JUDGMENT ANOOP V. MOHTA, J. 1. Rule, returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of parties. 2. The Petitioners (The State) have challenged Judgment dated 13 October 2014 passed by Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai (Tribunal) in Original Application No. 839 of 2014, by which a mid-term transfer order dated 30 August 2014 issued by the State has been set aside. 3. The basic events of the case are as under:- On 16 august 2014, a letter proposing Respondent No.1's (the employee) transfer was submitted to the Principal Secretary, Housing Department. On 19 August 2014, the Under Secretary, Housing Department submitted a note proposing transfer of Respondent No.1. On 19 August 2014, the Deputy Secretary, Housing Department approved the note. On 20 August 2014, the file reached the office of the Hon'ble Chief Minister and on the same date, it was approved. On 21 August 2014, the file came back to the Principal Secretary, Housing Department. On 22 August 2014, the Principal Secretary, Housing Department sent Office Note to the Deputy Secretary, Revenue and Forest Department informing the decision to transfer and requested for action. On 30 August 2014, the transfer order was issued. An independent note was moved by the Deputy Secretary, Revenue Department seeking modification/cancellation of the transfer order in view of letter of request received from the Chief Election Commissioner. The suggestion contained in the note was declined. 4. The transfer order issued by the Petitioner-State is as under:- “Repatriated Repatriation of Smt. Padmashree Bainade, Dy. Collector (Enc/Rem) Colaba Mumbai in her parent department. Dated 30th August, 2014. Government Order: In exercise of the powers conferred by sub section 4(4) & 4(5) of the Maharashtra Government Servants Regulation of Transfers and Prevention of Delay in Discharge of Official Duties Act, 2005, deputation of Smt. Padmaja Bainade, Deputy Collector (Enc/Rem) Colaba Mumbai has been terminated and she is repatriated. Additional Collector Mumbai City to relieve Smt. Padmaja Bainade, Deputy Collector to join in her parent department. Divisional Commissioner, Konkan Division is hereby authorized to give appointment to Smt. Padmaja Bainade, Dy. Collector. Additional Collector Mumbai City to relieve Smt. Padmaja Bainade, Deputy Collector to join in her parent department. Divisional Commissioner, Konkan Division is hereby authorized to give appointment to Smt. Padmaja Bainade, Dy. Collector. By the order and in the name of Governor of Maharashtra.” It is clear that the State has invoked Maharashtra Government Servants Regulation of Transfers and Prevention of Delay in Discharge of Official Duties Act, 2005 (the Act) but plain reading of the order shows it was intended order of repatriation by termination her services as Deputy Collector (Enc/Rem), Colaba, Mumbai. The State has invoked the Act, for repatriation, but intended mid term transfer. The State has invoked wrong provisions for wrong purpose and passed the vague, unbased, inconsistent and unreasoned mid-term transfer order. This act not only deals and regulates transfers, but also various other aspects of service of Government servants, official duties and responsibilities of the concerned authorities, covering transfer and disciplinary action. Relevant sub sections 4(4) & 4(5) of the Act reads as under:- (1)……………… (2) ……………… (3) ……………… (4) The transfers of Government servants shall ordinarily be made only once in a year in the month of April or May: Provided that, transfer may be made any time in the year in the circumstances as specified below, namely: (i) To the newly created post or to the posts which become vacant due to retirement, promotion, resignation, reversion, reinstatement, consequential vacancy on account of transfer or on return from leave. (ii) Where the competent authority is satisfied that the transfer is essential due to exceptional circumstances or special reasons, after recording the same in writing and with the prior approval of the next higher authority. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 3 or this section, the competent authority may, in special cases, after recording reasons in writing and with the prior approval of the immediately superior Transferring Authority mentioned in the table of section 6, transfer a Government servant before completion of his tenure of post.” 5. Section 10 of the Act is relevant for the present purpose and is reproduced as under: “10. Section 10 of the Act is relevant for the present purpose and is reproduced as under: “10. (1) Every Government servant shall be bound to discharge his official duties and the official work assigned or pertaining to him most diligently and as expeditiously as feasible: Provided that, normally no file shall remain pending with any Government servant in the Department or office for more than seven working days: Provided further that, immediate and urgent file shall be disposed of as per the urgency of the matter, as expeditiously as possible, and preferably the immediate file in one day or next