ORDER : ” The following petitioners were granted bail by this Court considering the merits of the case on the conditions enumerated and reasoned order was to follow later. Petitioner Ramdev Sahani of Cr. Misc. No.48853 of 2012 was granted bail by order dated 17.12.2012 to the satisfaction of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Katihar in connection with Korha P.S. case No.306 of 2012 on conditions A, B, C, D, E, whereas petitioner Ramesh Kumar alias Chhotka Makhan of Cr. Misc. No. 48779 of 2012 was granted bail to the satisfaction of A.C.J.M., Danapur in connection with Danapur P. S. case No.254 of 2012 on conditions A, C, D, E, G, petitioner Rahul Kumar Yadav of Cr. Misc. No. 48965 of 2012 was granted bail by order dated 18.12.2012 to the satisfaction of C.J.M., Saharsa in connection with Sonbarsa Raj P. S. Case No.128 of 2012 on conditions A, C, D, E, I and petitioner Sanjay Kumar of Cr. Misc.No. 48795 of 2012 was granted bail to the satisfaction of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jehanabad in connection with Makhdumpur P.S. case No.219 of 2011 on conditions A, H. Conditions are enumerated below: (A) That one of the bailors will be a close relative of the petitioner, who will give an affidavit giving genealogy as to how he is related with the petitioner. The bailor will undertake to furnish information to the court about any change in the address of the petitioner. (B) That the affidavit shall clearly state that the petitioner is not an accused in any other case and, if he is, he shall not be released on bail. (C) That the bailor shall also state on affidavit that he will inform the court concerned if the petitioner is implicated in any other case of similar nature after his release in the present case and thereafter the court below will be at liberty to initiate the proceeding for cancellation of bail on the ground of misuse. (D) That the petitioner will give an undertaking that he will receive the police papers on the given date and be present on date fixed for charge and if he fails to do so on two given dates and delays the trial in any manner, his bail will be liable to be cancelled for reasons of misuse. (D) That the petitioner will give an undertaking that he will receive the police papers on the given date and be present on date fixed for charge and if he fails to do so on two given dates and delays the trial in any manner, his bail will be liable to be cancelled for reasons of misuse. (E) That the petitioner will be well represented on each date and if he fails to do so on two consecutive dates, his bail will be liable to be cancelled. (G) Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that he has been implicated repeatedly at the instance of the local police who is hostile to the petitioner and seeks protection of a person well reputed doing social service in the area. Under the circumstances, the petitioner will report to Mr. Kishore Kunal, Chairman, Bihar Religious Trust Board, Bihar, Patna, within fifteen days of his release on provisional bail for a period of six months and file a certificate about the same in the court within the stipulated time. In case, the petitioner fails to file certificate, notice shall be sent to him for cancellation of bail, (ii) That once the petitioner reports to Mr. Kunal, Mr. Kunal is requested to evolve a method by which without affecting the petitioner-” s present vocation, if any, the petitioner can be made socially productive so that an effort is made to bring him back in the main stream of the society/he is given adequate protection and (iii) At the end of the six months, the petitioner will be required to file a certificate in the court below granted by Mr. Kishore Kunal. If the certificate granted to the petitioner is found satisfactory, the court below will confirm the provisional bail granted to the petitioner or else will issue notice for cancellation of bail. (H) The petitioner volunteers to deposit Rs. 500/- (five hundred) per month in the court below firstly within 15 days of the release from jail custody and subsequently by 15th every month which the wife of the petitioner will be at liberty to withdraw without prejudice the right of the parties. The court below shall inform the wife of the petitioner about the present order. 500/- (five hundred) per month in the court below firstly within 15 days of the release from jail custody and subsequently by 15th every month which the wife of the petitioner will be at liberty to withdraw without prejudice the right of the parties. The court below shall inform the wife of the petitioner about the present order. However, if the Complainant/Informant has a Bank Account or subsequently opens a Bank Account, the money shall be deposited in the Account and a receipt to this effect shall be filed by 15th every month in the Court below and in case he fails to do so, his bail would automatically be cancelled. (I) In view of the antecedents of the petitioner, the petitioner is directed to appear before the Superintendent of Police, Saharsa within fifteen days of his release with a copy of this order and every two weeks thereafter for the next nine months. The conduct of the petitioner will be kept under watch in this period by the Superintendent of Police concerned and if it is found wanting in any respect, a report shall be made to the court concerned by him to initiate a proceeding for cancellation of bail for reasons of misuse of bail. After reporting to the Superintendent of Police, a certificate will be filed by the petitioner before the court concerned. 2. While this Court was hearing bail matters not only was it surprised that the litigant had to travel to the High Court for bail in matters such as above but was also anguished to note that the Courts below have routinely fallen into a habit of refusing bail and hence felt it essential to discuss the problem which has eaten into the innards of the judicial system. This Court also felt the necessity of explaining its reasons for imposing the various conditions and hence this exercise. 3. To begin with, it is a fact that Criminal Courts have been eternally faced with the dilemma as to whether or not to grant bail in offences of non-bailable nature. On the one hand, is the question of personal liberty of a citizen while on the other is the question of public good. 3. To begin with, it is a fact that Criminal Courts have been eternally faced with the dilemma as to whether or not to grant bail in offences of non-bailable nature. On the one hand, is the question of personal liberty of a citizen while on the other is the question of public good. Interestingly the concept of freedom in a Political State in a wider sense was explained by Justice H. R. Khanna in the case of ADM Jabalpur (1976) 2 SCC 521 : ( AIR 1976 SC 1207 ), which may be relevant for this order. The same is quoted below: ' Freedom under law, it may be added, is not absolute freedom. It has its own limitations in its own interest, and can properly be described as regulated freedom. In the words of Ernest Barker, (i) the truth that every man ought to be free has for its other side the complementary and consequential truth that no man can be absolutely free; that (ii) the need of liberty for each is necessarily qualified and conditioned by the need of liberty for all; that (iii) liberty in the State, or legal liberty, is never the absolute liberty of all; that (iv) liberty within the State is thus a relative and regulated liberty; and that (v) a relative and regulated liberty; actually operative and enjoyed, is a liberty greater in amount that absolute liberty could ever be- if indeed such liberty could ever exist, or even amount to anything more than nothing at all' -. 4. To confine our focus specifically on the meaning of bail I would like to quote from a very illuminating judgment reported in AIR (38) 1951 Madras 1042 paragraph 3 which comments on its concept and that, it is, in no way, absolute freedom: ' ......... Bail, or mainprize, originally meant, as Blackstone and other eminent jurist-” s explain, bailment or delivery of a person to his sureties, to be in their custody (instead of being sent to common jail), they being jailors of his own choosing who have dominion and control over him. That is why sureties are called upon to produce him, as his jailors, in Court, and punished when they fail to do so. That is why sureties are called upon to produce him, as his jailors, in Court, and punished when they fail to do so. If the sureties cannot control him and keep him in good conduct during the period of bail, naturally, the Court will intervene when he misconducts himself and re-arrest him and recommit him to jail ...........' - 5. However over the years we seem to have forgotten the real meaning of bail. Why it has happened should not merely be a subject-matter of discussion and exploration at seminars alone, but also of judicial deliberations if we wish the survival of the Institution and raise public confidence. In the backdrop of near collapse of the Criminal Justice Delivery System there is an imperative need for a healthy debate. 