Judgment : 1. The revision petitioners, who are defendants 2 and 3 in the original suit have preferred this revision petition against the order passed in I.A.No.1551 of 2002 in O.S.No.269 of 2002 dated 22.06.2009 on the file of the Principal District Munsif Court, Cuddalore. 2. For the sake of convenience, defendants 2 and 3 in the original suit are referred as revision petitioners, plaintiffs 1 to 6 in the original suit are referred as respondents 1 to 6, the first defendant in the original suit is referred as 7th respondent and the fourth defendant in the original suit is referred as 8th respondent hereinafter. 3. Respondents 1 to 6 filed a suit in O.S.No.269 of 2002 and seeking the relief of declaration that the compromise final decree passed in I.A.No.864 of 1998 in O.S.No.347 of 1977 on 30.04.1999 on the file of the Principal District Munsif Court, Cuddalore is not valid and unenforceable and also prayed for to set aside the same. 4. During the pendency of the suit, the revision petitioners filed an application in I.A.No.1551 of 2002 under Section 12(2) of Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act and prayed for to decide the correctness of the Court fees as preliminary issue before recording evidence. According to the revision petitioners, the respondents have to value the suit and to pay the Court fee under Section 40 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act. Further, the case of the revision Petitioners is that if the suit is valued under Section 40 of Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuations Act, the trial Court in which the suit was filed has no jurisdiction to try the suit and therefore, prayed for to decide the issue in respect of Court fees as preliminary issue. 5. Further, the case of the revision Petitioners is that if the suit is valued under Section 40 of Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuations Act, the trial Court in which the suit was filed has no jurisdiction to try the suit and therefore, prayed for to decide the issue in respect of Court fees as preliminary issue. 5. On the side of the contesting respondents/plaintiff filed a detailed counter in which it is stated that the suit is filed only seeking the relief of declaration that the final decree passed in I.A.No.864 of 1998 in O.S.No.347 of 1977 dated 30.04.1999 is void, not binding and unenforceable and on that ground prayed for to set aside the final decree and therefore the court fee paid under Section 25(d) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuations Act, is correct and no need to pay the court fee under Section 40 of Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuations Act, since the respondents did not seek the relief of cancellation of decree. Further, it is stated that the above said issue may be decided in the trial itself along with other issues and the preliminary issue leads to multiplicity of the proceedings and also it leads to unnecessary delay. Therefore, prayed for dismissal of the above said application. 6. Since the trial Court already rejected to grant the above said relief sought for in the above said application, the revision petitioners preferred C.R.P.(PD) No.2861 of 2003 before this Court. This Court has held that the question must be heard and to be decided by the Court below before recording the evidence and therefore, the order of the trial Court passed on 04.03.2003 was set aside and the matter has been remitted back to the trial Court for disposal in accordance with law. 7. The trial Court again passed an order on 22.06.2009 after hearing both sides and finally dismissed the above said application filed by the revision Petitioners.. Aggrieved over the above said dismissal order passed in I.A.No.1551 of 2001 by the trial Court, again the revision petitioners have preferred this civil revision petition. 8. Heard the learned counsel appearing for both sides and perused the materials available on record. 9. Aggrieved over the above said dismissal order passed in I.A.No.1551 of 2001 by the trial Court, again the revision petitioners have preferred this civil revision petition. 8. Heard the learned counsel appearing for both sides and perused the materials available on record. 