JUDGMENT N.W. Sambre, J. 1. This petition is tagged with Writ Petition No. 612 of 2002, perhaps having regard to the similarity to the issue involved. The Writ Petition No. 612 of 2002 is not assigned to this Court. As such, the said matter be de-tagged and be placed before the Bench taking up 2002 matters. So far as the present writ petition is concerned, this petition is pending since 2001, It was adjourned from time to time and by way of last chance, this Court on 4th December 2014, adjourned it by one week. Today, the learned Counsel for the petitioner is present, however, the learned Counsel for the respondent is absent. In view of the pendency of this petition since 2001 and the fact that the last chance in the matter was already granted, this petition is taken up for final hearing. 2. Heard Mrs. Kalpalata Bharaswadkar, learned Counsel for the petitioner. 3. The present petition takes an exception to the order passed by the learned Judge, First Labour Court, Ahmednagar in Complaint (ULP) Nos.103/1999 and 11/2001 which came to be allowed by a common judgment dated 12th February 2001 which was confirmed by the Member, Industrial Court, Ahmednagar in Revision (ULP) No. 16/2001 at the behest of the petitioner, 4. The respondent herein was in the employment of the petitioner as a Labour. In Complaint (ULP) No. 103/1999, which was filed on 13th February 1999, directions were sought by the present respondent to carry out correction in his date of birth and consequently, to the retirement date. According to the respondent, his correct date of birth is 1st September 1945, which was incorrectly recorded as 1st April 1941. 5. In Complaint (ULP) No. 11/2001, the challenge was raised by the respondent -employee to the notice of superannuation dated 26th December 2000 which put him on notice that he shall stand superannuated on 1st April 2001. 6. It was the claim of the present respondent before the learned Labour Court that he was initially engaged in the employment in the year 1969 as a casual labour and was conferred permanent status w.e.f. 1st April 1980. According to him, in the primary school record, his date of birth is recorded as 1st September 1945. 6. It was the claim of the present respondent before the learned Labour Court that he was initially engaged in the employment in the year 1969 as a casual labour and was conferred permanent status w.e.f. 1st April 1980. According to him, in the primary school record, his date of birth is recorded as 1st September 1945. He further claimed that in 1982-1983, he has moved the petitioner Corporation for correction of his date of birth and on 24th March 1996, by submitting an application to correct his date of birth to 1st September 1945 from 1st September 1941 by carrying out appropriate correction in his service book. According to him, as the petitioner -Corporation had continued with the old incorrect date of birth in the service record has prompted him to file the first complaint before the labour Court. 7. The second complaint is moved by the present respondent on the ground that he was sought to be superannuated on 1st April 2001 having regard to the incorrect date of birth, which according to him, amounts to victimise him by violating the rights of the employee. 8. The contentions of the respondent employee were resisted by the petitioner -Corporation by filing written statement at Exh. C-4 wherein objection was raised to the tenability of the complaint on the ground of limitation. Though it was admitted by the petitioner herein that the respondent joined services in 1969, it is claimed that he was made permanent in 1980. The petitioner further claimed that the date of birth of respondent employee was rightly recorded as 1st April 1941 and further submits that at no point of time, the respondent has taken steps for correcting his date of birth. According to petitioner, while entering into the employment, in the prescribed form of employees provident fund, in the year 1976, the respondent himself volunteered his date of birth as 1st April 1941 along with an affidavit disclosing his age as 36 years. 9. According to petitioner, while entering into the employment, in the prescribed form of employees provident fund, in the year 1976, the respondent himself volunteered his date of birth as 1st April 1941 along with an affidavit disclosing his age as 36 years. 9. According to the petitioner, the petitioner Corporation, in the betterment of the employee, has relaxed the policy for correction of date of birth and invited applications for carrying out correction in date of birth as per Circular dated 28th December 1982 to which, according to the petitioner, the respondent has not responded and the respondent continued in employment without objecting to the date of birth as 1st April 2001, which according to him, was sought to be corrected for the first time in 1999 by filing the application in question and further in 2001, by challenging the notice of superannuation. 10. Having regard to the pleadings raised before the labour Court, the labour Court framed the following issues, which were answered accordingly. 1. Whether the complaint is maintainable ? 2. Does the complainant prove that his proposed retirement on superannuation w.e.f. 1.4.2001 is by way of victimisation; not in good faith, but in the colourable exercise of the employer's right; for patently false reasons; in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice in the conduct of domestic enquiry or with undue haste, under Item-1 of Sch-IV of M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P. Act, 1971 ? 