6. The concern in particular is because by a reliable estimate 85% of criminal cases involve the poor at least on one side and 78% Indians survive on less than Rs. 20/- per day. It must be kept in mind that the poor, all over the world, effectively mean the marginalized section, the one existing on the fringes of the society, the economically precarious, who have almost no access to health care, education, shelter i.e. the essentials of a healthy upbringing. Also, there is routine denial of human rights which ostensibly has an adverse impact on those socially hedged in. 7. These are the people who have had no alternative accessory, no right to choice, akin to what Salman Rushdie describes the immigrant London, of deprivation and prejudice, and calls it ' a city visible but unseen-” . These inherently socially handicapped people are more likely to land up in situations which may not always be one of their choice or making. Either one crime leads to another or one entry in the crime records leads to the creation of many others. 8. Courts, while dealing with the vital idea of justice, have a duty to ensure that no cry for justice goes unheard, the poor are not left behind the bars like trapped butterflies, and we drive away demons of elitist prejudices and complacency. 9. To further elaborate the argument that criminal litigation materially affects the poor I would like to refer to the representative data of year 2012 of the National Crime Records Bureau under the Ministry of Home Affairs. 9. To further elaborate the argument that criminal litigation materially affects the poor I would like to refer to the representative data of year 2012 of the National Crime Records Bureau under the Ministry of Home Affairs. Out of 1,27,789 convicted inmates, 37,255 are illiterate 58,014 are below class X thus constituting 74.6% of the convict population.. Out of 2,54,857 under trials 76,626 were illiterates, 10,385 were educated below Class X thus constituting 73.4% of the total inmate population. There is no doubt that the above statistics do not spell out the economic status of the prisoners but commonsense will guide us here that the literacy level indicates to it. 10. The concern is universal as would appear from the observations of President Lyndon B. Johnson when he signed the American Bail Reforms Act, 1966 enacted after great research. It is quoted by Justice Krishna Iyer in the case of Moti Ram and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (1978) 4 SCC 47 : ( AIR 1978 SC 1594 ). ' ' 15. Today, we join to recognize a major development in our system of criminal justice: the reform of the bail system. This system has endured ' - archaic, unjust and virtually unexamined-” since the Judiciary Act of 1789. The principal purpose of bail is to insure that an accused person will return for trial if he is released after arrest. How is that purpose met under the present system? The defendant with means can afford to pay bail. He can afford to buy his freedom. But the poorer defendant cannot pay the price. He languishes in jail weeks, months and perhaps even years before trial. He does not stay in jail because he is guilty. He does not stay in jail because any sentence has been passed. He does not stay in jail because he is any more likely to flee before trial. He stays in jail for one reason only-” because he is poor.... (Emphasis added) 11. Since this Court is trying to tackle the problem from various standpoints it would like to deal with the figures of filing of bail from 2.1.2011 to 29.11.2013 in the Patna High Court provided by NIC, quoted below: Total cases Bail Rejected Disposed Pending filed granted cases 1,25,951 79,626 7,833 1,11,096 14,855 The aforesaid figures reveal that roughly 205 bail applications were filed per working day. Out of the 1,25,951 filed between 2011 to 2013 in only 7,833 matters bail was rejected by the High Court. The rest were stated to be either disposed off with observations or were pending. Why did the 79,626 (Seventy nine thousand six hundred and twenty six) cases in which bail was granted come to the High Court when the Sessions Court with concurrent powers could have passed the same order? Dispensing justice is not an empty formality. It has to be done with whole- hearted commitment. Lip service to it is not only abhorrent but also intolerable. After all it affects our own fellow-countrymen. The essential component of justice which is compassion is in gross short supply in such orders, which are passed merely in purported exercise of jurisdiction without a sense of duty. There should be no confusion in the mind of any one that any person who has been conferred with certain jurisdiction, has to exercise his powers, as a duty imposed upon him, and not in the manner of exhibiting his power as a monarch, proclaiming a dicta, or a wrestler flexing his muscles, would do. 12. The aforesaid figures are distressing, also because according to me, it indicates that the High Court is doing what the Sessions Judge should have done and also probably indicates that the Sessions Judge does what a Magistrate should have done. 13. The reason cited by some officers, seconded by the rest, is that they suffer from a scare of administrative action while passing a positive order. When there are two parties to every litigation, why is only a positive order interpreted to have been passed for reasons not all honourable and not a negative one, defies both logic as well as common-sense. To stress on an important aspect which is, that central to every order, is the integrity of an officer. If the same is deficient, the nature of order can sway in any direction. Hence, to my mind, a Judicial Officer may be amenable to departmental action not only when he fails to exercise his discretion judiciously as also when he fails to exercise it altogether. An order which lacks qualitative appreciation is as much judicial dishonesty as an order which exhibits failure of duty while exercising jurisdiction. Convenient excuses which have the potential of annihilating the Institution and eroding public trust will not work any longer. An order which lacks qualitative appreciation is as much judicial dishonesty as an order which exhibits failure of duty while exercising jurisdiction. Convenient excuses which have the potential of annihilating the Institution and eroding public trust will not work any longer. In some quarters, now, the Judiciary is also defined as a Service Provider, and resultantly its non-performance, like any other wing of administration constituted to serve the public, is also subject to scrutiny. 14. Courts which hold administrative control also need to calm themselves and seriously introspect and search their hearts as to whether, by misjudging a positive order, they have encouraged a culture of status quo, and promoted a monolith which in the name of honesty, projects itself as an indifferent and callous Institution, which does not care for dispensation of Justice but works only to protect itself from possible criticism and administrative action. 15. We seem to have erroneously drawn a line that an officer of a particular rank is empowered to pass only a certain type of order irrespective of the jurisdiction conferred upon him by the Legislature. The result is that the discretion conferred on him is not bridled by the law but by administrative control. It may satisfy the whim or ego of a perverse Officer to determine the artificial line but it destroys and damages the culture of duty which every Judicial Officer must have a sense of, while exercising his judicial discretion. The important question is who accounts for this failure of duty and resultant loss to the litigant, a majority of whom are poor? Why should a poor litigant have to approach a higher Court, further draining his limited resources, if the first Court he goes to is duty bound to redress his grievance? 