9. Briefly the case of the respondents 1 to 6 stated in the plaint is that one Dhanalakshmi purchased the suit properties from legal heirs of Parrie De Gonsaga on 7.2.1959. Later, father of respondents 1 to 6 and 8 namely Govindaraju and their mother Visalakshmi purchased the same property from John De Gonsaga under a registered sale deed dated 6.6.1962. The above said Govindaraju filed a suit for declaration and for recovery of possession against Dhanalakshmi and her vendor in O.S.No.226 of 1963. The suit was dismissed and the first appeal in A.S.No.138 of 1965 also dismissed. But in the Second Appeal in S.A.No.1431 of 1973, this Court held that all the three legal heirs of Joseph De Gonsaga were entitled to one third share each and a preliminary decree was passed on 6.7.1976. At the time of final decree proceedings, a compromise was arrived at and in the above said compromise, A schedule property was allotted to mother of the Respondents 1 to 6, namely Visalakshi and passed a final decree accordingly. The above said Visalakshi died in the year 1999. The respondents 1 to 6 and 8 are sons and daughters of the said Govindaraju and Visalakshi. The respondents 1 to 3, 4 and 5 jointly executed a registered power of attorney in favour of the 7th respondent Sundararajan on 27.2.1996. The above said power of attorney holder Sundararajan sold the suit properties in four parts in favour of both the revision Petitioners. Therefore the respondents 1 to 6 filed another suit against the revision Petitioners and respondents 7 and 8 in O.S.No.87 of 2000 for declaration that the sale deed executed by the 7th respondent herein in favour of revision Petitioners should be rescinded as void and other reliefs. The revison Petitioners questioning the maintainability of the suit without setting aside the final decree passed in I.A.No.869 of 1998 in O.S.No.347 of 1977 dated 30.4.1999. The revison Petitioners questioning the maintainability of the suit without setting aside the final decree passed in I.A.No.869 of 1998 in O.S.No.347 of 1977 dated 30.4.1999. Therefore the respondents 1 to 6 herein filed the present suit in O.s.No.269 of 2001 by contending that the above said compromise, final decree was passed in I.A.No.864 of 1998 in O.S.No.347 of 1977 is not valid, since it is against law, equity and unreasonable and on that ground they prayed for to declare that the compromise decree passed in final decree proceedings in I.A.No.864 of 1998 in O.s.No.347 of 1977 dated 30.4.1999 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Cuddalore is not valid and unenforceable and to set aside the same. 10. A careful reading of the above said pleasdings reveal that the predecessor of the respondents 1 to 6 and 8 namely Govindaraju and Visalakshi were parties in the compromise decree passed and these respondents 1 to 6 and 8 also impleaded and they appeared through power of attorney (i.e.,) the 7th respondent herein in final decree proceedings in I.A.ZNo.864 of 1998 in O.S.No.347 of 1977. The respondents 1 to 6 claim right only under the above said Govindaraju and his wife namely Visalakshi. Further the respondents 1 to 6 admitted in the pleadings that the respondents 1 to 4 and 6 had executed a registered power of attorney in favour of 7th respondent herein on 27.2.1996. In the above said circumstances, the respondents 1 to 6 have filed a original suit and seeking the relief of declaration that the above said compromise final decree passed in I.A.No.864 of 1998 in O.s.No.347 of 1977 on 30.4.1999 is not valid and unenforcable and also prayed for to set aside the same. 11. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the revision Petitioners, the parents of the respondents 1 to 6 were parties in the previous suit in O.S.No.347 of 1977 and both sides entered into a compromise and accordingly a compromise decree was passed in the final decree proceedings in which the respondents 1 to 6 and 8 herein appeared through power of attorney (i.e,)7th respondent Further from both side contentions, it is revealed that the revision Petitioners are also impleaded as parties in the above said final decree proceedings in I.A.No.864 of 1998 as respondents 14 and 15 as purchaser. In such circumstances, the respondents 1 to 6 now prayed for to set aside the above said compromise final decree. Therefore the respondents 1 to 6 should value and to pay the court fee for the above said relief under Section 40 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act(hereinafter called as the Act). But in the instant case the respondents 1 to 6 valued the suit at Rs.400/- and paid court fees of Rs.30.50/- under Section 25 (d) of the Act. 12. The learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 6 submitted that the respondents 1 to 6 filed a suit only for declaring the final decree passed in the earlier suit is invalid since it is void, not binding and unenforceable and therefore the Court fee paid under Section 25(d) of the Act is correct. Further the learned counsel submitted that the court fee payable on the plaint is to be decided only on the basis of the allegations and prayer in the plaint and therefore in the instant case, the Court fee paid by the respondents 1 to 6 is correct. To substantiate their contention, the learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 6 relied on the following three decisions reported in: 1. 