day morning and the urgent file in four days: Provided also that, in respect of the files not required to be referred to any other Department, the concerned Department shall take the decision and necessary action in the matter within forty-five days and in respect of files required to be referred to any other Department, decision and necessary action shall be taken within three months. (2) Any willful or intentional delay or negligence in the discharge of official duties or in carrying out the official work assigned or pertaining to such Government servant shall amount to dereliction of official duties and shall make such Government servant liable for appropriate disciplinary action under the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 or any other relevant disciplinary rules applicable to such employee. (3) The concerned competent authority on noticing or being brought to its notice any such dereliction of duties on the part of any Government servant, after satisfying itself about such dereliction on the part of such Government servant shall, take appropriate disciplinary action against such defaulting Government servant under the relevant disciplinary rules including taking entry relating to such dereliction of duty in the Annual Confidential Report of such Government servant.” 6. The relevant supporting reasons of impugned order dated 13 October 2014, are as under:- “32. Pertinently, the documents in support of the plea of misconduct liable to be relied upon by the Government were not forming part of the annexures of the proposal for transfer. As noted earlier all communication referred to in the reference clause in the transfer proposal dated 16.08.2014 which was sent to the competent authority were sent separately, though only on 16.08.2014. All the letters referred to and sent only on 16.08.2014 are antecedent. As noted earlier all communication referred to in the reference clause in the transfer proposal dated 16.08.2014 which was sent to the competent authority were sent separately, though only on 16.08.2014. All the letters referred to and sent only on 16.08.2014 are antecedent. The record does not reveal that the material on the basis of which the Respondent no.3 had alleged the misconduct and said facts as grounds of transfer were at all considered by competent authority. 33. All that is evident is that the Principal Secretary, Housing, has vetted the proposal dated 16.08.2014 on the same day instantaneously and without perusal of supporting material, since said material had traveled to his office independently though on the same day. In total obedience of Principal Secretary's endorsement, the Under Secretary adopted the grounds contained in the proposal in office note. All Officers accepted alleged misconduct in the nature of disobedience as a basis of transfer or even without summary enquiry or even without perusal of supporting material. 34. The record does not show that the Government had applied its mind and recorded satisfaction to the proposal meaning that special reasons existed, due to which mid-term transfer became imperative. Note submitted by the Under Secretary dated 19.08.2014 contains total reproduction of the letter dated 16.08.2014. Moreover, the vetting done by the Principal Secretary Housing, endorses the reasons suggestions respondent No.3 in his letter dated 16.08.2014 saying that in the larger interest the Housing Department may propose the transfer to review and various departments. In fact, the proposal submitted by the Respondent No.3 was positively vetted by the Principal Secretary on the same day and that too within scrutiny whatsoever. 35. In the result it has to be concluded that the grounds of misconduct when used as grounds for transfer, those result in a summary action which is a sort of punitive action taken in summary way. The aspect of punitiveness may get the secondary status would such lightening action, be justified, on the grounds that the transfer could safeguard the larger public interest, public safety, public order and any other similar exigency. 36. The aspect of punitiveness may get the secondary status would such lightening action, be justified, on the grounds that the transfer could safeguard the larger public interest, public safety, public order and any other similar exigency. 36. It is not shown by the respondents as to how the alleged misconduct of the applicant was so grave that instead of following routine legitimate course of taking disciplinary action and initiation of disciplinary proceedings against applicant, as to how or for what special reasons continuation of the applicant on the same post would be so gravely prejudicial to the public interest, that said need would constitute special reasons or extraordinary circumstances. 38. Thus, it is evident that the version contained in the proposal for transfer i.e. letter dated 16.08.2014 alone is the factual foundation of special reasons or exceptional circumstances. Acts of disobedience picked up in a short duration, which do not prove and pose any emergency to public interest, cannot and do not ipso facto constitute factual material to answer and justify the stipulation of special reasons or exceptional circumstances either. 