JUDGMENT : Sumbuddha Chakrabarti, J. By this petition the petitioner has inter alia prayed for a writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents not to proceed further pursuant to a memo dated July 9, 2008 issued by the District Inspector of Schools, Secondary Education, a writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents to regularise the petitioners services on the basis of the appointment letter quashing the memo mentioned above and for other reliefs. 2. The case of the petitioner inter alia is that her mother was an Assistant School Teacher in Cossipore Sri Gopal Vidya Mandir for girls. She died on July 25, 2001 when she was still in service leaving behind her husband and the only daughter, i.e., the petitioner. 3. The petitioner refers to a Government Circular dated October 12, 1987 which inter alia states that if a primary school teacher dies in harness his ward should be considered for employment in the first instance in any primary school in the district the Assistant Teacher last served. On the basis of the said circular the petitioner who was an unmarried daughter of the deceased mother made an application for registering her name in the live roster in the death-in-harness category seeking employment as an Assistant Teacher on compassionate ground to the District Inspector of Schools, Secondary Education, Calcutta. 4. Subsequently she was married on September 30, 2001. She attended the office of the School Service Commission on May 24, 2002 as directed. She says that she had informed the authority during her interview about her marriage. Her name was recorded in the death-in-harness category before her marriage was solemnized. According to her she is entitled to be appointed and the circular relied on by her does not provide that a subsequent marriage will ever be a bar to her appointment. 5. By a memo dated November 14, 2002 the Secretary of the West Bengal School Service Commission, Southern Region, informed the Secretary of Tiljala Balika Vidyalaya about the appointment of the petitioner against regular vacancy in the post of Assistant Teacher in English of the said school and subsequently the Secretary of the said school had issued an appointment letter to the petitioner as an Assistant Teacher and the petitioner joined the school on November 25, 2002. 6. 6. By a memo dated December 16, 2002 the Secretary of the school informed the petitioner about the cancellation of her appointment in view of the memo issued by the Secretary, West Bengal Regional School Service Commission (Southern Region). Her appointment was cancelled on the ground that she was a married daughter of the deceased teacher of the school. The petitioner alleges that her appointment was cancelled treating the date of registration to be May 24, 2002 which is factually incorrect. The petitioner protested against this by a letter dated December 23, 2002 and subsequently by a legal notice she demanded justice. 7. The petitioner subsequently filed a writ petition being WP No. 4738(W) of 2003 and by a judgment and order dated June 23, 2003 a learned single judge of this court set aside the order impugned and directed the respondents to allow the petitioner to join the school. It was further held that the petitioner should be deemed to be continuing from the date of joining pursuant to the order of appointment. An appeal therefrom was dismissed by the Division Bench. 8. The next phase of trouble for the petitioner started when she was on study leave and continuing with her B.Ed course after being allowed by the school for admission on deputation. The District Inspector of Schools (SE) issued an office memo dated July 9, 2008 cancelling and or deleting the name of the petitioner from the live register inter alia alleging that such cancellation had been done in compliance with the direction of the Director of School Education who in turn had passed it in compliance of an order passed by the High Court on May 26, 2007 in the appeal referred to above. The petitioner says that in the appeal no such order was ever passed. Such cancellation was made on the ground that she had been married on September 30, 2001 which was much before her selection by the Regional School Service Commission (SR) and this point had already been decided in the earlier' writ petition filed by her. 9. The petitioner has alleged that the point regarding appointment of married daughter on compassionate ground had already been settled by this court and as such this point cannot be reagitated. The respondents have no right to cancel her name from the live register maintained by the District Inspector of Schools (SE). 9. The petitioner has alleged that the point regarding appointment of married daughter on compassionate ground had already been settled by this court and as such this point cannot be reagitated. The respondents have no right to cancel her name from the live register maintained by the District Inspector of Schools (SE). She has also alleged that the memo dated July 9, 2008 is arbitrary, mala fide and is an infringement of the petitioners fundamental rights. The petitioner has assailed this memo in the present writ petition. 10. The state respondents have opposed this application by filing an affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by the District Inspector of Schools (SE), Kolkata. It has been alleged that after the writ petitioner had made the application the concerned District Inspector of Schools, i.e., the respondent no. 4 herein, asked the petitioner to visit the office on October 16, 2001 to ascertain the financial condition of the family. When the aforesaid requirement was wanted from the writ petitioner the dependency factor of the petitioner upon the income of her deceased mother underwent a change. On September 30, 2001 the petitioner was married which was concealed by the petitioner from the official respondents and she never intimated the same. 11. After her appointment the Regional School Service Commission by an order dated December 13, 2002 had cancelled the recommendation upon detecting the actual fact situation. The answering respondents have mentioned in the affidavit that while disposing of the appeal from ah order passed by a learned single judge the Division Bench had categorically made it clear that consideration of the dependency factor, whether at all was existing due to the marriage of the writ petitioner, had not been decided by the court in any way and the matter was kept open for a decision by the appropriate authority. Thereafter the respondent no. 4 by the memo impugned had cancelled the name of the petitioner in the live register ab initio. The answering