JUDGMENT The unsuccessful Defendant No.1 (Appellant) in this appeal has challenged the Judgment & decree passed by the Learned Sub-ordinate Judge, Chhatrapur (as it was then) in Title Suit No. 31 of 1989 decreeing the suit preliminary making Plaintiff No.1 (Respondent No 1) entitled to the share in "Schedule B, C & 0" properties equal to that of the Defendant No.1 (Appellant) with further direction to the Defendant No.1 (Appellant) - (i) to render account to the Plaintiff (Respondent No.1) in respect of the income of those properties; (ii) to pay Rs.75,000 towards the marriage expenses of Plaintiff No.2 (Respondent No.2); (iii) in making further provision of Rs.1 lakh to meet the marriage expenses of Plaintiff NO.3 (Respondent No.3); (iv) to pay a sum of Rs.1500 per month to Plaintiff No.2 & 3 (Respondent NO.2 & 3) from the date of filing of the suit till 19.12.1991 & (Veto pay a sum of Rs.700 per month as maintenance & educational expenses to Plaintiff Np.3 (Respondent No.3) from 19.12.1991 till her marriage. 2. For the sake of convenience, in order to avoid confusion & for proper appreciation, the parties hereinafter are being referred, to as they have been arranged in the original suit. 3. Admittedly, Plaintiff No.1, 2 & 3 are siblings being the son & daughters of Defendant No.1 & Defendant NO.2 is their paternal grand-father. Plaintiff Nos. 1, 2 & 3 being minors, in this suit have got their representation through the next friend maternal grandfather, having no adverse interest to those of minors. It is their case that their father Defendant No.1 & grandfather (Defendant N0.2) constituted joint Hindu family & were having family ancestral landed I1roperties described in "Schedule A" besides two houses & those were partitioned between them in T.S. NO.10 of 1977 of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Aska (as it was then) which was disposed of in terms of compromise. The lands described in "Schedule - B" & house better described in "Schedule - C" fell to the share of Defendant No.1. From out of the surplus income, from the property under "Schedule B", the property described in "Schedule - D" was acquired by Defendant No.1. It is further said that with the surplus of income derived from the "Schedule - B" property, the Defendant NO.1 not only acquired a piece 0.1 land measuring Ac. 0.0400 dec. From out of the surplus income, from the property under "Schedule B", the property described in "Schedule - D" was acquired by Defendant No.1. It is further said that with the surplus of income derived from the "Schedule - B" property, the Defendant NO.1 not only acquired a piece 0.1 land measuring Ac. 0.0400 dec. but also established & started running a rice huller. The said construction etc. over it was made by spending money from the surplus income for which it also acquired the nature & character as ancestral property in the hand of Defendant No.1. It is also said that the joint family property such as the rice huller came into being & ran with the help of the funds that become surplus from out of the income of "Schedule-B" property after meeting necessary expenses. It is next stated that after the partition & birth of Plaintiff No.1, the Defendant No.1 got addicted to several bad habits to which he was also having the leaning previously. Therefore, ultimately with oblique motive, he had filed a suit for dissolution of marriage against the mother of the Plaintiffs. Attempt to bring in a compromise in the said suit being made; the same became successful which ultimately culminated in execution of a registered document. Defendant No.1 agreed to pay maintenance to the Plaintiffs, their mother & also to make provision for their marriage, educational & other expenses. A share was curved out for Plaintiff No.1. son. But it is a alleged that later the same was flouted as if it was so vowed. Thereafter, further litigation arose. So, by this suit they claimed partition of the properties described in "Schedule B, C & D" of the plaint with necessary allotment of shares together with other reliefs as stated in the plaint. 4. The Defendant No.1 contested the suit by Fling the written statement. While traversing the plaint averments, the main challenge has been levelled as regards the acquisition of the vacant land measuring Ac. 0.0400 dec. & installation of rice huller i.e. "Schedule - D" property. It is stated that the same was never purchased with the help of the surplus income from out of the ancestral joint family property which had fallen in the share of Defendant No.1. 0.0400 dec. & installation of rice huller i.e. "Schedule - D" property. It is stated that the same was never purchased with the help of the surplus income from out of the ancestral joint family property which had fallen in the share of Defendant No.1. In this connection, it is further stated that the said property purchased is his exclusive self-acquired property having been purchased from out of his own income that is salary & other source & therefore, it is asserted that the same is not liable to be partitioned. As regards other facts relating to' the arrangement mace in the divorce suit etc., the Defendant No.1 has asserted to have never flouted in any manner. 5. With the above rival pleadings. the Trial Court framed altogether eight issues & those are: - entitlement of Plaintiff No.1 to e. share equal to Defendant No.1 from "Schedule B. C & D" property; provision for Plaintiff NO.2 & 3 rendering the account towards the income of .Schedule B, C & D" property by the Defendant N0.1. Liability of Defendant No.1 to pay marriage expenses of Plaintiffs & most importantly as regards the partition of "Schedule D" property in specific besides the issue relating to the fact as to whether the decision of the village gentries under the registered documents between the Plaintiffs mother & Defendant No.1 has been acted upon or not. 6. On the basis of the rival case of the parties as projected in respective pleadings. the evidence piloted during the trial & upon their consideration & analysis, the Trial Court has answered that the settlement was never acted upon by the parties at any point of time & next the most important issue as regards the entitlement of share of the Plaintiffs over "Schedule- S" property has been answered in favour of the Plaintiffs along with the issue relating to Plaintiff NO.1 's entitlement of share over "Schedule-S" property to be the joint family property. Consequentially Defendant No.1's liability to render accounts in respect of all those properties has been passed. The other issues with regard to marriage & other expenses as well as maintenance have been answered in favour of the Plaintiffs as stated above. 7. Consequentially Defendant No.1's liability to render accounts in respect of all those properties has been passed. The other issues with regard to marriage & other expenses as well as maintenance have been answered in favour of the Plaintiffs as stated above. 7. Learned Counsel for the (Defendant No.1) Appellant at the out set submits that in this appeal, the Appellant is mainly assailing the finding with respect to "Schedule - D" property, holding' the same as liable for partition, whittling down the Defendant No.1's claim that it is his self-acquired property. In other words, the finding' in respect of property as to have been purchased from out of the surplus of the income of family joint property in "Schedule -B & C" is under challenge & so also the decree to render accounts for the properties under that item along with the quantum of maintenance & marriage expenses. Next adverting to the merit, his submission is that the Plaintiffs in the suit have not been able to discharge the initial burden by leading clear, cogent & acceptable' evidence that the/property under "Schedule -D" had been purchased by Defendant No.1 from out of the funds available in his hand as the surplus of income from out of "Schedule-S & C" property after meeting all necessary expenses. The evidence on this score according to him is wholly insufficient. It is also his submission that the Trial Court has erroneously placed the burden on the Defendant No.1 to prove his case that it was his self-acquired property. It is also his submission that even on that score, the Defendant No.1 has led sufficient evidence which are enough to render the finding in favour of Defendant No.1 that it is his self-acquired property & as such not liable for partition. 