Judgment R.V. More, J. 1. Heard Mrs. Veena Thadhani, learned counsel for the petitioner and Ms. P.S. Cardozo, learned AGP for respondents. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith and, by consent, the matter is heard finally. 2. By this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner is challenging the orders dated 3rd July, 2014 and 1st August, 2012 passed by the 2nd and 1st respondents respectively, whereby applications made by the petitioner for grant of public entertainment license was rejected. 3. The petitioner is the sole proprietor of restaurant in the name and style of M/s. Hotel Reena Restaurant and is carrying on business in shop No. 9/10, Survey No. 461, C.S.T. No. 262, Link Road, Opposite Goregaon Sports Club, Near Swagat Park, Malad West, Mumbai-400064. The petitioner was granted Eating House Registration Certificate by the 1st respondent on 30th December, 2010 for carrying on business of restaurant. The petitioner thereafter applied for FL-III license under the Bombay Foreign Liquor Rules, 1953 (for short "the BFL Rules") framed under the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 (for short "the BP Act") and, accordingly, FL-III license was granted after verification by State Excise Department on 14th October, 2011. The petitioner thereafter paid the license fees amounting to Rs. 3,63,000/- and this license is being renewed thereafter every year. The petitioner was informed that before commencing the business, he is required to obtained another license viz. Public Entertainment License under the Bombay Police Act, 1951 (for short "the Police Act") from the Commissioner of Police. The petitioner, accordingly, applied to the 1st respondent for public entertainment license under the Police Act read with the Rules of Places of Public Entertainment Licenses, 1953 (for short "PPEL Rules"). This application, as stated above, was rejected by respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2 confirmed the said order in an appeal filed by the petitioner. 4. Mrs. Thadhani, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the BFL Rules framed under the BP Act are stringent and, in detail, prescribes the statutory distance required to be maintained from religious and educational institutions. She submitted that, in fact, the license was granted to the petitioner by the State Excise Department only after the premises in which the restaurant is situated was being inspected physically by the senior officers. Ms. She submitted that, in fact, the license was granted to the petitioner by the State Excise Department only after the premises in which the restaurant is situated was being inspected physically by the senior officers. Ms. Thadhani further submitted that the FL-III license was granted by the statutory committee constituted under section 44A of the BFL Rules and respondent No. 1 is the member of the said committee. She stated that the State Excise Department having granted FL-III license, respondent No. 1 now cannot refuse to grant public entertainment license. She also submitted that the license is refused only on the ground that the petitioner has not made provision for parking spaces and, therefore, in future there would be possibility of traffic problem. She submitted that the order rejecting the license is discriminatory inasmuch as respondent No. 1 has granted several public entertainment licenses to similarly situated establishments. She lastly submitted that the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside and the petitioner deserves to be granted public entertainment license. 5. Ms. Cardozo, learned AGP appearing for the respondents vehemently contested the petition. She submitted that after grant of FL-III license to the petitioner, report was received from the Traffic Control Branch objecting the grant of the public entertainment license on the ground that it will result in traffic congestion. She submitted that under the Development Control Regulations for Greater Bombay, 1991 (for short "the DC Rules"), the petitioner is required to make an arrangement for 7 independent parking slots for the customers visiting his establishment. Since the petitioner has not made any provision for the same, the license came to be rejected. She submitted that the impugned orders, in the above circumstances, cannot be interfered with. She relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Vikrama Shama Shetty vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.2006 (5) ALL MR 214 (S.C.) and the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in St. Philomena Convent High School, Nashik vs. Union of India and Ors., 2009 (4) Mh.L.J. 255 : 2009 (5) ALL MR 356. 6. Having considered the rival submissions and having gone through the compilation of the petition including the impugned orders and the ratios of the decisions cited above, I find merit in the petition. Philomena Convent High School, Nashik vs. Union of India and Ors., 2009 (4) Mh.L.J. 255 : 2009 (5) ALL MR 356. 6. Having considered the rival submissions and having gone through the compilation of the petition including the impugned orders and the ratios of the decisions cited above, I find merit in the petition. There is no dispute that the petitioner was granted Eating House Registration Certificate in the year 2010 and is carrying on business in the name and style of M/s. Hotel Reena Restaurant. There is no dispute that the petitioner was also granted FL-III license by the State Excise Department under the provisions of BFL Rules framed under Bombay Police Act. Further, there is no dispute that in order to serve liquor in the petitioner's restaurant, the petitioner is required to obtain public entertainment license from the 1st respondent and, therefore, the petitioner applied for the same, which came to be rejected by the orders impugned in the petition. 