16. This has led to another worrying aspect that presently Criminal Courts, instead of discharging its primary duty of giving a finding on guilt are largely occupied in matters of bails and have landed themselves in a vicious cycle where even while it robs itself of its time and energy it also obstructs the course of justice. On account of the sine die postponement of a return on guilt, a lot of unnecessary attention is focused on the interim arrangement of bail feeding fat to the general misconception, that bail is the end of a criminal case. On account of the sine die postponement of a return on guilt, a lot of unnecessary attention is focused on the interim arrangement of bail feeding fat to the general misconception, that bail is the end of a criminal case. It is for this reason that there is a great public outcry every time an Accused, who has occupied large public space, is released on bail, little realizing that the main verdict on guilt or otherwise, which is much more important, is yet to come. 17. To get out of this Catch 22 situation, all Courts need to firstly seriously introspect on the issue, then have a will to initiate an improvement, and simultaneously pledge themselves to it. Till such time as they introspect, this Court directs that all Courts, irrespective of their rank hierarchically determined, are enjoined to exercise their jurisdiction in matters of Bail guided by the Statute, judicial pronouncements, and also, by observing how it is dealt with practically by its Superior Courts, and adhere to the pattern and tradition of Bail of its High Court. There is no reason why a Magistrate should refuse bail which is granted by its Superior Courts (unless Legislature prohibits it) or a Sessions Judge should so refuse, when the High Court with concurrent powers traditionally grants bail. 18. All Courts are required to avoid multiplicity of litigations, which tax the poor litigant, the honest tax payer and wastes valuable time. The interest of the entire Criminal Justice Delivery System must converge at a point, where the first Court takes it upon itself to grant expected relief, reducing the burden of its superior courts and leaving all Courts to their business of finally deciding matters. 19. I must add here that Courts should not be shy in exercising its discretion wisely because the definition of a perfect order remains enigmatic, intangible and elusive. For this reason it has to give way to generalizations where it is impossible to eliminate the unconscious infiltration of the element of speculation and human error. It is for this reason that Courts have to adopt general practices of its High Court. Even while accepting myself equally fallible I would direct all Criminal Courts to evolve uniform methods by which it shall not refuse bail by way of punishment and consider each case in its wider perspective. It is for this reason that Courts have to adopt general practices of its High Court. Even while accepting myself equally fallible I would direct all Criminal Courts to evolve uniform methods by which it shall not refuse bail by way of punishment and consider each case in its wider perspective. I have myself kept the following category of cases which affect the public order as not deserving bail : i) Kidnapping for ransom. Even when the only material is confession of accused/co-accused before the police, since this is the only material that can be available in the manner in which the offence is executed. Also because, the Court, at the stage of bail is not to look for evidence, but only material. ii) Cases of fake currency. Since it is a well organized crime directed to destabilize the economy of the Nation. iii) Killing or attempting to kill a witness. Since it obstructs the course of justice. iv) Demand of extortion or offences committed for mercenary reasons which spread terror in the heart of the general public. v) Human trafficking. vi) Economic offences, if of the nature that it corrodes the principles of a Civil Society. vii)Cases where the Act itself lays down certain cautions, such as NDPS Act. The list is not exhaustive, nor is it without exceptions. 20. While we are on the issue of Bails, I would also lead an examination as to how the law on bails has developed over the years so as to understand the principles. 21. In an effort to do so without reproducing the relevant Sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Old Code) incorporated in Chapter XXX1X I would point out that Section 499, 497 and Form XXV of the Old Code are almost similar to the section 436, 437, and Form 45 respectively of the Act of 1974 (henceforth referred to as New Code) nuances of which I shall discuss at the appropriate stage. 22. 22. For the present, as I understand, the salient features of the provisions of the old Act were ; (i) there were different yardsticks for grant of bail in cases of bailable and non-bailable offences; (ii) sureties could be dispensed with, under certain circumstances; (iii) Court was to record reasons for granting bail in non-bailable offence; (iv) bonds were not to be excessive ; (v) the accused was bound with a condition to regularly attend the court; (vi) he was also bound to attend the court on the date fixed for charge ; (vii) the sufficiency of sureties was to be scrutinized ; (viii) affidavits could be given in proof of facts stated by the sureties and most importantly ; (ix) the Courts were empowered to cancel bail bonds at any stage for which no reasons were specified ; (x) the powers of High Court and Sessions Judge were not defined as in present Code vide Section 439 ; 23. Now, to examine the notable older decisions on bail, of various High Courts. 24. Quoted below is the earliest decision of our High Court reported in AIR 1927 Pat 302 which lays down the basic principles followed till this day :-” ' ' The principles on which the Courts should exercise their discretion, in regard to non-bailable offences, have been set out in Nagendra Nath Chakrabarti v. Emperor (1), and in this respect it has been said that there is no difference between the English and the Indian practice. Bail is not to be withheld merely as a punishment, and the requirements as to bail are merely to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial. In my opinion the test is to be applied by reference to the following considerations amongst others: (1) The nature of the accusation. (2) The nature of the evidence in support of the accusation. (3) The severity of the punishment which conviction will entail. (4) The character of the sureties, that is to say, whether they are independent or in demnified by the accused. (5) The character and the behaviour of the accused. (2) The nature of the evidence in support of the accusation. (3) The severity of the punishment which conviction will entail. (4) The character of the sureties, that is to say, whether they are independent or in demnified by the accused. (5) The character and the behaviour of the accused. It was said in In re Robinson (2) that the character or behaviour of the ac cused is irrelevant; but other authorities are of a contrary opinion, and in India, I think, any allegation that the accused is tampering, or attempting to tamper, with witnesses, and thereby obstructing the course of justice, would, in my opinion be a very cogent ground for refusing bail-” -” . 25. In a case reported in AIR 1931 All 356 the Allahabad High Court had held that the Legislature had given High Court and the Courts of Sessions discretion under Section 498 (now 439) unfettered by any limitation to others which controls all discretionary powers vested in a Judge except that the discretion must be exercised judicially. It must have been the first decision which laid down the principle that grant of bail was the rule and refusal an exception. Relevant lines reproduced below :-” ' ' Per Mukerji, J.