Judgment V. Dhanapalan, J. 1. Heard Mr. V. Ramesh, learned counsel for the appellant Transport Corporation and Mr. Mukund R. Pandian, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/claimants. 2. The Transport Corporation is on appeal against the award dated 02.03.2011 made in M.C.O.P.No.321 of 2007 on the file of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Principal District Judge, Krishnagiri. 3. It was the case of the respondents/claimants before the Tribunal that on 10.10.2006, when the deceased one E.Jaishankar was driving his motor cycle bearing Registration No.TN 24 X 3025 from his residence to Bagalur Hudco to attend some personal work, about 8.30 p.m., when he was nearing the opposite side of ICICI Bank, Hosur, on Hosur-Krishnagiri Road, a Tamilnadu State Transport Corporation bus bearing Registration No.TN 29 N 1180 came in an uncontrollable speed and dashed against the deceased, who was driving his motor cycle on the left side of the road. Due to that impact, the deceased sustained grievous injuries and died on the spot itself. The Hosur Traffic Investigation Wing Police registered a case against the driver of the TNSTC Bus in Crime No.334/2006 under Sections 279 and 304A IPC. Since the deceased was aged only 30 years at the time of accident, his dependants, who are his wife, son and mother, claimed a sum of Rs.35,00,000/- as compensation under different heads. 4. The Transport Corporation resisted the claim petition that the driver of the TNSTC bus bearing Registration No.TN-29 N 1180 drove the same very slowly, cautiously and observing all the traffic rules. While nearing the said place, the rider of the said motorcycle bearing Registration No.TN 24 X 3025 drove the same in a rash and negligent manner without observing any rules of the road, suddenly turned to the right side of the road and fell down on the road and caused the accident. The rider of the motorcycle was not having any valid driving licence at the time of accident and hence the Transport Corporation is not liable to pay any compensation to the claimants. According to the Transport Corporation, the compensation claimed by the claimants is very high and excessive and hence, sought dismissal of the claim petition. 5. Before the Tribunal, the 1st claimant examined herself as P.W.1. One Mahesh and one Janardhanan were examined as P.W.2 and P.W.3, respectively. On behalf of the claimants, Exs.A1 to A14 were marked. According to the Transport Corporation, the compensation claimed by the claimants is very high and excessive and hence, sought dismissal of the claim petition. 5. Before the Tribunal, the 1st claimant examined herself as P.W.1. One Mahesh and one Janardhanan were examined as P.W.2 and P.W.3, respectively. On behalf of the claimants, Exs.A1 to A14 were marked. On the side of the respondents, the Conductor of the State Transport Corporation bus was examined as R.W.1. But, no document has been marked on their side. 6. The Tribunal, on evaluation of pleadings and evidence, found that the driver of the State Transport Corporation Bus was responsible for the accident and awarded a sum of Rs.14,44,000/- as compensation with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. The compensation awarded by the Tribunal under different heads are as under: S. No. Heads Amount 1 Loss of dependency Rs. 10,88,000.00 2 Future Prospects Rs. 3,26,000.00 3 Loss of consortium and company Rs. 15,000.00 4. Loss of Estate Rs. 10,000.00 5 Transportation & Funeral Expenses Rs. 5,000.00 Total Rs. 14,44,000.00 Aggrieved by the said award, the appellant Transport Corporation is before this Court seeking modification of compensation. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant Transport Corporation would mainly question the award of the Tribunal on three grounds: firstly, the income of the deceased was fixed without any documentary evidence to support; secondly, the percentage of computation of future prospects determined by the Tribunal is not correct and thirdly, 20% of the total income, which has to be deducted for the purpose of Income Tax, is not done. Therefore, he would contend that the award is legally infirmed. Though he raised a plea of negligence, in view of the Tribunal's conclusion on the oral and documentary evidence including R.W.1's evidence, he did not insist on the aspect of negligence. 8. On the above points, we have heard the learned counsel for the respondents/claimants. As regards the income of the deceased, he would submit that Ex.A7, Salary particulars of the deceased would be a conclusive proof to show the income of the deceased and that the Tribunal is right in fixing the income of the deceased at Rs.8000/-. As regards determination of future prospects, he would submit that the Tribunal has rightly determined the loss of future prospects, as the deceased was aged only 30 years at the time of death. As regards determination of future prospects, he would submit that the Tribunal has rightly determined the loss of future prospects, as the deceased was aged only 30 years at the time of death. With regard to the third point that 20% deduction towards Income Tax is not done, learned counsel would submit that the deceased was earning only Rs.1,00,000/- per annum, which would not attract income tax. 9. We have given careful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel on either side and perused the materials available on record. 