8. Learned Counsel for the Respondents (Plaintiffs), while supporting the finding of the Trial Court in respect of that issue that the property under "Schedule-D" is not the self-acquired property of the Defendant No.1 & that it is the joint family property of the parties, has further submitted that the Defendant No.1 has utterly failed to prove that he had any independent source of income at the relevant point of time showing even the occasion for him to purchase being in a position to spend. It is also his submission that whatever income that the Defendant No.1-was having was all from the ancestral family property falling to his share where the Plaintiff No.1 has the right & interest by birth & so also other Plaintiffs who are daughters of Defendant No.1 in view of the mandate of the provision of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as it now stands after amendment in the year 2005. According to him the Trial Court has rightly said that the Defendant No.1 has failed to discharge the burden of proof that "Schedule - D" property is his self acquired property. It is also his submission that in the facts & circumstances of the case, the Defendant No.1 has failed to establish the case by leading clear, cogent & acceptable evidence on the score of self acquisition as above. In the facts & circumstances of case, according to him, the Defendant No; 1 was under obligation to establish his case that "Schedule -D" property is his self-acquired property by proving the facts as to what was his actual income from his independent sources to satisfy that he was in a position to purchase with that. 9. It is next submitted by him that in view of the present position of law as it stands after amendment of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005, the daughters cannot be denied their shares & therefore, the preliminary decree is to be accordingly modified. This submission is resisted by the Learned Counsel for the Appellant that there being no claim on that score in the suit, at this stage in this appeal, said relief of allotment of share to the daughters is not legally permissible. It is also his submission that they are not entitled to the same. 10. Joint family property & self-acquired property are the two concepts of Hindu law, Thus there is need to examine the law on this aspect of the case. Principle of law is well settled by now on the point. The oft quoted decision in case of "Srinivas Krishna Rao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango &.others" reported in AIR 1954 SC 379 is that proof of the existence of joint family does not lead to the presumption that the property held by any member of the family is joint. Principle of law is well settled by now on the point. The oft quoted decision in case of "Srinivas Krishna Rao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango &.others" reported in AIR 1954 SC 379 is that proof of the existence of joint family does not lead to the presumption that the property held by any member of the family is joint. The initial burden rests upon the one who asserts any item of property as joint by establishing the said fact leading satisfactory evidence that at the time, the family Possessed some joint property which from its nature & reactive values may have formed, the nucleus from which the property in question may have been acquired. Then only the burden shifts to the party asserting self acquisition to establish affirmatively that the property was acquired without the aid of the joint family property & from out of his income from independent source. 11. In case of Appalaswami v. Suryanarayan Murty & ors; AIR 1947, Privy Council, 189, the concept of jointness & self acquisition of property have been explained. What should 'be the burden of proof if property held either jointly or separately by any member of the family has also been explained there in. Even if there is proof to show the existence of joint that family, it does not lead the Court to arrive at conclusion abruptly that the property held by any members of the family is also joint. What has been said is that the burden lies on the person who asserts that any item of the property is joint, has to prove the said fact. However, once it is proved that the family possessed some joint family property which from its nature & relative value may have formed the nucleus from which the property claimed to be joint may have been acquired. In such a case the burden shifts immediately & automatically to the party alleging self acquisition to prove affirmatively that the property is acquired without any aid of joint family property. This view taken by the Privy Council has also been followed by the Supreme Court in Srinivas Krishna Rao Kango (Supra). 12. In such a case the burden shifts immediately & automatically to the party alleging self acquisition to prove affirmatively that the property is acquired without any aid of joint family property. This view taken by the Privy Council has also been followed by the Supreme Court in Srinivas Krishna Rao Kango (Supra). 12. Besides the above, it is pertinent to mention here that there is one more situation under which a property separately held by a member of the joint family at the initial stage as self-acquired property can be taken to have been altered or transformed to be one as the joint family property at a later stage & that is by• way of blending. The self acquired property of a member of the joint family must have been thrown to the common stock voluntarily, abandoning & surrendering all such separate rights & by waiving all those must have been made available for being enjoyed & claimed by all the members which must be shown by such conduct as expressed & intention as manifested. The self acquired property of the member of the joint Hindu family will never become so simply because that member does not maintain separate account of income accrued from that property even if all the members of the joint family enjoyed the same there of. But for that purpose it must be shown that the owner of such property has waved or surrendered special right in that property by his own volition & expressing such intention. It has also been held incase of "M.N. Aryamurty v. M.L. Subbaraya': AIR 1972 SC 1279 & in case of Purnabasi v. Raj Kumar, (1995) 1 OLR 606 that if there has been severance of joint family & subsequently one item of property is acquired in the name of particular member of the family even though without joint fund it would be the self acquired property. The Apex Court has made it clear that if one of the members remained in possession of the entire property of the family even after severance of status, there is no presumption that the property which is acquired by him after severance of status must be regarded as acquired for the family where rents & profits were received by the member in possession & he would be liable to account for the same but the funds in the hands of that member do not become impressed with any trust in favour of other members. Therefore, if such a member acquired such property with the funds in his possession, the other members would have no claim of share in that property. 