JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.—Heard Sri Madan Mohan, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents and Sri Ashish Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the Gaon Sabha. 2. This writ petition has been filed for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the orders dated 28.2.2014 passed by the learned Member Board of Revenue in Revision No. 30/06 (Bachchoo Singh and Pappu alias Vijay Singh v. Fateh Singh and others) by which the revision has been allowed by setting aside the order dated 30.8.2006 and maintaining the earlier orders dated 6.7.2005 passed by the Naib Tehsildar and the order dated 21.4.2006 passed in appeal by the Sub-Divisional Officer. 3. The facts giving rise to this case are that the petitioner has purchased a piece of land from one Saba through registered sale-deed on 8.6.1990. On the basis of registered sale-deed, the petitioner has filed mutation application before the Naib Tehsildar, which was numbered as Case No. 161/91-92 (Fateh Singh v. Saba). The said case was dismissed on 9.1.1991 holding the sale-deed to be forged. It is thereafter the petitioner has filed another mutation application, which was allowed ex parte on 30.10.1992. Seeking recall of this order, an application was filed by Sri Bachchoo Singh son of Saba stating that when his father had died, at that time, he was minor and after coming to know about the mutation order dated 30.10.1992, he immediately filed an application seeking recall of the earlier order, on 1.1.2005. To this application an objection was filed by the otherside stating therein that recall application was barred by time and also not maintainable. The Naib Tehsildar, after hearing the parties, had allowed the recall application on 6.7.2005 and recalled the order dated 30.10.1992. 4. Against the aforesaid order dated 6.7.2005 passed by the Naib Tehsildar, the petitioner, herein, has filed appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer, which was numbered as Case No. 25/2004-05 (Fateh Singh v. Bachchoo Singh and another). The appeal was dismissed by the Sub-Divisional Officer on 21.4.2006. 5. Aggrieved petitioner filed revision before the Commissioner, Agra Division Agra, against the order dated 21.4.2006, which was numbered as Revision No. 118 of 2006 (Fateh Singh v. Bachchoo Singh). The appeal was dismissed by the Sub-Divisional Officer on 21.4.2006. 5. Aggrieved petitioner filed revision before the Commissioner, Agra Division Agra, against the order dated 21.4.2006, which was numbered as Revision No. 118 of 2006 (Fateh Singh v. Bachchoo Singh). The revision was heard and allowed by the Additional Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra vide order dated 30.8.2006 by setting aside the order dated 21.4.2006 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer as well as the order dated 9.7.2005 passed by the Naib Tehsildar and maintaining his earlier order dated 30.10.1992. 6. Against the aforesaid order, the otherside had filed revision before the Board of Revenue, which was numbered as Revision No. 30/06 (Bachchoo Singh and Pappu alias Vijay Singh v. Fateh Singh and another). The revision has been allowed and the order dated 30.8.2006 passed by the Additional Commissioner has been set aside and the orders dated 6.7.2005 passed by the Naib Tehsildar and the order dated 21.4.2006 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer have been maintained. While assailing this order, Sri Madan Mohan, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that recall application filed by the respondent was barred by time, therefore without condoning the delay, recall application should not have been allowed. 7. The Naib Tehsildar, while recalling the order, has observed that the otherside (late Saba) was living outside the village and the service of notice upon him was not sufficient. Further, the son of Saba who has filed recall application was minor at that time meaning thereby he has considered explanation furnished by the otherside for not filing the recall application earlier and after considering the same, he has allowed the recall application therefore it cannot be said that the Court concerned has not applied its mind regarding condonation of delay and in my view, it shall amount the deemed condonation. The matter was different in case there was no explanation for condonation of delay and the Court also did not address itself on the said issue. 8. The matter was different in case there was no explanation for condonation of delay and the Court also did not address itself on the said issue. 8. The view taken by me find support from the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Davinder Pal Sehgal and another v. Partap Steel Rolling Mills Pvt. Ltd. and others, AIR 2002 SC 451 , wherein the Apex Court has observed as under : “Therefore, merely because in the order of trial Court, specifically, there is no reference to petition for condonation of delay, it cannot be said that it did not consider the same. From a bare perusal of the order, it would appear that the grounds stated in the restoration application for non appearance on 24th August, 1988 as well as delay in filing the restoration application having found favour with the trial Court, the suit has been restored, therefore, it cannot be said that the order of restoration has been passed without condoning the delay in filing the restoration application. The submission of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents that application for restoration filed on behalf of the plaintiffs was dismissed earlier for non prosecution cannot be taken to be a ground for throwing out the restoration application as the High Court on the earlier occasion set aside order of the trial Court whereby restoration application was dismissed for non prosecution and the said order attained finality.” 9. The matter may be examined from another angle too. This is a case of almost illiterate rustic villager and such type of litigants are totally dependent on the legal skill of their counsel and in case, counsel omit some thing and that omission is defeating the cause of justice, in that eventuality, the Court should prefer to advance the justice instead of scuttle the process of justice on technicalities. 10. The Apex Court in A. Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalnai Sangam represented by its President etc., 2012 (3) CCC 1 (SC), has held that the entire journey of a judge is to discern the truth from the pleadings, documents and arguments of the parties. Truth is the basis of justice delivery system. 11. 10. The Apex Court in A. Shanmugam v. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalnai Sangam represented by its President etc., 2012 (3) CCC 1 (SC), has held that the entire journey of a judge is to discern the truth from the pleadings, documents and arguments of the parties. Truth is the basis of justice delivery system. 11. Again in Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2010 (2) SCC 114 , it has been observed that truth constitutes an integral part of the justice delivery system which was in vogue in pre-independene era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the Courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-independence period has been drastic changes in our value system. 