3. Is complainant entitle for the relief claimed ? Findings to the said issues are : 1. Yes 2. Yes 3. Yes 11. The learned Judge of the labour Court, having regard to the claim brought before it, and the evidence as regards to certificate Exh.U-5/1, the Evidence of Head Master, Exh.U-10/1 as regards entry in the school record, Exh.U-8/1 school leaving certificate and in view of Board Resolution of the petitioner Corporation passed in its meeting dated 14th April 1980, which has resulted into issuance of the Circular in the year 1982, has accepted the contention of the present respondent and it was pleased to declare that the correct date of birth of respondent is 1st September 1945. According to the learned Judge, Labour Court, the retirement notice dated 26th December 2000 was illegal, as the correct date of birth of the respondent be taken into account as 1st September 1945 12. According to the learned Judge, Labour Court, the retirement notice dated 26th December 2000 was illegal, as the correct date of birth of the respondent be taken into account as 1st September 1945 12. The learned Judge of the Labour Court, while considering the issue as regards whether the claim was barred by limitation, has considered the notice of superannuation as the cause of action and given finding that the complaint cannot be termed as barred by limitation. The labour Court has also taken into account the entries in the Provident Fund record and has given finding that if the correction of entry as regards date of birth was sought, based on the school leaving certificate, the same is to be granted as there is no limitation shown. 13. The revisional authority, i.e. learned Member, Industrial Court, Ahmednagar, while dealing with the claim of the present petitioner has considered the following points for consideration and answered the same accordingly. 1. Does the Applicant prove that the Labour Court failed to exercise or exceeded jurisdiction vested in it and committed error on the fact of record ? 2. Whether the Applicant is entitled for relief ? Findings to the abovesaid issues are answered as : 1. No 2. No 14. The learned Member, Industrial Court while dealing with the issue as regards maintainability of the complaint has noticed that as the complaint was preferred immediately after issuance of notice of superannuation dated 26th December 2000, retiring the respondent employee from the employment w.e.f. 1st April 2001, has held that the complaint was made within time and the same was maintainable. The learned Member, Industrial Court, having regard to the evidence in the form of school leaving certificate has reached to a conclusion that the labour Court has correctly reached to finding as the correct date of birth of the respondent is 1st September 1945. The Industrial Court noticed that as the finding of the labour Court is based on record to the material issues, the Industrial Court cannot sit in an appeal under Section 44 of the Act Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act and draw an independent finding. The Industrial Court, based on the judgment in the matter of the Union of India Vs. The Industrial Court, based on the judgment in the matter of the Union of India Vs. Harnam Singh, reported in 1993-I-LLP.1012 has noticed that the facts of the present case do not give rise to any issue qua limitation and as such, maintained the order passed by the learned labour Court and dismissed the revision, as such the present petition. 15. The learned Counsel for the petitioner - Corporation while questioning both the orders, has taken me through the observations made by labour Court and appreciated by the learned Industrial Court under the revisional jurisdiction and submits that even if it is accepted that the respondent -employee has entered in employment in 1969 and in 1976, the Provident Fund record shows that his date of birth as 1st April 1941, particularly, the affidavit in support of claim for provident fund, the cause for carrying out appropriate correction in the date of birth from 1st April 1941 to 1st September 1945, according to her, was not maintainable in 1999. She further submits that though the Board, in the interest of the employees has issued circular dated 28th December 1982 permitting the correction in the date of birth, the respondent employee herein has failed to demonstrate on record of initiation of any action qua correction of his date of birth. She submits that from the very pleadings of the respondent herein before the learned labour Court and the Industrial Court, it could be easily inferred that for the first time the respondent employee has sought to agitate his grievance by placing on record an application in 1996 for correcting date of birth and filing of complaint before the labour Court. According to her, the law on the said point is well settled that at the fag end of the service of the employee, it is not open for the employee to carry out any correction in the date of birth. She further urged that it was the case of respondent employee before the labour Court that in 1996, when the respondent employee has moved an application for correction of his date of birth, it was open for him to move a complaint before the labour Court and the respondent ought not to have waited till 1999 for filing the complaint. She further urged that it was the case of respondent employee before the labour Court that in 1996, when the respondent employee has moved an application for correction of his date of birth, it was open for him to move a complaint before the labour Court and the respondent ought not to have waited till 1999 for filing