13. In the touch-stone of above settled legal principle, the case in hand requires examination with reference to the evidence on record & the foundations through pleadings. Here "Schedule B" property admittedly is joint family property which Defendant No.1 got in partition with his father being ancestral property. It stands admitted that this Defendant No.1 was at that point of time having quite considerable extent of land measuring Ac. 16.55 dec. under his control which belong to the joint family. So reasonably from its nature & 'relative value it can be well inferred that the said property had formed the nucleus & in view of the fact that this extent of land was in his possession & control in the absence of any evidence being let in by Defendant No.1 specifically on the point that he was absolutely having no surplus income from out of it. 14. It has been pleaded by the Para 3 of the plaint that with , this surplus income derived from schedule B properties, that the Defendant No.1, has acquired a piece of vacant land measuring Ac.0.0400 dec. in village Jharipadar & has installed a rice huller mill thereon. The said piece of land along with the rice huller has been acquired from the out of the surplus of the nucleus of the joint family property as prescribed in "Schedule D". in village Jharipadar & has installed a rice huller mill thereon. The said piece of land along with the rice huller has been acquired from the out of the surplus of the nucleus of the joint family property as prescribed in "Schedule D". It has been further pleaded in Para - 9 of the plaint that as Scheduled Band C of the property are the ancestral property of the family & Schedule D land having been acquired with the surplus income of schedule B land, the same is also the joint family property & is liable to the partitioned. The Defendant N0.1 in the written statement has denied the fact that "Schedule D" property was also the joint family property having not been purchased from out of the surplus income of the joint family property described in schedule Band C. It has been specifically pleaded in Para - 5 of the written statement that the Defendant No.1 was working as village Postmaster & was doing business by availing loan. He claims to have acquired the said properties from the out of the income from salary & business & as such the property in ,"Schedule D" being self acquired is not liable to the partitioned. It has been specifically stated that the property over under Schedule D of the plaint was never acquired from out of the surplus income of the nucleus of the joint family property. The Defendant No.1 has asserted to have accordingly acquired the "Scheduled D" property & claims that to be his own property & thus denies the right of the Plaintiffs over the same. 15. The Trial Court has having taken up this issue NO.5 for discussion in Para 8 of the Judgment has gone to first of all say by analyzing the evidence that the said property under "Schedule - D" is liable to be partitioned. The Defendant- 1 in his evidence has stated that from the year 1976 to 1982, he was serving as village Postmaster & he was a1so doing contract business during the period. Out of his own income from the above business & service, he has stated to have purchased "Scheduled-D" property by registered sale-deed which has been admitted in evidence & marked Ext. Out of his own income from the above business & service, he has stated to have purchased "Scheduled-D" property by registered sale-deed which has been admitted in evidence & marked Ext. C. In spite of this, the Trial Court has said that there remains no cogent evidence to show that how much amount Defendant No.1 has earned as his salary as village Postmaster & how much he has received from his work as a contractor. Therefore, he has discarded the case of Defendant No.1 that it was purchased from out of his own income. It may be stated here that in support of the plea that Defendant No.1 was a contractor, has filed copy of the letter issued by the Superintendent Engineer dated 30.04.1979 marked Ext. B which reveals that the Def No.1 was a registered "D" class contractor & his license was valid up to 31.03.1992. The Trial Court has discarded that as it has not been specifically proved as to whether he was .actually allotted with any contract work or not. The Trial Court in this connection has practically discarded the case of the Defendant No.1 due to his failure to prove the detail account as regards his own income with reference to works as a contractor & was also towards his salary as village Postmaster. This particular view in the present case appears to be erroneous. At such distant point of time, the Trial Court's view that it was the further duty of the Defendant No.1 to produce & prove that he was being actually allotted with Govt. work & had undertaken certain work & also the other fact by leading clear, cogent & acceptable evidence as to quantum of work that he had done & what was the total work value & what was the earning from said work contract, so as to make out a full proof case is not acceptable & rather unjust, improper & an unrealistic approach. In my considered view, all these evidence after long lapse of time even if not plotted in detail, cannot lead to take a view adverse to the case 0F the Defendant No.1, when broadly he 11as proved that he was serving as village Postmaster & was working as "D" Class contractor, having the reacquired license for the purpose showing independent sources & probable income. Therefore, the view of the Trial Court is unsustainable. Therefore, the view of the Trial Court is unsustainable. It has also been the case Defendant No.1 that he had installed a rice huller & in cross-examination he has also further stated that he was a contractor for four years had made a profit of Rs.15000 to RS.16000 & savings of Rs.4000 to Rs.5000 from out of his salary which does not ,-appear to be unreasonable D.W. 2's evidence also provide support to the evidence of D.W. 1, that he was village Postmaster for a period of 6 to 7 years, was also doing some contract work. All these details were not required to be specifically pleaded by Defendant No.1 & for that when the pleading remains as regards independent sources etc, the evidence as above can not be ignored or kept out of consideration. On the other hand the Plaintiffs have not tendered any evidence to show that such facts are palpably false & have been simply pleaded/stated to project a case of self acquisition of "Schedule-D" property & nothing more when actually there was no other source for the Defendant N0.1. So in this state of affairs in the evidence it stands proved that the Defendant No.1 was having independent sources of income for certain period. This itself leads to an inference that when joint family property was therein as described in "Schedule-B" & with its income he was managing the family, also he was having its separate income of which the sources have been proved. Therefore, in the present case, being unable to subscribe to the Trial Court's view, it is found that the Defendant NO.1 have through sufficient evidence has established that "Schedule-D" property was his self acquired property. In this case in hand no case of blending is set up by the Plaintiffs' in the alternative. With this view, as emanate from my above discussions of pleading & evidence, I differ from the finding of the Trial Court that the Plaintiffs are entitled to any share over the said property. The "Scheduled-D" property thus is not liable to be partitioned in the present suit. 16. With this view, as emanate from my above discussions of pleading & evidence, I differ from the finding of the Trial Court that the Plaintiffs are entitled to any share over the said property. The "Scheduled-D" property thus is not liable to be partitioned in the present suit. 16. This leads me to delve with the submission advanced for the first time in course of hearing of this appeal as 'regards claim of share by Plaintiff NO.2 & 3, the daughters of Defendant No.1 & grant thereof over the property described in "Schedule B & C" which Defendant No.1 got in a partition with his father as his share over ancestral property. Admittedly at the time of hearing & decision in the suit, the Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005 had not come into force & it came into force only on 09.09.2005 during pendency of this appeal filed by Defendant No.1 challenging the Judgment & decree preliminarily worked out by the Trial Court & pending scrutiny by this Appellate Court. This appeal as per the settled position of law is a continuation of suit. & when the Appellate Court confirms, modifies or reverses the decree on merit, the Trial Court's decree is under law merges in the Appellate decree & it is the Appellate Court's decree which rules. In case of the change in the law whether it will affect pending appeals was considered in case of "Laxmi Narayan Guin & ors - vrs. Niranjan Modak;" (1985)1 SCC 270 ; Ram Srup. vrs. Munshi; AIR 1963 SC 553 ; Mulla - vrs. Gadhu; AIR 1966 SC 1423 & United Bank of India, Calcutta - vrs. Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Limited & others; AIR 2000 SC 2957 . It has been held that a change in law during the pendency the appeal has to be taken into account & will govern the rights of the parties. If the new law speaks in language, which expressly or by clear intendment: takes in even pending matters, the Court of Trial as well as the Court of Appeal must regard to an intention so expressed, 6. the Court of appeal may give effect to such a law even after the Judgment of the .Court of first instance. If the new law speaks in language, which expressly or by clear intendment: takes in even pending matters, the Court of Trial as well as the Court of Appeal must regard to an intention so expressed, 6. the Court of appeal may give effect to such a law even after the Judgment of the .Court of first instance. Therefore, this Court is commanded to consider applicability of the Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005 in respect of the rights conferred therein upon the daughters in getting shares over coparcenary property. 