39. Therefore, this Tribunal is satisfied as regards the fact that the Respondents have failed to make out the case to justify the transfer within the sphere of existence of special reasons or extraordinary circumstances, public interest, larger good of larger number of people, called in name whatsoever.” 7. The learned Member of the Tribunal, even referred to the various letters exchanged by and between the parties referring to the alleged action of Respondent No.1 ranging from 30 June 2014 to 16 August 2014. The letter dated 16 August 2014 dealt with the various reasons noted as foundation for the transfer. Those are as under:- (i) The applicant failed to take action as regards removal of encroachments which was to be done furtherence to the instructions given by the Hon'ble Chief Minister in the meeting held on 12.02.2014, till the commencement of Code of Conduct on 06.03.2014. (ii) Once Smt. Hinduban Oza, Member of the Association of Cuff Parade residents, has submitted the complaint in July 2014 about unauthorized constructions nearby the Cuff Parade, have not been attended to by the applicant, despite oral and written complaints. (ii) Once Smt. Hinduban Oza, Member of the Association of Cuff Parade residents, has submitted the complaint in July 2014 about unauthorized constructions nearby the Cuff Parade, have not been attended to by the applicant, despite oral and written complaints. (iii) Hon'ble Shri Arvind Sawant, Member of Parliament, Mumbai-31 constituency, has submitted the complaint on 14.07.2014 bringing it to the notice of the office, series of lapses on the part of applicant in relation to her failure to remove encroachments, near Ganeshmurti Nagar, Division 3, Colaba, Cuff Parade. (iv) The applicant was not available for contact and was absent in the office, without notice on 08.08.2014. (v) The Applicant has shown negligence in the work of removal of encroachment on Girgaon Chowpathy and she did not personally attend the work and has delegated it to subordinate staff which has resulted in failure to secure necessary cooperation of the officers from Bombay Municipal Corporation as well as Police. (vi) The applicant has failed to relieve Shri Rahul Vasant Darade inspite of his transfer on completion of term of three years and despite that other staff in his cader was available, and thereby she had become insubordinate, indisciplined and instrumental for promoting corruption. (vii) The Applicant has failed to carry out the work of completion and furnishing schedule-2, though said work was pending for compliance since 21.10.2011 and inspite of reminders and letter given, on 14.06.2014, 30.06.2014, 02.07.2014 and 09.07.2014. (viii) The applicant remained absent at the meeting which was convened by Hon'ble M.L.A. Of Colaba Legislative Assembly Constituency and proceeded on leave without giving intimation, and has become instrumental for the displeasure of the representatives of the people.” 8. The learned senior counsel appearing for the Petitioners relied upon the following cases revolving around the law of transfer not in support of impugned order:- (i) State of Maharashtra vs. Ashok Ramchandra Kore & Others, 2009 (3) Bom. C.R. 673 (ii) Sanjeev Bhagwantrao Kokil vs. State of Maharashtra & Others, 2013 (7) Bom. C.R. 148 (iii) Ramakant Baburao Kendre vs. State of Maharashtra & Others, 2012 (Supp) Bom. C.R. 735 (iv) Shankarrao Narayanrao Jadhav vs. State of Maharashtra & Others, 2011 (11) Bom. C.R. 792 (v) Purushottam Govindrao Bhagwat vs. State of Maharashtra & Others, 2012 (3) Bom. C.R. 673 (ii) Sanjeev Bhagwantrao Kokil vs. State of Maharashtra & Others, 2013 (7) Bom. C.R. 148 (iii) Ramakant Baburao Kendre vs. State of Maharashtra & Others, 2012 (Supp) Bom. C.R. 735 (iv) Shankarrao Narayanrao Jadhav vs. State of Maharashtra & Others, 2011 (11) Bom. C.R. 792 (v) Purushottam Govindrao Bhagwat vs. State of Maharashtra & Others, 2012 (3) Bom. C.R. 442 (vi) Harish M. Baijal vs. State of Maharashtra & Others, W.P. No. 7960 of 2011, dated 21.10.2011 (vii) National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. vs. Shri Bhagwan & Another, (2001) 7 SCC 574 (viii) Registrar General, High Court of Judicature of Madras vs. R. Perachi and Others, (2011) 2 SCC (L & S) 643 (ix) State of U.P. and Another vs. Siya Ram and Another, 2004 SCC (L&S) 1009 (x) Arun Damodar Veer vs. State of Maharashtra & Others, 1999 (2) Bom. C.R. 766 (xi) Union of India and Others vs. Janardhan Debanath and Others, 2004 SCC (L&S) 631 9. The learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.1 relied upon the following cases, in support of the impugned order:- (i) Harish M. Baijal vs. State of Maharashtra & Others (supra) (ii) Purushottam Govindrao Bhagwat vs. State of Maharashtra & Others (supra) (iii) S.B. Bhagwat vs. State of Maharashtra & Others, 2012 (3) Mh. L.J. 197 (iv) State of Rajasthan vs. Vinodkumar, 2012 (6) SCC 770 (v) State of J&K vs. Vinay Nanda, (2001) 2 SCC 504 (vi) Union of