Judgment : Delivered By R. Sudhakar, J. 1. This civil miscellaneous appeal is filed against the order dated 28.1.14, passed by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, Chennai, made in Miscellaneous Order No.40275/2014. 2. The issue raised in the present appeal, filed by the Revenue, is on extension of stay granted by the Tribunal on account of huge pendency of appeals, particularly in the case of the respondent/assessee, who is the appellant before the Tribunal. 3. The Revenue is aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal granting extension of stay till the disposal of the appeal. The Tribunal, in the present case, granted interim order in favour of the respondent/assessee on 8.4.09 in an application filed for waiver of pre-deposit on certain terms. The department does not dispute the fact that the conditional order has been complied with. On an application filed by the assessee, the interim order granted vide Stay Order No.240/09 dated 8.4.09 was extended till the disposal of the appeal by Misc. Order No.41392/2013 dated 4.6.13. Thereafter, on another application filed by the respondent/assessee, the Tribunal passed an order on 28.1.14 extending the interim order till the disposal of the appeal, which reads as follows :- “The applicant has filed this application for extension of stay already granted vide Stay Order No.240/2009 dated 8.4.2009. On going through the records and hearing both sides, we find that the appeal could not be decided because there is huge pendency of the appeals before this Tribunal and the delay is inevitable. Following the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CCE, Ahmedabad – Vs – Kumar Cotton Mills Pvt. Ltd. - 2005 (180) ELT 434 (SC), the application is allowed and the period of stay is further extended until the disposal of the appeal. The miscellaneous application is hereby allowed.“ Aggrieved against the abovesaid order of the Tribunal, the Revenue is before this Court by filing the present appeal. 4. Mr.Ravi Ananthapadmanabhan, learned standing counsel for the appellant contended that in accordance with the 3rd proviso to Section 35C (2A), which came into effect from 10.5.13, by virtue of Section 98 of the Finance Act, 2013 (Act 17 of 2013), the Tribunal ought not have extended the stay and should have vacated the order thereon. 5. For better clarity, the proviso to sub-section (2A) of Section 35C (2A) is extracted hereunder : SECTION 35C. 5. For better clarity, the proviso to sub-section (2A) of Section 35C (2A) is extracted hereunder : SECTION 35C. Orders of Appellate Tribunal. — (1) The Appellate Tribunal may, after giving the parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit, confirming, modifying or annulling the decision or order appealed against or may refer the case back to the authority which passed such decision or order with such directions as the Appellate Tribunal may think fit, for a fresh adjudication or decision, as the case may be, after taking additional evidence, if necessary. The Appellate Tribunal may, if sufficient cause is shown,?(1A) at any stage of hearing of an appeal, grant time, from time to time, to the parties or any of them and adjourn the hearing of the appeal for reasons to be recorded in writing : Provided that no such adjournment shall be granted more than three times to a party during hearing of the appeal. The Appellate Tribunal may, at?(2) any time within [six months from the date of the order, with a view to rectifying any mistake apparent from the record, amend any order passed by it under subsection (1) and shall make such amendments if the mistake is brought to its notice by the [Commissioner of Central Excise or the other party to the appeal : Provided that an amendment which has the effect of enhancing an assessment or reducing a refund or otherwise increasing the liability of the other party, shall not be made under this subsection, unless the Appellate Tribunal has given notice to him of its intention to do so and has allowed him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (2A) The Appellate Tribunal shall, where it is possible to do so, hear and decide every appeal within a period of three years from the date on which such appeal is filed : Provided that where an order of stay is made in any proceeding relating to an appeal filed under sub-section (1) of section 35B, the Appellate Tribunal shall dispose of the appeal within a period of one hundred and eighty days from the date of such order : Provided further that if such appeal is not disposed of within the period specified in the first proviso, the stay order shall, on the expiry of that period, stand vacated. Provided also that where such appeal is not disposed of within the period specified in the first proviso, the Appellate Tribunal, may, on any application made in this behalf by a party and on being satisfied that the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to such party, extend the period of stay to such further period, as it thinks fit, not exceeding one hundred and eighty-five days, and in case the appeal is not so disposed of within the total period of three hundred and sixty five days from the date of order referred to in the first proviso, the stay order shall, on the expiry of the said period, stand vacated.” 