respondents have referred to the grounds on which the action impugned in the writ petition has been challenged by the petitioner and submitted that none of the grounds was tenable in the eye of law to set at naught the impugned decision. According to them the need for immediate financial assistance underwent a sea change once the petitioner got married prior to being recommended before the School Service Commission by the District Inspector. According to them the need for immediate financial assistance underwent a sea change once the petitioner got married prior to being recommended before the School Service Commission by the District Inspector. A person on the day applying for a job on compassionate ground may have need for minimum assistance which may undergo substantial change within a short span of making the application. Once such change occurs the claim for compassionate appointment has to be adjudged keeping in mind the new circumstances. The respondents prayed for a dismissal of the writ petition. 12. The petitioner had denied the contentions of the answering respondents by filing an affidavit-in-reply. She says that on September 30, 2001 her registration of marriage had taken place and there was no change of circumstances till the social marriage was solemnized. She has disclosed the factum of her marriage to the District Inspector of Schools. She has further mentioned that the respondent No. 4 had no right to cancel her appointment after regularisation of her service. Moreover, the judgment of the Division Bench contained no such direction to pass the order impugned for compliance. According to her notwithstanding the claim made by the respondent no. 4 that the order impugned was issued in compliance of the direction given by the Division Bench he was not authorised to issue any such direction. Marriage was not sufficient to hold that the financial condition of the family came to an end with marriage. 13. Thus the moot question that crops up for consideration is whether by a marriage subsequent to the death of an employee a daughter forfeits her rights to be employed on compassionate ground. Strong reliance has been placed by the petitioner on the case of Smt. Usha Singh v. State of West Bengal and Others, reported in 2003(1) CLJ 407 . In that case the relevant rules governing the field inter alia provided that the Council might appoint primary teachers with the approval of the Director on compassionate ground when a teacher dies-in-harness before the date of his superannuation leaving a family which in the opinion of the Council was in extreme economic hardship. It was mentioned that the persons who might make an application were the unemployed widow or the unemployed son or the unemployed unmarried daughter. The court was not inclined to read in the said rules a restraint upon marriage. It was mentioned that the persons who might make an application were the unemployed widow or the unemployed son or the unemployed unmarried daughter. The court was not inclined to read in the said rules a restraint upon marriage. There was no guarantee that the appointment would be made immediately upon the death or even immediately upon the applicant being found eligible. She might have to wait for her turn in a roster which may take any length of time. The court further held that the rationale of the rules was that the son or the daughter who applied for an appointment in the died-in-harness category should have been dependant upon the income of the deceased so that his untimely death left them in extreme economic hardship. The avowed object of the rules was to provide relief to the family which was in extreme financial hardship and for this an unemployed son could apply whether married or unmarried. Why then was the restriction, a learned single judge of this court posed a question, upon a daughter that she should be unmarried in order to be eligible for appointment? An unmarried daughter could be divorced being fully dependant upon the father. She might have been an abandoned wife, fully dependent upon the father. She might have been married to an indigent husband so that both the married daughter and the son-in-law would have been dependants upon the income of the bread winner whose death led them to extreme financial hardship. The court countenanced that there might be many other probabilities in which a married daughter might be fully dependant upon the income of her father so that the death of the father would leave her and the rest of the members of the family in extreme economic hardship. 14. In the said case of Smt. Usha Singh (Supra) the court concluded that the discrimination made by the rules between a married son and a married daughter only on the basis of gender was unconstitutional and offended Article 15 when it provided that unemployed married son was eligible but an unemployed married daughter was not. Rule 14 of the concerned rules was thus struck down. 15. Rule 14 of the concerned rules was thus struck down. 15. The petitioner also relied on an unreported judgement of the Bombay High Court in the case of Sou Swara Sachin Kulkami v. The Superintending Engineer, Pune Irrigation Project Circle and Another, Writ Petition No. 11987 of 2012. There also the Bombay High Court decided a similar issue. The name of the petitioner was deleted from the list because of her marriage. The Division Bench held that the petitioners name could not have been so deleted. Compassionate appointment is to enable the family to get or tide over a financial crisis. It was observed that as the petitioner was the only member who could earn and support the mother in her old age, so also the emoluments including the pension of the deceased were inadequate that she was interested in pursuing her claim. The Division Bench observed: "We cannot expect a welfare State to take a stand that a married daughter is ineligible to apply for compassionate appointment simply because she becomes a member of her husbands family. She cannot be treated as not belonging to her fathers family....... The wife of the deceased and the mother of the daughters has no body else to look to for support, financially or otherwise in her old age. In such circumstances, the stand of the State that married daughter will not be eligible or cannot be considered for compassionate appointment violates the mandate of Article 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India. No discrimination can be made in public employment on gender basis." 