2013 (5) CTC 12 (L.P.Alaghappa Chettiar and another vs. V.Janardhanan and another) and in which, para 23 reads as follows: “23. From the above decision it is clear that if the plaintiffs are not parties to the sale deed which is being attacked as sham and nominal or on any other ground then a Suit for declaration without asking for the relief of cancellation of the said deed is maintainable and the suit property can be valued under Section 25(d) of the Act and it is not necessary to value the suit property under Section 40(1) of the Act Admittedly, in the present case the plaintiff has sought for the relief of declaration and there is no prayer for cancellation of the sale deed. Further, the plaintiff is not parties to the said sale deed. As per the ratio laid down in the above said decisions, only a party to the document or decree which is challenged alone need to pay the court fee as under Section 40(1) of the Act and a third party to the document is not entitled to value the suit property under Section 40(1) of the Act. As per the ratio laid down in the above said decisions, only a party to the document or decree which is challenged alone need to pay the court fee as under Section 40(1) of the Act and a third party to the document is not entitled to value the suit property under Section 40(1) of the Act. If a third party to the document is required to pay the court fees as per Section 40(1) i.e., as per the market value of the suit property, then it will result in disastrous consequences. Section 25(a) or (b) or(c) also would not attract to the present case since the plaintiff did not ask for the relief of possession or consequential injunction or any exclusive right of use.Further a reading of the averments in the plaint, would show that no astuteness in drafting the plaint can be attributed to the Plaintiff is required to pay the court fee only under Section 25 (d) of the Pondicherry Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act.” 2. An unreported decision of this Court in C.R.P(PD)No.1956 of 2008(A.Murugesan .vs. Satheesh Kumar and others), in which, para 10, reads as follows: “10. As far as the present case is concerned, the case of the revision Petitioner/Plaintiff is that he has been perforced to cancel the power of attorney deed executed by him on 12.10.1999 by means of cancellation deed and further that the first defendant after knowing about the cancellation of power in his favour has created a false document vis., a purported sale deed in regard to the suit properties in favour of the deceased second defendant on 15.10.1999 etc. Thus, it is clear that the revision Petitioner/Plaintiff is not a party to the sale deed in question and therefore, he is a stranger and not bound by the sale deed and in that view of the matter, he need not initiate action for cancellation of the document, in the considered opinion of this Court. Thus, it is clear that the revision Petitioner/Plaintiff is not a party to the sale deed in question and therefore, he is a stranger and not bound by the sale deed and in that view of the matter, he need not initiate action for cancellation of the document, in the considered opinion of this Court. Therefore, looking into the natture of relief sought for by the revision Petitioner/Plaintiff to the effect that he has only sought for a declaratory relief in regard to the title of the suit properties in his favour etc., this Court comes to the inevitable conclusion that the relief sought for is not coming within the four corners of Section 40 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 and accordingly, the revision Petitioner/Plaintiff need not pay Court Fee under Section 40 of the Court Fees Act and resultantly, allows the civil revision Petition to prevent aberration of justice.” 3. The third decision reported in 2007-2-L.W 389(K.Palanisamy and another .vs. S.B.Subramani and another), in which, relevant portion of para 11 reads as follows: “11.............While holding so, the Supreme Court further held that the Court fee payable on the plaint is certainly to be decided on the basis of the allegations and the prayer in the plaint and the question whether the plaintiff's suit will have to fail for failure to ask for consequential relief is of no concern to the Court at that stage in deciding the question of substantive relief that is asked for. Mere astuteness in drafting the plaint will not be allowed to stand in the way of the Court looking at the substance of the relief asked for. This judgment is totally inapplicable to the facts of the present case.” 13. A careful perusal of the above said decisions relied on by the respondents 1 to 6 reveal that facts of the case are not applicable to the facts of the present case. As already discussed in the instant case, the predecessor of the respondents 1 to 6 are parties in the suit and the respondents 1 to 6 also appeared through Power of Attorney and the present revision Petitioners also impleaded as R14 and R15 in the final decree proceedings and in which a compromise decree was passed. As already discussed in the instant case, the