7. The public entertainment license is rejected solely on the ground that the petitioner has not provided for requisite parking spaces and that will result in congestion of traffic. The petitioner, in this regard, claimed that there is no provision under the Rules for keeping places of Public Entertainment in Greater Bombay, 1953 (for short "the Public Entertainment Rules") which prescribes parking spaces as a condition precedent to grant of public entertainment license. The respondents, on the contrary, relied upon DC Regulations, especially regulation 36 to assert that the parking spaces must be provided by the petitioner in order to be held eligible for grant of public entertainment license. Regulation 36 of the DC Regulations deals with parking spaces. Under this regulation, wherever a property is developed or redeveloped, parking spaces at the scale laid down in these regulations are required to be provided. This regulation further mandates that when additions are made to an existing building, the new parking requirements will be reckoned with reference to the additional space only and not to the whole of building, however, this concession shall not apply where the use is changed. This regulation about parking spaces is applicable when the property is developed or redeveloped or when additions are made to the existing building. This regulation cannot, therefore, be a ground for rejection of public entertainment license. This regulation about parking spaces is applicable when the property is developed or redeveloped or when additions are made to the existing building. This regulation cannot, therefore, be a ground for rejection of public entertainment license. Reliance placed by learned AGP in this regard on the decisions cited in Vikrama Shama Shetty (supra) and St. Philomena Convent High School (supra) is misplaced. The Division Bench in St. Philomena Convent High School (supra) was considering the power of the Municipal Commissioner to relax minimum distance. The Division Bench held that the power is an exceptional power which has to be used sparingly and with a great deal of caution. The Apex Court in Vikrama Shama Shetty (supra) held that the wrong permitted in some other case cannot be a ground for doing another wrong and, therefore, equal treatment cannot be pressed in such a case. In the present case, the petitioner is neither claiming relaxation nor it is the case of the respondents that public entertainment licenses granted to the similarly situated persons were wrong. Therefore, both the decisions are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 8. The question whether inadequate facility for parking can be a ground for rejection of performance license was considered by learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 2075 of 2004. Learned Single Judge observed that the petitioner has already been granted license to keep a public place of entertainment without any objection on the ground of parking space. It was further observed that the authority should have due regard to the fact that in a city like Mumbai, denial of license due to want of parking space would result in closing down of a large number of establishment on that ground. The learned Single Judge, accordingly, quashed the order of the licensing authority refusing to grant license. 9. Similar question was considered by another learned Single Judge in Criminal Writ Petition Nos. 1473 and 1688 of 2012. The learned Single Judge has made following observations in paragraphs 3 and 4 as under: 3. On perusal of the affidavit and annexures, it is revealed, in the area of Chembur, the licences are issued or renewed for the year 2010, 2009, 2011. The Chart furnished by Mr. 1473 and 1688 of 2012. The learned Single Judge has made following observations in paragraphs 3 and 4 as under: 3. On perusal of the affidavit and annexures, it is revealed, in the area of Chembur, the licences are issued or renewed for the year 2010, 2009, 2011. The Chart furnished by Mr. Shah, Advocate, a copy of which was given to the police earlier, also illustrates, such several licenses issued on identical situation to several establishments in the western region. 4. There is no reason, for the police agency to discriminate the petitioners for permission to carry the activities sought for on the ground of no parking space. Identical scale and parameters should have been applied to the Petitioner. Rejection on this count by the Authorities is set aside. It is clarified, if the petitioners have other deficiencies, they will face the consequence. The petitions are allowed. In the present case also, it is specific case of the petitioner that in similar circumstances, public entertainment licenses are granted to other establishments. It is not the case of the respondents that these licenses are granted illegally. Ratio of this decision is, therefore, applicable to the present case. 10. Another learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. 253 of 2014, Harmesh Singh Chadha vs. The Commissioner of Police and Anr. made following observations in paragraph 13 which are reproduced as under: "13 As regards the issue of parking is concerned, the learned counsel for the Petitioner has placed on record the compilation of orders passed by the Court in Writ Petition No. 2075 of 2004 in the case of Krishna A. Poojari vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors., Writ Petition Lodging No. 2995 of 2012 Manohar G. Bhavanishankar vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. and in the case of Jagdish N. Shetty vs. Commissioner of Police and Ors., reported in 2013 (6) Mh.L.J. 791 : 2014 (1) ALL MR 225. There is no serious dispute on behalf of the State as regards the contention that availability of parking cannot be made as a ground for rejection of the Police license. In view of this decision, the objection based on parking will not survive. There is no serious dispute on behalf of the State as regards the contention that availability of parking cannot be made as a ground for rejection of the Police license. In view of this decision, the objection based on parking will not survive. A statement is made by the learned counsel for the Petitioner that valet parking will be provided to the customers of the said establishment and valet parking will be organised in such a manner not to obstruct free-flow of traffic and cause other traffic problems. This statement on instructions is accepted. If this statement is breached it will be open to the authorities to take suitable action." 11. Thus, this Court in series of judgments held that non-availability of the parking spaces cannot be a ground for rejection of public entertainment license. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained especially when the petitioner has already been granted Eating House Registration Certificate and FL-III license. The license claimed by the petitioner is rejected only on the ground of non-availability of parking spaces. As stated above, this ground is covered by series of decisions of this Court and in spite of the decisions of this Court, the authorities have been passing orders as if the decisions are not existing. No purpose would be served by remanding the matter back to the authority, since the issue is already settled, however, is being ignored by the authority. This course of action has already been indicated in the decision in Jagdish N. Shetty vs. Commissioner of Police and Ors., 2013 (6) Mh.L.J. 791 : 2014 (1) ALL MR 225. In that view of the matter, the petition deserves to be allowed. Rule is, accordingly, made absolute in terms of prayer clause (b). The writ petition, accordingly, stands disposed of.