10. As regards the plea of negligence raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, it is seen that R.W.1, who was examined on the side of the respondent, has deposed that on the date of accident, the driver of the bus drove the bus slowly and cautiously and the driver of the motorcycle had overtaken the bus and fell down on the right side of the bus. Though, the driver of the bus applied sudden brake immediately, he could not stop the vehicle and hence, the accident occurred. But, as per Ex.A1 – copy of First Information Report and the evidence of P.W.2, the accident occurred only due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the bus. Further P.W.2 has deposed in his evidence that only the left side front portion of the bus hit the motorcycle, due to which, the deceased fell down and the left front and back wheel ran over the deceased. Since the evidence of P.W.2 is corroborative with the contents of Ex.A1 - copy of First Information Report, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that there is no contributory negligence for the accident and held the driver of the bus liable for the accident. A perusal of the oral and documentary evidence would clearly show that the driver of the bus was responsible for the accident. Though the counsel for the appellant made a plea on the aspect of negligence, since he did not insist upon it, we are not inclined to go deep into it. 11. A perusal of the oral and documentary evidence would clearly show that the driver of the bus was responsible for the accident. Though the counsel for the appellant made a plea on the aspect of negligence, since he did not insist upon it, we are not inclined to go deep into it. 11. Now, what has to be seen is (i) whether the Tribunal has rightly fixed the income of the deceased at Rs.8000/- per month based on proper material evidence; (ii) whether the percentage of computation of future prospects determined by the Tribunal is correct and (iii) whether 20% of the total income has to be deducted towards Income Tax. 12. As regards the first point raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that there is no proof to support the income of the deceased, it is seen that the Tribunal, taking note of the oral and other documentary evidence, fixed the income of the deceased at Rs.8000/- per month. It is seen that P.W.1, wife of the deceased has deposed in her evidence that her husband was working in M/s. Indian Refrigerator (Videocon) Company as Junior Officer and that he earned more than Rs.9000/- per month and contributed his entire earnings to his family. Further P.W.3, one K. Janardhanan, in his evidence, has stated that the deceased Jaishankar was working as a Junior Officer in Indian Refrigerator Company and earned a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- per annum and that once in five years, he will get promotion. He also deposed that if the deceased had been alive, he would have been promoted as an Officer. Ex.A11 is the appointment letter of the deceased sent by M/s. Indian Refrigerator Company Limited on 03.01.2000. In proof of the income of the deceased, Ex.A7-Salary particulars of the deceased as well as other persons for the months of June, August and September 2006 was marked. Ex.A8 is the copy of the Attendance Register of the abovesaid Company for the months January 2006 to September 2006. The salary particulars vide Ex.A7 would show Rs.4000/- as Basic Pay; Rs.2000/- as House Rent Allowance; Rs.800/-towards Transport & Conveyance; Rs.200/- towards Uniform Washing; Rs.568/- towards Management Supplement and Rs.432/- towards Provident Fund; thereby, it is clear that the deceased was drawing a sum of Rs.8000/- as monthly salary. Ex.A2-copy of the post-mortem Certificate, shows that the deceased was aged 30 years at the time of accident. Ex.A2-copy of the post-mortem Certificate, shows that the deceased was aged 30 years at the time of accident. Ex.A6 – copy of the Driving Licence of the deceased Jaishankar would show his date of birth as 30.12.1976. So, at the time of accident, the deceased was aged 29 years and 10 months. 13. The Tribunal, fixing the income of the deceased at Rs.8000/- per month, deducted one third towards personal expenses and arrived at a sum of Rs.64,000/- per year as contribution to his family members. Placing reliance on Sarla Verma's case reported in 2009 ACJ 1298 , the Tribunal applied the multiplier of 17 and arrived at a sum of Rs.10,88,000/- towards loss of dependency (i.e. Rs.64,000/- x 17). In our view, the Tribunal has applied the correct multiplier of 17' in this case, as the deceased was aged only 30 years at the time of death and we find no reason to interfere with the decision of the Tribunal as regards the income of the deceased. Hence, we confirm the compensation of Rs.10,88,000/- awarded by the Tribunal towards 'loss of dependency'. 14. Coming to the second question that the percentage of computation of future prospects is not correct, it would be worth referring to the ratio laid down by the Honourable Apex Court in the case of Rajesh and others vs. Rajbir Singh and others reported in (2013) 9 SCC 54 , wherein, it is held as under: "8. Since, the Court in Santosh Devi case (2012) 6 SCC 421 actually intended to follow the principle in the case of salaried persons as laid down in Sarla Verma case and to make it applicable also to the self-employed and persons on fixed wages, it is clarified that the increase in the case of those groups is not 30% always; it will also have a reference to the age. In other words, in the case of self-employed or persons with fixed wages, in case, the deceased victim was below 40 years, there must be an addition of 50% to the actual income of the deceased while computing future prospects. Needless to say that the actual income should be income after paying the tax, if any. Addition should be 30% in case the deceased was in the age group of 40 to 50 years.'' 