16. Learned advocate for the state-respondents submitted that the order impugned was passed pursuant to the direction given by the Division Bench arising out of the first writ petition filed by the petitioner. There is one obvious difficulty in accepting this contention. It is true that while disposing of the appeal the Division Bench had observed that the consideration of the dependency factor, whether at all was existing due to marriage of the writ petitioner, had not been decided by the court in the matter and was kept open for decision of the appropriate authority, if the authority so desired. The Bench, therefore, kept the point open for adjudication and the appropriate authorities were at liberty to take appropriate steps which were to be considered, both right and proper. 17. The Bench, therefore, kept the point open for adjudication and the appropriate authorities were at liberty to take appropriate steps which were to be considered, both right and proper. 17. This judgement and order of the Division Bench obviously did not contain any direction upon the respondents to pass the order impugned and as such the recording in the order impugned that the same was passed in compliance with the order of the High Court was an obvious misreading of the order passed by the Division Bench. The Division Bench while holding that the action taken in the earlier writ petition by the Regional School Service Commission was not sustainable had nonetheless decided to grant some liberty to decide the question of dependency factor whether at all it was existing due to the marriage of the petitioner. It will be still more obvious from the statement that this liberty was to be exercised by the respondent if the authority so desired. As such the interpretation that the court had directed the respondents to embark into the aspect was an obvious misinterpretation of the order. 18. That apart in the process the respondent no. 4 while passing the memo impugned had glossed over a very major aspect of the liberty granted by the Division Bench. Satisfaction of the authority that the conditions stipulated for appointment on compassionate grounds were to be specified in the true sense was a precondition for the exercise of such authorities. 19. In the present case there is no adjudication of the conditions stipulated for appointment under the died-in-harness category or the continuance of the dependency factor of the writ petitioner after her marriage. There has been merely a recording of the sequence of events and the allegation that it had come to the knowledge that the petitioner was married before the selection by the School Service Commission for the post of Assistant Teacher. And, therefore, in presumed compliance of the order of the High Court the said authority had cancelled the petitioners name from the live register as maintained by his office. 20. This is obviously not what was intended by this court. And, therefore, in presumed compliance of the order of the High Court the said authority had cancelled the petitioners name from the live register as maintained by his office. 20. This is obviously not what was intended by this court. It may be mentioned that after the judgement and order passed by the learned single judge in the earlier writ petition it was not permissible for the respondent to take up the same point for cancellation of the appointment of the petitioner which was on an earlier occasion found to be not sustainable. It may be mentioned that on the earlier occasion as well her appointment was cancelled on the ground that the petitioner was married daughter of the deceased staff of the school. The learned single judge relied on the earlier decision of this court in the case of Smt. Usha Singh (Supra) and held that the said decision had not been altered or varied by any competent court of law. The learned single judge had held that the respondents had acted illegally in cancelling the appointment of the petitioner on the ground that she was a married daughter of the deceased teaching staff and set aside the order passed by the respondent authority. 21. In such view of it was not proper on the part of the respondent no. 4 to mention the marriage of the petitioner as a ground for cancellation of her appointment and that was not even permitted by the Division Bench either. The Division Bench had also found the action of the concerned respondent to be illegal and unsustainable and dismissed the appeal. But it was for a very limited purpose that a liberty was given to decide the question of consideration of the dependency factor, i.e., whether it existed after the marriage of the petitioner. As such the authorities were eligible to embark into a fresh consideration into the matter only on the question of the dependency factor and whether the conditions stipulated for appointment under the death-in-harness category were specified in the true sense and once they had decided to do it pursuant to the liberty given by this court it was imperative that they would have to adjudge the matter as directed by the court. It was also imperative that the petitioner was to be given an opportunity of being heard and upon considering the materials the concerned authority must have to arrive at a finding on the points as mentioned by the Division Bench. 22. Nothing of the sort was done. The order impugned, as mentioned earlier merely recited a sequence of events and cancelled the appointment of the petitioner on the ground of her previous marriage. This stand taken by the respondent is clearly impermissible. In the case of Smt. Usha Singh (Supra) as well the petitioner got married not only after her application for appointment on compassionate ground but even after the interview. In this case also the petitioner got married after she had filed the application for registering her name in the death-in-harness category. 23. In such view of it I find sufficient merit in the writ petition and the same is hereby allowed. 24. The order impugned dated July 9, 2008 which has been annexed to the writ petition as Annexure P-16, is set aside and quashed. I direct the respondent no. 4 to adjudicate the matter afresh in terms of the order passed by the division bench of this court in connection with the writ petition filed earlier. The said authority is directed to consider the question of the dependency factor. The authority is directed to consider and dispose of the matter positively within six weeks from the date of communication of this order after giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard. The respondent no. 4 shall intimate his order to the petitioner within a week thereafter. 25. The field of adjudication so far as the respondent no. 4 is concerned is strictly limited to the extent indicated above. 26. The writ petition is disposed of with the above observations.