JUDGMENT Heard Mr. Kamat Malyekar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Rao, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents no.6 and 8 and Mr. Menezes, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no.4. 2. Rule. Rule is made returnable and heard forthwith. 3. By this petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 30/08/2013, passed by the Administrative Tribunal in Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 81/2013/CONDONE, in Comunidade Appeal. 4. Respondent no.1 is the Administrator of Comunidades, an authority constituted under the Code of Comunidades ('the Code' for short). Respondent no.2 is the Comunidade of Calangute. Respondent no.3 is the Clerk in-charge of respondent no.2. Respondent no.4 is the President of respondent no.2 for Triennium 2013-2016. Respondent no.5 is the elected substitute President of respondent no.2 for the said Triennium 2013-2016. Respondents no.6 and 7 are the elected treasurers and substitute treasurers of respondent no. 2 for the Triennium 2013-2016 and lastly respondent no. 8 is the Attorney and respondent no.9 is the substitute Attorney of respondent no.2, elected for the Triennium 2013-2016. 5. The general election for the Managing Board of respondent no.2 was held on 13/01/2013 and respondents no.4 to 9 came to be declared elected as office bearers of respondent no.2. Alleging that the said election was illegal and held in total defiance of law, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Administrative Tribunal challenging the election of respondents no.4 to 9 along with an application for condonation of delay, since there was delay of 43 days in filing the appeal. The respondents had filed a reply opposing the application for condonation of delay. 6. By impugned order dated 30/08/2013, the Administrative Tribunal rejected the said application for condonation of delay holding that the same is not maintainable. The said order is impugned in the present petition. 7. The point for determination is whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to an appeal under Section 49 of the Code. 8. Mr. Kamat Malyekar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that in the entire Code, there is no provision excluding the application of the Limitation Act, 1963. He read out Article 49 of the Code which provides that appeal has to be filed to the Administrative Tribunal within five days. 8. Mr. Kamat Malyekar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that in the entire Code, there is no provision excluding the application of the Limitation Act, 1963. He read out Article 49 of the Code which provides that appeal has to be filed to the Administrative Tribunal within five days. He then read out the provision of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and submitted that the provision of Section-5 of the Limitation Act applies to the Code, since there is no express exclusion of the same. According to the learned Counsel, the judgment in the case of “SBI Vs. Sajida Begam” passed in Writ petition No.22317/2012, relied upon by the Administrative Tribunal, was not applicable to the present case, since Section 24 of the Debts and Recovery Tribunal provides that the provision of Limitation Act would apply to an application made to the Tribunal. He submitted that though the provision of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act was brought to the notice of the Tribunal, the Tribunal has not given any finding nor any reason regarding the application or non-application of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. He, therefore, urged that the petition be allowed and the proceedings be remanded to the Administrative Tribunal for a fresh decision on the application for condonation of delay by considering the provision of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. 9. On the other hand, Mr. Rao, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents no. 6 and 8 submitted that the appeal under Article 49 is summary appeal. He read out the provisions of Articles 39 to 52 of the Code and pointed out as to how strict time schedule is required to be maintained. He submitted that for every step, particular time limit has been mentioned. He pointed out that under Article 49 of the Code, the appeal has to be filed within 5 days and the Administrative Tribunal is bound to decide the appeal within 8 days. He further pointed out that there is no requirement of any certified copy of the minutes to be produced before the Tribunal and that the appeal is required to be drawn up on plain paper. Learned Counsel submitted that Article 46 provides for penalty if the Clerk of the comunidade fails to maintain the time limit. He further pointed out that there is no requirement of any certified copy of the minutes to be produced before the Tribunal and that the appeal is required to be drawn up on plain paper. Learned Counsel submitted that Article 46 provides for penalty if the Clerk of the comunidade fails to maintain the time limit. He urged that the provisions of Limitation Act do not apply to the chapter on elections contained in the Code, as the same is self contained Code. He submitted that the learned Tribunal has correctly followed the scheme of the Code and, therefore, no interference is called for with the impugned order. 