15. Needless to say that the actual income should be income after paying the tax, if any. Addition should be 30% in case the deceased was in the age group of 40 to 50 years.'' 15. The above ruling says that in the case of deceased victims with fixed wages, if he is below 40 years, there must be an addition of 50% to the actual income of the deceased while computing future prospects. But, in the case on hand, though the deceased is aged 30 years, the Tribunal has computed only 30% increase in the future prospects of income, which comes to Rs.3,26,400/-. Therefore, we find no reason to interfere with the compensation of a sum of Rs.3,26,400/-awarded towards 'future prospects'. 16. Coming to the third question that 20% has not been deducted from the total income of the deceased towards income tax, we are of the view that such question can be raised only when the income of the deceased is on the higher side. In the case on hand, the annual income of the deceased is below Rs.1,00,000/- and hence, it would not attract income tax. 17. As regards compensation awarded by the Tribunal under other heads, it is seen that a sum of Rs.15,000/- has been awarded under the head 'loss of consortium and company' to the wife of the deceased. In the given circumstances, we find it not justifiable. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh and others vs. Rajbir Singh and others (cited supra) was pleased to hold as under: “20. The ratio of a decision of this Court, on a legal issue is a precedent. But an observation made by this Court, mainly to achieve uniformity and consistency on a socio-economic issue, as contrasted from a legal principle, though a precedent, can be, and in fact ought to be periodically revisited, as observed in Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Company Limited and others, 2012(2) TN MAC 1 (SC). We may, therefore, revisit the practice of awarding compensation under conventional heads: Loss of Consortium to the spouse, Loss of Love, care and guidance to children and Funeral Expenses. It may be noted that the sum of Rs.2,500/- to Rs.10,000/- in those heads was fixed several decades ago and having regard to inflation factor, the same needs to be increased. We may, therefore, revisit the practice of awarding compensation under conventional heads: Loss of Consortium to the spouse, Loss of Love, care and guidance to children and Funeral Expenses. It may be noted that the sum of Rs.2,500/- to Rs.10,000/- in those heads was fixed several decades ago and having regard to inflation factor, the same needs to be increased. In Sarla Verma and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, 2009 (2) TN MAC 1 (SC), it was held that compensation for Loss of Consortium should be in the range of Rs.5,000/- to Rs.10,000/-. In legal parlance, 'consortium' is the right of the spouse to the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, society, solace, affection and sexual relations with his or her mate. That non-pecuniary head of damages has not been properly understood by our Courts. The loss of companionship, love, care and protection, etc., the spouse is entitled to get, has to be compensated appropriately. The concept of non pecuniary damage for Loss of Consortium is one of the major heads of award of compensation in other parts of the world more particularly in the United States of America, Australia, etc. English courts have also recognized the right of a spouse to get compensation even during the period of temporary disablement. By Loss of Consortium, the Courts have made an attempt to compensate the loss of spouse's affection, comfort, solace, companionship, society, assistance, protection, care and sexual relations during the future years. Unlike the compensation awarded in other countries and other jurisdictions, since the legal heirs are otherwise adequately compensated for the pecuniary loss, it would not be proper to award a major amount under this head. Hence, we are of the view that it would only be just and reasonable that the Courts award at least rupees one lakh for Loss of Consortium.” In view of the above ruling, we feel it appropriate to increase the compensation awarded under the head 'loss of consortium and company' and accordingly, it is increased to a sum of Rs.50,000/-. 18. Since the deceased was aged only 30 years at the time of accident and as he was the only breadwinner of his family, his death is an irreparable loss to the family. 18. Since the deceased was aged only 30 years at the time of accident and as he was the only breadwinner of his family, his death is an irreparable loss to the family. Moreover, taking into account the tender age of the child, who would be longing for the love and affection of his father, a sum of Rs.10,000/- awarded under the head 'loss of estate', which according to us, is certainly on the lower side. Therefore, compensation under the head 'loss of estate' to the respondents 2 and 3, is increased to a sum of Rs.50,000/-. 