17. In the exercise as aforesaid at first instance, the points arising for consideration are the followings: (a) The right of the daughter of a coparcener in a joint Hindu family governed by Mitakhara Law in Coparcenary Property by virtue of Hindu Succession Amendment Act, 2005. (b) The amended provision is prospective or retrospective in operation. But before that, let there be a short survey with regard to the rules of interpretation of statute as enunciated in several cases by the Apex Court of which few are being referred to. 18. The Apex Court in case of "Mahadfolal Kanodia - vrs. Administrator General of West Bengal;" AIR 1960 SC 936 has laid down the principles to be applied as under: (1) Statutory previsions which create or take away substantive rights are ordinarily prospective. They can be retrospective if made so expressly or by necessary implication & the retrospective operation must be limited only 'to the extent to which it has been so made either" expressly or by necessary implication. (2) The intention of the legislature has to be gathered from the words used by it, giving then the plain, normal grammatical meaning. (3) If any provision of a legislation, the purpose of which is to benefit a particular class of persons is ambiguous so that it is capable of two meaning, the meaning which preserves the benefit should be adopted. (4) If the strict grammatical interpretation gives rise to an absurdity or inconsistency such interpretation should be discarded & an interpretation which will give effect to the purpose will be put on the words, if necessary even by modification of the language used. 18.1. In case of "Commissioner of Income Tax vrs. India Bank Ltd; AIR 1965 SC 1473 , the Supreme Court reiterated with further emphasis." "In construing the Act, we must adhere closely to the language of the Act. 18.1. In case of "Commissioner of Income Tax vrs. India Bank Ltd; AIR 1965 SC 1473 , the Supreme Court reiterated with further emphasis." "In construing the Act, we must adhere closely to the language of the Act. If there is ambiguity in terms of a provision, recourse must naturally be had to well established principles of' construction, but it is not permissible first to create an artificial ambiguity & then try to resolve the ambiguity by resort to some general principles." 18.2. The principles are so succinctly stated in American Jurisprudence (2nd Edition, Vol-73, Page 434, Para 366) quoted with approval in "S.R. Bommai- vrs. Union of India;" AIR 1994 SC 1918 ". "While it has been held that it is duty of the Courts to interpret a statute as they find it without reference to whether its provisions are expedient or in expedient; it has also been recognized that where a statute is ambiguous & subject to more than one interpretation, the expediency of one construction or the other is properly considered. Indeed, where the arguments are nicely balanced, expediency may trip the seals in few or of a particular construction. It is not the function of a Court in the interpretation of statutes, to vindicate the wisdom of, the law. The mere fact that the statute leads to unwise results is not sufficient to justify the Courts in rejecting the plain meaning of unambiguous words or in giving to a statute a meaning of which its language is not suspectable, or in restricting the scope of a statute. By the same token, an omission or failure to prove for contingency which it may seem wise to have provided for specifically, does not justify any judicial addition to the language of the statute. To the contrary, it is the duty of the Court to interpret a statute as they find it without reference to whether its provision are wise or unwise, necessary or unnecessary, appropriate or inappropriate, or well or ill conceived." "Rule of interpretation are meant to ascertain the true intent & purpose of the enactment & set right any anomaly, in consistency or ambiguity, while giving effect to it, the several rules of interpretation when juxta positioned may give an impression that they are inconsistent with each other. Further the same provision, when interpreted with reference to different rules of interpretation, may lead to different results. Further the same provision, when interpreted with reference to different rules of interpretation, may lead to different results. This is because the rules of interpretation are meant to set right different types of defects. It is not possible to apply all rules of interpretation together to a provision of law. An appropriate rule of interpretation should be chosen as a tool depending upon the nature of the defect in drafting which has to be set right. The rules of interpretation are to be applied in interpreting the statute, only if there is ambiguity, inconsistently, absurdity or redundancy. Where the words are clear, unambiguous, there is little need to open the tool kit of interpretation". 19. At this moment, it also requires to be taken note of that coparcenary is a creature of Hindu Law & is not created by agreement of parties except in case of reunion & consists of only those persons who have taken by birth an interest in the property of the holder" & who. can enforce partition when ever they like. It's a narrower body than joint family (Ref.:- Bhagwan Dayal (since deceased) vrs.- Ust Reoti Devi (deceased) AIR 1962 SC 287 & Sunil Kumar & anr- vrs. - Ham Bakash & ors; AIR 1988 SC 576 ) The joint Hindu family is genus whereas coparcenary is an unit under it & a specie. Joint Hindu family consists of all persons lineally descended from a common ancestor & includes their wives & unmarried daughters whereas Hindu coparcenary is a much narrower body than the joint family; includes only those persons who acquire by birth an interest in the joint or coparcenary property, they being sons, grand sons & great grandsons of the holder of the joint property for the time being. (Ref.:- Smt. Sitalbai & anr- vrs. Ram Chandra; AIR 1970 SC 343 ; Gowli Buddana - vrs. Comm. Income Tax, Maysore; AIR 1966 S.C 1523 & Bhagawati Prasad Sah & ors vrs. Dulhin; AIR 1952 SC 72 ). 20. With these in mind, it is felt apposite to have a sojourn for having a telescopic examination upon the position of law on the subject after 1956 & prior to 2005 Amendment Act & thereafter along with their objects & reasons as well as the goal sought to be achieved. Dulhin; AIR 1952 SC 72 ). 20. With these in mind, it is felt apposite to have a sojourn for having a telescopic examination upon the position of law on the subject after 1956 & prior to 2005 Amendment Act & thereafter along with their objects & reasons as well as the goal sought to be achieved. By the Act of 1956 while codifying the law on intestate succession among Hindus, it was also aimed to carry out reforms to remove the disparities & disabilities suffered by Hindu women But amidst much resistance it finally came into force on 17.06.1956. It conferred on women & in particular daughter equal rights as that of the son. The limited ownership ripened to absolute ownership in respect of any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after commencement of the Act. But, the said enactment had no application to coparcenary property. The daughter was not considered as coparcener & that stood as before. However, by a proviso to Section 6, provision was made that if a male Hindu dies leaving behind a surviving female relative specified in class 1 of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that class who claims through such females relatives, the interest of the deceased in Mitakshara Coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession as the case may be, under the Act & not by survivorship. This inequality was tolerated for about 50 years where after the demand that such discrimination is wholly unjust standing on the way of rendering social justice reached its peak & no more be swept under the carpet. This called for the need of a radical reform of the law on the subject. Thus the Hindu Succession Act (Amendment) Bill, 2005 come to be introduced on 20.12.2004 in Rajya Sabha & it was passed there on 16.08.2005 followed by its passing in Lak-Sabha on 29.08.2005 & assent of the President on 05.09.2005 giving its effect from 09.09.2005. The object is to bring the equality guaranteed by Constitution having regard to the need to render social justice to women by removing the discrimination contained in Section 6 of Act of 1956 in conferring equal rights to daughters in the Hindu Mitakshara coparcenary property as sons have. 21. The object is to bring the equality guaranteed by Constitution having regard to the need to render social justice to women by removing the discrimination contained in Section 6 of Act of 1956 in conferring equal rights to daughters in the Hindu Mitakshara coparcenary property as sons have. 21. In the backdrop of above, the provisions of Section 6 as' it stood before & after the Amendment Act, 2005 requiring interpretation be stated hereunder : Section - 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Pre-Amendment) "6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property.