 shares stood sanctioned in favour of Chandi Ram i.e. predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff vide note No.1. Therefore, the defendants cannot take any advantage from Ex.PW1/A which otherwise alongwith Ex.DW3/A cannot be said to have been misread by the learned Courts below. The substantial questions of law are accordingly answered against the defendants/appellants. 13. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, I find no merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed, with no orders as to costs. 14. Before parting, Shri Virender Kumar Verma, learned Additional Advocate General has brought in my notice that certain unwarranted disparaging remarks and strictures have been made by the learned trial Court in paras 13 to 17 of the judgment against the government officials, particularly, the Tehsildar, who was not even a party to the proceedings, nor separate notices were issued to them before passing strictures or commenting adversely against them. It is apposite to reproduce paras 13 to 17 of the trial Court judgment which read as under:- “13. The proper procedure was also not followed by the concerned Revenue Officer in getting the service of notice Ext. It is apposite to reproduce paras 13 to 17 of the trial Court judgment which read as under:- “13. The proper procedure was also not followed by the concerned Revenue Officer in getting the service of notice Ext. DW-3/A issued under S. 163 of the Act ibid effected upon the plaintiff as also borne out from the perusal of the report Ext.DW-4/A which shows that in the very first instance in the event of non-availability of the plaintiff, notice was affixed on the house of the plaintiff though service by fixation is never done in such like manner in the first instance and the said course is only resorted to where there is specific order of the concerned revenue authority issuing the notice to effect service by way of fixation. Report Ext. DW-4/A further shows that no witnesses associated by the concerned Madan Singh, Jamadar, Tehsil Office, Nahan before effecting service by fixation on the plaintiff and therefore, it is again quite doubtful that the plaintiff was not available at the relevant point of time at his house. The proper course for the concerned Process Server was to associate one or two respectables of the village at the time of effecting service and also to get his report verified on the spot but nothing of the sort was at all done. Another glaring violation in the notice Ext.DW-3/A has been that of the failure of A.C. 1st Grade in giving a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the ejectment of the plaintiff as the said notice Ext. DW-3/A was issued on 20-07-1997 and plaintiff was directed to appear before the concerned Revenue Officer on the very next day on 21-07-1997 which by no stretch of imagination can be termed as a reasonable opportunity as heavens would not have fallen if atleast a week’s time had been given by the A.C. Ist Grade to the plaintiff to show cause as to why action should not be taken against him under the provisions of S.163 of the Act ibid. DW-3, Subhash Chand, the then Tehsildar Nahan who passed order Ext.DW-3/A dated 21-07-1997 whereby the structure raised by the plaintiff was ordered to be demolished speaks volumes of arbitrariness, highhandedness and arrogancy of the concerned Revenue Officer in passing the said order as the said Tehsildar has tried to be more loyal than the king in ordering the removal of the structure raised by the plaintiff on the suit land. What better proof can be provided than the words used by the said Revenue Officer in his order Ext. DW-3/A which at the cost of repetition are summed up as follows:- “It is incumbent upon the Revenue Officials to show as much extra ordinary activity to meet the situation” meaning thereby that the concerned revenue official in his endeavour to meet the extra situation created by the raising of structure overnight by the plaintiff quite oblivion of the stringent and mandatory provisions of Section 163 of the Act ibid and also the principles of natural justice, went on to pass a very dictatorial and funny type of order which deserves to be deplored and condemned in strong words as how so ever wrong committed by the individual may be, the government servant/officers cannot be expected to bypass the relevant provisions of law in meeting out the situation. In common parlance the approach of the concerned Revenue Officer goes to suggest that if any person is booked for an offence of murder, he should be immediately shot dead and not subjected to any trial or so but I am afraid such type of approach is at all warranted on the part of the Government Officers in dealing with any type of wrong on the part a private individual. The minute perusal of the order dated 21-07-1997 i.e. Ext.DW-3/A also shows that the concerned revenue Officer was only obsessed with the idea to teach the plaintiff a lesson and has not at all given any thought to the correctness of the service of notice Ext.DW-3/A alleged to be effected by DW-4, Madan Singh, Jamandar vide his report Ext. DW-4/A upon the plaintiff. 