the complaint. She submits that the aspect of limitation by answering the same in affirmative, the labour Court and the Industrial Court have committed error of law apparent on the face of record by entertaining the complaint, which was filed at belated side. 16. So far as the respondent - employee is concerned, the learned Counsel appearing on his behalf, though is absent, from the record it is noticed that the employee has claimed that after issuance of Circular dated 28th December 1982, permitting the correction in the date of birth, he has moved an application for correction of date of birth, however, the same was not granted and no correction was carried out. It was the stand of the respondent - employee before both the Courts below that the petitioner has indulged in unfair practice to the fact within the knowledge of respondent employee. 17. Having considered the rival contentions of the parties, in extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court, this Court is required to take into account whether there is perversity of finding or any grave error of law apparent on the face of record. 18. In the present case, the entry of the respondent - employee in employment is in 1969 wherein the date of birth entered into the service record is 1st April 1941. The respondent employee having regard to the Circular/policy of the petitioner Corporation, as reflected in Circular dated 28th December 1982, claimed to have applied for carrying out correction in the date of birth. The respondent employee has also in the matter of claiming Provident Fund, in the year 1976 given declaration of his date of birth as 1st April 1941. It is further claimed by him that he has applied for correction of date of birth after issuance of Circular dated 28th December 1982, however, no cogent evidence to that effect is brought on record by the respondent employee to establish his claim. It is further claimed by him that he has applied for correction of date of birth after issuance of Circular dated 28th December 1982, however, no cogent evidence to that effect is brought on record by the respondent employee to establish his claim. The respondent employee, in clear terms had claimed that in 1996 he has made an application for correction of date of birth, however, same was not granted. 19. From the judgment of the Apex Court, it is required to be noted that the Apex Court has in categorical terms has put an embargo on the right of employees who claim benefit of extension in service by virtue of carrying out correction in date of birth at the fag end of service. The Apex Court has ruled that at the fag end of service correction of date of birth cannot be granted. 20. The petitioner was served with the notice of superannuation informing him that he shall stand superannuated from 1st April 2001. It is claimed by him that in 1996 he has applied for grant of correction of date of birth and in 1999, he has filed complaint seeking correction of date of birth. The said conduct of the petitioner continuing in employment since 1969, giving declaration under the Provident Fund Act in 1976 that his date of birth is 1st April 1941 and subsequent thereto after issuance of the Circular dated 28th December 1982, permitting change of his date of birth to which he has not responded, in my opinion, disentitled him for any relief. His case of correction of date of birth by establishing before both the Courts below by appropriate claim that he has taken steps seeking correction of the date of birth, takes this Court to the conclusion that the respondent has moved the petitioner at the fag end of his service for correction of his date of birth. The said issue is already covered by the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Union of India Vs. Harnam Singh, reported in 1993-I-LLN-P.1012. The Apex Court, in paragraph 7 of the said judgment has observed thus : 7. The said issue is already covered by the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Union of India Vs. Harnam Singh, reported in 1993-I-LLN-P.1012. The Apex Court, in paragraph 7 of the said judgment has observed thus : 7. A Government servant, after entry in service, acquires the right to continue in service till the age of retirement, as fixed by the State in exercise of its powers regulating conditions of service, unless the services are dispensed with on other grounds contained in the relevant service rules after following the procedure prescribed therein. The date of birth entered in the service records of a civil servant is, thus of utmost importance for the reason that the right to continue in service stands decided by its entry in the service record. A Government servant who has declared his age at the initial stage of the employment is, of course, not precluded from making a request later on for correcting the age. It is open to a civil servant to claim correction of his date of birth, if he is in possession of irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth as different from the one earlier recorded and even if there is no period of limitation prescribed for seeking correction of date of birth, the Government servant must do so without any unreasonable delay. In the absence of any provision in the rules for correction of date of birth, the general principle of refusing relief on grounds of laches or stale claims, is generally applied to by the courts and tribunals. It is nonetheless competent for the Government to fix a time limit, in the service, rules, after which no application for correction of date of birth of a Government servant can be entertained. A Government servant