Order Both the writ petitions – W.P.No.1863 of 2006 & W.P.No.30623 of 2013 - are between the same parties, involving causes concomitant to each other. Accordingly, both the writ petitions are disposed of by this common order. The facts as are pleaded in W.P.No.1863 of 2006 are taken as the basis for the discussion of the issues in both the writ proceedings. In fact, the cause in W.P.No.30623 of 2013, being only consequential to the cause in W.P.No.1863 of 2006, does not require any special ratiocination. In this writ petition, the first petitioner, an aided college, and second and third petitioners, lecturers working in un-aided posts, call in question the action of the respondent authorities in rejecting the proposal of the first petitioner college to absorb second and third petitioners into existing grant-in-aid vacancies. The first petitioner is a college established in 1968 with grant-in-aid since its inception. In response to the proposal of the first petitioner college on 21.10.2000 and 04.01.2001, taking the need and workload into account, the Commissioner of Collegiate education, Hyderabad, the second respondent, issued proceedings on 20.01.2001 granting permission to fill up 3 unaided posts of lecturers in computer science, physics and mathematics. Further permission was also granted on 27.01.2001 to fill up the unaided post of lecturer in Hindi as well. Following the due procedure for recruitment as laid down in G.O.Ms.No.119, dated 22.03.1991 and G.O.Ms.No.12, dated 10.01.1992, the first petitioner completed the recruitment process. In fact apart from notifying the vacancies, the first petitioner college called for applications from eligible candidates through newspaper notification, apart from seeking sponsoring of eligible candidates from employment exchange. Eventually the petitioners 2 and 3 were appointed lecturers in Hindi and physics respectively through orders of appointment, dated 12.10.2001. When the incumbent lecturers working in grant-in-aid posts retired from service on their attending superannuation, the first petitioner college submitted a proposal on 16.04.2002 to the second respondent sickness permission to absorb petitioners 2 and 3 in the grant-in-aid posts. Despite the lapse of three years, when no orders were passed, the first petitioner filed W.P.No.25951 of 2005 questioning the inaction of the authorities. Despite the lapse of three years, when no orders were passed, the first petitioner filed W.P.No.25951 of 2005 questioning the inaction of the authorities. Eventually, the said writ petition was disposed of on 06.12.2005 with a direction to the respondents to pass appropriate orders on the proposal submitted by the first petitioner on 16.04.2002 within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. In the light of the directions of this court, the second respondent issued proceedings in Rc.No.1768/Admn. VI-1/2005, dated 17.01.2006 rejecting the proposal of the first petitioner college. Aggrieved thereby, the college as well as the incumbent lecturers working in unaided posts filed the present writ petition. Sri Ashwani Kumar, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has submitted that the rejection of the proposal to absorb the petitioners 2 and 3 into clear vacancies of aided posts by the second respondent is totally unjustified and unsustainable not only on account of the statutory mandate in that regard but also the numerous precedents of this court. As a prefatory submission the learned counsel has stated that there have been numerous instances of the respondent authorities according permission to absorb similarly placed lecturers working in unaided category in the existing vacancies of aided posts. Thus, he has contended that the action of the respondents is discriminatory, to say the least. The learned counsel has strenuously contended that though the rejection was based on three counts, all the three reasons assigned by the authorities are merely excuses without having any force. Dilating further, the learned counsel has stated that the plea of the respondents that the initial appointment of the petitioners two and three was without any financial commitment and that now the present request of the petitioner college to absorb them into aided categories would be in violation of the said permission is lopsided. According the learned counsel, the said condition applies so long as the petitioners 2 and 3 continued to work as unaided lecturers, and it cannot be read by any stretch that they should never be considered for regularisation and absorption into aided category at any point of time. The second objection being only a corollary to the first one that the management alone should pay the salaries to the said lecturers, it would need no further elucidation. The second objection being only a corollary to the first one that the management alone should pay the salaries to the said lecturers, it would need no further elucidation. Finally, the learned counsel has contended that the alleged ban said to have been in place preventing the absorption of the petitioners 2 and 3 into aided category no longer survives as it has been set aside by this court on earlier occasion. Placing reliance on R.N.Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmiah ( AIR 1972 SC 1767 )and also on G.E.Chandra Kalarani v. Prl., Secretary, Education Dept., Hyderabad (Order, dt.17.11.2003 in WP No.5437 of 2002), the learned counsel stated that absorption from unaided to aided posts does not constitute recruitment, and as such assuming that there was any ban, it would be confined only to fresh recruitments. The learned counsel has also cited various instances of similarly placed lecturers having been absorbed into aided vacancies by the same respondent authorities. Thus, the learned counsel has urged this court to allow the writ petition as prayed for. Per contra, the learned Government Pleader has strenuously opposed the claims and contentions of the petitioners. He has submitted that merely because the petitioners 2 and 3 were initially recruited into unaided posts of lecturers based on the permission granted by the respondent authorities, it would not ipso facto provide any indefeasible right to the petitioners to seek absorption into aided vacancies. According the learned Government Pleader the parameters for granting permission to the colleges to recruit lecturers, be it by way of fresh recruitment or by way of absorption, are entirely different. The learned Government Pleader, drawing the attention of this court to the impugned proceedings of rejection passed by the second respondent, has contended that the recruitment to the grant-in-aid posts is a matter of policy on the part of the government and as such unless the government decides to fill up the posts, neither the first petitioner college nor the lecturers would have any right to compel the Government to grant permission to absorb petitioners 2 and 3 into aided vacancies. The learned government pleader has submitted that now the government has a policy of not filling up the aided vacancies, except backlog vacancies. According to the learned government pleader any direction to the authorities to absorb the petitioners 2 and 3 into aided vacancies would be in violation of the said policy. The learned government pleader has submitted that now the government has a policy of not filling up the aided vacancies, except backlog vacancies. According to the learned government pleader any direction to the authorities to absorb the petitioners 2 and 3 into aided vacancies would be in violation of the said policy. As a matter of technicality, the learned government pleader would submit that the first petitioner college filing the writ petition along with its employees working in unaided category would speak volumes about the collusion and complicity between the management and the unaided staff. Finally, the learned government pleader has stated that the authorities have duly complied with the direction of this court in its order, dated 06.12.2005 in W.P.No.25951 of 2005. As a matter of subsequent development, recently the petitioners 2 and 3 filed a miscellaneous petition in WPMP No.970 of 2012 seeking a direction to the respondents to absorb them into aided posts of lecturers in Hindi and physics of the first petitioner college pending the disposal of the writ petition. Through an order, dated 28.06.2012, a learned single judge of this court disposed of the said miscellaneous petition. In that process the learned single judge took cognizance of the fact that on 11.11.1999, 16.06.2001 and 24.08.2001 the second respondent accorded his approval for appointing the lecturers working in various other colleges against unaided posts by absorbing them into vacant aided posts. The learned judge has also examined G.O.Rt.No.482, Higher Education (CE.II-1) Department, dated 18.07.2011 absorbing Smt.M.Jyothi into aided vacancy of lecturer in commerce from unaided post in Sarada College, Vijayawada, Krishna District. Under those circumstances, the learned single Judge has directed the respondents to take up the proposals of the first petitioner college for appointing the petitioners 2 and 3 against the aided posts as lecturers in Hindi and Physics respectively and pass appropriate orders. In fact to have the said order vacated, the respondent authorities have filed WVMP No.485 of 2013. In the said vacate petition, the respondents have taken certain additional pleas. Based on them, the learned government pleader has stated that for absorption into aided vacancies the communal roster should be strictly followed. Even the unaided posts should be filled only to the extent required as per the workload norms prescribed by the universities concerned and no post shall be filled without workload. Based on them, the learned government pleader has stated that for absorption into aided vacancies the communal roster should be strictly followed. Even the unaided posts should be filled only to the extent required as per the workload norms prescribed by the universities concerned and no post shall be filled without workload. WP No.30623 of 2013: As stated above, the petitioners filed WPMP No. 970 of 2012 in W.P.No.1863 of 2006 seeking a direction to the respondents