Judgment 1. The petitioner was one of the members of the Board of Directors of A-394, Virudhunagar District Urban Co-operative Bank Limited, which is a co-operative society governed by the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act. During the relevant period, one Mr.Rajakani was the President of the Board, consisting of as many as 8 members including the petitioner. 2. On 19.06.1998, the Board of Directors resolved to engage one Mr.J.Ayanar as a Collection Agent. Similarly, on 30.07.1999, the Board resolved to engage one Mr.S.Palanivel as a Collection Agent. In the same manner, on 30.07.1999, the Board resolved to engage one Mr.Sivakumar as Collection Agent. Accordingly, they were engaged and they were paid wages. Mr.J.Ayanar was paid a total sum of Rs.74,874/-; Mr.S.Palanivel was paid a total sum of Rs.1,32,164/- and Mr.Sivakumar was paid a total sum of Rs.66,965/-. Thereafter, on 07.08.2000, the President Mr.Rajakani engaged one Mr.R.Suresh Kumar as Collection Agent. To him, a total sum of Rs.21,004/- was paid. Then, the President Mr.Rajakani appointed one Mr.K.Paulraj as night watchman and to him, a sum of Rs.23,200/- was paid in total. 3. Whileso, the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies ordered inspection and investigation of the affairs of the said society. The Enquiry Officer held enquiry and finally submitted a report holding that the petitioner and all the other Board of Members were all responsible for the loss caused to the society by paying wages to Mr.J.Ayanar, Mr.S.Palanivel and Mr.Sivakumar. The report further stated that for the loss caused to the society by paying wages to Mr.Sureshkumar and Mr.Paulraj, the President Mr.Rajakani is responsible. 4. Based on the same, the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Aruppukkottai initiated proceedings under Section 87 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 (In short, the Act). Though the petitioner and other members of the Board initially appeared before the Deputy Registrar for some time, later they failed. Finally, the Deputy Registrar, by his proceedings in Tha. Va. No.4/2003-2004 Sa.Ba dated 19.04.2004 passed an award in favour of the society, thereby holding that the petitioner, the President and all the other members of the Board are jointly and severally liable to pay the amount back to the society with interest at the rate of 18% on account of the loss caused to the society by the payment of wages to Mr.J.Ayanar, Mr.S.Palanivel and Mr.Sivakumar. Sofar as the loss caused to the society, insofar as the wages paid to Mr.Suresh Kumar and Mr.Paulraj, according to the Arbitrator, the President Mr.Rajakani alone is liable to repay the same with interest at 18%. 5. Challenging the said award of the Arbitrator, the petitioner and others have filed an appeal before the Co-operative Tribunal cum Principal District Judge, Virudhunagar District at Srivilliputhur in C.M.A.(CS).No.11 of 2004. The Tribunal, by order dated 30.08.2005 dismissed the appeal. 6. Aggrieved over the same, the petitioner is before this Court with this writ petition. 7. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the learned Government Advocate appearing for the second respondent and the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent and I have also perused the records carefully. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner would commence the arguments by submitting that a copy of the report, under Section 82 of the Act was not furnished to the petitioner. 9. In this submission, I do not find any force, because, the petitioner had never raised such an issue before the Arbitrator. Had he raised such an issue before the Arbitrator, the Arbitrator would have furnished a copy under Section 82 of the Act. Thus, in my considered opinion, the petitioner has not been in any manner affected by non-supplying of a copy under Section 82 of the Act. Therefore, this ground is rejected. 10. Nextly, the learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that though the proceedings under Section 87 of the Act was initiated on 09.05.2003, the impugned award was passed only on 19.04.2004. He would further submit that as per Section 87 of the Act, the award was not passed within a period of 6 months from the date of initiation of the proceedings. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, on this ground, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. But, there is no difficult for me to reject this argument because the law has been well-settled by this Court in catena of decisions, more particularly in S.V.K.Sahasramam v. Dy.Registrar of Co-op. Societies, reported in (2008) 8 MLJ 231 , wherein, this Court has held that the period mentioned for conclusion of enquiry under Section 87 of the Act is only directory in nature. Therefore, this ground raised is also rejected. 11. Societies, reported in (2008) 8 MLJ 231 , wherein, this Court has held that the period mentioned for conclusion of enquiry under Section 87 of the Act is only directory in nature. Therefore, this ground raised is also rejected. 11. Nextly, the learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that even assuming that there was loss caused to the society by the payment of the wages to the employees, who were engaged by the society, that cannot be stated to be either a negligence or a willful negligence. Therefore, according to him, the award should not have been passed under Section 87 of the Act against the petitioner. 12. In this regard, I may refer to Section 87 of the act, which states that on certain specified conditions alone, the award may be passed under Section 87 of the Act. It states that in case of misappropriation or fraudulent retention of money or other property or guilt of breach of trust or willful negligence or has made any payment, which is not in accordance with this Act, the rules or the by-laws, the Registrar himself or any person specially authorised by him in this behalf, may initiate action under Section 87 of the Act. Here, in this case, the record would show that it is neither a case of misappropriation nor a case of breach of trust. Similarly, it is neither a case of retention of money nor causing breach of trust. 13. The learned counsel for the respondent would submit that loss was caused due to the willful negligence of the petitioner and other Office Bearers. This argument deserves only to be dismissed, as it is only an attempt made, at the fag end of the litigation to show some improvements in the case of the respondents. A perusal of the record would go to show that the charge-memorandum does not indicate that there was any willful negligence on the part of the petitioner and others. Even in the award passed by the second respondent, it has not been concluded that the petitioner was willfully negligent. A perusal of the order of the tribunal would also go to show that it is not the finding of the tribunal also that the loss was caused due to the willful negligence of the petitioner. Even in the award passed by the second respondent, it has not been concluded that the petitioner was willfully negligent. A perusal of the order of the tribunal would also go to show that it is not the finding of the tribunal also that the loss was caused due to the willful negligence of the petitioner. It needs to be noted that it is not the mere negligence, which results in loss to the society, makes a person responsible for the loss to make good the same. For making the person responsible to make good the loss, it should be pleaded and proved that the negligence is willful. Time and again, this Court has held in a catena of decisions that charge should be specific to say that it is not only negligence but also willful negligence, which resulted in the loss. Here, in this case, as I have already mentioned, nowhere, it has been mentioned that the petitioner was negligent and that too willful negligent. 14. Not on the above technical ground of failure to mention that the negligence was willful, I am inclined to set aside the award of the Arbitrator. But, instead, I find that there is no material even to infer that the petitioner was willfully negligent. It is the admitted case that for the purpose of making collection of long pending dues to the society, in the larger interest of the society, a decision was taken in the Board of Directors to engage Collection Agents. Thus, there is no question of negligence at all. When basically there is no negligence, it cannot be said that there was willful negligence. Hence, I find no proof of willful negligence against the petitioner. If willful negligence is so ruled out, since there is neither misappropriation nor fraudulent retention of money, the petitioner is bound to succeed. It is on this ground, I am inclined to set aside the award. 15. In view of all the above, the writ petition succeeds. The impugned order of the tribunal and the order of the Arbitrator are hereby set aside, insofar as the petitioner is concerned. No costs.