JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition is directed against order dated 25.5.94 of Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, whereby a second appeal preferred by the petitioner under Section 224 of Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (for short "the Act") against the judgment and decree dated 16.6.87 of Revenue Appellate Authority (RAA)- II, Jodhpur, affirming the judgment and decree dated 25.2.87 passed by the Assistant Collector, Mt. Abu decreeing the suit preferred by the respondents-plaintiffs under Section 188 & 187B of the Act, stands dismissed. 2. The respondents-plaintiffs preferred a suit against the petitioner herein under Section 188 & 187B of the Act with the averments that the lands ad measuring 4 bighas 10 biswas comprising khasra no.48, 1 biswa comprising khasra no.49, 1 biswa comprising khasra no.50, 11 bighas 1 biswa comprising khasra no.51, 3 bighas 1 biswa comprising khasra no. 53 and 3 biswas comprising khasra no.54, have been in their possession since 1978 and prior to that the land was in cultivatory possession of their father and grand father. It was alleged that on 9.7.84, the petitioner-defendant had forcibly and illegally dispossessed the respondents-plaintiffs of 4.1 bighas land comprising khasra no.48 and 1.10 bighas land comprising khasra no.51. It was further alleged that the petitioner-defendant is bent upon to dispossess the respondents-plaintiffs from remaining land. 3. The suit was contested by the petitioner-defendant by filing a written statement thereto taking the stand that the disputed land was purchased by Shri Shyamlal from one Shri Ram Sahai through a registered sale deed on 12.10.60. The petitioner defendant claimed that 1/4th of the land was in his possession since long and therefore, Shri Ram Sahai was not entitled to sell the entire land and consequently, on the strength of the Will dated 6.12.78 executed by Shri Shyamlal in favour of respondents-plaintiffs they cannot claim any right over the land in occupation of the petitioner-defendant. 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed the issues and parties led their evidence. After due consideration of the evidence on record, the trial court arrived at the finding that the respondents-plaintiffs remained in possession of the disputed land since 1978. The Will executed by Shri Shyamlal in favour of the respondents-plaintiffs was held to be proved. After due consideration of the evidence on record, the trial court arrived at the finding that the respondents-plaintiffs remained in possession of the disputed land since 1978. The Will executed by Shri Shyamlal in favour of the respondents-plaintiffs was held to be proved. The issue with regard to forcible dispossession of the respondents-plaintiffs from the disputed land ad measuring 4.10 bighas comprising khasra no.48 and 1.10 bighas comprising khasra no.51 in the year 1984 by the petitioner-defendant was also decided in favour of the respondents-plaintiffs. However, the court observed that it is not proved that whether the land so willed was self acquired or ancestral and therefore, no right can be construed from the said Will in favour of the plaintiffs. The court found that the title over the land is neither proved nor disproved in favour of either party, however, since the plaintiffs' possession over the land is proved, his right to sue under Section 188 of the Act is not affected. Accordingly, the suit preferred was decreed in favour of the respondents-plaintiffs and the petitioner-defendant was ordered to refrain from any kind of interference in possession of the plaintiffs over khasra no.48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54 directly or through any of his agents. That apart, the petitioner-defendant was directed to hand over the possession of the land measuring 4.10 bighas comprising khasra no.48 and 1.10 bighas comprising khasra no.51 to the respondents-plaintiffs. 5. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 25.2.87 passed by the trial court, the petitioner-defendant preferred an appeal before the RAA, which stood dismissed vide order dated 16.6.87. The second appeal preferred by the petitioner defendant aggrieved by judgment and decree passed by the RAA also stands dismissed by the Board of Revenue by the order impugned. Hence, this petition. 6. It is pertinent to note that after hearing both the parties, the writ petition was disposed of by a coordinate Bench vide order dated 7.2.08 in the following terms: "Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of by setting aside the impugned order of the Board of Revenue (Annex.8) dated 25.5.1994 and the matter is remanded back to the Board of Revenue for decision afresh in accordance with law after giving opportunity of hearing to the concerned parties. The parties through their counsels may appear before the Board of Revenue on 10.03.2008 in the first instance. No order as to costs." 7. The parties through their counsels may appear before the Board of Revenue on 10.03.2008 in the first instance. No order as to costs." 7. As a matter of fact, during the pendency of the petition, one of the plaintiffs-Dinesh Chandra, the respondent no.3 herein, had died on 1.11.96 whose name was ordered to be deleted from the array of the respondents vide order dated 24.7.01 passed by this court, on the request being made on behalf of the counsel for the petitioner. Later, an application was preferred on behalf of the petitioner to bring the legal representatives of respondent no.3-Dinesh Chandra on record, which stood rejected vide order dated 9.1.02. Yet another application preferred under Order I Rule 10 CPC for impleading legal representatives of Dinesh Chandra as party respondents was also rejected by this court on 22.3.02. 8. During the course of the hearing before the coordinate Bench, a question relating to the abatement of the petition was raised on behalf of the counsel for the respondent no.2, however, the question raised was not decided by the court observing that "Whether the decree is in nature of joint and inseparable or not and whether the present proceedings would stand abated or not is also a question which requires reconsideration". 