6. Sub-section (2A) of Section 35C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 came into effect from 11.5.02 by Finance Act, 2002. Sub-section (2A) contemplates that the appeal should be disposed of within three years from the date on which such appeal is filed. The 1st proviso to sub-section (2A) contemplates that the appeal should be disposed of within a period of 180 days, failing which the order of stay shall stand vacated. 7. The abovesaid provision came to be interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CCE, Ahmedabad – Vs – Kumar Cotton Mills Pvt. Ltd. ( 2005 (180) ELT 434 (SC)), wherein in para-6 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court held as follows :- “6. The sub-section which was introduced in terrorem cannot be construed as punishing the assessees for matters which may be completely beyond their control. For example, many of the Tribunals are not constituted and it is not possible for such Tribunals to dispose of matters. Occasionally by reason of other administrative exigencies for which the assessee cannot be held liable, the stay applications are not disposed of within the time specified. The reasoning of the Tribunal expressed in the impugned order and as expressed in the Larger Bench matter, namely, IPCL v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Vadodara (supra) cannot be faulted. However we should not be understood as holding that any latitude is given to the Tribunal to extend the period of stay except on good cause and only if the Tribunal is satisfied that the matter could not be heard and disposed of by reason of the fault of the Tribunal for reasons not attributable to the assessee.” 8. However we should not be understood as holding that any latitude is given to the Tribunal to extend the period of stay except on good cause and only if the Tribunal is satisfied that the matter could not be heard and disposed of by reason of the fault of the Tribunal for reasons not attributable to the assessee.” 8. The present amendment, which came into effect from 10.5.13, by virtue of Section 98 of Finance Act, 2013 is only an extension of proviso 1 and 2 of sub-section (2A) of Section 35C. All that the 3rd proviso states is that where such appeal is not disposed of within the period specified in the first proviso, the Appellate Tribunal may, on an application made in this behalf by a party and on being satisfied that the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to such party, extend the period of stay to such further period, as it thinks fit, not exceeding one hundred and eighty-five days, and it further states that if the appeal is not disposed of within the total period of three hundred and sixty-five days from the date of order referred to in the first proviso, the stay order referred to in the 1st proviso, viz., the order of stay shall, on the expiry of the said period, be vacated. 9. We find that the 3rd proviso has incorporated the language of the Supreme Court in para-6 as above to some extent and limit the period by which the Tribunal can extend the interim order. The principle laid down by the Supreme Court in relation to proviso 1 and 2 of sub-section (2A) has been applied to the 3rd proviso in the amendment. Nevertheless, if the Tribunal accepts that if the delay is not on account of the assessee, and grants an order of stay, as is passed in the present case, we do not find any reason to find fault with the order extending the interim order applying the same principle as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Kumar Cotton Mills case (supra). 10. 10. Accordingly, we find that in the present case, the Tribunal has considered the application filed by the respondent/assessee and has given a reason for grant of extension of interim order by holding that the Tribunal is granting the extension of interim order only on the ground that the Tribunal is unable to dispose of the appeal in time due to huge pendency of appeals before the Tribunal. When the appellate authority itself clearly concedes the fact that the delay is not on account of the respondent/assessee, the Tribunal has rightly relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Kumar Cotton Mills case (supra) and we find no reason to differ with the said stand taken by the Tribunal in granting extension of the interim order by relying on the said judgment. 11. This Court finds no question of law much less substantial question of law arising for consideration in this appeal, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Kumar Cotton Mills case (supra). 12. Accordingly, there being no merits, this appeal is dismissed. However, considering the intention of the Legislature, we hope the Tribunal will take up the appeal for disposal at an early date.