to absorb them into aided posts of lecturers in Hindi and physics of the first petitioner college pending the disposal of the writ petition. Through an order, dated 28.06.2012, the said Miscellaneous Petition was disposed of by this Court. In fact, this court directed the respondents to take up the proposals of the first petitioner college for appointing the petitioners 2 and 3 against the aided posts as lecturers in Hindi and physics respectively and pass appropriate orders and inform the same to the first petitioner college as well as the petitioners 2 and 3 within a period of three months. Consequent to the direction given therein, the 1st respondent issued proceedings in Memo No.1776/C.E.II.1/2006-1, dated 23.01.2013 and the 2nd respondent issued consequential proceedings in Memo No.1768/Admn.VI-1/2002, dt.07.02.2013, rejecting the claim of the petitioner. Laying challenge against the said rejection, this writ petition is filed. The pleas taken and the grounds urged in both the writ petitions are dealt with compendiously. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned government pleader for the respondents, apart from perusing the record. The initial order of rejection passed by the second respondent in Rc.No.1768/Admn.VI-I/2005, dated 17.01.2006, impugned in W.P.No.1863 of 2006 contains the following reasons for not considering the proposal of the first petitioner to absorb the services of the petitioners 2 & 3 into aided category: “The request is not feasible of compliance for the following reasons: i) While according permission to the management, to fill up the unaided posts it was clearly informed that there should be any financial commitment on the part of the Government and also the unaided posts shall not be claimed for Grant-in-Aid either now or in future. ii) The appointments of both the incumbents were made purely against unaided vacancies and therefore the management should pay salaries to them from their own funds only and the official respondent has nothing to do with regard to payment of salaries to them. iii) There is a ban on filing up of the aided vacancies in the Private Aided Colleges in the State as per the Orders issued in Government Memo No.41209/CE.II-1/98-2 Edn., dated 17.12.1999. In support of the above, the contention of the respondents is that even the unaided posts shall be filled only to the extent required as per the workload norms prescribed by the universities concerned and no posts should be filled without workload. There is no gainsaying the statement. The fact, however, remains that initially the unaided posts involving the petitioners 2 and 3 were filled up by following the due process, only after obtaining the necessary prior permission from the respondents. It can thus be presupposed that the authorities have granted permission only based on the workload at that time. The respondents have reiterated their plea about the initial disclaimer that had been put in place by the government at the time of granting the permission to the college to fill up the unaided posts. It is to the effect that the government would not have any financial liability and that any further absorption into aided vacancies would be in violation of government Memo No.41209/CE.II-1/98-2, Education, dated 17.12.1999. As could be seen, in the light of the interim order, dated 28.06.2012 passed in WPMP No.970 of 2012, the respondent authorities have once again considered the case of the petitioners 2 and 3 and rejected it through Memo No.1776/C.E.II.1/2006-1, dated 23.01.2013 of the first respondent and the consequential Memo No.1768/Admn.VI-1/2002, dt.07.02.2013, passed by the second respondent, holding that the said petitioners do not possess Ph.D., that the only scheme for regulation of unaided lecturers into aided posts was under G.O.Ms.No.328, dated 15.10.1997 with a cut-off date of 25.11.1993, and that since the objective behind the said GO was achieved, it was subsequently annulled through another G.O.Ms.No.283, dated 03.11.1999. The authorities have further stated, as a reason for rejection, that the number of students getting admitted in private aided degree colleges has been drastically going down over the years and as such in the aided degree colleges more and more lecturers are being rendered surplus. The authorities have further stated, as a reason for rejection, that the number of students getting admitted in private aided degree colleges has been drastically going down over the years and as such in the aided degree colleges more and more lecturers are being rendered surplus. The fallacy of the statement is very apparent. If at all there is any surplus staff declared in the petitioner college, some order to the said effect should have been forthcoming from the authorities. Unless a comprehensive exercise has been undertaken by the Government in identifying the excess teaching posts and the colleges with the dwindling admissions, this generic plea of decline in the rate of admissions cannot be a legitimate ground. The respondents have also spoken about G.O.Ms.No.35, HE (CE.II-1) Department, dated 27.03.2006. Based on the said