-” The principle to be deduced from Ss. 496 and 497 is that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. An accused person is presumed under law to be innocent till his guilt is proved. As a presumably innocent person he is entitled to every freedom and every opportunity to look after his case. An accused person if he enjoys freedom will be in a much better position to look after his case and to properly defend himself than if he were in custody-” -” . Further, ' ' As to the object of keeping an accused person in detention during the trial, it has been stated that the object is not punishment, that to keep an accused person under arrest with the object of punishing him on the assumption that he is guilty even if eventually he is acquitted is improper. This is most manifest. The only legitimate purposes to be served by keeping person under trial in detention are to prevent repetition of the offence with which he is charged where there is apparently danger of such repetition and to secure his attendance at the trial. This is most manifest. The only legitimate purposes to be served by keeping person under trial in detention are to prevent repetition of the offence with which he is charged where there is apparently danger of such repetition and to secure his attendance at the trial. The first of those purposes clearly to some extent involves an assumption of the accused-” s guilt, but the very trial itself is based on a prima facie assumption of the accused-” s guilt and it is impossible to hold that in some circumstances it is not a proper ground to be considered. The main purpose however is manifestly to secure the attendance of the accused. 26. These principles appear to be uniformly followed as the decision of Allahrakhio v. Emperor reported in AIR 1933 Sind 367 indicates :-” ' ' Bail will not be withheld merely as punishment and the requirements as to bail are merely to secure attendance of an accused person at the trial. But in granting or refusing bail the Courts generally take into consideration the following points: (1) the nature of the accusation; (2) the nature of the evidence in support of the accusation; (3) the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail; (4) whether accused, if released on bail, is likely (a) to tamper with the prosecution evidence or (b) to get up false evidence in support of the defence: R.V. Bose (1891) 67 L J Q B 289. 27. Now to examine the relevant provisions of the New Code which came into existence on 1.4.1974 which also significantly introduced the provision of Anticipatory Bail, on the basis of comprehensive recommendations of the Fourteenth, Twenty-fifth, Thirty-second, Thirty-third, Thirty-sixth, Thirty- Seventh and Fortieth Law Commission Reports. The following basic considerations were carefully examined by the Government :- (i) an accused person should get a fair trial in accordance with the accepted principles of natural justice; (ii) every effort should be made to avoid de-lay in investigation and trial which is harmful not only to the individuals in-volved but also to society; and (iii) the procedure should not be complicated and should, to the utmost extent possible, ensure fair deal to the poorer sections of the community. 28. It is significant that these recommendations were made after India had gained Independence and had adopted a democratic set up. 28. It is significant that these recommendations were made after India had gained Independence and had adopted a democratic set up. Keeping in mind the Constitutional obligations it laid special importance on need for fairness to the disadvantaged. Despite the same, Criminal Courts have remained routinely insensitive to them, leading to a situation when the Apex Court, in a knee-jerk reaction, had to pass a series of orders releasing prisoners languishing uncared for, and unnoticed, in Bihar jails in the famous case of Hussainara Khatoon ( AIR 1979 SC 1360 ). 29. Since things did not improve substantially sometime later the One Hundred and Fifty Fourth Law Commission reviewed the New Code and submitted its Report on 22.8.1996. It looked into the various problems plaguing the system and considered as to whether the poor were being discriminated against, what were the conventions of bail, scope for improvement in the problem of professional bailors and production of fake papers for securing bail and recommended certain changes in various Sections including 437 to which I shall refer later. 30. Since it marks major shift in the Code according to me, before coming to the amendments, I would like to reproduce Chapter VI of the Law Commission deliberations extensively, to facilitate appreciation of the change in the concept, considerations, conditions and scope of bail and whether in fact it is in opposition to public good. ' 2. The law of Bails, which constitutes an important branch of the procedural law dovetails two conflicting interests namely, on the one hand, the requirements of shielding the society from the hazards of those committing crimes and on the other, the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence, namely, the presumption of innocence of an accused till he is found guilty. 6. A person accused of a bailable offence is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right if he is arrested or detained without warrant. But if the offence is non-bailable, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, the court may grant bail on its discretion. The scope of discretion varies in inverse proportion to the gravity of the crime. But if the offence is non-bailable, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, the court may grant bail on its discretion. The scope of discretion varies in inverse proportion to the gravity of the crime. The courts have formulated the following guidelines for grant bail in non-bailable offences (i) the enormity of the charge; (ii) the nature of the accusation; (iii) the severity of the punishment which the conviction will entail; (iv) the nature of the evidence in support of the accusation; (v) the danger of the accused person ab-sconding if he is released on bail; (vi) the danger of witnesses being tampered with; (vii) the protracted nature of the trial; (viii) opportunity to the applicant for preparation of his defence and access to his counsel; (ix) the health, age and sex of the accused; (x) the nature and gravity of the circum- stances in which the offence is committed; (xi) the position and status of the accused with reference to the victim and the wit- nesses; and (xii) the probability of accused committing more offences it released on bail, etc. 31. On a plain reading of Clause 6 we find that it is an in depth, expansive, and all encompassing study based on the decisions of various Courts over the years out of which 6[i] [ii] [iii] [iv] [x] pertain to the offence, 6[v] [vi] [xii] to his conduct, whereas the rest are special circumstances in regard to the accused or the case. 32. The Law Commission further goes on to clarify that ' ' 7. These considerations are by no means exhaustive. Factors such as previous convictions, criminal records of the accused and the possibility of the accused committing offences if enlarged on bail are also taken into account while deciding the question of bail. 8.1. Does the bail system discriminate against the poor? 8.2. On this question, the Report of the Legal Aid Committee appointed by the Government of Gujarat, in 1971 has commented on the bail system thus. ' ' The bail system causes discrimination against the poor since the poor would not be able to furnish bail on account of their poverty while the wealthier persons otherwise similarly situate would be able to secure their freedom because they can afford to furnish bail. ' ' The bail system causes discrimination against the poor since the poor would not be able to furnish bail on account of their poverty while the wealthier persons otherwise similarly situate would be able to secure their freedom because they can afford to furnish bail. This discrimination arisen even if the amount of the bail fixed by the Magistrate is not high, for a large majority of those who are though (sic) before the Courts in criminal cases are so poor that they would find it difficult to furnish bail even in a small amount. The evil of the bail system is that either the poor accused has to fall back on touts and professional sureties for providing bail or suffer pre -trial detention. Both these consequences are fraught with great hardship to the poor. In one case the poor accused is fleeced of his moneys by touts and professional sureties and sometimes has even to incur debts to make payment to them for securing his release; in the other he is deprived of his liberty without trial and conviction and this leads to grave consequences, namely: (1) though presumed innocent he is subjected to the psychological and physical deprivations of free life; (2) he loses his job, if he has one, and is deprived of an opportunity to work to support himself and his family with the result that burden of his detention falls heavily on the innocent members of the family, (3) he is prevented from contributing to the preparation of his defence; and (4) the public exchequer has to bear the cost of maintaining him in the jail-” -” . 