India and Another vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, 2014 (1) SCJ 115 (vii) Somesh Tiwari vs. Union of India and Others, (2009) 2 SCC 592 (viii) Punjab State Electricity Board and Others vs. JIT Singh, (2009) 13 SCC 118 (ix) The Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. vs. Union of India and Another, AIR 1976 SC 1785 10. Both the learned counsel have cited the Judgments so noted above dealing with the power, authority and jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with the order of transfer without assigning any reason. The principle so laid down are based upon the facts and circumstances of the case. The State Act and its provisions have been dealt with and interpreted in these judgments. In some matters, based upon the facts, this Court interfered with the order of transfer. In some cases, this Court refused to interfere with the order of transfer. The principle so laid down are based upon the facts and circumstances of the case. The State Act and its provisions have been dealt with and interpreted in these judgments. In some matters, based upon the facts, this Court interfered with the order of transfer. In some cases, this Court refused to interfere with the order of transfer. We are not dealing with the facts and circumstances of each case as cited by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, as the settled principle is that the Court needs to consider the background, events and the relevant documents and related facts of the case in hand before applying the State law and the State policy of transfer of employees. 11. The learned Tribunal, therefore, in view of above background required to consider the basic reasons and/or existence of special reasons or exceptional circumstances as referred to in second proviso of Sub Sections (4) and (5) of Section 4 of the Act. The learned Tribunal member has also recorded, that there exists a case of gross misconduct and therefore the State has option to initiate the disciplinary proceedings, however, they have taken recourse to this action of transfer instead of suspension. There are specific provisions under the Act with regard to the disciplinary action which needs to be taken, if the case of insubordination or misconduct is made out. There was no such Departmental action initiated by the State. Therefore, without assigning any reason, they have treated the same grounds as grounds for transfer, without referring to the explanation so given and without initiating any disciplinary action and/or proceedings against the Petitioner. 12. The learned Tribunal also recorded reasons for interfering with the order treated it to be transfer order, as quoted in paragraph Nos. 32 to 39. This finding and the basis of setting aside order passed by the Applicant, we have to test under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In our view, to interfere with such order/detailed reasoned order passed by the Tribunal, unless there is a perversity and/or illegality and the order is based upon the extra material than the law. The reason so recorded above and the findings so given, in our view, just cannot be stated to be contrary to the record, bad in law and/or perverse to interfere with the same. 13. The reason so recorded above and the findings so given, in our view, just cannot be stated to be contrary to the record, bad in law and/or perverse to interfere with the same. 13. The learned counsel for the Respondents submitted that the order of transfer is a punitive order and/or is in lieu of punishment. He submitted that in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Somesh Tiwari vs. Union of India and Others, (2009) 2 SCC 592 a punitive order or an order in lieu of punishment would be bad in law. He also placed reliance on the decision of Division bench of this Court in the case of Harish Maganlal Baijal vs. State of Maharashtra, W.P. No. 7960 of 2011 decided on 21 October 2011. In this decision the Division Bench has followed the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Somesh Tiwari (supra). 14. According to the learned Senior counsel for the Petitioner-State, the order was not passed in lieu of punishment but the behaviour of the Respondents was such that it was found necessary to transfer her from the post, on administrative grounds. He submitted that neither the transfer order casts any stigma nor the service conditions or career prospects of the Respondents are affected in any manner. 