- When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary & not in accordance with this Act: Provided that, if the deceased had left him surviving a female relative specified in class 1 of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that class who claims through such femai'e relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act & not by survivorship. Explanation 1,.- For the purposes of this Section, the interest of a-Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. Explanation 2.- Nothing contained in the proviso to this Section shall be construed as enabling a person who. has separated himself from the coparcenary before the death of the deceased or any of his heirs to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein." Section - 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Post-Amendment) "6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property. has separated himself from the coparcenary before the death of the deceased or any of his heirs to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein." Section - 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Post-Amendment) "6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property. - (1) On & from the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, in a Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, the daughter of a coparcener shall, (a) by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son;', (b) have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son; (c) be subject to the 'same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenary property as that of a son. & any reference to a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to include a reference to a daughter of a coparcener. Provided that nothing contained in this sub-Section shall affect or invalidate any disposition or alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition of property which had taken place before the 20th Day of December, 2004. (2) Any property to which a female Hindu becomes entitled by virtue of sub-Section (1) shall be held by her with the incidents of coparcenary ownership & shall be regarded, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, or any other law for the time being in force, as property capable of being disposed of by her by testamentary disposition. (2) Any property to which a female Hindu becomes entitled by virtue of sub-Section (1) shall be held by her with the incidents of coparcenary ownership & shall be regarded, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, or any other law for the time being in force, as property capable of being disposed of by her by testamentary disposition. (3) Where a Hindu dies after the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, his Interest in the property of a Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be under this Act & not by survivorship, & the coparcenary property shall be deemed to have been divided as if a partition had taken place &, (a) the daughter is allotted the same share as is allotted to a son; (b) the share of the pre-deceased son 'or a pre-deceased daughter, as they would have got had they been alive at the time of partition, shall be allotted to the surviving child of such predeceased son or of such pre-deceased daughter; & (c) the share of the pre-deceased child of a pre-deceased son or of a pre-deceased .daughter, as such child would have got had he or she been alive at the time of the partition, shall be allotted to the child of such pre-deceased child of the pre-deceased son or a pre-deceased daughter, as the case may be. Explanation.- For the purpose of this sub-Section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would ,have been allotted to him if a partition of the property, had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. (4) After the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, no Court shall recognise any right to proceed against a son, grandson or great-grandson for the recovery of any debt due from his father, grandfather or great-grandfather solely on the ground of the pious obligation under the Hindu taw, of such son, grandson or great-grandson to discharge any such debt: (5) Nothing contained in this Section shall apply to a partition, which has been effected before the 20th Day of December, 2004. Explanation.- For the purposes of this Section "partition" means any partition made be execution of a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908) or partition effected by the decree of a Court." 22. Simultaneous reading of the above provisions of as they stood before & now after amendment, it is seen that the heading of Section remains unchanged. 22.1. Sub-Section (1) of the first part has been introduced which declares the rights of the daughter of a coparcener giving her the right by birth of becoming a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son & then further asserting her the rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son which in other words treating her as that of a son &' to have been born as such Next in the same way & manner with respect to sharing of liability. Most importantly, the command, given that Hindu Mitakshara coparcener has to be deemed to include referring to a daughter of a coparcener. All these leave no scope for any interpretation. The language is clear & unambiguous in the above respect of daughter of a coparcener's right by birth as a coparcener, having rights & liability as such as of by birth in her own right & being a member of the coparcenary being as by that. Proviso saves the disposition or alienation including any partition taking place prior to 20.10.2004 from not being falling within the net of being affected consequential to such declaration of right etc: with the explanation forbidding the acceptance of any made of partition other that') the two i.e. (1) by registered deed of partition & decree of the Court again if had been done/passed prior to 20.12,2004, The legislature being conscious of the fall out of above declaration made such limited saving. Sub-Section (2) states that the property so held would be no doubt with the incidents of coparcenary ownership but that is again couched with non-obstante clause that it would be capable of being disposed by testamentary disposition referring to existing provision in Section 30 of the Act. All the above got introduced in original Act by the Amendment Act by way of substitution of the entire Section 6 as it existed. All the above got introduced in original Act by the Amendment Act by way of substitution of the entire Section 6 as it existed. Importantly, rights are thus conferred on daughters & there has been removal of inequality between son & daughter in restoring equality i.e. un-equals have been made equals as per the Constitutional Mantra rectifying the mistake. So far as the application of the provision, cut off date i.e., 20.12.2004 has been fixed as in relation to saving alienation etc. with respect to partition prior to that in order to prevent unsettling of the state of affair, in the field, followed by the explanation deserving specific made of partition to be recognised to prevent mischief to deprive bonafide beneficiaries by way of collusion or manipulation & the cut off date is the date of introduction of the Bill in Parliament, coming to public domain. Thus any such acts thereafter have been refused to be given legal sanction as per earlier Act has not been placed out of the net of the fallout of the declaratory provision for the daughters. But most imporfantly the notional partition as per earlier provision has not been recognised. 