predecessor of the respondents 1 to 6 are parties in the suit and the respondents 1 to 6 also appeared through Power of Attorney and the present revision Petitioners also impleaded as R14 and R15 in the final decree proceedings and in which a compromise decree was passed. The respondents 1 to 6 now seeking the relief of declaration that the above said compromise final decree passed in the above said suit as invalid and unenforceable and also prayed for to set aside the decree. Therefore from the pleadings of the respondents 1 to 6 in their plaint itself clearly reveal that the respondents 1 to 6 should have value and to pay the court fee under Section 40 of the Act. Therefore the above said decisions are not helpful to the respondents 1 to 6 14. Per contra, the learned counsel for the revision Petitioners relied on two decisions in support of their contentions. 1. AIR 1974 Madras 152(Rajam Ammal .vs. V.N.Swaminathan and others), in which , para 4 reads as follows: “4...... In view of this, the question for consideration will be whether the Full Bench Judgement inferred to above construing Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act, 1870, as amended by the Madras Court Fees(Amendment) Act, 1922, can be overlooked or ignored for construing Section 40 of the Madras Court fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955. In the Full Bench Decision also the suit was for a decree setting aside a conveyance which the plaintiff had executed and for possession of the land covered by the deed, pleading that he had been induced to sign the instrument as a result of undue influence and fraud. In the Full Bench Decision also the suit was for a decree setting aside a conveyance which the plaintiff had executed and for possession of the land covered by the deed, pleading that he had been induced to sign the instrument as a result of undue influence and fraud. The question was whether that has to be valued under Section 7(iv-A) for the purpose of the court fee and court fee should be paid on the market value of the property involved as on the date of the plaint.The arugment that was advanced on behalf of the plaintiff in that case was that since a prayer for possession of the property had been made the suit had to be valued under Section 7(v) and not under Section 7(iv-A).The Full Bench negatived the contention and agreed with the view of Venkatasubba Rao,J., in Bali Reddi .vs. Khatipulal Sab, ILR 59 Mad 240:(AIR 1935 Mad 863) and held that the court fee has to be paid on the market value of the property as on the date of the plaint. The Full Bench held that-- The Court fee is to be calculated on the amount or the value of the property and to give the wording of para (iv-A) its plain meaning the valuation must be the valuation based on the market value of the property at the date of the plaint.” 2. Another decision reported in 2005(5) CTC 190(Chellakannu vs. Kolanji),in which, para 15 reads as follows: “15. The allegation on the Plaint in substance amounts to cancellation of the document. Though the prayer is couched in the form of seeking declaration that the document is not valid and not binding, the relief in substance indirectly amounts to seeking for cancellation of the Sale Deed. Learned District Munsif was right in ordering payment of Court Fee under Section 40 of the Act. This Revision petition has no miets and is bound to fail.” 15. In view of the above said observations in the above said decisions, in the instant case, from the entire pleadings and prayer sought for in the plaint, respondents 1 to 6 should have value and to be paid the court fee under Section 40 of the Act. This Revision petition has no miets and is bound to fail.” 15. In view of the above said observations in the above said decisions, in the instant case, from the entire pleadings and prayer sought for in the plaint, respondents 1 to 6 should have value and to be paid the court fee under Section 40 of the Act. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the revision Petitioners, the trial Court has not at all considered the pleadings in the plaint and contention raised by the revision Petitioners. Therefore the findings of the trial Court are perverse and illegal as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the revision Petitioners. 16. In the result, the order passed by the trial Court in I.A.No. 1551 of 2002 in O.S.No.269 of 2002 on the file of the Principal District Munsif Court, Cuddalore is set aside and the respondents 1 to 6 are directed to represent the plaint and also directed to pay the court fee under Section 40 of the Act within one month from the date of order before the concerned Court which is having the jurisdiction to try the suit. Failing which, directed to reject the plaint immediately and the Civil Revision Petition is ordered accordingly. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. No order as to costs.