14. The present case is a naked and blatant example of the misuse of official powers by the then Revenue Officer especially DW-3 Subhash Chand, Tehsildar, who passed order Ext.DW-3/A dated 21-07-1997. DW-4/A upon the plaintiff. 14. The present case is a naked and blatant example of the misuse of official powers by the then Revenue Officer especially DW-3 Subhash Chand, Tehsildar, who passed order Ext.DW-3/A dated 21-07-1997. The wrong committed by DW-3, Tehsildar is writ large on the face of the record and no amount of explanation made by him in his deposition can justify the illegal approach adopted by him in ordering the removal/demolition of the structure raised by the plaintiff on the suit land as there is well set procedure even for doing so under the provisions of S. 163 of the Act ibid but the concerned Revenue Officer instead of adopting the same went on to conduct himself in a very dictatorial and arrogant manner which is quite unbecoming of a revenue officer of the rank of Tehsildar. Though the then Collector has no art or part in the said misdeeds of the Tehsildar and other revenue officials but it is quite distressing to note that despite notice issued as PW-1/F by the plaintiff through his counsel to defendant No.1 and defendant No.2, no steps were taken especially by defendant No.2 to inquire into the entire matter or to take remedial steps for the redressal of the grievances of the plaintiff which again reflects very poorly upon the working of the then Collector of District Sirmaur and shows that something was definitely lacking in the fair and impartial working of the revenue officers right from top to the bottom at the relevant point of time that is why the revenue Officer of the rank of Tehsildar could dare to ignore and violate the basic spirit of the provisions of Section 163 of the Act ibid in ordering the removal/demolition of the structure raised by the plaintiff allegedly over the Government land. 15. The Bureaucracy has to be sensitive towards the genuine grievances of the general public and not to be an arrogant as has been the approach of the revenue Officers in the present matter. This is a case as a glaring example of redtapism and shows that how much cruel and callous bureaucracy can be in ignoring the genuine grievance of a private individual and how merciless and ruthless in violating the basic and mandatory provisions of H.P. Land Revenue Act in dealing with the case of encroachment. This is a case as a glaring example of redtapism and shows that how much cruel and callous bureaucracy can be in ignoring the genuine grievance of a private individual and how merciless and ruthless in violating the basic and mandatory provisions of H.P. Land Revenue Act in dealing with the case of encroachment. The general public is rightly losing all its faith due to unfair and partial working of the Executive Officers as a lot of credibility gets eroded on account of biased, partial and improper and unfair working of the likes of DW-3, Subhash Chand, the then Tehsildar, Nahan whose approach in the entire matter has been not at all above board. 16. The construction of the plaintiff was demolished in total violation of the provisions of Section 163 of the Act ibid rather in view of the proceedings under S.163 of the Act ibid by Tehsildar the basic provisions of the said Section were mauled and violated with impunity by the then Tehsildar examined as DW-3. 17. Now raises the question as what should be the quantum of compensation to be given to the plaintiff in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is an admitted fact that one storey pucca structure raised by the plaintiff allegedly on the government land was demolished by the Revenue Officers on 22-07-1997 by issuing/showing extra ordinary activity as per the order Ext.DW-3/A of the then Tehsildar dated 21-07-1997 which in common parlance also can be termed as ‘TUGLAKSAHI’. The plaintiff of his own has claimed damages of Rs.20000/- for demoliltion of the said structure but given the fact that no sufficient evidence has been brought on the record by the plaintiff regarding the amount spent by him on the construction of the said pucca one room structure, I deem it appropriate to grant damages of Rs.12000/- in favour of the plaintiff for the removal of the said structure by the defendants in an illegal manner. Similarly no sufficient evidence has been brought on the record by the plaintiff to show that he suffered loss to the tune of Rs.30000/-regarding damage to his household articles allegedly kept in the said room though it is stated by the plaintiff that he had kept dowry items for the marriage of his two daughters and other house hold articles in the said room but again the bare statement of the plaintiff in this respect cannot be made the basis to grant compensation of Rs.30000/- in his favour on this count rather it shall be in the fitness of things to grant lumpsum compensation of Rs.18000/- for the