19. The amount of Rs.5,000/- awarded under the heads 'transportation and funeral expenses' is definitely on the lower side. The Apex Court in the case of Rajesh and others vs. Rajbir Singh and others (cited supra), while awarding compensation under the head funeral expenses has held as under: "18. We may also take judicial notice of the fact that the Tribunals have been quite frugal with regard to award of compensation under the head "funeral expenses". The "price index", it is a fact has gone up in that regard also. The head "funeral expenses" does not mean the fee paid in the crematorium or fee paid for the use of space in the cemetery. There are many other expenses in connection with funeral and, if the deceased is a follower of any particular religion, there are several religious practices and conventions pursuant to death in a family. All those are quite expensive. Therefore, we are of the view that it will be just, fair and equitable, under the head "funeral expenses", in the absence of evidence to the contrary for higher expenses, to award at least an amount of Rs.25,000/-." 20. Taking note of the ratio laid down in the above ruling, we are of the view that it would be just and reasonable to award compensation under the heads 'funeral and transportation expenses' separately. Accordingly, a sum of Rs.10,000/-is awarded under the head 'funeral expenses' and a sum of Rs.5,000/- under the head 'transportation charges'. 21. Accordingly, the award passed by the Tribunal is modified and the new break-up details are as follows: S. No. Description Amount awarded by Tribunal Amount awarded by this Court Award confirmed of modified 1. Loss of Dependency (Rs. 64,000 x 17) = Rs. 10,88,000.00 Rs. 10,88,000.00 Confirmed 2. Loss of future prospects Rs. 3,26,400.00 Rs. 21. Accordingly, the award passed by the Tribunal is modified and the new break-up details are as follows: S. No. Description Amount awarded by Tribunal Amount awarded by this Court Award confirmed of modified 1. Loss of Dependency (Rs. 64,000 x 17) = Rs. 10,88,000.00 Rs. 10,88,000.00 Confirmed 2. Loss of future prospects Rs. 3,26,400.00 Rs. 3,26,400.00 confirmed 3. Loss of Consortium and company Rs. 15,000.00 Rs. 50,000.00 Increased 4. Loss of Estate Rs. 10,000.00 Rs. 50,000.00 Increased 5. Funeral expenses Rs. 5,000.00 Rs. 10,000.00 Awarded separately/increased Rs. 5,000.00 Total Rs. 14,44,400.00 Rs. 15,29,400.00 Rs. 85,000.00 increased 22. Though, no Cross-Objection is filed by the claimants herein, this Court taking note of the facts and circumstances of the case, has thought it fit to enhance the compensation awarded by the Tribunal. It is well settled that Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the Appellate Court to grant relief to a person who has neither appealed nor filed any cross-objections. The object of this provision is to do complete justice between the parties. Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been discussed time and again by the Supreme Court in the following cases: (i) Pannalal v. State of Bombay, AIR 1963 SC 1516 (ii) Rameshwar Prasad v. M/s Shyam Beharilal Jagannath, (1964) 3 SCR 549 (iii) Nirmal Bala Ghose v. Balai Chand Ghose, AIR 1965 SC 1874 (iv) Giasi Ram v. Ramjilal, AIR 1969 SC 1144 (v) Harihar Prasad Singh v. Balmiki Prasad Singh, (1975) 2 SCR 932 (vi) Mahant Dhangir v. Madan Mohan, (1988) 1 SCR 679 (vii) State of Punjab v. Bakshish Singh, (1999) 8 SCC 222 23. Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 empowers the Court to award such compensation as appears to be just which has been interpreted to mean just in accordance with law and it can be more than the amount claimed by the claimants. The provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are clearly a beneficial legislation and hence should be interpreted in a way to enable the Court to assess just compensation. The provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are clearly a beneficial legislation and hence should be interpreted in a way to enable the Court to assess just compensation. The scope of Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the power of the High Court to enhance the award amount in accident cases in the absence of cross-objections has been discussed by the Supreme Court in Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh, AIR 2003 SC 674 , where the Apex Court has held that the Court is required to determine just compensation and there is no other limitation or restriction for awarding such compensation and in appropriate cases wherefrom the evidence brought on record if the Tribunal/Court considers that the claimant is entitled to get more compensation than claimed, the Tribunal may pass such award and would empower the Court to enhance the compensation at the appellate stage even without the injured filing an appeal or cross-objections. 24. In Oriental Fire And General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Amarsing Pratapsing Sikliker, I (1993) ACC 627, the Division Bench of Gujarat High held as under:- “15. Unfortunately, in a case where the claimant is awarded an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- interest only at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the application till realisation was awarded from the opponents. Cross-objections are not filed. