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2014 DIGILAW 250 (PAT)

Management State Bank of India, Patna v. Hrishikesh Mishra

2014-02-13

NAVIN SINHA, VIKASH JAIN

body2014
ORDER The present appeal assails order dated 6.12.2012 passed in CWJC No.13188 of 2010. The Learned Single Judge held that the punishment of dismissal was excessive. It was set aside and the matter remanded to reconsider the punishment opining that withholding one increment for six months would be sufficient considering that the delinquent had been deceased in the meantime and was substituted by his son. 2. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that the delinquent had been charged on two counts : (a) not caring for bank’s discipline and neglecting the work allotted to him (b) leaving office early on five specified dates without permission of the competent authority without attending to works allotted and tampering the attendance register. The delinquent filed his reply to the two charges on merits. A presenting officer had been appointed. Five prosecution witnesses had led evidence. Documentary evidence was led in support of the charges proved by prosecution witnesses marked as Exhibit PEX 1 to PEX 13. The delinquent did not lead any evidence in defence except himself and relied on no documentary evidence. The enquiry officer returned a finding of guilt. A second show cause notice was issued to the delinquent and after considering the reply punishment of dismissal was passed. The delinquent preferred an appeal which had also been rejected. Subsequently the delinquent obtained a Reference under Section 10 (1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act. He died during pendency of the Reference and was substituted by his son. The Tribunal held that the disciplinary proceedings were held in accordance with law and the punishment warranted no interference. 3. It was submitted that the Learned Single Judge erred in holding that the disciplinary proceedings had not been held in accordance with law simultaneously holding that the punishment was excessive and directing imposition of punishment by stoppage of one increment of six months. The Learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the charges were primarily based on documentary evidence. The delinquent had been given full opportunity of defence and original documents produced. No fresh charges or documents beyond the charge sheet were produced during inquiry. 4. Learned Senior counsel for the respondent submitted that the charges were not specific and consequentially not fully understandable. They were replied to by the delinquent to the best of his understanding. The delinquent had been given full opportunity of defence and original documents produced. No fresh charges or documents beyond the charge sheet were produced during inquiry. 4. Learned Senior counsel for the respondent submitted that the charges were not specific and consequentially not fully understandable. They were replied to by the delinquent to the best of his understanding. Non-production of the original attendance register with regard to the days of alleged absence without any explanation substituted by photocopy had vitiated the inquiry. The photocopy was a fabricated document created to victimise the respondent. The dismissal order and appellate order were both non-speaking in nature. The Industrial Tribunal erred in holding that the inquiry was not procedurally defective. It further erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to examine the quantum of punishment. The learned Single Judge had rightly opined that it was at best a case for minor punishment withholding one increment for six months. In support of the submissions reliance was placed on [1978] 3 SCC 366 [Nand Kishore Prasad Vs. State of Bihar], [1984] 2 SCC 569 [Ved Prakash Gupta Vs. Delton cable [P] Ltd.], [1986] 3 SCC 454 [Sawai Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan], 1990 [2] PLJR 797 [M/s. Indian aluminium Co. Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi], 2013 [2] PLJR 160 [Ramesh Singh Vs. State of Bihar] and 2013 [3] PLJR [SC] 106 [Shri Anant R. Kulkarni Vs. Y.P. Education Society]. 5. The submissions on behalf of the parties have been considered by us. The Learned Single Judge after noticing all aspects of the matter ultimately held;— “However, it cannot be said that there was no neglect of duty as the very fact that the delinquent had left the office without permission or left earlier to the closing time, would lead to the conclusion that he was neglecting his work.” 6. Manifestly, the Learned Single Judge did not find sufficient reason to hold that the entire departmental proceedings was severely flawed to the prejudice of the delinquent and was required to be set aside. The order of punishment as affirmed in appeal and by the Industrial Tribunal was not set aside on its merits but only procedurally to facilitate reconsideration of quantum of punishment. If that had been so, nothing prevented the Learned Single Judge after holding so to grant full benefits to the legal heir. The order of punishment as affirmed in appeal and by the Industrial Tribunal was not set aside on its merits but only procedurally to facilitate reconsideration of quantum of punishment. If that had been so, nothing prevented the Learned Single Judge after holding so to grant full benefits to the legal heir. In the ultimate conclusion, the Learned Single