who makes an application for correction of date of birth beyond the time, so fixed, therefore, cannot claim, as a matter of right, the correction of his date of birth even if he has good evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth is clearly erroneous. The law of limitation may operate harshly but it has to be applied with all its rigour and the courts or tribunals cannot come to the aid of those who sleep over their rights and allow the period of limitation to expire. The law of limitation may operate harshly but it has to be applied with all its rigour and the courts or tribunals cannot come to the aid of those who sleep over their rights and allow the period of limitation to expire. Unless altered, his date of birth as recorded would determine his date of superannuation even if it amounts to abridging his right to continue in service on the basis of his actual age. Indeed, as held by this Court in State of Assam Vs. Daksha Prasad Deka, (1971) 2 SCR 687 : ( AIR 1971 SC 173 ), a public servant may dispute the date of birth as entered in the service record and apply for its correction but till the record is corrected he cannot claim to continue in service on the basis of the date of birth claimed by him. This court said : (para 4 of AIR) : "The date of compulsory retirement under F.R. 56(a) must in our judgment, be determined on the basis of the service record; and not on what the respondent claimed to be his date of birth, unless the service record is first corrected consistent with the appropriate procedure. A public servant may dispute the date of birth as entered in the service record, and may apply for correction of the record. But until the record is corrected, he cannot claim that he has been deprived of the guarantee under Article 311(2) of the Constitution by being compulsorily retired on attaining the age of superannuation on the footing of the date of birth entered in the service record." 7. Note (5) to Fundamental Rule 56 governing correction of date of birth in the service record, substituted by Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms Notification No. 19017/79/Estt-A dated 30th November, 1979 published as SO 3997 in the Government of India Gazette dated 15th of December 1979 limits the exercise of the right by the Government servant to seek alteration of his date of birth only within the specified period. The provision reads as under : "Note 5 The date on which a Government servant attains the age of fifty-eight years or sixty years, as the case may be, shall be determined with reference to the date of birth declared by the Government servant at the time of appointment and accepted by the appropriate authority on production, as far as possible, of confirmatory documentary evidence such as High School or Higher Secondary or Secondary School Certificate or extracts from Birth Register. The date of birth so declared by the Government servant and accepted by the appropriate authority shall not be subject to any alteration except as specified in this note. An alteration of date of birth of a Government servant can be made, with the sanction of a Ministry or Department of the Central Government or the Comptroller and Auditor-General in regard to persons serving in the Indian Audit and Accounts Department, or an Administrator of a Union Territory under which the Government servant is serving if - 21. In the matter of Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board Vs. Mohan Lal, reported in 2013 LLR 1009, the Apex Court though has considered about the non-applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 to an industrial adjudication, however, has endorsed a view that the labour Court must keep in view the delayed act of the employee like in the present case, after entering into the service in 1969, the employee appears to have for the first time sought correction in 1996. The Apex Court, in paragraph 20 of the said judgment observed thus : "20. We are clearly of the view that though Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the reference made under the I.D. Act but delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important circumstance which the Labour Court must keep in view at the time of exercise of discretion irrespective of whether or not such objection has been raised by the other side. The legal position laid down by this Court in Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan Development Corporation v. Gilam Singh (2013) 5 SCC 136 , that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant facts including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute, must be invariably followed." 22. Though it is not brought on record as to the limitation, within which period the application for correction of date of birth should have been moved, however, this Court, having regard to the policy of the petitioner - Corporation, reflected in the Circular dated 28th December 1982 and having regard to the social status of the employee as a labour and the object of the said circular to be a beneficial legislature even if construes limitation of seven years, the claim put forth by the respondent employee appears to be after the period of almost ten years to which there is no explanation. In that view of the matter, as the claim put forth by the respondent employee was moved at belated stage, in my opinion, both the orders i.e. order passed by the labour Court and the Industrial Court are not sustainable. The petition, therefore, succeeds. 23. In that view of the matter, the Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (B) with no order as to costs.