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the powers of this court under Order 41, Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code ('Code' for short) should be exercised in absence of cross-objections so as to enhance the rate of interest. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that this is not a fit case wherein this court should exercise its discretion to enhance the rate of interest from 6% per annum on the amount of compensation. Thus, it is submitted that this is not a fit case where the Tribunal has failed to exercise the discretion for award of interest. In other words, it is contended that mere award of lesser rate of interest cannot be said to be a sufficient ground so as to call for the exercise of powers of this court under Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code. This submission is seriously controverted by the learned counsel for the claimant. 17. In other words, it is contended that mere award of lesser rate of interest cannot be said to be a sufficient ground so as to call for the exercise of powers of this court under Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code. This submission is seriously controverted by the learned counsel for the claimant. 17. It becomes very clear from the aforesaid provisions that the appellate Court is empowered to grant adequate relief so as to do substantial justice between the parties even in absence of cross-objections or appeal. Considering the scope of this rule and the factual scenario emerging from the evidence on record, we are of the opinion that the rate of interest is required to be upwardly revised even in absence of cross-objections or appeal at the instance of the original claimant, while exercising the powers of this court under Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code. Rule 33 is, primarily, intended to confer power upon the appellate court to do justice by granting relief to a party who has not appealed. We are reminded of the observations made by the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Municipal Board, Mount Abu v. Hari Lal, reported at 1988 ACJ 821 = II (1981) ACC 397 Raj. “Should the courts be silent spectators and feel helpless and impotent by not redressing injustice and by tolerating such grave injustice simply because due to the human values for compensation which could be valued and imagined by the advocate drafting the petition were too low or the appellant's inability to pay the court fee which may be a more tangible ground for putting the reduced claim. Inadequate claim has been made at both levels of the original court and the appeal. I have repeatedly observed in various decisions, e.g., Pista Aggarwal's case and Rao Dheer Singh's case that in adjudicating compensation cases, the claim case should not be considered like those of easement or mortgage or property dispute. Inadequate claim has been made at both levels of the original court and the appeal. I have repeatedly observed in various decisions, e.g., Pista Aggarwal's case and Rao Dheer Singh's case that in adjudicating compensation cases, the claim case should not be considered like those of easement or mortgage or property dispute. For social welfare legislation of a State wedded to socialism and the Constitution's focus is on social injustice not only in the preamble, but in directive principles which are to be enforced by passing legislation like the Fatal Accidents Act or Motor Vehicles Act or other alike social welfare statutes the approach should be liberal, humanistic, non-technical and equitable.” The underlying purport and design of the provisions of Order 41, Rule 33 would clearly go to show that the Parliament has enacted such a provision with a view that the court could rise to the occasion and render substantial justice between the parties even in absence of cross-objections or appeal. Thus, the framers of the Code, who had hardly any concept of social justice then in that period of 1908, had enacted under Order 41, Rule 33 that even if the appellant may not have made a perfect claim the court should not become silent spectator and remain impotent to give appropriate relief to one who rightly deserves the potentiality. All the courts should deliver justice according to the needs of the litigants and the circumstances emerging from the evidence on record, has been thus recognised by the provisions incorporated in Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code. Therefore, in absence of the cross-objections by the claimant, this court can invoke the provisions of Order 41, Rule 33 even if required, suo motu and enhance the compensation or rate of interest. In the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Tulsi Devi, reported in 1988 ACJ 962 it was held by the Rajasthan High Court that under Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code, the appellate court can saddle the insurer with enhanced liability. 18. In the case of Maharashtra State Road Trans. In the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Tulsi Devi, reported in 1988 ACJ 962 it was held by the Rajasthan High Court that under Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code, the appellate court can saddle the insurer with enhanced liability. 