10. Mr. Menezes, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no.4, submitted that as is the case in the Representation of People Act, 1951, by implication, the Limitation Act has been kept out from the chapter of elections under the Code. He read out Sections 3 to 6 of Chapter I of Part II of the Representation of People Act, 1951, which pertain to qualification for membership of Parliament. Then, he invited my attention to the provisions of Chapter III thereof which pertain to disqualifications for membership. He, then, pointed out the provisions of Chapter IV of part V which pertains to the Poll. He read out Sections 56 onwards. He also read out the provisions of Chapters II and III of Part-VI, which pertain to presentation of election petitions to High Court and trial of election petitions. According to him, the provisions pertaining to elections as contained in Representation of People Act, 1951 are similar to those contained in the Code and the time limit has been fixed for every step. He submitted that it is not the entire Code, which has to be seen, but the scheme of particular Chapter pertaining to elections, which has to be seen. He submitted that, by implication, the Limitation Act has been excluded and, therefore, the impugned order is not erroneous. 11. I have gone through the entire material on record. I have also considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties. 12. (i) Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides as under : “29. Savings. 11. I have gone through the entire material on record. I have also considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties. 12. (i) Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides as under : “29. Savings. (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.” (ii) Article 49 of the Code provides as under: “Art. 49- In the case of any irregularity in the election, any member of the comunidade, with voting right, may appeal to the Administrative Tribunal, within five days and the proceedings of the appeal shall be drawn up on plain paper. Sole § The Administrative Tribunal shall decide the appeal, within eight days and, if the election is annulled, the comunidade or the twenty major shareholders members, shall be convened again, following the formalities prescribed in the article 47, in order to hold a fresh election in accordance with the decision of the Tribunal.” 13. No doubt, the above provision of Article 49 of the Code does not expressly exclude the application of Limitation Act to this Article. It is the contention of Mr. Malyekar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, that the words “expressly excluded” used in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act would mean that there must be an express reference made in the Special or Local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. He urged that in Article 49 of the Code, there is no express reference to Section 5 of the Limitation Act saying that the operation of the same is excluded. Hence, he submitted that the impugned order is perverse and liable to be quashed and set aside. 14. In the case of “Gopal Sardar Vs. He urged that in Article 49 of the Code, there is no express reference to Section 5 of the Limitation Act saying that the operation of the same is excluded. Hence, he submitted that the impugned order is perverse and liable to be quashed and set aside. 14. In the case of “Gopal Sardar Vs. Karuna Sardar”, [ AIR 2004 SC 3068 ], relied upon by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, the provision of Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1959 was in question. The said Section 8 provides as under : “8. Right of purchase by co-sharer or contiguous tenant- (1) If a portion or share of a plot of land of a raiyat is transferred to any person other than a co-sharer of a raiyat in the plot of land, the bargadar in the plot of land may, within three months of the date of such transfer, or any co-sharer of a raiyat in the plot of land may, within three months of the service of the notice given under sub-section (5) of Section 5, or any raiyat possession land adjoining such plot of land, may, within four months of the date of such transfer, apply to the Munsif having territorial jurisdiction for transfer of the said portion or share of the plot of land to him, subject to the limit mentioned in section 14M on deposit of the consideration money together with a further sum of ten per cent of that amount.” 15. In the case of “Gopal Sardar” (supra), the said provision of Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act did not show that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall apply to the same. However, the other provisions of the same Act as for example the provisions of Section 14-H, 14-O and 19, which provided for appeals, specifically provided that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall apply to the appeal. In such circumstances, the Apex Court held that the said Act is self-contained Code and the period of the Limitation Act was specifically prescribed in the said Act to make an application under Section 8 of the said Act and for preferring appeals or revisions under the provisions of the said Act. In such circumstances, the Apex Court held that the said Act is self-contained Code and the period of the Limitation Act was specifically prescribed in the said Act to make an application under Section 8 of the said Act and for preferring appeals or revisions under the provisions of the said Act. It was held that the said provisions were clear enough to indicate that the said Act was a complete Code in itself dealing with the rights of preemption. It was observed that second proviso to Section 14-H specifically provided for