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2014 DIGILAW 244 (AP)

Koratala Leela Satya Sai v. Ghanta Dharma Rao

2014-02-14

L.NARASIMHA REDDY

body2014
Judgment The appellant is the lessee of the premises bearing No.2-20-3 of Tenali owned by the respondent. The lease is said to have commenced in the year 1998, and that was to be for a period of ten years. The respondent got issued a notice, dated 06.04.2009 (Ex.A.1), requiring the appellant to vacate the premises. The appellant got issued a reply, dated 20.04.2009 (Ex.A.3), stating that the lease is for manufacture of footwear, and Ex.A.1, through which, he was required to vacate the premises, within one month, is not tenable in law. Thereafter, the respondent filed O.S.No.168 of 2009 in the Court of Additional Senior Civil Judge, Tenali, for eviction of the appellant. 2. The appellant filed a written statement, opposing the suit. He pleaded that initially, the premises were given on lease by the respondent to one Mr. Kantilal in the year 1990 for running a cloth shop, and said Kantilal, in turn, put the appellant in possession of the premises as a lessee, with the knowledge and permission of the respondent. It was pleaded that an agreement (Ex.B.1), in that behalf, was executed by Kantilal in favour of the appellant on 01.10.1998, and a specific mention to the effect that the purpose of the lease is to manufacture of footwear, and that Ex.A.1 is not tenable in law. 3. The trial Court decreed the suit through judgment, dated 13.03.2012. Aggrieved by that, the appellant filed A.S.No.87 of 2012 in the Court of XI Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Guntur at Tenali. The appeal was dismissed on 03.04.2013. Hence, this Second Appeal. 4. Sri P. Venu Gopal, learned counsel, who appeared on behalf of the appellant, submits that the purpose, for which, the premises were taken on lease, is to manufacture of footwear, and that the notice issued by the respondent under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short ‘the Act’), requiring the appellant to vacate the premises within one month, does not bring about any obligations in law. He contends that the views taken by the trial Court and the lower appellate Court, regarding the nature of the relationship between the parties, or the terms of lease, are contrary to the evidence. Learned counsel further submits that the lower appellate Court committed irregularity, inasmuch as the judgment was rendered by the learned Presiding Officer, after he received the orders of transfer. 5. Learned counsel further submits that the lower appellate Court committed irregularity, inasmuch as the judgment was rendered by the learned Presiding Officer, after he received the orders of transfer. 5. Sri N. Srirama Murthy, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that there is nothing on record to disclose that the premises were given on lease for manufacturing purpose, and that the ground pleaded by the appellant is not correct. He contends that the respondent is not a party to Ex.B.1, much less; it can be treated as a lease deed. Learned counsel further submits that even if there exists any defect in Ex.A.1, the same does not become material, in view of the amendment caused to Section 106 of the Act in the recent past, through which, Sub-Section 2 was introduced. He further submits that the learned Presiding Officer received the orders of transfer, after the arguments in the appeal were heard and the matter was reserved for judgment, and pronouncement of judgment, after the orders of transfer are received, cannot be treated as improper or illegal. 6. Though there is some dispute as to the terms of lease, there is no denial of the fact that the appellant is the tenant of the suit schedule premises owned by the respondent. 7. On the basis of the pleadings before it, the trial Court framed the following issues for consideration: 1) Whether plea of fresh lease or extension of lease as contended by defendant is true? 2) Whether quit notice is valid? 3) Whether plaintiff is entitled to recovery of possession as prayed for? 4) Whether plaintiff is entitled to damages as prayed for? 5) To what relief? 8. On behalf of the respondent, P.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.A.1 to A.6 were filed. On behalf of the appellant, D.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.B.1 to B.6 were filed. 9. The suit was decreed, and in A.S.No.87 of 2012 filed by the appellant herein, the lower appellate Court framed the following points for consideration: 1) Whether the oral lease dated 01.10.2008 is true, valid and binding on the respondent/landlord? 2) Whether the quit notice is valid? 3) Whether the appellant is liable for eviction? 4) To what relief? The appeal was dismissed. 10. Two contentions are urged before this Court. 2) Whether the quit notice is valid? 3) Whether the appellant is liable for eviction? 4) To what relief? The appeal was dismissed. 10. Two contentions are urged before this Court. The first is about the nature of lease and, thereby, the validity of Ex.A.1, and the second is about the propriety of the learned Presiding Officer and the lower appellate Court in delivering the judgments. 11. According to the respondent, the lease commenced on 01.10.1998 and was agreed to be for a period of ten years. He did not make any reference to any lease deed. It is said to be an oral arrangement. The appellant, on the other hand, pleaded that originally, the premises were leased by the respondent to one. Mr. Kantilal and the latter, in turn, inducted the appellant into possession of the premises in the year 1998 under an arrangement mentioned in Ex.B.1. A perusal of Ex.B.1 discloses that the respondent is not a party to it, and one just cannot understand, as to what was the propriety and legality, on the part of the said Kantilal to lease the premises owned by the respondent, in favour of the appellant. Even if it is a case of transfer of lease, it can be done only with the consent or approval of the owner. Once the respondent did not figure as a party to Ex.B.1, the document cannot regulate the relationship between the appellant and the respondent. 