8.3. Subsequently, a Central Committee on Legal Aid reported in similar vein : ' ' - [We] think that a liberal policy (sic) of conditional release without monetary sureties or financial security and release on one-” s own recognizance with punishment provided for violation will go a long way to reform the bail system and help the weaker and poorer sections of the community to get equal justice under law. Conditional release may take the form of entrusting the accused to the care of his relatives or releasing him on supervision. The court or the authority granting bail may have to use the discretion judiciously. Conditional release may take the form of entrusting the accused to the care of his relatives or releasing him on supervision. The court or the authority granting bail may have to use the discretion judiciously. When the accused is too poor to find sureties, there will be no point in insisting on his furnishing bail with sureties, as it will only compel him to be in custody with the consequent handicaps in making his defence.' - [Underlining mine] 8.4. In order to eliminate the discrimination against the poor and the indigent accused in the grant of bail for bailable offences, Clause 40 of the Criminal Procedure Amendment Bill, 1994 seeks to amend section 436 of the Code to make a mandatory provision that if the arrested persons accused of a bailable offence is an indigent and cannot furnish security, the court shall release him on his execution of a bond without sureties. The amendment is as follows: In section 436, in sub-section (1) ' - (a) in the first proviso, for the words ' ' may, instead of taking bail,-” -” the words may, and shall, if such person is ' indigent and is unable to furnish security-” -” , shall be substituted: (b) after the first proviso the following Explanation shall be inserted: Explanation ' - Where a person is unable to give bail within a week of the date of his arrest, it shall be sufficient ground for the officer or the court to presume that he is an indigent person for the purposes of the proviso. 8.5. The Commission recommends the amendments referred to above as they are consistent with the Supreme Court-” s pronouncements and juristic opinion that poor accused committing bailable offences should not be denied bail on the basis of indigency. Pre-trial Detention: 9. The purpose of pre-trial detention is not punishment. A survey of decided cases reveals that the law favours release of accused on bail, which is the rule, and refusal is the exception. 9.1. The plight of under-trial prisoners was vividly brought out in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary. ( AIR 1979 SC 1360 )The case disclosed a dismal state of affairs in the State of Bihar in regard to administration of criminal justice. Hordes of men and women under-trial were languishing in Bihar jails for periods ranging from three to ten years without the commencement of trials. ( AIR 1979 SC 1360 )The case disclosed a dismal state of affairs in the State of Bihar in regard to administration of criminal justice. Hordes of men and women under-trial were languishing in Bihar jails for periods ranging from three to ten years without the commencement of trials. They were in jails for much longer periods than they would have been had they been found guilty and sentenced after trial. They were in jails not because they were found guilty but were too poor to afford bail and the trials did not commence. In this context the following observations of P.N. Bhagwati, J., (as he then was) are apposite. ' ' One reason why our legal and judicial system continually denies justice to the poor by keeping them for long years in pre -trial detention is our highly unsatisfactory bail system. It suffers from property oriented approach which seems to proceed on the erroneous assumption that risk of monetary loss is the only deterrent against fleeing from justice. The Code of Criminal Procedure, even after its re-enactment, continues to adopt the same antiquated approach as the earlier Code enacted towards the end of the last century and where an accused is to be released on his personal bond, it insists that the bond should contain a monetary obligation requiring the accused to pay a sum of money in case, he fails to appear at the trial. Moreover, as if this were not sufficient deterrent to the poor, the courts mechanically and as a matter of course insist that the accused should produce sureties who will stand bail for him and these sureties must again establish their solvency to be able to pay up the amount of the bail in case the accused fails to appear to answer the charge. This system of bails operates very harshly against the poor and it is only the non-poor who are able to take advantage of it by getting themselves released on bail. This system of bails operates very harshly against the poor and it is only the non-poor who are able to take advantage of it by getting themselves released on bail. The poor find it difficult to furnish bail even without sureties because very often the amount of the bail fixed by the court is so unrealistically excessive that in a majority of cases the poor are unable to satisfy the police or the magistrate about their solvency for the amount of the bail and where the bail is with sureties as is usually the case, it becomes an almost impossible task for the poor to find persons sufficiently solvent to stand as sureties. That result is that either they are fleeced by the police and revenue officials or by touts and professional sureties and sometimes they have even to incur debts for securing their release or, being unable to obtain release, they have to remain in jail until such time as the court is able to take up their cases for trial, leading to grave consequences. It is high time that our Parliament realizes that risk of monetary loss is not the only deterrent against fleeing from justice, but there are also other factors which act as equal deterrents against fleeing............. Parliament would do well to consider .......... whether............ considerations such as family ties, roots in the community, job security, membership to stable organizations etc., should be the determinative facts in grant of bail and the accused should in appropriate cases be released on his personal bond without monetary obligation. Of course, it may be necessary in such a case to provide by an amendment of the penal law that if the accused willfully fails to appear in compliance with the promise contained in his personal bond, he shall be liable to penal action. But even under the law as it stands today the courts must abandon the antiquated concept under which pre-trial release is ordered only against bail with sureties-” -” . 11. But even under the law as it stands today the courts must abandon the antiquated concept under which pre-trial release is ordered only against bail with sureties-” -” . 11. In order to make the provision under section 437 more stringent and ensure that the accused released on bail does not interfere or intimidate the witnesses, section 437 be amended as provided under Clause 42 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Bill, 1994: ' ' In section 437 of the principal Act, (i) in sub-section (1), (a) Clause (ii) for the word ' a non-bailable and cognizable offence-” -” , the words -' ' a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for not less than three years-” -” shall be substituted, (b) After the third proviso, the following proviso shall be (sic) inserted, namely, ' ' Provided also that no person shall, if the offence alleged to have been committed by him is punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for seven years or more be released on bail by the Court under this sub-section without giving an opportunity of hearing to the Public Prosecutor-” -” . (ii) in sub-section (3) for the portion beginning with the words, the ' ' Court may impose-” -” and ending with the words ' ' the interests of justice-” -” , the following shall be substituted, namely: ' ' the Court shall impose the conditions,- (a) that such person shall attend in accordance with the conditions of the bond executed under this Chapter. (b) that such person shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer or tamper with the evidence and may also impose, in the interests of justice, such other conditions as it considers necessary-” -” . 