15. The Act not only regulates the transfers by providing a security of tenure for minimum period but also mandates the government to take action against the erring officers who are negligent in performance of their duty. 16. Section 10 of the Act mandates that a government servant shall be bound to discharge his duties as diligently and expeditiously. Sub-section 2 of Section 10 declares a willful or intentional delay or negligence as a conduct liable for disciplinary action under the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1979, or such other disciplinary rules. Section 10(3) of the Act not only confers power on the competent authority but also casts a duty on it to take appropriate disciplinary action when the case of willful or intentional delay or negligence by any government servant is made out. 17. If the gist of allegations against the Respondents are perused they fall under sub-section 10(2) of the Act. 17. If the gist of allegations against the Respondents are perused they fall under sub-section 10(2) of the Act. Thus, once case of alleged negligence on part of the Respondents was brought to the notice of the authority as per Sub-section 3, after satisfying itself, the authority had to take appropriate disciplinary action. Negligence or intentional delay, which is squarely the case put against the Respondent, is thus a misconduct to be dealt with departmentally under Section 10(3) of the Act. Upon repeated query, the learned Senior advocate for the Petitioner-State has stated that, State has not decided to hold an departmental enquiry against the Respondent. According to the learned counsel for the Petitioner, the State can choose not to hold departmental enquiry when such allegation is made and simplicitor transfer an employee on that basis. If the case under Section 10(2) is made out, for the purpose of the Act, it would be a misconduct, liable for disciplinary action. If satisfied that such ground exists, the satisfaction of the authority would be that the government servant has committed misconduct. It is always open to the government to transfer an employee pending a disciplinary action. But without taking any disciplinary enquiry if a transfer is effected then it will be a transfer whose foundation will be based on misconduct. The purport of Chapter III of the Act is not only to govern master and servant relationship but to improve good governance by placing the competent authority under obligation to take action against negligent government officers. If the authority is satisfied that such negligence exists, then a punitive action is warranted to inculcate a sense of discipline. If an enquiry is held the government servant will also get an opportunity to defend himself and clear the imputations of negligence. 18. After going through the pleadings and documents and the reasons so given by the learned Tribunal, we have also to consider whether the State's decision of transfer was based upon the supporting material on record. The State at the time of passing of transfer order had not assigned any reasons even briefly. The documents so referred and reflected in the reasons of the impugned order shows that it was the case of alleged misconduct and/or insubordination by the employee. The action ought to have been taken under the Act. The State at the time of passing of transfer order had not assigned any reasons even briefly. The documents so referred and reflected in the reasons of the impugned order shows that it was the case of alleged misconduct and/or insubordination by the employee. The action ought to have been taken under the Act. Though reference is made in the transfer order stating it to be “repatriation” but, without referring to any reasons for the same, they passed the unreasoned mid-term transfer order. 19. In Manohar vs. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 13 SCC 14, the Supreme Court observed as under:- “19. In Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd vs. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496, the Court dealt with the question of demarcation between the administrative orders and quasi-judicial orders and the requirement of adherence to natural justice. The Court held as under:- “47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:- (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c)……………… (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) to (o)……………… 20. The Apex Court dealing with the power including administrative of any Authority, including of quasi-judicial authority, referred that the basic principle of natural justice required to be followed by all the concerned. It is not the case that the State initiated action immediately after recording the misconduct and/or dereliction of duties. The initiation for such action so started in the month of June ultimately culminated into the confused order dated 30 August 2014, even after the written submissions and the explanations by the employee. Therefore, in this background, the order in question, in our view, ought to have been with reasons which is apparently missing in the present case. 21. It is essential for the delinquent/employee to know the special reason or circumstance for such order so also for the Court/Tribunal. Therefore, in this background, the order in question, in our view, ought to have been with reasons which is apparently missing in the present case. 21. It is essential for the delinquent/employee to know the special reason or circumstance for such order so also for the Court/Tribunal. The State's submission is that, there is no specific provision to provide reasons and/or even to issue any show cause notice. There is no procedure for making any representation. The