G.O., it is contended that there is a general ban on filling up of vacant aided posts in private aided Junior/degree colleges. All the vacant posts, it is contended, are required to be filled up by way of recruitment by transfer/promotion of unaided employee working in aided post as per existing service rules. The next reason assigned says that the request of the certain unaided lecturers in private aided colleges ‘for absorption into grant-in-aid cannot be and should not be agreed to in isolation ‘as it would trigger similar requests in respect of almost all the vacant aided posts’ from large number of similarly situated persons. Addressing the first contention that there was a ban, it could be said that this court on more than one occasion declared the said Ben to be illegal and as such it needs no further cogitation. Concerning the second aspect of plethora of pleas for absorption from other people, it is elementary to state that a plea of a person is to be determined based on the statutory position governing the issue raised by the said person. If he is legally entitled to relief, it cannot be denied on the premise that it would make way for others to raise the same demand. If such an impossible situation or an insurmountable problem presents itself to the government, it is always open to the authorities to take a policy decision and place it in the form of an enforceable statutory mandate applying across the board affecting all the persons equally. If such an impossible situation or an insurmountable problem presents itself to the government, it is always open to the authorities to take a policy decision and place it in the form of an enforceable statutory mandate applying across the board affecting all the persons equally. The plea of demands from similarly placed persons is facetious, since once such a demand is legal or supported by precedent, it cannot be denied to the deserving person, thus, playing the card of demand from other similarly placed person piecemeal only to deny opportunity to some selectively. Concerning the previous absorptions in 1999 and 2001 no denial is made by the authorities. On the issue of G.O.Rt.No.482, Higher Education (CE.II-1) Department, dated 18.07.2011 absorbing Smt. M. Jyothi into an aided vacancy of lecturer in commerce from unaided post in Sarada College, Vijayawada, Krishna District, the learned government pleader has stated that it was also based on the direction of this court and that it is subject to the outcome of the writ petition still pending. In any event, when the respondents filed a writ appeal questioning the interim direction of a learned single judge to appoint Smt. M. Jyothi into aided vacancy, even that appeal seems to have been dismissed. In the vacate petition, the respondents pleaded that Smt. M. Jyothi was absorbed as a special case and that it should not be quoted as a precedent in future. While exercising the powers of judicial review under public law remedy, courts of record, be it the Supreme Court or the High Courts, may grant relief to the petitioner under the peculiar circumstances of the case and thereby serve a caveat that it should not be treated as a precedent. In fact, the efficacy of such a direction is the subject matter of intense judicial debate in legal circles. At any rate, the authorities cannot themselves proclaim that any action on their part should not be treated as a precedent. In para No. 14 of Memo, dated 23.01.2013, which is the subject matter of W.P.No.30623 of 2013, as one of the reasons for rejection, the authorities have stated that as per section 46 (1) of A.P.Education Act, 1982, Government is empowered to reduce or withdraw any grant payable to an educational institution having regard to the various aspects involved thereon. In para No. 14 of Memo, dated 23.01.2013, which is the subject matter of W.P.No.30623 of 2013, as one of the reasons for rejection, the authorities have stated that as per section 46 (1) of A.P.Education Act, 1982, Government is empowered to reduce or withdraw any grant payable to an educational institution having regard to the various aspects involved thereon. I am afraid I do not find any material filed by the respondents to show that the authorities have already acted under the said section and have taken measures thereof regarding the petitioner college. It is regrettable that the authorities have taken pains to note a proposition of law from the Hon’ble Supreme Court as laid down in Union of India v. International Trading Company, (quoted in the impugned order as National Trading Company), that two wrongs do not make one right. The statement on the part of the respondents bears repetition: “A party cannot claim that since something wrong has been done in another case directions should be given for doing another wrong.” Every proposition of law or judicial observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution gets its colour from its context. In Union of India v. International Trading Co. (2003) 5 SCC 437 ), it is observed: “9.Though there can be quarrel with the proposition that renewal of a permit carries with it a valuable