Judge opined that it was a case for minor punishment under other provisions of the Shastry Award. The question of imposing a lesser punishment merely because of subsequent demise could not have arisen if the Court was satisfied of an illegal departmental proceeding. No cross appeal has been filed by the respondent that the Learned Single Judge erred in not setting aside the punishment itself and interfering only on the quantum of punishment. The charges against the delinquent were :— (a) That despite repeated instructions of manager (Accounts)of service branch to you, you did not care to maintain the Banks’s discipline and neglected the work allotted to you. (b) That you left office on 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th and 9th October, 1991 at 1:00pm,11:30pm,12:30pm,11:30am and 12:30pm respectively without taking permission from the competent authority of the Branch and also did not attend to the works allotted to you. A suitable noting to the effect of your leaving the office before time was made in the attendance register, but after tampering it, you changed your departure timing to read as 5:30pm and 2:30pm respectively although you left office much earlier as stated above. 7. The delinquent, in his written statement to the charges did not take any defence of inability to understand due to vagueness or non-supply of documents. The charge was replied on merits. The evidence was primarily documentary from PEX 1 to PEX 13. The PEX 1 was the original attendance register containing the interpolations for the specified dates. PEX 2 was a photocopy of the attendance register kept by the appellants before interpolations were made by the respondent. The others were documentary evidences with regard to letters written to him, assignment of works, inability to deliver the orders because he left office prematurely proved by the witness assigned for delivery to him. No fresh documentary evidence beyond the charges were produced during the inquiry. The delinquent also did not take any such defence. Five departmental witnesses deposed in support of the charges and led evidence from the documents. No fresh documentary evidence beyond the charges were produced during the inquiry. The delinquent also did not take any such defence. Five departmental witnesses deposed in support of the charges and led evidence from the documents. The delinquent, except for himself did not examine any other witness or lead any documentary evidence. It is not his case that he was denied the right to cross examine or that documents beyond those marked as exhibits had been relied upon much less any evidence taken behind his back. The enquiry report is well reasoned and fully discusses not only the departmental stand and evidence but also the defence taken by the respondent and why he had failed to disprove the charge. An appellate order of affirmation need not be reasoned and speaking like an original order. It would suffice if it displays application of mind. We have perused the appellate order. It meets that requirement. The Industrial Tribunal by a reasoned conclusion had held that there was no procedural infirmity in the conduct of the departmental proceedings warranting interference on merits or quantum of punishment. It also noticed that twice earlier also the delinquent had been punished for poor performance and failure to follow directions. 8. The law with regard to the scope for judicial review of an order of punishment passed in a departmental proceeding is well entrenched by several precedents. The Court cannot act as an appellate authority to examine and re-appreciate evidence to arrive at its own independent conclusion at variance with that of the authorities. The duty of the Court is confined to primarily examining irregularities in the decision making process, violating principles of natural Justice in its many facets and interference on merits in an appropriate case may be made if the findings are totally arbitrary and perverse unsupportable by materials on record. In the present case charges were served and duly replied. They were primarily based on documentary evidence which was also proved by prosecution witnesses. A 2nd show cause notice was issued, duly replied after which the order for punishment was passed. The appeal was considered and rejected by an order reflecting application of mind. Another opportunity was availed by the delinquent when Reference was made to the Industrial Tribunal. 9. In [1999] 1 SCC 759 [Apparel export promotion Council Vs. A 2nd show cause notice was issued, duly replied after which the order for punishment was passed. The appeal was considered and rejected by an order reflecting application of mind. Another opportunity was availed by the delinquent when Reference was made to the Industrial Tribunal. 9. In [1999] 1 SCC 759 [Apparel export promotion Council Vs. A.K. Chopra] the extent for permissibility of judicial interference with order of punishment passed in a departmental proceeding was noticed as follows :— “16. The High Court appears to have overlooked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact-finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot, normally speaking, substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even insofar as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Even insofar as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, it appears, ignored the well-settled principle that even though judicial review of administrative action must remain flexible and its dimension not closed, yet the court, in exercise of the power of judicial review, is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for procedural illegalities or irregularities which vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at. Judicial review, it must be remembered, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process…..” 