immediate effect was given to the order of transfer. The Tribunal/Court, as directed, for the first time the Appellant/State placed on record the materials to justify their unreasoned mid-term transfer and/or repatriation order. The Court/Tribunal, has no choice but to go into those factual background and circumstances and came to the conclusion as reflected in the impugned order, as the Executive/State did not provide reasons in support of the same. This procedure has caused further delay in deciding the matter, to note the background circumstances by going through the files in the Court. In the meantime the transfer order attracted interim order, pending the final decision. This frustrate the whole object of such transfer also. This, in no way, to be read and refer, to mean that in an extraordinary circumstances and for a special reason, reflected on record, the State cannot pass transfer order. The special privilege and/or claim can be made and/or right may be reserved to show the reason exclusively to the Court and/or the Tribunal. This is not even a special and/or extraordinary circumstances case in view of the submission so made and the explanation given without initiating any disciplinary action as contemplated under the Act. 22. The decision so taken, in the background, in breach of principle of statutory provisions and the principle of natural justice is bad in law, as this amounts to punishment/punitive action based upon unproved alleged misconduct and dereliction of duty. The transfer order refers to the repatriation action also, but the State has invoked the State Act. This also reflects the non-application of mind, confusion and any concrete foundation or motive. The process followed to take such decision was wrong and arbitrary. 23. The transfer is a part of service contract and/or the service jurisprudence. The transfer order refers to the repatriation action also, but the State has invoked the State Act. This also reflects the non-application of mind, confusion and any concrete foundation or motive. The process followed to take such decision was wrong and arbitrary. 23. The transfer is a part of service contract and/or the service jurisprudence. Transfer is an incidence of service Reason to be recorded cannot read to mean, no reason should not be communicated at any circumstances, specially when it is obligatory on the part of the State to act fairly, transparently and reasonably. The decision needs to be actuated by consideration based on law and the record and certainly not an extraneous consideration. Unreasoned order is always vulnerable to challenge and stated to be mala fide. The State/Authority needs to act bonafide. Therefore, cannot be restricted to meant for and/or with the private record/department. It must be reflected before taking any action/order. Perversity or irrationality, bonafide, legality of reasons difficult to test, if not disclosed at the time of order/action itself. It is normally the unreasoned mid-term order or such orders are vulnerable to challenge. An executive order on undisclosed or unreasoned foundation of alleged misconduct and dereliction of duty is also vulnerable to challenge on the ground of malice in law. Such undisclosed burdened mid-term order of transfer affects the status of the employee, it violates the service conditions thus illegal, though it is administrative order. It has civil consequences. The principle of natural justice is applicable. The State Act and not any guidelines govern such State Government transfer order, such transfer order is arbitrary, irrational and violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 24. It is relevant to note, in this background, the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Vijay Shankar Pandey vs. Union of India dealing with the service matters is in the following words:- “42. The Constitution declares that India is a sovereign democratic Republic. The requirement of 21 Civil Appeal No. 9043 of 2014 dated 22 September 2014 such democratic republic is that every action of the State is to be informed with reason. State is not a hierarchy of regressively genuflecting coterie of bureaucracy.” “43. The right to judicial remedies for the redressal of either personal or public grievances is a constitutional right of the subjects (both citizens and non-citizens) of this country. State is not a hierarchy of regressively genuflecting coterie of bureaucracy.” “43. The right to judicial remedies for the redressal of either personal or public grievances is a constitutional right of the subjects (both citizens and non-citizens) of this country. Employees of the State cannot become members of a different and inferior class to whom such right is not available.” 25. Resultantly, the Petition is dismissed. Interim order stands vacated. 26. The learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners-State submitted to stay the effect and operation of the Judgment passed today in the Court. Considering the reasons so recorded, we see no case is made out to stay the Judgment. The oral request is therefore, rejected.