right, it cannot be lost sight of that for outweighing reasons of public interest, renewal can be refused. It is not in dispute that licences have not been granted for a period of 15 years. If at the time when the matter is taken up for considering whether renewal is to be granted, there is a change in policy it cannot be said that the right is defeated by introduction of a policy. In such an event, the question of applying the doctrine of legitimate expectation or promissory estoppel loses significance. It has not been disputed that in fact the policy decision exists. But the stand of the respondents is that it cannot outweigh the legitimate expectation or the inbuilt rights. In such an event, the question of applying the doctrine of legitimate expectation or promissory estoppel loses significance. It has not been disputed that in fact the policy decision exists. But the stand of the respondents is that it cannot outweigh the legitimate expectation or the inbuilt rights. Additionally it is submitted that the issue has to be considered in the background of thirty two vessels referred to above.” In the present case I am unable to see any proceedings placed before the Court reflecting the change of policy in the matters of regularisation of the services of the petitioners 2 & 3. Viewed from another angel, in the first place, the authorities have not shown any remedial measures having been taken by them concerning the said proverbial two wrongs. These two proverbial wrongs, perhaps, may have to be read as a comedy of errors on the part of the officials who would brazenly proclaim that they were at liberty to commit errors but it did not lie in a Court of law to declare that to be arbitrary and selective discrimination. One cannot help feeling that the authorities have been bending over backwards to sustain what is unsustainable, indulging in a battle of wits with hapless un-employees or employees on the fringe, such as the petitioners 2 & 3. I stop short of saying that the action of the respondents boarders on vindictive persecution of the petitioners since they had the temerity of approaching the Court pointing out the shortcomings of the authorities. I fervently hope that the authorities focus their energies more constructively in administration, instead of fighting multiple rounds of litigation taking it to the highest redressal echelons, thus spending more money, in its wake, than what they would be otherwise paying as salaries. As an alternative submission, the learned government pleader has also stated that two wrongs cannot make one right. Without disputing the said proposition, it is to be stated that any order passed by an authority has to be sustained on the basis of reasons provided in the said order but not by way of supplementary material supplied in justification thereof. This proposition has stood the test of time having been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court way back in 1962 per a Constitutional Bench Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr. This proposition has stood the test of time having been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court way back in 1962 per a Constitutional Bench Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr. (1978) 1 SCC 405 ) which has held: “8.The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose, J. in Gordhandas Bhanji [Commr. of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16 ]: “Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself.” Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older.” Concerning the distinction between regularisation and recruitment, in R.N.Nanjundappa v. T.Thimmiah, (1st supra) the Supreme Court has rejected the contentionon behalf of the State that a rule under Article 309 for regularisation of the appointment of a person would be a form of recruitment read with reference to power under Article 162 as unsound and unacceptable. Since the respondents have not laid any stress on the said aspect, it may not be relevant to be considered at any length. With specific reference to the facts of this case, it may be stated that this Court, under identical circumstances, through a Common Order, dt.12.04.2012, in Writ Petition Nos. 4105 and 4107 of 2002, rendered by a learned Single Judge, has held: “The petitioners in their affidavits stated that the Government, vide memo No.39100/CE.II-1/98-4, dated 30.10.1999, has regularized 23 part-time lecturers and posted them to various places. 