JUDGMENT B.K. Srivastava-II,J.: - By means of present writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs: "(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order dated 07.01.2005 issued by opposite party no. 3-The Registrar, Hon'ble High Court at Allahabad as contained in Annexure-10 to the writ petition, further be pleased to quash the order dated 05.01.2005 after summoning the same from opposite parties. This Hon'ble Court further be pleased to quash the order dated 12.08.2005 issued by the opposite party no. 3 as contained in Annexure-15 and further be pleased to quash the order dated 11.08.2005 after summoning the originals and the same from the opposite party no. 2. (ii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari for quashing the placement of the petitioner as Bench Secretary Grade Ist vide the impugned order dated 06.02.2006 as contained in Annexure-18 so far as same is relates to the petitioner. (iii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari for quashing the impugned order dated 31.03.2005 passed by the opposite party no. 3 by which the confirmation of the petitioner has been deferred as contained in Annexure-12 to the writ petition, so far as same is relates from the petitioner. (iv) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the opposite parties to treat the petitioner confirmed Bench Secretary Grade-II w.e.f. April, 2000 or in any case w.e.f. 2003 and further be pleased to direct the opposite parties to place the petitioner as Bench Secretary Grade-III in pay scale of Rs.12,000-16,500/- from the date on which junior from the petitioner has been given the such placement. (v) Issue any other writ order or direction in the nature and manner which deemed just and proper in the circumstances of the case; (vi) Allow the writ petition with costs." 2. The brief facts of the case are that on the basis of competitive examination the petitioner was appointed as Bench secretary Grade-II in the pay scale of 6500-10500/- vide order dated 23.04.1999. In the merit list the petitioner was placed at serial no. 18. In pursuance of the said appointment the petitioner is working since April, 1999 as Bench Secretary Grade-II in the pay scale of Rs.6500-10500/-.
In the merit list the petitioner was placed at serial no. 18. In pursuance of the said appointment the petitioner is working since April, 1999 as Bench Secretary Grade-II in the pay scale of Rs.6500-10500/-. The petitioner at present is posted as Bench Secretary Grade-II in the Hon'ble High Court, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow. The petitioner was on duty in Court no. 22 as Bench Secretary where the Bench was presided over by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Imtiyaz Murtaza, wherein Criminal Appeal No. 1585 of 2002 was listed as a fresh case at serial no. 12 and the same was taken up for hearing by the Hon'ble Court but the file of the said case was misplaced after passing of the order. After making sufficient efforts, the petitioner was not able to trace out the file and subsequently on 27.11.2002, he moved an application to the Registrar, High Court, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow for instituting a preliminary enquiry for the purpose of coming out of the truth. 3. In the said application the petitioner had mentioned entire facts and efforts made by him to trace out the record of Criminal Appeal No. 1585 of 2002. The petitioner has stated that Sri S.R. H. Zafari, Private Secretary, had noted the orders from Serial No. 9 to 18 except the Criminal Appeal No.1588 which was taken up in the revised list. He further stated that Sri Zafari has not shown the note book when the petitioner enquired from him, therefore, the petitioner moved the aforesaid application for enquiry in the matter. 4. On the application of the petitioner, the Registrar ordered for a preliminary enquiry, which was conducted by Sri M.H. Salman, Deputy Registrar (Criminal), who after enquiry submitted his report dated 02.12.2002 without fixing any responsibility of the petitioner for the loss of the said record. 5. Further Registrar, High Court, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow with the approval of Hon'ble the Senior Judge, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow ordered for fresh preliminary enquiry to be conducted by Sri Anil Kumar Srivastava, O.S.D. calling for the findings as to loss of record and fixing responsibility of the said loss as well. 6. In pursuance of the order passed by the Registrar, High Court, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow, the enquiry was conducted by the Enquiry Officer and during the enquiry proceedings the statement of four persons including the petitioner and Sri Zafari were recorded. 7.
6. In pursuance of the order passed by the Registrar, High Court, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow, the enquiry was conducted by the Enquiry Officer and during the enquiry proceedings the statement of four persons including the petitioner and Sri Zafari were recorded. 7. In the statement Sri Zafari has admitted that the orders passed by this Hon'le Court in Criminal Appeal from serial nos. 9 to 18 have not been noted by him on his notebook, however, he stated that he had noted the orders over the appeals itself and has given back to the petitioner. 8. The petitioner has also given his statement during preliminary enquiry and has stated that paper-books/files which were given to him by the P.S./P.A.s just after getting the signature of the Hon'ble Court, he sent the files back to the Section. It was also stated that P.S./P.A.s are not giving any receiving and practically it is also difficult to note that after transcribing the dictation over the file which files have returned and which files have not been returned due to reason that after taking dictation from the Hon'ble Court the P.S./P.A.s return some paper books on the same day some after one or two days and also in some cases they are taking time of more than a week to return the files. 9. It has been further stated that the petitioner was searching with the help of other persons but when he could not get success to trace the paper book only thereafter he moved the aforesaid application before respondent no. 3 for enquiry in the matter. Further, petitioner has stated in his statement that when Sri Zafari had taken down dictation on the file from serial nos. 9 to 18, he must have noted the dictation on the file concerned which was listed at serial no. 12 since Sri Zafari, in his statement has himself admitted that he has not noted the order in his note book and that he does not remember whether he had taken dictation over the file listed from serial no. 9 to 18 or not. 10. Later on, the charges were framed and the charge-sheet was served on the petitioner on 28.03.2003. Subsequently the petitioner submitted his reply and witnesses were cross-examined.