33. Importantly we find that even though the Commission deliberated on considering the antecedents of an accused at the time of grant of bail his potentiality to repeat a similar offence in Clause 7, its recommendations were confined only to pinning down an accused to appearing regularly in Court and to restrain himself from tampering with the evidence. However the Legislature in its wisdom added another clause by way of section 437(3)(b) to control the future activities of an accused. 34. Sureties. 19.1. However the Legislature in its wisdom added another clause by way of section 437(3)(b) to control the future activities of an accused. 34. Sureties. 19.1. The bail procedure is becoming a shame in courts with the accused in criminal cases absconding after arranging fake sureties on fake identities and address. Accordingly the procedure of securing release on the basis of forged documents has become easy. 19.2. In Delhi the practice seems to be that when the court allows accused-” s release on bail after a local person is willing to stand surety, the guarantor has to produce documents to the Court to prove his domicile and solvency. This is done by producing a ration card or a passport. In addition, a power - of-attorney attested by a Notary Public, a motor vehicle registration document, a bank fixed deposit receipt or a certificate from the Income-Tax Department is required to be submitted to authenticate the guarantor-” s solvency. 19.3. There are touts operating in the Court premises, who help out, on a price tag, those accused who scheme to obtain bail with the idea of absconding. These touts give surety on the basis of fake identity. They operate with numerous, fake ration cards which substantiate their domicile in Delhi each in a different name and address. A back dated stamp paper is procured on which details regarding the power -of-attorney of the guarantor-” s property in Delhi are stated and is attested by a Notary Public. They also have in their possession fake letterheads of private organizations, fake identity cards of themselves as government servants and fake motor vehicle registration papers. The touts have to be paid 20% to 30% of the surety amount before the presentation of the surety. 19.4. Clause 44 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Bill seeks to incorporate a new section, section 441A to deal with the abuse of professional and fake sureties which reads as under: ' ' Every person standing surety to an accused person for his release on bail, shall make a declaration before the court as to the number of persons to whom he has stood surety including the accused, giving therein all the relevant particulars-” -” . 19.5. We are of the view that section 441A be incorporated in the Code to eliminate the pernicious evil of professional and fake sureties in the bail process. 19.5. We are of the view that section 441A be incorporated in the Code to eliminate the pernicious evil of professional and fake sureties in the bail process. It will eliminate collusion between professional sureties, administrators of criminal justice system and criminals-” . 35. Thus we find that the Law commission concluded, in the background of various decisions, [i] that bail is not to be refused as a punishment and Iii] that established principles of law favours bail. [iii] that the poor were a disadvantaged lot [iv] there was a need to improve quality of bailors [v] there was also a need to control the activities of an accused to ensure a fair and speedy trial. 36. Now to examine the Amendments in the relevant provisions which came 9 years later in 2005, marked in italics reproduced below. 436. In what cases bail to be taken- (1) When any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or appears or is brought before a Court, and is prepared at any time while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceeding before such Court to give bail, such person shall be released on bail: Provided that such officer or Court, if he or it thinks fit, [may, and shall, if such person is indigent and is unable to furnish surety, instead of taking bail] from such person, discharge him on his executing a bond without sureties for his appearance as hereinafter provided: (Provided -...) [Explanation- Where a person is unable to give bail within a week of the date of his arrest, it shall be a sufficient ground for the officer or the Court to presume that he is an indigent person for the purposes of this proviso.] (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where a person has failed to comply with the conditions of the bail-bond as regards the time and place of attendance, the Court may refuse to release him on bail, when on a subsequent occasion in the same case he appears before the Court or is brought in custody and any refusal shall be without prejudice to the powers of the Court to call upon any person bound by such bond to pay the penalty thereof under section 446. 37. 37. It is important to point out herein itself that after amendment the provision unlike the previous one becomes more stringent when an accused fails to comply with the conditions with which he is bound even in cases of bailable nature and after amendment more benevolent towards indigent persons. 38. To further the cause of compassion Section 436(A) was introduced to ensure that no person remained endlessly in custody as an under-trial even in certain classes of non- bailable offence but by adding the Explanation it ensured it was not an unconditional compassion. 436-A. Maximum period for which an undertrial prisoner can be detained.-” Where a person has, during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial under this Code of an offence under any law (not being an offence for which the punishment of death has been specified as one of the punishments under that law) undergone detention for a period extending up to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for that offence under that law, he shall be released by the Court on his personal bond with or without sureties: Provided that ............. Provided further that......... Explanation.-” In computing the period of detention under this section for granting bail the period of detention passed due to delay in proceeding caused by the accused shall be excluded. 437. Provided further that......... Explanation.-” In computing the period of detention under this section for granting bail the period of detention passed due to delay in proceeding caused by the accused shall be excluded. 437. When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence.-” [(1) When any person accused of, or suspected of, the commission of any non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court other than the High Court or Court of Session, he may be released on bail, but- (i) Such person shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life; (ii) such person shall not be so released if such offence is a cognizable offence and he had been previously convicted of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for seven years or more, or he had been previously convicted on two or more occasions of (a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for three years or more but not less than seven years]: Provided that the Court may direct that a person referred to in Clause (i) or Clause (ii) be released on bail if such person is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is sick or infirm: Provided further that the Court may also direct that a person referred to in Clause (ii) be released on bail if it is satisfied that it is just and proper so to do for any other special reason. Provided also that the mere fact that an accused person may be required for being identified by witnesses during investigation shall not be sufficient ground for refusing to grant bail if he is otherwise entitled to be released on bail and gives an undertaking that he shall comply with such directions as may be given by the Court]: [Provided also that no person shall, if the offence alleged to have been committed by him is punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for seven years or more, be released on bail by the Court under this sub-section without giving an opportunity of hearing to the Public Prosecutor.] (2) ……… (3) When a person accused or suspected of the commission of an offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or more or of an offence under Chapter VI, Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII or the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or abetment of, or conspiracy or attempt to commit, any such offence, is released on bail under sub-section (1), [the Court shall impose the conditions,- (a) that such person shall attend in accordance with the conditions of the bond executed under this Chapter, (b) that such person shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he is accused, or suspected, of the commission of which he is suspected, and (c) that such person shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer or tamper with the evidence, and may also impose, in the interests of justice, such other conditions as it considers necessary.] (4), (7) .... 