12. The effort made by the appellant to rely upon Ex.B.1 was only to establish that the premises were taken on lease for manufacturing purpose, and for termination of such lease, the notice under Section 106 of the Act must be of not less than six months. 13. Two aspects assume significance in this behalf. The first one is as to whether the lease in favour of the appellant was for manufacturing purpose, and the second is as to whether the defect, if any, in relation to the period mentioned in Ex.A.1 notice, is fatal. 14. Section 106 of the Act maintains a distinction between the leases, that are for agricultural or manufacturing purposes and those which are for other purposes. For the first category of leases, a quit notice is required to be issued six months in advance. For the leases of other category, the period is just one month. 14. Section 106 of the Act maintains a distinction between the leases, that are for agricultural or manufacturing purposes and those which are for other purposes. For the first category of leases, a quit notice is required to be issued six months in advance. For the leases of other category, the period is just one month. The question, as to whether the lease of particular premises is for manufacturing or for any different purpose, must be evident from the lease deed or the instrument in this behalf, particularly, when there is a serious dispute between the parties. A unilateral assertion by the lessee cannot be taken into account. In case reliance is placed upon any document, it should be the one, which can validly regulate the lease between the parties. The document, to which the lessee is not a party, or the one, which does not accord with the provisions of law, cannot be taken into account. In the instant case, the respondent categorically pleaded that the lease was from month to month, and Ex.A.1 was issued, requiring the appellant to vacate the premises. The reply, Ex.A.3 given by the appellant based upon Ex.B.1, cannot at all be taken into account. The inexcapable conclusion, therefore, is that the lease was from month to month. 15. Coming to the form of notice, the plea raised by the appellant is about the period, within which, he was required to vacate the premises. Once it emerged that the lease was from month to month, the period mentioned in Ex.A.1 is adequate. Sub-Section 2 of Section 106 of the Act makes such defect, if any, inconsequential. Even if the period mentioned in a quit notice is short of the one stipulated under law, the shortfall stands condoned, if it is established that the suit was filed within the period stipulated in law. No effort was made by the appellant to establish that the notice is defective, despite the facility under Section 106(2) of the Act. 16. The second ground urged by the appellant is about the propriety, on the part of the Presiding Officer, in delivering the judgment. A certified copy of the docket order, dated 03.04.2013, is placed before this Court. It is to the effect that the suit was advanced to that day, since the Presiding Officer is being relieved in the afternoon. 16. The second ground urged by the appellant is about the propriety, on the part of the Presiding Officer, in delivering the judgment. A certified copy of the docket order, dated 03.04.2013, is placed before this Court. It is to the effect that the suit was advanced to that day, since the Presiding Officer is being relieved in the afternoon. It is also mentioned that notice is given to both parties. In case the appeal was heard by the learned Presiding Officer, that too, by advancing it, the ground pleaded by the appellant can certainly be taken into account. The record, however, discloses that the appeal was heard already, and the matter was reserved for judgment. However, before the date stipulated for pronouncement of judgment reached, the orders of transfer were received by the Presiding Officer. What all the learned Presiding Officer did was that he advanced the matter only for the purpose of pronouncement of the judgment. It cannot be said that there was any illegality in this regard. In fact, there would have been a serious lapse, on the part of the Presiding Officer, in case the judgment, which was otherwise ready, is not pronounced on the pretext of transfer. 17. This Court does not find any merits in the Second Appeal, and it is, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 18. Learned counsel for the appellant made a request for granting time for vacating the premises. The same is opposed by learned counsel for the respondent. Taking into account, the fact that the appellant is a lessee for the past 1 ½ decades, this Court grants time, till the end of July, 2014, for the respondent to vacate the premises, on condition that the arrears of rent, if any, shall be cleared within one month from today, and the rent for the current period shall be paid on or before 10th of every month. The appellant shall file an undertaking before the trial Court within four weeks from today, to the effect that he would put the respondent in vacant possession of the premises within one month. 19. The Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in the appeal shall stand disposed of.