application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matter of preferring an appeal or revision; Section 14-O(1) specifically enabled the Appellate Authority to allow to prefer an appeal even if the expiry of period of limitation prescribed, on showing sufficient cause; and similarly, second proviso to Section 19(2) expressly provided for an application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to an appeal. It was further observed that however, in contrast, although Section 8 of the said Act prescribed the period of limitation for applying to enforce preemption rights, it did not speak of application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act or its principles. The Apex Court held that it should be construed that there has been exclusion of application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to an application under Section 8 of the said Act. In paragraph 10 of the judgment in the case of “Gopal Sardar' (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has quoted the observation of three-Judges Bench of the Apex Court in the case of “Hukumdev Narain Yadav Vs. Lalit Narain Mishra,” [ (1994)2 SCC 133 ]. The Hon'ble three- Judges Bench of the Apex Court has held thus : "17. ..... Even assuming that where a period of limitation has not been fixed for election petitions in the Schedule to the Limitation Act which is different from that fixed under Section 81 of the Act, Section 29(2) would be attracted, and what we have to determine is whether the provisions of this Section are expressly excluded in the case of an election petition. It is contended before us that the words "expressly excluded" would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. It is contended before us that the words "expressly excluded" would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. As usual, the meaning given in the Dictionary has been relied upon, but what we have to see is whether the scheme of the special law, that is in this case the Act, and the nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the Legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our view, even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. The provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act that a suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed are provided for in Section 86 of the Act which gives a peremptory command that the High Court shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Sections 81, 82 or 117.” 16. From the above, it is clear that the words “expressly excluded” as used in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act do not mean an express reference made in the Special or Local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. Even if the Special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, by an express reference, it would still be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject matter and the scheme of special law exclude their operation. Even if the Special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, by an express reference, it would still be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject matter and the scheme of special law exclude their operation. In view of the above, it is clear that even if it is not specifically mentioned in the Section that the provision/s of Limitation Act shall not apply, such an exclusion/bar can be implied in the said provision, having regard to the other provisions of the Act with regard to the Chapter on said subject. 17. Section IV of Chapter II of the Code deals with the Managing Committee. In terms of Article 39 of the Code, the affairs of each Comunidade are managed by a Managing Committee chosen every three years in the manner prescribed under the Code. Therefore, the manner of election of the Managing Committee is specifically provided for in the Code and the process of election starts with the procedure envisaged in Article 42 of the Code. For the purpose of constituting the Managing Committee, two lists are prepared every three years by 31st August by the Clerk and Attorney of the Comunidade. One of the two lists is of all the qualified members and the other of 20 major shareholders, who are qualified members. Article 43 provides that after the said two lists have been publicly displayed for a period of 8 days from the 2nd September and the copies of the same affixed on the door of the Committee meeting's hall and any of the temples of any religion existing in the village, an appeal may be filed to the Administrator on a plain paper within the same period. This time limit for filing the appeal against the lists is fixed for 8 days. It should be kept in mind that the provision is that the appeal may be filed on a plain paper and it does not say the certified copies of the lists should be annexed. This shows as to how important is the time limit. This time limit for filing the appeal against the lists is fixed for 8 days. It should be kept in mind that the provision is that the appeal may be filed on a plain paper and it does not say the certified copies of the lists should be annexed. This shows as to how important is the time limit. Article 44 of the Code provides that the Administrator shall give his decision, within the fixed period of 5 days, without fail, and the said decision shall be made public in the entry book of the Administration office, against which an appeal may be filed, also on a plain paper, to the Administrative Tribunal, within a period of 8 days. This appeal also is bound to be decided by the Administrator within 8 days. The appeal