pain and suffering, mental agony and inconvenience suffered by the plaintiff due to illegal action of the Tehsildar. Pain and agony caused to the plaintiff on account of the highhandedness shown by the Tehsildar in removing the said one room pucca structure can well be imagined and simply cannot be put into words. Compensation of Rs.30000/-in total i.e. Rs.12000/- towards house and Rs.18000/- towards pain and suffering, mental agony and inconvenience etc. to the plaintiff is the proper amount which can be granted as such in favour of the plaintiff as against the defendants No.1 and 2. The plaintiff fully deserves the compensation of Rs.30000/-for the illegal acts of the Tehsildar so that in future revenue officers do not venture out to order even the removal of the structure raised in an illegal manner in such like fashion by totally bypassing the basic provisions of H.P. Land Revenue Act and violating the principles of natural justice and they give a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the concerned party. Issue No.1 is therefore, decided accordingly whereas issue No.4 is answered in the negative.” 15. I find great deal of force in the contention of the learned Additional Advocate General. Though fearlessness is as essential for maintenance of judicial independence. However, sobriety, cool calm and poise should be reflected in every action and expression of a Judge. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘K’ A JUDICIAL OFFICER (2001) 3 SCC 54 , held as under:- “7. A Judge entrusted with the task of administering justice should be bold and feel fearless while acting judicially and giving expression to his views and constructing his judgment or order. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘K’ A JUDICIAL OFFICER (2001) 3 SCC 54 , held as under:- “7. A Judge entrusted with the task of administering justice should be bold and feel fearless while acting judicially and giving expression to his views and constructing his judgment or order. It should be no deterrent to formation and expression of an honest opinion and acting thereon so long as it is within four corners of law that any action taken by a subordinate judicial officer is open to scrutiny in judicial review before a superior forum with which its opinion may not meet approval and the superior Court may upset his action or opinion. The availability of such fearlessness is essential for the maintenance of judicial independence. However, sobriety, cool, calm and poise should be reflected in every action and expression of a Judge. 8. The primary purpose of pronouncing a verdict is to dispose of the matter in controversy between the parties before it. A Judge is not expected to drift away from pronouncing upon the controversy, to sitting in judgment over the conduct of the judicial and quasi-judicial authorities whose decisions or orders are put in issue before him, and indulge in criticising and commenting thereon unless the conduct of an authority or subordinate functionary or anyone else than the parties comes of necessity under review and expression of opinion thereon going to the extent of commenting or criticising becomes necessary as a part of reasoning requisite for arriving at a conclusion necessary for deciding the main controversy or it becomes necessary to have animadverted thereon for the purpose of arriving at a decision on an issue involved in the litigation. This applies with added force when the superior Court is hearing an appeal or revision against an order of a subordinate judicial officer and feels inclined to animadvert on him. The wisdom of a superior Judge itching for making observations on a subordinate Judge before ventilating into expression must pause for a moment and read the counsel of Cardozo – "Write an opinion, and read it a few years later when it is dissected in the briefs of counsel. You will learn for the first time the limitations of the power of speech, or, if not those of speech in general, at all events your own. You will learn for the first time the limitations of the power of speech, or, if not those of speech in general, at all events your own. All sorts of gaps and obstacles and impediments will obtrude themselves before your gaze, as pitilessly manifest as the hazards on a golf course. Sometimes you will know that the fault is truly yours, in which event you can only smite your breast, and pray for deliverance thereafter." (Essays on Jurisprudence, Columbi a Law Review, 1963 at p. 315). 