22.2. Sub-Section 3 of course has undergone change in the amendment. Thus any such acts thereafter have been refused to be given legal sanction as per earlier Act has not been placed out of the net of the fallout of the declaratory provision for the daughters. But most imporfantly the notional partition as per earlier provision has not been recognised. 22.2. Sub-Section 3 of course has undergone change in the amendment. Changes are (i) in place of male Hindu, now the word 'Male' has been omitted which stands as 'Hindu' obviously implying both male & female; (ii) Applicability has been restricted to those cases where Hindu dies after commencement of Amendment Act which was earlier in case of death of male Hindu after commencement of principal Act; (iii) the word having at the time of the death of male Hindu having an interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property has been substituted by:- "his interest in the property of a joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law"; (iv) proviso restricting the devolution of interest of the deceased in the coparcenary property only in the event of being survived by a female relative specified in class.- 1 of he schedule or a male relative of that class claiming through such female relative no more remains & in its place deeming division as if a partition had taken place has been introduced followed by allotment of share therein to daughter as to a son along with provision for devolution in the eventuality of their prior death; (v) provision no more remains to deny any share over the interest as it was in respect of a person separated from coparcenary. 23. The rights created & conferred are: (i) The daughter of a coparcener by birth became a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son bringing equality in status vis-a-vis the coparcenary property; . (ii) The daughter of a coparcener having the same rights in the coparcenary property, as she would have had, if she had been a son i.e. equal right in coparcenary property. Equally, the daughter like son is also saddled with liability in respect of the said coparcenary property giving effect to the equality objective in letter & spirit. Thus the concept of coparcenary underwent sea change destroying the monopoly of male lineal descendants by giving entry to the daughters by the command of law in the said club. Equally, the daughter like son is also saddled with liability in respect of the said coparcenary property giving effect to the equality objective in letter & spirit. Thus the concept of coparcenary underwent sea change destroying the monopoly of male lineal descendants by giving entry to the daughters by the command of law in the said club. It is pertinent .to state here & to be borne in mind that in the year 1956, there was codification of law for the first time concerning intestate succession among Hindus. It had left the special rights of the members of Mitakshara coparcenary untouched & -unaffected. Whereas the Amendment Act of 2005 is to obliterate those special rights of members of coparcenary property as by birth. This is to rectify the blunder done by way of gender discrimination against the Constitutional mandate. This leaves no scope for further interpretation when also the Amendment is by way of total substitution whose effect is that it would be deemed - to be there since 17.06.1956 with the rider that w.e.1. 09.09.2005, the daughter became coparcener with right by virtue of her birth which can not be taken to ef'1u.re to the benefit of only those born on or after 09.09.2005 it squarely benefits the daughters even born before. The entry to the club of coparcenary is with effect from 09.09.2005 since when they can be said to have been duly enrolled therein. 24. Thus by the substituted provision, it is first declared that on & from the commencement of the Amendment Act in a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara Law. the daughter of a coparcener shall by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son & have the same rights in the said property as she would have had if she had been a son & so also as regards liability. So first right is conferred by declaring the same as on & from 09.09.2005 which enures to the benefit by birth which is clear & unambiguous. Thus though on the date of birth .she did not have such right as per the law governing the field then, its clear that by amendment of the law, such a right is conferred on her from the date of commencement of the Act of 1956. Thus though on the date of birth .she did not have such right as per the law governing the field then, its clear that by amendment of the law, such a right is conferred on her from the date of commencement of the Act of 1956. The intention is culled out when it is seen that there has been employment of word "shall by birth become coparcener in her own right" & "what she would have had." With all these languages of the statute by no stretch of imagination even the birth can be said to have been kept under suspension till then. Had it been the intention, the disposition, alienation, partition etc from would not have been saved & made immune from being affected from a date anterior to the date of commencement of the Amendment Act & there was no necessity to do so by adding a proviso in creating an exception to what is in the enactment, which has to travel within the provision of main enactment & not beyond. As the general rule in construing an enactment containing a proviso is to construe them together without making either of them redundant or otiose. The devise of exclusion is adopted only to exclude a part from the whole, which but for the exclusion, continues to be a part of it & the words of exclusion are presumed to have some meaning without being readily recognised as mere surplus age. More importantly neither there remains any separate saving Section in the Amendment Act of 2005 nor even the concept of notional partition as it earlier stood gets the recognition or any protection for having attained finality & so notwithstanding the fact that there was a partition of the coparcenary property as recognised under Hindu law, the daughter of a coparcener who has been conferred with equal right in the coparcenary property as that of a son would be entitled to a share therein. That apart there remains no point in saying that vested right of other male members by amendment has been taken away. That apart there remains no point in saying that vested right of other male members by amendment has been taken away. The vested right is the right to share which the coparcener acquires by birth but the extent of that share is not a vested rigrl1 as that is not determ.ined on the date of birth when it is not definite & is likely to fluctuate every now & then with birth & deaths of coparceners. In the present case, particularly for all purposes by the conferment of right upon the daughter, the member of member in the coparcenary goes up. The same in no way dismembers any other coparceners. This runs at par with settled position of law that till disruption of joint family status takes place no coparcener can claim what is his exact share in coparcenary property. It is liable to increase or decrease depending upon the addition to the number or departure of a male member & in heritance by survivorship.But once disruption of joint family status takes place, coparcener's cease to hold the property as joint tenants but they hold so as tenants-in-common. Similarly, so far as the right of other female relatives is concerned, the same is also not wholly affected & for that the provision no more remains for deeming a partition as if to have taken place immediately before his death as existed before. The principle of Hindu law by Mulla; Vol. 1 (17th Edition) as regards the right of wife, it is stated thata wife cannot herself demand a partition but if a partition does take place between her husband & his sons, she is entitled (except in South India) to receive a share equal to that of a son & to hold & enjoy that share separately even from her husband (Article 315, page 506). This is not ignored here & the position as before prevails. For the same, the Parliament have purposely employed the word his interest in the property of Hindu joint family governed by Mitakshara Law in substitution of the word Mitakshara coparcenary property' after omitting the word 'Male' In new provision of sub-Section (3) of Section-6 of the Act.' The intention not to deprive as above is manifest & clear. So, this Amended provision successfully passes that important test so as to stand for its retrospective operation. So, this Amended provision successfully passes that important test so as to stand for its retrospective operation. In view of above discussion & reasons, the conclusion follows that though such right was declared on 09.09.2005, the declaration that the said right as a coparcener enures to her by birth. 