39. At this stage this Court wishes to draw attention to the Notes on Clauses of the amendment and relevant unamended portion of Sections 437(3) to understand its import and its relation with Section 439(a). Amendment Act 2005 ' Under sub-section (3) of section 437 of the Code, the Court has got the discretion to impose certain conditions for the grant of bail. Under section 441(2), where any condition is imposed for the release of a person on bail, the bond shall contain that condition also. Amendment Act 2005 ' Under sub-section (3) of section 437 of the Code, the Court has got the discretion to impose certain conditions for the grant of bail. Under section 441(2), where any condition is imposed for the release of a person on bail, the bond shall contain that condition also. In order to make the provision stringent and to see that the person on bail does not interfere or intimidate witness, sub-section (3) is being amended to specify certain conditions, which are mandatory' -. (Underlining mine) Substituted by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2005 (25 of 2005), S. 37(ii), for ' the Court may impose any condition which the Court considers necessary- (a) in order to ensure that such person shall attend in accordance with the conditions of the bond executed under this Chapter, or (b) in order to ensure that such person shall not commit an offence similar to the offence of which he is accused or of the commission of which he is suspected, or (c) otherwise in the interests of justice' - 439. Special powers of High Court or Court of Sessions regarding bail.-” (1) A High Court or Court of Session may direct- (a) that any person accused of an offence and in custody be released on bail, and if the offence is of the nature specified in sub-section (3) of section 437, may impose any condition which it considers necessary for the purposes mentioned in that sub-section; (Underlining mine) (b) .... Provided that ....... (2) …. 40. After amendment of 2005 in section 437(3), we find that the ' purpose' - previously mentioned and qualified in Section 439(1)(a) now stands deleted. Instead 437(3) now mandates that the accused be compulsorily fastened with certain conditions. 41. Under the circumstances I would think that the underlined words of Section 439(1) (a), reproduced above also required corresponding amendment to tune in with Section 437(3). That not having been done it has somewhat created an impression that only Magistrates are required to impose conditions. In my view, keeping in mind the reasons for amendments of 2005, it would be desirable that High Courts and Sessions Judge interpret the word ' may-” appearing in section 439(1)(a) as ' shall-” and necessarily impose conditions since ' purpose-” has been substituted with a mandate, so as to reach a harmonious construction. 42. In my view, keeping in mind the reasons for amendments of 2005, it would be desirable that High Courts and Sessions Judge interpret the word ' may-” appearing in section 439(1)(a) as ' shall-” and necessarily impose conditions since ' purpose-” has been substituted with a mandate, so as to reach a harmonious construction. 42. I would also think that by ignoring the importance of imposition of conditions, the Courts have not only failed to keep pace with the march of the law, but have also permitted an accused to continue to assume that he has relinquished his responsibility of a trial once released on bail. 43. In my opinion this change in law is also of great significance because prior to the amendments, a Court, apart from the merits of the offence, had also to seriously consider as to whether or not, post bail, the accused would appear during trial and/or whether or not he would tamper with prosecution evidence. Thus the Court took the entire responsibility of a speedy and fair trial upon itself. The effect of amendments is that now these aspects are given constants, leaving no scope for speculation. It radically balances the responsibility of a Court and that of an Accused. The conditions to which an accused is to be bound now mandate that he shall not flee the course of justice, shall regularly attend the Court and once let loose, shall not predate on the right of the others to live in peace. Without undermining the importance of the discretion of the Courts in matters of bail, the Legislature has attempted to transfer some load off the Courts to an accused, who in lieu of ' regulated freedom' - has to undertake that he would remain within the control of the judicial system. It also suggests that we need to stop agonizing ourselves only on the merits of the case, which is not the sole criteria for allowing or refusing bail and need to shift our focus to making an accused more responsive to the judicial system. Unless we do so, we have no hope. 44. In this context let us examine the development in the provisions pertaining to Bonds which also seems to be geared in the same direction. 441. Unless we do so, we have no hope. 44. In this context let us examine the development in the provisions pertaining to Bonds which also seems to be geared in the same direction. 441. Bond of accused and sureties.-” (1) Before any person is released on bail or released on his own bond, a bond for such sum of money as the police officer or Court, as the case may be, thinks sufficient shall be executed by such person, and, when he is released on bail, by one or more sufficient sureties conditioned that such person shall attend at the time and place mentioned in the bond, (3) If the case so requires, the bond shall also bind the person released on bail to appear when called upon at the High Court, Court of Session or other Court of answer the charge. (4) For the purpose of determining whether the sureties are fit or sufficient, the Court may accept affidavits in proof of the facts contained therein relating to the sufficiency or fitness of the sureties, or, if it considers necessary, may either hold an inquiry itself or cause an inquiry to be made by a Magistrate subordinate to the Court, as to such sufficiency or fitness. (Underlining mine) 45. In 2005 Section 441 A quoted below was added which materially affects the character of a surety; 441-A. Declaration by sureties.-” Every person standing surety to an accused person for his release on bail, shall make a declaration before the Court as to the number of persons to whom he has stood surety including the accused, giving therein all the relevant particulars. By enacting 441A the quality of bailor now is subject to scrutiny and rejection. Here Form 45 appended to the Code reproduced below also warrants attention. BOND AND BAIL-BOND FOR ATTENDANCE BEFORE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF POLICE STATION OR COURT (See Sections 436, [436-A], 437, [437-A], 438(3) and 441) I, .................. (name), of ……... (place), having been arrested or detained without warrant by the officer in charge of ……. Here Form 45 appended to the Code reproduced below also warrants attention. BOND AND BAIL-BOND FOR ATTENDANCE BEFORE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF POLICE STATION OR COURT (See Sections 436, [436-A], 437, [437-A], 438(3) and 441) I, .................. (name), of ……... (place), having been arrested or detained without warrant by the officer in charge of ……. police station (or having been brought before the Court of ……..), charged with the offence of ………., and required to give security for my attendance before such Officer or Court on condition that I shall attend such Officer or Court on every day on which any investigation or trial is held with regard to such charge, and in case of my making default herein, I bind myself to forfeit to Government the sum of rupees ……. Dated, this............ day of ........., 20 (Signature) 46. Section 446-A evidently further holds the key to the power of the Courts to cancel bail bonds for reasons of default in appearance. ' 446-A. Cancellation of bond and bail bond - Without prejudice to the provisions of section 446, where a bond under this Code is for appearance of a person in a case and it is forfeited for breach of a condition. (a) the bond executed by such person as well as the bond, if any, executed by one or more of his sureties in that case shall stand cancelled; and (b) …….... Provided …….. 