9. The Courts do have power to express opinion,make observations and even offer criticism on the conduct of anyone coming within their gaze of judicial review but the question is one of impelling need, justification and propriety. The following observation by Sulaiman, J. in Panchanan Banerji v. Upendra Nath Bhattacharji, AIR 1927 All 193 : 27 Cri LJ 1407 : 25 All LJ 100 was cited with approval before this Court in Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhusan Kar, (1986) 2 SCC 569 : 1986 SCC (Cri) 196 (SCC p.576, para23) "The High Court, as the Supreme Court of revision, must be deemed to have power to see that Courts below do not unjustly and without any lawful excuse take away the character of a party or of a witness or of a counsel before it." 10. This Court went on to add: (SCC p.576, paras 24-25) "24. It is, therefore, settled law that harsh or disparaging remarks are not to be made against persons and authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before Court of law unless it is really necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof to animadvert on that conduct. We hold that the adverse remarks made against the appellant were neither justified nor called for. 25. Having regard to the limited controversy in the appeal to the High Court and the hearsay nature of evidence of the appellant it was not at all necessary for the Appellate Judge to have animadverted on the conduct of the appellant for the purpose of allowing the appeal of the first respondent. Even assuming that a serious evaluation of the evidence of the appellant was really called for in the appeal the remarks of the learned Appellate Judge should be in conformity with the settled practice of Courts to observe sobriety, moderation and reserve. Even assuming that a serious evaluation of the evidence of the appellant was really called for in the appeal the remarks of the learned Appellate Judge should be in conformity with the settled practice of Courts to observe sobriety, moderation and reserve. We need only remind that the higher the forum and the greater the powers, the greater the need for restraint and the more mellowed the reproach should be." 12. Though the power to make remarks or observations is there but on being questioned, the exercise of power must withstand judicial scrutiny on the touchstone of following tests:- (a) Whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the Court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself. (b) Whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks. (c) Whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. The overall test is that the criticism or observation must be judicial in nature and should not formally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve (See Mohd. Naim AIR 1964 SC 703 : (1964) 2 SCR 363 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 549). 13. It was so said by a Special Bench of three-Judges presided over by Tek Chand, J. in Philip William Ravanshawe Hardless v. Gladys Isabel Hardless, AIR 1940 Lah 82 (AIR Head-note): "A passage which is not necessary to the conclusion of the Judge nor even necessary to his argument and is likely to militate seriously against party's earning a living in his profession should be expunged from the judgment." 14. In A.M. Mathur v. Pramod Kumar Gupta (1990) 2 SCC 533 this Court sounded a note of caution emphasising a general principle of highest importance to the proper administration of justice that derogatory remarks ought not to be made against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration unless it is absolutely necessary for the decision of the case to animadvert on their conduct and said: (SCC pp. 538-39, para 13) "13.Judicial restraint and discipline are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of the army. The duty of restraint, this humility of functions should be constant theme of our Judges. This quality in decision making is as much necessary for Judges to command respect as to protect the independence of the judiciary. The duty of restraint, this humility of functions should be constant theme of our Judges. This quality in decision making is as much necessary for Judges to command respect as to protect the independence of the judiciary. Judicial restraint in this regard might better be called judicial respect, that is, respect by the judiciary. Respect to those who come before the Court as well to other coordinate branches of the State, the executive, and legislature. There must be mutual respect. When these qualities fail or when litigants and public believe that the Judge has failed in these qualities, it will be neither good for the Judge nor for the judicial process." 16. In view of the principles laid down in the aforesaid decision, I find that the disparaging, scathing and undeserving remarks do not fall within the four corners of the tests laid down therein. Neither the party whose conduct in question was before the Court or he had an opportunity of explaining or defending himself nor the evidence on record had bearing on the conduct justifying remarks nor were these remarks necessary for the decision of the case as an integral part thereof to animadvert on that conduct. Moreover, the criticism or observation ought to be judicial in nature and the learned trial Judge should not have formally departed from sobriety, moderation and reserve. 17. In view of the above, the disparaging and undeserving remarks as made by the learned trial Court in paragraphs 13 to 17 against different officials of the government, more particularly, Tehsildar, are ordered to be expunged.