25. The question whether a statute operates prospectively or retrospectively is one of the legislative intent. In para 18, 18.1 & 18.2 reference has been made to the decision of Apex Court in case of Mahadfolal KElnodia (supra). The legal principles have been further elaborated & settled in Constitution Bench decision in case of "Shyam Sunder & others vrs. Ram Kumar & anr." AIR 2001 SC 2472 , it has been held that a substituted Section in the Act is the product of an Amending Act & all the effects & consequences that follow in the case of an Amending Act, the same would also follow in the case of a substituted Section in an Act. It has also been held that where an amendment affects vested rights the amendment would operate prospectively unless it is expressly made retrospective or its retrospective operation follows as a manner of necessary implication. Ordinarily, when an enactment declares the previsions law it requires to be given retrospective effect. The function of a declaratory statute is to supply an omission or explain previous statute & when such an Act is passed, it comes into effect when the previous enactment was passed. The legislative power to enact law includes the power to declare what was the previous law & when such a declaratory Act is passed invariably it has been held to be retrospective. Mere absence of use of word 'declaration' in an Act explaining what was the law before may not appear to be a declaratory Act. But if the Court finds an Act as declaratory or explanatory it has to construe as retrospective. Further held that the function of a declaratory or explanatory Act is to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to meaning of the previous Act & such an Act comes into effect from the date of passing of the previous Act. 25.1. Further held that the function of a declaratory or explanatory Act is to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to meaning of the previous Act & such an Act comes into effect from the date of passing of the previous Act. 25.1. In this connection, it is also profitable to refer to the following observations in 'Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 5th Edition 1992, by Sri G. P. Sin 9 hat page 35 1 under caption ‘Declaratory Statutes’; "The presumption against retrospective operation is not applicable to declaratory statutes. As stated in CRMES & approved by Supreme Court:- For modern purposes a declaratory Act may be defined as an Act to remove doubts existing as to common law, or meaning or effect of any statute. Such Acts are usually held to be retrospective. The usual reason for passing a declaratory Act is to set aside what Parliament deems to have been a judicial error whether in the statement of common law or in the interpretation of statutes." It is well settled that if a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective operation is generally intended. 25.2. The inhibition against retrospective construction is not a rigid rule & must vary secundum materium. It has been said that "the basis of the rule is no more than simple fairness which ought to be the basis of every legal rule. (Vijay vrs. State of Maharashtra; (2006) 6 SCC 289 referring the doctrine of fairness in the context of retrospectively)." In case of "Ganduri Koteshwaramma vrs. Chakiri Yanadi; (2011) 9 SCC 788 , the Apex Court in a suit for partition between brothers, sisters & other members of the family in respect of coparcenary property had to consider the daughters entitlement in view of Amendment Act of 2005, it has been held therein that: "The new Section 6 provides for parity of .rights in the coparcenary property among male & female members of a joint Hindu family on & from 09.09.2005. The legislature has now conferred substantive right in favour of the daughters. According to the new Section 6, the daughter of a coparcener becomes a coparcener by birth in her own rights & liabilities in the same manner as the son. The legislature has now conferred substantive right in favour of the daughters. According to the new Section 6, the daughter of a coparcener becomes a coparcener by birth in her own rights & liabilities in the same manner as the son. The declaration in Section 6, that the daughter of a coparcener shall have some rights & liabilities in the coparcenary prop8rty as she would have been son is unambiguous & unequivocal. Thus, on an from 09.09.2005, the daughter is entitled to a share in the ancestral property & is a coparcener as if she had been a son." 27. In the touchstone of ail the above principles of law as settled & in view of discussion held in aforesaid Paras more particularly in Para 22 to 24 of the Judgment, the substituted provision of Section 6 as brought in by Amendment Act of 2005 is held to be . retrospective in operation as otherwise it would be without object. In view of above, the two decisions rendered by this Court in case of "Pravat Ch. Pattnaik & ors vrs. Sarat Chandra Pattnaik & anr;" 106 (2008) CLT 98 & Santi lata Sahu vrs. Sabitri Sahu & ors; 105 (2008) CLT 389 stand for commendation & those also stand firmly by the side of above view & conclusion getting further support from the reasons & legal justifications given therein before that the daughters are conferred with the rights on & from the commencement of the Amendment Act & not merely to those born thereafter. 28. Adverting to the point of grant of shares to Plaintiff NO.2 & 3 in this appeai when not claimed earlier, it is profitable to quote few paras from the Apex Court's decision in case of Ganduri Koteshwaramma (supra): "12. The rights accrued to a daughter in the property of a joint Hindu family under 2005 Amendment Act is absolute except in the circumstances provided in the proviso appended to sub• Section 1 of Section 6. The excepted categories to which the new Section 6 of the Act is not applicable are:- (i) where the disposition or alienation, including any partition has taken place before 20.12.2004; & (ii) where testamentary disposition of property has been mad before 20.12.2004. Sub-Section 5 of Section 6 leaves no room (or doubt as it provides that this Section shall not apply to the partition which has been affected before 20.12.2004. Sub-Section 5 of Section 6 leaves no room (or doubt as it provides that this Section shall not apply to the partition which has been affected before 20.12.2004. 