47. To summarize, as per the New Code the Courts have to keep in mind that; i) the sufficiency of the bond is an indeterminate factor (441) ii) Both, the bailor, as well as the accused are bound to ensure attendance/production of the bailed accused before the Court on the required dates (437(3)(a) read with 441(1) Form 45). iii) Attendance on the date of Charge is a prefixed condition (437(3)(a) read in conso-nance with 441 Form 45). iv) The Court is competent to accept Affidavits in proof of sufficiency of Bailors [441(4)] v) a bailor has to furnish further details (441A) 48. Finally, this Court seeks to explain the conditions mentioned in paragraph 1. (i) Through condition A this Court seeks further information of the family of an accused while handing him over in the watch of his relative so he can be reached through any one of them at the required time. Finally, this Court seeks to explain the conditions mentioned in paragraph 1. (i) Through condition A this Court seeks further information of the family of an accused while handing him over in the watch of his relative so he can be reached through any one of them at the required time. The information is to be given on oath so that if later any entry is found false, it is a good ground for cancelling the bail bonds. Also ordinarily a litigant attaches a certain amount of sanctity to an Affidavit and is afraid to lie on oath. It is often noticed that trials are delayed because an Accused shifts his location. So the condition further requires a bailor to give information to the Court on any change of address. (ii) It is often found that Court requires a further Affidavit in regard to antecedents at the time of release of an offender and hence it is subject to verification in appropriate cases, as condition B, which is in line with Section 437(1)(ii). (iii) Condition C takes care of the future conduct of the Accused and is in terms of Section 437(3)(b). It is a valid ground for cancellation of bail of an accused to which he need not be given any further notice since he has already bound himself to the condition of not indulging in similar activity. However, importantly, the Court will have to satisfy itself that the implication in the subsequent case is a genuine one. This condition additionally, also imposes a continuous responsibility upon the Caretaker i.e. the bailor till the end of trial. (iv) Condition D is imposed to plug the two main clogging points in trial i.e. the stage of receiving police papers, and the stage of charge. It also seeks to transfer a major responsibility of ensuring a smooth and expeditious trial off its shoulders to that of an Accused. (v) In synchronization with the above, Condition E is imposed to obviate the possibility of unexplained absence of an accused. Both these conditions are in conformity with Sections 437(3)(a), 446-A and Form 45. It also seeks to transfer a major responsibility of ensuring a smooth and expeditious trial off its shoulders to that of an Accused. (v) In synchronization with the above, Condition E is imposed to obviate the possibility of unexplained absence of an accused. Both these conditions are in conformity with Sections 437(3)(a), 446-A and Form 45. (vi) This Court adopts the suggestion mentioned in the deliberations of the Law Commission in Clause 8.3 that an accused be handed over in the care and guardianship of a responsible person and imposes condition G in appropriate cases where this Court feels the Accused had hitherto escaped the safety net of the family and society. It is not only to ensure his attendance but also to block the negative feeders, to give him an option to a way of life to which he had earlier no choice. By doing so this Court hopes to divert his energy and attention to a world of hope and promise. This I feel is essential since I am of the view that the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act may not have the same impact on the life of a person after conviction, as an opportunity given earlier. Moreover, on presentation of a good certificate there could be chances of a lighter punishment which would put in effect the Probation of Offenders Act and also add a human touch to the criminal justice delivery system. (vii) Condition H which requires a husband to pay a reasonable amount to his wife is imposed to ameliorate the condition of a wife who has to fight against many odds to get even meager doles of maintenance from her husband. (viii) In appropriate cases looking into the nature of the offence, and the need to keep the activity of an accused in check this Court imposes Condition I by which it mandates the accused to appear before a police authority who is directed to keep a watch on his activities. 49. The aforesaid principles have been enumerated and explained by me in extenso so that all Criminal Courts bear them in mind while dealing with such matters and do not proceed mechanically without applying their judicial mind. 50. All Magistrates are also directed not to routinely insist upon monetary sureties nor fix onerous ones. 49. The aforesaid principles have been enumerated and explained by me in extenso so that all Criminal Courts bear them in mind while dealing with such matters and do not proceed mechanically without applying their judicial mind. 50. All Magistrates are also directed not to routinely insist upon monetary sureties nor fix onerous ones. Documents such as Voter I.D./Aadhaar card /BPL/Ration Card and such other papers should be enough to satisfy them on the credibility of the Accused/Bailor and their roots in the Society. 51. Further, Criminal Courts are well advised to keep in mind that certain offences, such as, 498A be dealt with differently. The anxiety of all courts should be firstly to initiate a process of mediation and protect the interest of the family for which reason it should refrain from routinely putting the Accused of such cases behind the bars. If any family member is put behind the bars chances of a settlement may diminish. Hence in cases of 498A, unless the allegations are so gross that there would be, with absolute certainty, no chance of a settlement, whenever an Accused appears or moves for Anticipatory Bail and offers to settle the dispute he should be granted bail/provisional bail. At the same time the relevant party be noticed and after appearance the matter be referred to the local Mediation Center or a responsible citizen/lawyer. The bailed Accused be conditioned to appear before the Mediation Center/person, and if he fails to do so his bail bonds be cancelled for having violated the condition to which he had bound itself. An outer time limit such as 4 months be fixed for such proceeding. At the end of it, if the report is favourable the matter be sent to Lok Adalat for a final decree, if not, the case be marked for expeditious disposal, preferably on a day to day basis. An outer limit, once again, be fixed, depending on the number of witnesses. In the meanwhile Condition H be imposed at the first instance. Here I would like to point out that even though Section 437(2) gives power to a Magistrate to provisionally release an accused in certain situations, it does not cover cases instituted under Section 498A, I.P.C. Therefore, whenever a Magistrate attempts to reconcile a dispute of such nature he has to necessarily grant bail to an accused giving him an unfair advantage. I would take this opportunity to request the Law Commission to look into this problem and suggest suitable amendment in Section 437(2) giving a Magistrate wider discretion in such matters. 52. Lastly to keep cynics at bay, this Court explains that it is under no misconception that by imposing the aforementioned conditions it is likely to achieve a State of Utopia. It believes it does so, in order to deal with the lingering concern of the Code and that of the Law Commission on the aspects discussed above. The attempt of this Court has been merely to discharge its obligations of reflecting the wisdom of the Legislature and to keep pace with development of criminal jurisprudence and nothing more. 53. Let a copy of this order be communicated to all the District & Sessions Judges of Bihar for further circulation amongst the rest of the Judicial Officers. Let a copy of this order also be sent to the Chairman, Law Commission of India, ILI Building (IInd Floor), Bhagwandas Road, New Delhi ' - 110001. Order accordingly.