is exempted from the payment of costs and stamp fees. Immediately after the decision is given, the Secretary of the Administrative Tribunal is bound to send the copy of the same to the respective Administrators of the Comunidade, for compliance. Article 47 of the Code shows that the elections of members of the Managing Committee shall be held in the month of December, prior to the Triennium in which they start functioning. The election of the Attorney and his substitute shall be held on any of the Sundays of the same month and of the treasurer and his substitute on any day, other than the one fixed for election of the Attorney and his substitute, preferably on Sunday. The mode of election of the members of the Managing Committee is provided for by Article 48 of the Code. Lastly Article 49 of the Code specifically provides for filing of an appeal within 5 days from the date of announcement of the names of the members elected. The appeal has to be decided by the Administrative Tribunal within 8 days. Here also, the appeal can be drawn up on a plain paper and there is no requirement of filing any minutes of the elections etc. along with the same. The appeal has to be decided by the Administrative Tribunal within 8 days. Here also, the appeal can be drawn up on a plain paper and there is no requirement of filing any minutes of the elections etc. along with the same. Article 52 of the Code provides that the Managing committee shall assume office within the first three days of the month of March of the first year of their management and the President shall inform the Administrator about the installation and in case, when there had been any misappropriation of funds in the accounts, whether the same has been repaid. Therefore, Article 49 of the Code which provides for filing an appeal has to be read along with Article 52 which specifies the time by which the Managing Committee should start functioning. From the examination of the above provisions of the Code, it is clear that the above provisions regarding election make a complete code in themselves since period of limitation for every step is fixed in such a manner as not to admit of the application of any of the provisions of the Limitation Act mentioned in Section 29(2) of that Act. The provisions of Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, by implication. 18. There is no dispute that in the matters under the Representation of People Act, 1950, the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked. A reading of the provisions of Representation of People Act, 1951, which have been read by learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no.4, would make it clear that the procedure for election of Managing committee, as stipulated in Section IV of Chapter II (Articles 39 to 72) of the Code is similar to that stipulated in the Representation of People Act. In the circumstances above, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, the Code, insofar as the provisions of election is concerned, is a self-contained Code to which the Limitation Act would not apply. 19. The learned counsel, appearing for the respondent no. 4 before the Administrative Tribunal, had pointed out the provisions of the Code pertaining to elections. The Administrative Tribunal has considered the said provisions of Articles 42 to 52 of the Code. He has held that the dominant features present in the Representation of People Act are also present in the Code. The learned counsel, appearing for the respondent no. 4 before the Administrative Tribunal, had pointed out the provisions of the Code pertaining to elections. The Administrative Tribunal has considered the said provisions of Articles 42 to 52 of the Code. He has held that the dominant features present in the Representation of People Act are also present in the Code. He observed that as regards the condonation of delay in matters of elections, provisions of the Limitation are conspicuously absent in both the Statutes. It has been held that it would not be proper to stretch the provisions of the Code and such an exercise would be contrary to the intention of the Code insofar as the elections are concerned. The Administrative Tribunal held that the Code of Comunidade has specific intention to keep away the concept of condonation of delay in the matters of election petitions. There is, therefore, no force or substance in the contention of the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the Administrative Tribunal has not considered the import of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and, therefore, the matter requires to be remanded. In my view, the impugned order has considered all the aspects of the matter and there is no perversity in the same. The question of interfering with the said order in the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not arise. The petition deserves to be dismissed. 20. Mr. Rao, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents no. 6 and 8 has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of “Kokkanda B. Poondacha and others Vs. K. D. Ganapati and another”, [AIR 2011 SC 1353] wherein the Apex Court has held that High Court could not interfere with the order of the Trial Court without considering the question whether such order was vitiated due to want of jurisdiction or Trial Court had exceeded its jurisdiction or order passed by it had resulted in failure of justice. 21. In the result, the petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. In the facts and circumstances of the case, no order as to costs.