18. In the case of Maharashtra State Road Trans. Corporation v. Kamalabai, reported in 1989 ACJ 750 where the claimants neither filed an appeal nor preferred cross-objection but urged the appellate court to grant higher rate of interest taking aid of Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code, it would be appropriate to reproduce the relevant observations of the Bombay High Court: “It is well settled that provisions of Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code can be resorted to “ex debito justitiae”, i.e., to do justice to the parties in exceptional cases by varying the decree in favour of the respondents although they might not have preferred any appeal against the decree.” 19. In the case of Sone Ram v. Jayaprakash reported in AIR 1986 MP 21 , the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code enhanced the compensation granted by the Tribunal even though no appeal was preferred by the claimant. Similarly, in the case of Sewaram alias Sewan v. Nanhe Khan alias Asgar Beg reported in 1987 ACJ 354 (MP), the High Court of Madhya Pradesh awarded 10% interest on the compensation amount in absence of appeal or cross-objection by the claimants. Likewise, Rajasthan High Court in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Manumati Mahamia reported in 1987 ACJ 1045 (Rajasthan), enhanced the rate of interest to 12 per cent instead of 6% granted by the Tribunal from the date of the application till realisation. 20. In our opinion, the powers granted under the provisions of Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code are widest in amplitude and could be exercised in favour of the respondents notwithstanding that the respondents or claimants have not filed any cross-objection or appeal. 20. In our opinion, the powers granted under the provisions of Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code are widest in amplitude and could be exercised in favour of the respondents notwithstanding that the respondents or claimants have not filed any cross-objection or appeal. The power of the Tribunal to award interest is provided in Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (corresponding Section 110-CC of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939), where any court or Claims Tribunal allows claim for compensation made under this Act, such court or Tribunal may direct that in addition to the amount of compensation, simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and from such date but not earlier than making such application in this behalf. Thus, a wide discretion is given to the Tribunal for awarding rate of interest while granting the amount of compensation. Motor Vehicles Act is, undoubtedly, a welfare legislation. Needless to reiterate that whenever unfortunate victims of road accident or the dependants of the deceased victims enter the thresholds of the court for justice, they should not be overburdened with the technicalities or strict pleadings of the law applicable in other civil cases. In fact, most of the accident victims in our country are pedestrians or cyclists, and most of them are illiterate and come from poor strata of the society and suffering from poverty and ignorance. Considering the benevolence in the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the facts and circumstances emerging from the record of the cases on hand, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal has seriously erred in awarding rate of interest of 6 per cent only in a serious case of disintegration of the bodily frame of the claimant. 21. In view of the facts and circumstances and aforesaid proposition of law, we are convinced that this is a fit case wherein the rate of interest should be revised upwardly and enhanced even in absence of appeal or cross-objection by the original claimant, who is a living victim of the violent accident. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Diwan Chandra Gupta reported in 1989 ACJ 320, the Madhya Pradesh High Court was pleased to enhance the rate of interest from 6% to 12% from the date of the application till payment even without cross-objection. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Diwan Chandra Gupta reported in 1989 ACJ 320, the Madhya Pradesh High Court was pleased to enhance the rate of interest from 6% to 12% from the date of the application till payment even without cross-objection. Without any cross-objection, in an appeal at the instance of the insurer, like one on hand, interest was directed to be paid at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the application by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Shakuntla Bai reported in 1987 ACJ 224. Similar view was taken by the Gauhati High Court in the case of United India Fire & General Insurance Company Limited v. Malati Bala reported in 1985 (1) Gau. LR 443. In that case the award of the Tribunal was faulted by the High Court for not giving reasons for awarding only 6% interest and not higher interest, taking the view that the Tribunal had committed jurisdictional error in doing so and that could be corrected by the High Court without cross-objection of the claimant-respondent.” 25. For the reasons as aforesaid, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed and the award amount is enhanced by Rs.85,000/- from Rs.14,44,400/- to Rs.15,29,400/-. The rate of accrued interest at 6% fixed by the Tribunal is confirmed and the compensation awarded by this Court has to be disbursed to the claimants/respondents as per the apportionment fixed by the Tribunal. No costs. Consequently, connected M.P.No.1 of 2013 is closed.