12. In Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes and others v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeria (Dead) through L.Rs., 2012 (1) CCC 344 (SC) : 2012 (3) SCALE 550 , it has been observed by the Apex Court that truth alone has to be foundation of justice. The entire judicial system has been created only to discern and find out the real truth. Judges at all levels have to seriously engage themselves in the journey of discovering the truth. That is their mandate, obligation and bounden duty. Otherwise also, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in State of Bihar and others v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and another, JT 2000 (5) 389, wherein the Apex Court has held that “once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior Court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first Court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior Court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior Court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower Court.” 13. But it is a different matter when the first Court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior Court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior Court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower Court.” 13. In view of the above legal position, there is no scope to accept the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner regarding delay condonation as here the explanation furnished by otherside was sufficient as the order of which recall was sought was without sufficient service on the father of the applicant and the applicant was minor at that time, therefore the submissions of the petitioner regarding condonation of delay is misconceived. 14. On being confronted as to whether while filing the second application seeking mutation, the petitioner has disclosed the order dated 9.1.1991 passed in first mutation application or not, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the application is not on the record, therefore he cannot apprise the Court in this regard. It has nowhere been disputed that when the sale-deed was executed, the petitioner was minor. It has also not been disputed that the petitioner was living outside. On these facts, I am of the considered opinion that the learned Member Board of Revenue not fell in error in allowing the revision filed by the respondent No. 3. 15. It may also be observed that in case, while filing the second mutation application the petitioner has not disclosed the filing of the earlier mutation application and its rejection on 9.1.1991, the second order dated 30.10.1992 will be an outcome of concealment of fact and will amount to fraud. 16. It is settled law that fraud and justice cannot live together. If something has been obtained by playing fraud and the factum of fraud is not disputed, then that thing becomes non-est. In S.P. Chengal Varaya Naidu v. Jagannath and others, (1994) 1 SCC 1 , the Apex Court has observed as under : “5....The principle of “finality of litigation” cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands. The Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the Court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the Court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who’s case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.” 17. In A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of A.P., (2007) 4 SCC 221 . Considering English and Indian cases, one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) stated : (SCC p. 231, para 22) while dealing such matter, the Apex Court has observed as under : “22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgement, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the Court, tribunal or authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of law. Such a judgement, decree or order—by the first Court or by the final Court—has to be treated as nullity by every Court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any Court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings.” The Court defined “fraud” as an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. In fraud one gains at the loss and cost of another. Even the most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether in rem or in personam.” 18. This view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited, (2008) 12 SCC 481. 19. In Meghmala and others v. G. Narasimha Reddy and others, (2010) 8 SCC 383 , the Supreme Court in paragraphs 33 and 34 has observed as under : “33. Fraud is an intrinsic, collateral act, and fraud of an egregious nature would vitiate the most solemn proceedings of Courts of justice. Fraud is an act of deliberate deception with a design to secure something, which is otherwise not due. The expression “fraud” involves two elements, deceit and injury to the person deceived. Fraud is an intrinsic, collateral act, and fraud of an egregious nature would vitiate the most solemn proceedings of Courts of justice. Fraud is an act of deliberate deception with a design to secure something, which is otherwise not due. The expression “fraud” involves two elements, deceit and injury to the person deceived. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. [Vide Vimla (Dr.) v. Delhi Admn., AIR 1963 SC 1572 , Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) (P) Ltd., (1996) 5 SCC 550 , State of A.P. v. T. Suryachandra Rao, (2005) 6 SCC 149 , K.D. Sharma v. SAIL, (2008) 12 SCC 481 and Central Bank of India v. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir, (2008) 13 SCC 170 ] 34. An act of fraud on Court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata. Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made (i) knowingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. Suppression of a material document would also amount to a fraud on the Court. (Vide Gowrishankar v. Joshi Amba Shankar Family Trust, (1996) 3 SCC 310 , Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi, (2003) 8 SCC 319 , Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal, (2002) 1 SCC 100 , Ram Preeti Yadav v. U.P. Board of High School & Intermediate Education, (2003) 8 SCC 311 and Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of T.N., (2004) 3 SCC 1 ).” The Apex Court has reiterated the same view in Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab and another, 2011 (3) ACR 3544 (SC). 20. This Court has also taken the same view in Smt. Vibha Shukla and another v. Director Of Education (Basic) U.P., Allahabad and others, 2012 (6) ADJ 246 . 21. 20. This Court has also taken the same view in Smt. Vibha Shukla and another v. Director Of Education (Basic) U.P., Allahabad and others, 2012 (6) ADJ 246 . 21. In view of foregoing discussions, I am of the view that in case, dismissal of earlier mutation application has not been disclosed in the subsequent application on which the order dated 30.10.1992 was passed then the entire proceeding of the second mutation application shall be treated to be void having no effect and in case, the factum of the filing of the earlier application and the order passed thereon was disclosed in that eventuality too, the proceeding shall be treated concluded pursuant to the order of the Naib Tehsildar passed on the restoration application as the second mutation application was not maintainable. 22. In view of foregoing discussions, I do not find any error in the impugned order dated 28.2.2014 passed by the learned Member Board of Revenue. The writ petition fails and it is hereby dismissed. ——————