'Partition' has been explained to mean any partition affected by execution of a deed of partition followed by due registration or partition effected by a decree of a Court. So in view of above explanation for applicability of the Section what is relevant to find out is whether any partition has been affected before 20.12.2004 by a registered deed of partition or by a decree of a Court." "13. The legal position is settled that partition of a joint Hindu family can be effected by various modes, inter alia, two of these modes are (one) by a registered instrument of a partition & (two) by a decree of the Court." . "14. A preliminary decree determines the rights & interest of the parties. A suit for partition is not disposed of by passing of a preliminary decree. It is by the final decree that the immovable property of joint Hindu family is partitioned by metes & bounds. After passing of the preliminary decree, the suit continues till then until the final decree is passed. If in the interregnum i. e., after passing of the preliminary decree & before the final decree is passed, the events & supervening circumstances occur necessitating change in shares there is no impediment for the Court to amend the preliminary decree or pass another preliminary decree re-determining the rights & interest of the .parties having regard to the changed situation. "15. We are fortified in our view by a three- Judges Bench decision of this case in Phoolchand v. Gopal Lal, AI R 1967 SC 1470 whe reinth is Court stated as follows. We are of the opinion that there is nothing is in the Code of Civil Procedure prohibits the passing of more than one preliminary decree if circumstances justify the same & that it may be necessary to do so particularly in partition suits when after the preliminary decree some parties die & shares of other parties are thereby augmented. So far as partition suit is concerned when an event transpires after the preliminary decree which necessitates a change in shares, the Court can do so." 29. So far as partition suit is concerned when an event transpires after the preliminary decree which necessitates a change in shares, the Court can do so." 29. In case of S. Sai Reddy v. S. Narayan Reddy (1991) 3 SCC 647 during the pendency of the proceedings in the suit for partition before the Trial Court & prior to the passing of final decree, the 1956 Act was amended by State Legislature of Andhra Pradesh conferring share upon the unmarried daughters in the joint family property. The unmarried daughters claiming their share in the property. The matter went to High Court wherein the prayer was found favour with & then it was carried to the Apex Court. The Apex Court considering the objects & reasons behind such legislation & holding the preliminary decree to have not finally determined the shares putting the partition to an end confirmed the order of the High Court. The question again came to be raised before the Apex Court in Ganduri Koteshwaramma v. Chakiri Yanadi & anr (2011) 9 SCC 788 . In that case during final decree proceeding after submission of the report of the Civil Court Commissioner the Amendment Act come into force. So, necessary applications being filed for allotment of share by the deprived daughters the Trial Court allowed the application. However, the said order was set aside by the High Court. The Hon'ble Apex Court upon consideration of provision of law as well as the principle of law settled by earlier decisions having held that the daughters are entitled' to the shares in the joint family property as conferred under the Amendment Act have further said: "19. A suit for partition continues after passing of the preliminary decree & the proceedings in the suit get extinguished only on passing of the final decree. It is not correct statement of law that once a preliminary decree has been passed, it is not capable of modification. It needs no emphasis that the rights 01 the parties in a partition suit should be settled once for all in that suit alone & no other proceedings." "20. Section 97 C.P.C. that provides that where any party aggrieved by a preliminary decree passed after the commencement of the Court does not appeal from such decree. It needs no emphasis that the rights 01 the parties in a partition suit should be settled once for all in that suit alone & no other proceedings." "20. Section 97 C.P.C. that provides that where any party aggrieved by a preliminary decree passed after the commencement of the Court does not appeal from such decree. he shall be precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree does not create any hindrance or obstruction in the power of the Court to modify, amend or alter the preliminary decree or pass another preliminary decree is the changed circumstance so require." "21. "It's true that a final decree is always required to be in conformity with the preliminary decree but that does not mean that a preliminary decree, before the final decree is passed, cannot be altered or amended or modified by the Trial Court in the event of changed or supervening circumstances, even if no appeal has been preferred for such preliminary decree." The position is no more res-integra that mere passing of decree for partition whether by Trial Court or by the Appellate Court is not enough. Till a partition is affected by a decree of a Court, thereby meaning till the decree for partition has attained finality by sealing & signing of the final decree. the daughters cannot be deprived of her legitimate right in the said property. 30. The above authoritative pronouncements of Apex Court provide the answer to the present case concerning the declaration of the right’s of the Plaintiff No.2 & 3 over Schedule B & C properties & their entitlement to the shares equal to that of Plaintiff No.1 & Defendant No.1. When the same, can be so sought for by filling an application in the Trial Court for passing a second preliminary decree taking into consideration the changed & supervening circumstances of enforcement of the Amended provisions of law, I find no any reason to say as to why the same cannot be declared & conferred upon Plaintiff No.2 & 3 in this appeal when it would serve no purpose to drive them back to knock at the door of the Trial Court for the said relief & more so when this appeal is the continuation of the suit with doctrine of merger coming into play. Interestingly, in the case, at the time of decision of the suit in view of the law as it was then in fact the Plaintiff No.2 & 3 could not have maintained any appeal being not affected by the decree on the score of deprivation of their share over "Schedule B & C" properties & for that reason they had not even claimed so in the suit which cannot be so viewed to their detriment in the changed scenario of law. The right came to be conferred during appeal which cannot be ignored but has to be recognised as the changed & supervening event. As they are entitled to share in view of present position of law & they having not advanced the claim till now would not stand on the way of grant of their entitlement as per law. In the absence of any claim from any other side, Plaintiff No.2 & 3 are hereby found entitled to have their shares over Schedule B & C property to the extent of 1/4th (one fourth) each along with Plaintiff No.1 & Defendant No.1 each of whom are also entitled to 1/4th (one fourth) share therein as Plaintiff No.2 & 3 become coparceners in their own right by birth which entitles them to also have a right to sue for partition against other coparceners including their father in getting their shares in accordance with law. 31. The question next arises with regard to the other reliefs which have been granted by the Trial Court. In view of my above discussion concluded at Para 15 of the Judgment, & as a, consequence thereto the decree which has been granted by directing the Defendant NO.1 to render accounts in respect of the income of "Schedule D" property is liable to be modified that it should be confined to "Schedule- B & C" property. 32. For the marriage expenses, the decree has been passed for sum of Rs.75.000 & that is in respect of Plaintiff No.2 & in respect of Plaintiff N0.3 a sum of RS.1 lakh has been directed to be paid by the Defendant N0.1 for the same along with payment of Rs.1500 per month to both Plaintiff No.2 &3 from the date of filing of the suit till 19.12.1991. Decree has been passed for directing Defendant NO.1 to pay sum of Rs.700 per month as maintenance & educational expenses to Plaintiff No.3 from 19.12.1991 till her marriage. Considering the present days price index & soaring price with rate of inflation on a steep increasing trend with the cost of living ascending day by day, this Court finds that the quantum as ordered are quite reasonable & the same & in the facts & circumstances, thus• are found to be just & proper cumulatively viewed with the status 01 the parties as well as the properties that stand in their favour remaining under the care & control of the Defendant NO.1.So. the decree on those scores stand confirmed. 33. In view of aforesaid, the appeal stands allowed in part & in the circumstances without cost. The Judgment & decree stand modified to the extent that the Plaintiff No.1. 2 & 3 & Defendant No.1 are entitled to 1/4th (one fourth) share each over the properties described in "Schedule-B & C" of the plaint & accordingly the preliminary decree to that effect is hereby passed with the other directions as ordained under the said decree by the Trial Court with modification therein keeping "Schedule D" property out of the purview of rendition of accounts by Defendant No.1 confining to "Schedule B & C" property.