9. Aggrieved by the judgment dated 7.2.08 passed by the coordinate Bench as aforesaid, the respondent no.2 herein preferred an intra court appeal under Rule 134 of Rajasthan High Court Rules. The Division Bench of this court arrived at the conclusion that the writ court instead of deciding the issue of abatement of writ proceedings, was not justified in remanding the case to the Board of Revenue directing the Board to decide even the question with regard to abatement. Accordingly, while disagreeing with the reasoning of the writ court, the intra court appeal was allowed and the writ petition has been restored to its file for decision afresh, with the directions in the following terms: "Accordingly and in the light of the foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The writ petition is restored to its file for deciding the matter afresh. The impugned order is set aside. The writ petition is restored to its file for deciding the matter afresh. In case if it is held that writ petition has abated on account of death of Dinesh Chandra because his LRs were not brought on record or no case for setting aside of abatement is made out, then the consequences flowing from it will follow. If it is held that writ petition does not abate for any reason whatsoever, then different consequences will follow and accordingly, order will be passed." 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that where the plaintiffs or the appellants or petitioners are found to have distinct separate and independent rights of their own and for the purpose of convenience or otherwise join together in a single litigation to vindicate their rights, the decree passed by the court thereon is to be viewed in substance as combination of several decrees in favour of one or other parties and not as joint and inseverable decree and the same would be the position in the case of defendants or respondents having similar rights contesting the claims against them. Learned counsel submitted that in the instant case, merely because the respondent no.2 & 3 had joined together for their claim, the decree passed thereon cannot be treated to be a joint and inseverable one and therefore, the proceedings cannot be treated to be abated. In support of the contention, learned counsel has relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of " Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra (Dead) by LRs. & Ors. v. Pramod Gupta", (2003) 3 SCC, 272 . Learned counsel submitted that as a matter of fact, the principles of abatement of the proceedings do not apply to the writ proceedings but even if the same are applied, the interest of the respondent no.2 and 3 in the suit property in distinct and separate, the proceedings would abate only against specific interest of decessed-respondent. In this regard, learned counsel has relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of " Shahazada Bi & Ors. v. Halimabi ( since decessed) by her LRs", (2004) 7 SCC, 354 . 11. In this regard, learned counsel has relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of " Shahazada Bi & Ors. v. Halimabi ( since decessed) by her LRs", (2004) 7 SCC, 354 . 11. On the other hand, counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that in the instant case, the respondents-plaintiffs had claimed joint possession over the disputed land and their claim against the petitioner-defendant was joint and therefore, the decree passed in their favour against the petitioner-defendant not to interfere with their possession over the land in question and hand over the possession of the land from which they were dispossessed illegally is joint and inseverable and therefore, the petitioner-defendant having failed to bring the legal representatives of decessed-respondent no.3 on record, the decree as against the defendant-respondent no.3 has attained finality and therefore, the proceedings stands abated. In support of the contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of " Babu Sukhram Singh v. Ram Dular Singh & Ors.", AIR 1973 SC, 204 and " Budh Ram & Ors. v. Bansi & Ors.", 2010 DNJ (SC), 1045. 12. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the material on record. 13. Undoubtedly, whether on account of non-substitution of legal representatives of decessed respondents the appeal would abate as a whole or only qua the decessed defendants/respondents would depend on nature of the decree. When the decree in favour of the respondents is joint and inseverable and the appeal abates against one of them for not bringing on record his legal representatives, the appeal against other respondents cannot be proceeded with and shall be liable to be dismissed as abated. 14. When the decree in favour of the respondents is joint and inseverable and the appeal abates against one of them for not bringing on record his legal representatives, the appeal against other respondents cannot be proceeded with and shall be liable to be dismissed as abated. 14. In Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra's case (supra), relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that as to when a proceeding before the court becomes or rendered impossible or possible to be proceeded with after it had partially abated on account of death of one or other party on either side, has been always considered to depend upon the fact as to whether the decree obtained is a joint decree or a severable one and that in case of a joint and inseverable decree if the appeal abated against one or the other, the same cannot be proceeded with further for or against the remaining parties as well, but where in substance and reality the decree passed is combination of many decrees, there can be no impediment for proceedings being proceeded with among or against remaining parties other than the decessed.After due consideration of the various earlier decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealing with the issue including the decision in the matter of Ram Sarup v. Munshi AIR 1963 SC 553 , the court held: "34. In the light of the above discussion, we hold: (1) Wherever the plaintiffs or appellants or petitioners are found to have distinct, separate and independent rights of their own and for the purpose of convenience or otherwise, joined together in a single litigation to vindicate their rights, the decree passed by the court thereon is to be viewed in substance as the combination of several decrees in favour of one or the other parties and not as a joint and inseverable decree. The same would be the position in the case of defendants or respondents having similar rights contesting the claims against them. The same would be the position in the case of defendants or respondents having similar rights contesting the claims against them. (2) Whenever different and distinct claims of more than one are sought to be vindicated in one single proceedings, as the one now before us, under the Land Acquisition Act or in