Amar Nath Singh v. Additional District Judge Unnao
2014-08-14
DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya, J. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties. 2. This writ petition assails the validity of an order dated 22.04.2008, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Unnao in Regular Suit No. 212 of 2007 whereby the application moved by the petitioners under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking their impleadment was rejected. 3. The petitioners have also challenged the order dated 11.08.2009, passed by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Unnao whereby revision petition filed by the petitioners against the judgment and order dated 22.04.2008, passed by the learned trial court was also dismissed. 4. The facts of the case as culled from the pleadings of the respective parties, which are on record, are that Vijay Pratap Singh, son of late Arjun Singh Bhadauria and Smt. Radha Devi, widow of Rajendra Singh, residents of Village Sarai Manihar, Post Officer Sumerpur, Pargana Bhagwant Nagar, Tahsil Bighapur, District Unnao created a trust known as Radha Devi Rajendra Singh Dharmarth Nyas by executing a trust deed on 14.09.2006 which was registered in the office of the Registrar concerned on 15.09.2006. The trust deed mentions 9 other persons other than Vijay Pratap Singh and Smt. Radha Devi as trustees of the trust in question. 5. Smt. Radha Devi instituted a suit impleading Smt. Chandra Prabha, Vijay Pratap Singh and Radha Devi Rajendra Singh Dharmarth Nyas as defendants with a prayer for decree of cancellation of the trust deed dated 15.09.2006. The petitioners, who were trustees as per trust deed in question, moved an application before the learned trial court below under Order I Rule 10 of the C.P.C., praying therein that they be ordered to be impleaded as parties to the suit. The said application was moved on 11.04.2008. While pressing the said application, it was urged on behalf of the petitioners that in view of the provision contained under Order XXXI of the C.P.C., the petitioners, being trustees as per the trust deed, are the necessary parties and hence, they should be ordered to be impleaded in the suit. However, the said application of the petitioners did not find favour by the learned trial court which rejected the same by means of impugned order dated 22.04.2008.
However, the said application of the petitioners did not find favour by the learned trial court which rejected the same by means of impugned order dated 22.04.2008. The learned trial court while rejecting the application moved by the petitioners has given two reasons; (i) that issue no.5, which was framed to the effect as to whether the suit filed by the plaintiff suffers from the vice of non-joinder of all the trustees, has been decided in negative, hence the petitioners' application cannot be allowed and (ii) that under Order XXXI Rule 1, all the trustees are not to be impleaded necessarily as parties to the suit. 6. The revision petition preferred by the petitioners against the aforesaid order dated 22.04.2008, passed by the learned trial court has also been dismissed, by means of order dated 11.08.2009, by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Unnao stating therein that the term of the office bearers of the trust is three years which is coming to an end shortly on 15.09.2009, hence the petitioners are not necessary parties. 7. The question for consideration, which has arisen in this petition, is as to whether the facts and circumstances of the present case attract the provision contained in Rule 1 of Order XXXI or Rule 2 of Order XXXI of the C.P.C. The provisions in Order XXXI Rule 1 of the C.P.C. state that in a suit relating to property vested in a trustee, executor or administrator, where the dispute is between the persons beneficially interested in such property and a third person, the trustee, executor or administrator shall represent the persons so interested, and in such a situation, it shall not ordinarily be necessary to make them parties to the suit. Rule 2 of Order XXXI clearly states that where there are several trustees, executors or administrators, they shall all be made parties to a suit against one or more of them. 8. In the instant case, the suit for a decree of cancellation of the trust deed has been filed by Smt. Radha Devi, who is trustee No.2 as per the trust deed, against Vijay Pratap Singh and Smt. Chandra Prabha, who are trustee Nos. 1 and 5 respectively.
8. In the instant case, the suit for a decree of cancellation of the trust deed has been filed by Smt. Radha Devi, who is trustee No.2 as per the trust deed, against Vijay Pratap Singh and Smt. Chandra Prabha, who are trustee Nos. 1 and 5 respectively. Thus, as per the provision of Rule 2 of Order XXXI of the C.P.C. in a suit against one or more of the trustees all the trustees of the trust are to be made parties. Admittedly, the suit has been filed by one trustee against two other trustees, thus, in view of the provision contained in Rule 2 of Order XXXI of the C.P.C., all the trustees, in my considered opinion, are to be made parties. I also hold that the provision contained under Order XXXI Rule 1 of the C.P.C. does not have any application to the facts and circumstances of the case for the reason that suit in the instant case has not been filed where there is any dispute between the persons who are beneficially interested in the trust property and any third person. The suit has been filed for cancellation of trust deed against two of the eleven trustees. Thus, it is clear that in the instant case, provisions contained in Rule 2 of Order XXXI are clearly attracted and hence, the application moved by the petitioners, who are trustees as per the trust deed ought to have been allowed and by not doing so, learned trial court has erred. 9. So far as the reason given by the learned trial court regarding disposal of issue No.5 is concerned, the same also does not have any bearing on the right of the petitioners to be impleaded as parties to the suit in view of the express provision contained under Order XXXI Rule 2 of the C.P.C. The order deciding the said issue cannot be said to be binding on the petitioners as at the time when the order was passed, the petitioners were parties to the suit. 10.
10. Learned revisional court has completely misread the issue involved in the revision petition decided by him and has not found the petitioners to be necessary parties only on the ground that term of the petitioners as office bearers of the trust is coming to an end on 15.09.2009 and hence, their application under Order I Rule 10 of the C.P.C. has rightly been rejected. The view taken by the learned revisional court is absolutely erroneous inasmuch as merely because the term of a trustees as office bearers is coming to an end, their existence as trustees of the trust in question does not get extinguished. 11. To hold that the view taken by the learned courts below is erroneous, regard may be had to a judgment of this Court in the case of Ram Ghulam and another Vs. Shyam Sarup and others, reported in AIR 1934 Allahabad High Court, page 1 wherein it has been held that where a suit is instituted against a trustee, all the trustees should be impleaded. This is laid down in Order XXXI Rule 2 of the C.P.C. For the reasons given above, the impugned orders passed by the learned trial court and the learned revisional court below cannot be allowed to be sustained. 12. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 22.04.2008, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Unnao and the order dated 11.08.2009, passed by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Unnao are hereby set aside. 13. Learned trial court below is, however, directed to implead all the trustees as parties to the suit and thereafter to proceed to decide the suit in accordance with law. Looking into the entire facts and circumstances of the case, learned trial court below is also directed to expedite the proceedings of the suit and conclude the same as expeditiously as possible, say, within a period of fifteen months from the date of production of certified copy of this judgment and order. There will be no order as to costs.