JUDGMENT Hon’ble S.U. Khan, J.—Heard Sri S.K. Mehrotra, learned counsel for petitioner and Sri R.C. Srivastava, learned counsel for opposite party No. 2, Ram Surat. No one appeared on behalf of other opposite parties. 2. This writ petition arises out of consolidation proceedings pertaining to chak carvation. Order dated 17.9.1992 passed by D.D.C. Faizabad in Revisions No. 2358, Ram Prasad and others v. Finku and others, No. 2432, Dularey v. Ram Surat and others, No. 2644, Ram Surat v. Ramjan and others, has been challenged through this writ petition. 3. In the impugned order in respect of revision filed by opposite party No. 2, Ram Surat (revision No. 2644), it has been observed that he was chakdar No. 180 and his grievance was that through order challenged by him in the revision shape of his chak had become bad, hence he was in a loss and chakdar No. 177, who had been given land adjacent to his chak should be adjusted somewhere else so that his (Ram Surat’s) chak could become rectangular. The revisional Court set aside the order of the S.O.C. in respect of opposite party No. 2 and allowed his revision only and only on the ground that his demand was justified and he should be granted rectangular chak. Revisions cannot be allowed just to fulfil the demand of someone. Moreover, under consolidation it is not possible to provide perfect rectangular chaks to each and every one. Even after the judgment of the D.D.C. chak of opposite party No. 2 is not perfectly rectangular. Through the impugned order, petitioner has not been granted chak on his original holding. Petitioner is tenure holder No. 99. His original holdings are 374 exclusive and 73, 85, 49 co-tenancy. Accordingly, writ petition deserves to be allowed. 4. The main argument of learned counsel for opposite party No. 2 is that initially on 22.12.1992, operation of the order passed by the D.D.C. was stayed, however the said order was modified/clarified on 14.2.1996 by the following order: “Interim order dated 17.9.1992 is clarified to the extent that the operation of the order of the D.D.C. dated 17.9.1992 will be inoperative and shall remain stayed only in respect of chak No. 99 belonging to Badri Prasad. It is however made clear that the order dated 17.9.1992 of the D.D.C. in respect of other persons can be implemented and pendency of this writ petition shall not be considered a hurdle in respect of other persons.” 5. The argument is that due to above clarification dated 14.2.1996, petitioner retained the chak, which had been granted to him uptil S.O.C. level and also obtained possession of the chak, which was granted to him by the revisional Court and due to this opposite party No. 2 got neither chak given to him by the S.O.C. nor the chak given to him by the D.D.C. It was also argued that the land, which was given to the petitioner by the S.O.C. and on which he remained in possession by virtue of interim orders passed in this writ petition was given by him to Kashi Ram and Ram Gharib brick kiln owners of Pawan Mark Bricks, who dug the land to 3 to 4 feet depth. An application in that regard (No. 1560 of 2003) was also filed on 28/29 April, 2003 by opposite party No. 2 claiming huge damages. It was also stated therein that D.D.C. allotted 2 bighas 3 biswas 7 biswansis land out of which 1 bigh 15 biswas 10 biswansis was the land which had already been given to the opposite party No. 2 by the S.O.C. In para-6 of the affidavit filed in support of the said application, it was stated that petitioner let out the land at the rate of Rs. 50,000/- per kachcha bigha for digging the land. The figure appears to be highly inflated. Counter-affidavit was filed to the said application. Even though in the counter-affidavit petitioner denied having let out the land for digging earth, however he admitted that he permitted some earth to be taken out from one of his fields for manufacturing 15000 bricks for the purposes of construction of his house by the above bricks manufacturers. If someone wants to purchase bricks, it is not the general practice that he permits the brick kiln owner to dig earth from his land. If someone wants to purchase bricks, it is not the general practice that he permits the brick kiln owner to dig earth from his land. Moreover the entire area from which earth was taken had not been given to the petitioner either by S.O.C. or D.D.C. Accordingly, as it is admitted to the petitioner that earth was dug from the land, hence it is appropriate that petitioner must be directed to compensate opposite party No. 2. 6. Learned counsel for opposite party No. 2 has cited following authorities: (i) State of M.P. v. M.V. Vyavsay and company, 1997 (1) SCC 156 (ii) Dileep Singh v. State of U.P., 2010 (2) SCC 114 (iii) K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others, 2008 (12) SCC 481 7. In the said authorities, deliberately false pleas had been taken by the parties in litigation. In the instant case I do not find any such circumstance. However, it was unfair on the part of the petitioner to remain in possession on both the lands. 8. Accordingly, impugned order in so far as it affects the petitioner’s land, which was allotted to him by S.O.C. is set aside. However, it is directed that opposite party No. 2, Ram Surat shall immediately be given possession of the chak which was allotted to him uptil S.O.C. level. This shall positively be done within two months from the date of filing of a certified copy of this order. This Court will not appreciate a single day’s delay thereafter. No further digging shall take place until delivery of possession. Petitioner is directed to pay Rs. 25,000/- as damages/compensation to the opposite parties No. 2, which shall be deposited before the D.D.C. within one month for immediate payment to opposite party No. 2 otherwise it shall be recovered by the Collector from the petitioner like arrears of land revenue and paid to opposite party No. 2. 9. Writ Petition is accordingly allowed with the above condition.