similar nature of proceedings and/or claims in assertion of individual rights of parties are clubbed, consolidated and dealt with together by the courts concerned and a single judgment or decree has been passed, it should be treated as a mere combination of several decrees in favour of or against one or more of the parties and not as joint and inseparable decrees. (3) The mere fact that the claims or rights asserted or sought to be vindicated by more than one are similar or identical in nature or by joining together of more than one of such claimants of a particular nature, by itself would not be sufficient in law to treat them as joint claims, so as to render the judgment or decree passed thereon a joint and inseverable one. (4) The question as to whether in a given case the decree is joint and inseverable or joint and severable or separable has to be decided, for the purposes of abatement or dismissal of the entire appeal as not being properly and duly constituted or rendered incompetent for being further proceeded with, requires to be determined only with reference to the fact as to whether the judgment/decree passed in the proceedings vis-a-vis the remaining parties would suffer the vice of contradictory or inconsistent decrees. For that reason, a decree can be said to be contradictory or inconsistent with another decree only when the two decrees are incapable of enforcement or would be mutually self-destructive and that the enforcement of one would negate or render impossible the enforcement of the other." 15. In Shahazada Bi's Case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has followed the law laid down inter alia in Sardar Amarjit Singh's case (supra). 16. In Budh Ram's case (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents-plaintiffs, this court after due consideration of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amarjeet Singh's case and Shahazada Bi's case (supra), summarised the law on the issue as under: "19. 16. In Budh Ram's case (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents-plaintiffs, this court after due consideration of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amarjeet Singh's case and Shahazada Bi's case (supra), summarised the law on the issue as under: "19. Therefore, the law on the issue stands crystallised to the effect that as to whether non-substitution of LRs of the defendants/respondents would abate the appeal in toto or only qua the decessed defendants/respondents, depend upon the facts and circumstances of an individual case. Where each one of the parties has an independent and distinct right of his own, not inter dependent upon one or the other, nor the parties have conflicting interests inter se, the appeal may abate only qua the decessed respondent. However, in case, there is a possibility that the Court may pass a decree contradictory to the decree in favour of the decessed party, the appeal would abate in toto for the simple reason that the appeal is a continuity of suit and the law does not permit two contradictory decrees on the same subject matter in the same suit. Thus, whether the judgment/decree passed in the proceedings vis-a-vis remaining parties would suffer the vice of being a contradictory or inconsistent decree is the relevant test." 17. In the backdrop of position of law settled as above, adverting to the facts of the present case, it is to be noticed that the suit was preferred by the respondents-plaintiffs for permanent injunction and ejectment claiming joint ownership and possession over the disputed land. From the pleadings of the parties, in no manner, it can be inferred that the plaintiffs had joined for enforcement of their distinct and separate claim against the petitioner-defendant. The suit preferred has been decreed by the court in favour of the plaintiffs, as prayed for. The petitioner-defendant was restrained from interfering with the respondents-plaintiffs' possession over the disputed land and was directed to hand over the possession of portion of the land from which they were illegally dispossessed. Suffice it to say that the suit was filed by the respondents-plaintiffs for enforcement of their joint claim and accordingly, the decree has been passed in their favour, which by no means could be construed to be a decree in respect of any distinct or separate share or interest of the respondents-plaintiffs in the land in question. Suffice it to say that the suit was filed by the respondents-plaintiffs for enforcement of their joint claim and accordingly, the decree has been passed in their favour, which by no means could be construed to be a decree in respect of any distinct or separate share or interest of the respondents-plaintiffs in the land in question. Thus, the decree passed by the trial court in favour of the plaintiff-Dinesh Chandra having attained finality on account of failure of the petitioner-defendant to bring on record the legal representatives of decessed respondent-Dinesh Chandra, the petition preferred assailing the legality and propriety of the decree, cannot survive for consideration of this Court against the co-plaintiff, the respondent no.2 herein. 18. It is true that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code do not apply to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but then, the principles underlying the provisions incorporated in CPC governing the abatement of the proceedings can always be applied to the writ proceedings. Where the right to sue survives after the death of the respondent, the writ petitioner is under an obligation to substitute the heirs of the decessed-respondent. Suffice it to say that if a decree passed by the court of competent jurisdiction is joint and inseverable and has attained finality vis-a-vis some of the decree holders on account of abatement of the proceedings, the challenge to the same cannot survive for consideration of this court against other joint decree holders. Obviously, the decree passed in favour of the petitioner passed by the trial court affirmed by the RAA and the Board of Revenue having attained finality qua the decessed respondent-Dinesh Chandra, this Court cannot set aside the impugned decree qua the respondent no.2 herein, while maintaining the decree in favour of the decessed respondent- Dinesh Chandra. In other words, there cannot be two contradictory or inconsistent decrees in respect of joint and inseverable claim of co-plaintiffs. Thus, the writ proceeding abates as a whole and cannot be continued qua the respondent no.2 herein. Dismissed accordingly. No order as to costs. *******