4105 and 4107 of 2002, rendered by a learned Single Judge, has held: “The petitioners in their affidavits stated that the Government, vide memo No.39100/CE.II-1/98-4, dated 30.10.1999, has regularized 23 part-time lecturers and posted them to various places. The petitioners have also filed copies of the orders issued by the Commissioner of Collegiate Education in proceedings Rc.No.1093/Admn.III-1/2001, dated 24.08.2001 considering the case of Mrs. BBRC Vijayalakshmi, vide G.O. Ms. No.6, dated 19.01.2011 considering the case of Smt. K. Meghamala and G.O.Rt. No.677, dated 09.09.2011 considering the case of Smt. V. Anuradha. Thus, there cannot be any doubt to say that the respondents have considered the cases of similarly situated persons. This Court in W.P. No.5189 of 2006 in case between P. Ramalinga Reddy v. Govt. of a.P., rep. by its Principal Secretary, Department of Higher Education, Hyderabad, after referring to various GOs issued by the Government from time to time on this issue observed as follows. “…………..the respondent authorities are adopting a pick and choose selective methodology to suit their own vested interests for admitting particular incumbents to grant-in-aid posts. This blatant arbitrariness falls foul of the principles of equality and fair play in action enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. The respondent authorities are bound to adopt a consistent stand while dealing with these cases and their discriminatory and purely subjective and whimsical handling of similarly situated cases clearly demonstrates that their functioning is not in accordance with the rule of law. The petitioner, having been appointed as per the prescribed procedure against an aided vacancy, cannot therefore be denied approval of his appointment by the respondent authorities given the facts and circumstances of the case. Ergo, the adamant attitude of the authorities in trying to deny the petitioner by clutching at straws, as is evident from their counter, requires to be condemned.” Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, these writ petitions are allowed directing the respondents to regularize the petitioners services in the grant-in-aid posts held by them from the date of their original appointments with all consequential benefits. The respondents shall give effect to the above direction within two (2) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The respondents shall give effect to the above direction within two (2) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.” While disposing of another batch of writ appeals, a division bench of this court, through a common order, dated 26.07.2013, having considered all the instances of absorptions previously made at the behest of the government and also various judicial directives given in that regard by this court, speaking through either a Single Bench or a Division Bench, has held as follows: “We have gone through the orders in W.A.No.851 of 2010 dated 15-02-2012 and also the orders dated 05-09-2012 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.1047 of 2012 which was confirmed by the Supreme Court in SLP No.38336 of 2012 by order dated 07.01.2013 and also various proceedings issued by the Government wherein certain persons were admitted into grant-in-aid posts without the orders of the Court. Similar orders passed in several cases and also the orders passed by the learned Single Judges had become final. As such, the appellants cannot try to distinguish the case of the writ petitioners by citing above-mentioned judgements. When the appellants themselves have admitted similarly situated persons like the writ petitioners into grant-in-aid on their own and also the orders passed by this court, now they cannot contend that the petitioners’ cases have to be treated on a different footing. In all these cases, the learned Single Judges merely relied on the judgments in other cases which have been implemented and they have become final. In view of the same, it is not proper for the appellants to treat the petitioners on a different footing and it is not necessary for us to go through the judgement cited by the learned Special government Pleader for the Additional Advocate General, since the issue is squarely covered by the judgments referred to by the learned Single Judges as well as by us. Therefore, we do not find any error or infirmity in the orders passed by the learned Single Judges and we confirm the same.” In the light of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the considered opinion that the initial order of the 2nd respondent in Rc.No.1768/Admn. Therefore, we do not find any error or infirmity in the orders passed by the learned Single Judges and we confirm the same.” In the light of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the considered opinion that the initial order of the 2nd respondent in Rc.No.1768/Admn. VI-1/2005, dated 17.01.2006, and the subsequent order of the 1st respondent in Memo No.1776/C.E.II.1/2006-1, dated 23.01.2013, as well as the consequential proceedings in Memo No.1768/Admn.VI-1/2002, dt.07.02.2013, issued by the 2nd respondent cannot be sustained, and accordingly are set aside. As a natural corollary, the respondents are directed to regularise the services of the petitioners 2 & 3 in the grant-in-aid posts from the date of their entitlement, i.e., from the date the said posts fell vacant on the superannuation of the incumbent lecturers, with all consequential benefits. The respondents shall give effect to the above direction within two (2) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this Order. With the above observations both the writ petitions are allowed. No costs. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, in both the writ petitions shall stand closed.