10. The quantum of punishment to be imposed on the delinquent is primarily the jurisdiction of the disciplinary authority. Whether a minor punishment is to be imposed on a major is again for the disciplinary authority to decide so long as he has the power to do so. The Court cannot by reappraisal of evidence substitute its opinion for the punishment merely because it may have a different view. It is only when on admitted facts, the quantum of punishment is grossly excessive or disproportionate and shocks the conscience of the Court, for reasons discussed, the Court may interfere with the quantum of punishment. In the present case, in our opinion, the charges for lack of devotion to work, failure to discharge duties and interpolation with the attendance register were of serious nature. Discipline in the Bank and the manner in which it shall be enforced is the prerogative of the Bank. The Court cannot substitute its standards and opinions of discipline. We are unable to hold that the punishment of dismissal was shockingly disproportionate to the conscience. It has not been denied on behalf of the respondent that he had been proceeded with departmentally twice on earlier occasions and punished notwithstanding which he failed to mend his ways. 11. In (2011) 10 SCC 249 (SBI Vs. We are unable to hold that the punishment of dismissal was shockingly disproportionate to the conscience. It has not been denied on behalf of the respondent that he had been proceeded with departmentally twice on earlier occasions and punished notwithstanding which he failed to mend his ways. 11. In (2011) 10 SCC 249 (SBI Vs. Ram Lal Bhaskar) it was observed :– “13. Thus, in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the findings of the disciplinary authority and so long as the findings of the disciplinary authority are supported by some evidence the High Court does not reappreciate the evidence and come to a different and independent finding on the evidence. This position of law has been reiterated in several decisions by this Court which we need not refer to, and yet by the impugned judgment the High Court has reappreciated the evidence and arrived at the conclusion that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer are not substantiated by any material on record and the allegations levelled against Respondent 1 do not constitute any misconduct and that Respondent 1 was not guilty of any misconduct.” 12. Not performing official duties assigned and leaving office early without authorisation affecting discharge of duties and the tampering the attendance register to justify presence are undoubtedly serious charges of misconduct. The importance of discipline at the workplace was noticed in (2005) 3 SCC 401 (M.P. Electricity Board Vs. Jagdish Chandra Sharma):— “9.Discipline at the workplace in an organisation like the employer herein, is the sine qua non for the efficient working of the organisation. When an employee breaches such discipline and the employer terminates his services, it is not open to a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal to take the view that the punishment awarded is shockingly disproportionate to the charge proved. We have already referred to the views of this Court. To quote Jack Chan, “discipline is a form of civilly responsible behaviour which helps maintain social order and contributes to the preservation, if not advancement, of collective interests of society at large”. 13. We have already referred to the views of this Court. To quote Jack Chan, “discipline is a form of civilly responsible behaviour which helps maintain social order and contributes to the preservation, if not advancement, of collective interests of society at large”. 13. Nand Kishore Prasad [supra] relied upon by the respondent has no application to the facts of the case as it related to the issue of the examination of the records by the Court if it was not fully satisfied with the language used in the order of dismissal. In Ved Prakash Gupta [supra] it was held that the departmental inquiry was not proper and on facts the punishment imposed was shockingly disproportionate for flimsy charges. Likewise Sawai Singh [supra] again has no application as it related to a case of the inability of the Department to establish the charges and evidence adduced was perfunctory. In Indian Aluminium Co. [supra] the question related to the right of the delinquent to lead further evidence before the Industrial Tribunal in a reference arising out of a punishment passed in a departmental proceeding which again has no application as no further evidence was led by the delinquent. In Anant Kulkarni [supra] the issue related to the charges being nonspecific which is not the case presently. Ramesh Singh (supra) relates to a an election petition and has no application to the facts of the present case at all. 14. The order under appeal dated 6. 12. 2012 is therefore held to be unsustainable. It is set aside. 15. The appeal is allowed. VIKASH JAIN, J.:–I agree. ?