ORDER Heard learned counsel for the parties. 1. Challenge in this petition is to the legality and validity of the order dated 23.01.2014 (Annexure P-1), passed by the Director General of Police, Chhattisgarh, Raipur, whereby, the appellate authority affirmed the order dated 25-03-2011 (Annexure P-3), passed by the Commandant, 16th Battalion, Chhattisgarh Armed Forces, Narayanpur. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that pursuant to the selection process initiated by the respondent authorities, the petitioner participated and was appointed on the post of Constable (Cook), vide order dated 09-10-2009 (Annexure P-2). Pursuant to the said order, the petitioner joined on the said post on 16-11-2009. However, all of a sudden, the petitioner was terminated from the services by order dated 25-03-2011 (Annexure P-3) on the ground that on verification of the antecedents of the petitioner by the Police, it was revealed that FIR Nos. 54/01, 55/01, 56/01 & 57/01 under Section 379 of the IPC were registered against the petitioner. Though, the petitioner was acquitted from the said charge, however, he has not disclosed the said fact in the prescribed verification/antecedents form. 3. Against the said order, the petitioner preferred a representation/appeal before the Director General of Police. When no action has been taken on the said representation/appeal by the concerned authority, the petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P.(S) No.197/2013 & W.P.(S) No.4245/2013, in the meanwhile, by order dated 23-01-2014 (Annexure P-1), the Director General of Police affirmed the order of termination. 4. Placing reliance on the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Sandeep Kumar, 2011 AIR SCW 3601 and the decision of this Court in Churendra Kumar Dhruw v. State of C.G. & Others, 2012 (4) CGLJ 381, it has been strongly urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner having never been convicted for committing any offence involving moral turpitude and the proceeding under Section 107/116 (3) of the Cr.P.C. being not in the nature of a substantive criminal offence, the petitioner is entitled to continue in the service and the impugned order deserves to be quashed. 5. On the other hand, learned State counsel would support the impugned order of termination. 6.
5. On the other hand, learned State counsel would support the impugned order of termination. 6. The Supreme Court in Sandeep Kumar (supra), observed that “It is true that in the application form the respondent did not mention that he was involved in a criminal case under Section 325/34, IPC. Probably he did not mention this out of fear that if he did so he would automatically be disqualified.” The Supreme Court further observed that “at any event, it was not such a serious offence like murder, dacoity or rape, and hence a more lenient view should be taken in the matter.” 7. Although the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Sandeep Kumar (supra) has been referred to larger Bench, but since thereafter, the Supreme Court in Devendra Kumar v. State of Uttaranchal and Others, (2013) 9 SCC 363 , it has been held that issue of obtaining the appointment by misrepresentation is no more res integra. The question is not whether the applicant is suitable for the post. The pendency of a criminal case/proceeding is different from suppressing the information of such pendency. The case pending against a person might not involve moral turpitude but suppressing of this information itself amounts to moral turpitude. In fact, the information sought by the employer if not disclosed as required, would definitely amount to suppression of material information. In that eventuality, the service becomes liable to be terminated, even if there had been no further trial or the person concerned stood acquitted/discharged. 8. According to the Supreme Court a person having done wrong cannot take advantage of his own wrong and plead bar of any law to frustrate the lawful trial by a competent Court. In such a case the legal maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria applies. The persons violating the law cannot be permitted to urge that their offence cannot be subjected to inquiry, trial or investigation (Vide: Union of India v. Major General Madan Lal Yadav and Lily Thomas v. Union of India). Nor can a person claim any right arising out of his own wrong doing. (jus ex injuria non oritur). 9.
The persons violating the law cannot be permitted to urge that their offence cannot be subjected to inquiry, trial or investigation (Vide: Union of India v. Major General Madan Lal Yadav and Lily Thomas v. Union of India). Nor can a person claim any right arising out of his own wrong doing. (jus ex injuria non oritur). 9. Though the petitioner has taken the plea in para 9.2 of the petition that he has furnished all the information in column 12 in respect of offences registered against him and there is no case that he suppressed material facts about the offences, yet the authorities found that the conduct of the petitioner is not befitting to be the police constable and he should not be entrusted any responsibility. 10. In Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and Another v. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685 , the Supreme Court held thus : “34. The respondents are trying to draw mileage from the fact that in their application and/or attestation form they have disclosed their involvement in a criminal case. We do not see how this fact improves their case. Disclosure of these facts in the application/attestation form is an essential requirement. An aspirant is expected to state these facts honestly. Honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of the police force. The respondents should not, therefore, expect to score any brownie points because of this disclosure. Besides, this has no relevance to the point in issue. It bears repetition to state that while deciding whether a person against whom a criminal case was registered and who was later on acquitted or discharged should be appointed to a post in the police force, what is relevant is the nature of the offence, the extent of his involvement, whether the acquittal was a clean acquittal or an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt because the witnesses turned hostile or because of some serious flaw in the prosecution, and the propensity of such person to indulge in similar activities in future. This decision, in our opinion, can only be taken by the Screening Committee created for that purpose by the Delhi Police. If the Screening Committee’s decision is not mala fide or actuated by extraneous considerations, then, it cannot be questioned. 35. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public order in the society.
If the Screening Committee’s decision is not mala fide or actuated by extraneous considerations, then, it cannot be questioned. 35. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public order in the society. People repose great faith and confidence in it. It must be worthy of that confidence. A candidate wishing to join the police force must be a person of utmost rectitude. He must have impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged in the criminal case, that acquittal or discharge order will have to be examined to see whether he has been completely exonerated in the case because even a possibility of his taking to the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the police force. The Standing Order, therefore, has entrusted the task of taking decisions in these matters to the Screening Committee. The decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is mala fide. In recent times, the image of the police force is tarnished. Instances of police personnel behaving in a wayward manner by misusing power are in public domain and are a matter of concern. The reputation of the police force has taken a beating. In such a situation, we would not like to dilute the importance and efficacy of a mechanism like the Screening Committee created by the Delhi Police to ensure that persons who are likely to erode its credibility do not enter the police force. At the same time, the Screening Committee must be alive to the importance of trust reposed in it and must treat all candidates with an even hand. 11. It is also to be seen that the impugned order has not only considered the criminal cases registered against the petitioner, but in the history sheet of the concerned police station, the petitioner has been included as 'A' grade history sheeter, meaning thereby that the petitioner is a habitual offender and is not a law abiding citizen. 12. In view of the above, petitioner is not entitled to continue in the service and his discharge from service during probation does not suffer from any infirmity or illegality. 13.
12. In view of the above, petitioner is not entitled to continue in the service and his discharge from service during probation does not suffer from any infirmity or illegality. 13. As an upshot, the writ petition, being devoid of merit, is liable to be and is hereby dismissed at the motion stage itself.