9 to 18 or not. 10. Later on, the charges were framed and the charge-sheet was served on the petitioner on 28.03.2003. Subsequently the petitioner submitted his reply and witnesses were cross-examined. On the basis of enquiry report submitted by the enquiry officer a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner vide letter dated 07.05.2004 and petitioner made a representation with reference to the said charge sheet. 11. On the basis of enquiry report, the Registrar General, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad being the Appointing Authority held the petitioner guilty and vide order dated 07.01.2005 has awarded the punishment of withholding one increment for two years vide letter No. 41/Accounts (A-1) dated 05.01.2005 of the petitioner. 12. The petitioner submitted his representation/appeal dated 01.07.2005 in reference to said punishment before Hon'ble the Chief Justice through proper channel. The Registrar (establishment) vide its order dated 12.08.2005 informed the petitioner that his representation/appeal was considered and rejected by Hon'ble the Chief Justice vide order dated 11.08.2005. 13. After the punishment order on 04.03.2005 the Registrar General constituted a committee to examine and report on the matter of confirmation of the petitioner as Bench Secretary Grade-II. The Committee recommended that the petitioner being officiating Bench Secretary Grade-II was not found fit for confirmation as he had been punished and his confirmation has been deferred for one year period. The recommendations of the Committee was accepted by Hon'ble the Chief Justice on 02.02.2006 and notification regarding placement of Bench Secretaries was issued by the registry on 06.02.2006. 14. We have heard Dr. L.P. Misra, assisted by Sri G.C. Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Smt. Sangeeta Chandra, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the High Court. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned orders passed by the opposite parties no. 1, 2 and 3 are based upon the enquiry which was conducted by opposite party no. 4 and the said enquiry is itself illegal and based on presumption and as such the impugned orders are not sustainable in the eyes of law and deserves to be set aside. 16.
1, 2 and 3 are based upon the enquiry which was conducted by opposite party no. 4 and the said enquiry is itself illegal and based on presumption and as such the impugned orders are not sustainable in the eyes of law and deserves to be set aside. 16. Further submission is that undisputedly the petitioner was appointed as Bench Secretary Grade-II in the month of April, 1999 vide order dated 23.4.1999 and has completed probation period in April, 2000 but at no point of time the probation period was extended by the appointing authority and as such the petitioner is deemed to have been confirmed after expiry of probation period. 17. It is also submitted that in view of Rule 32 of the Rules known as Allahabad High Court Officers and Staff Rules, 1976 in any case probation period can not be extended beyond three years and as such if it is presumed in absence of the order even then after expiry of four years i.e. April, 2003 the petitioner would be deemed to have been confirmed and as such the impugned orders for deferment of the confirmation of the petitioner on 31.03.2005 are wholly unjustified and against the Rules. 18. It is also the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order dated 07.01.2005 which has been passed on the basis of the order dated 05.01.2005 is an unreasoned order and non speaking order and that the same has been passed without considering the reply submitted by the petitioner, as in the said order there is no whisper as to why the explanation given by the petitioner was not acceptable to the authority concerned. Further the petitioner had specifically pointed out the practical problems of Bench Secretaries but the opposite parties did not take into account the problem of the petitioner and as such the impugned orders being wholly illegal deserves to be set aside and quashed. 19. Learned counsel for petitioner has also alleged that as per the Service Rules, 1976 the period of probation was one year which could be extended to a maximum period of three years and thereafter the petitioner would he deemed to have been confirmed.
19. Learned counsel for petitioner has also alleged that as per the Service Rules, 1976 the period of probation was one year which could be extended to a maximum period of three years and thereafter the petitioner would he deemed to have been confirmed. It is also submitted that although a minor penalty of withholding of one increment temporarily for a period of two years had been imposed in the year 2005, the petitioner has suffered much more as he has not been confirmed and he has also not been promoted further, although his juniors have been given such promotions, hence it is a double jeopardy. 20. It is also the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the principles of natural justice has not been followed because proper procedure has not been observed while conducting enquiry against the petitioner and holding him guilty for the charges leveled against him. 21. Smt. Sangeeta Chandra, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the High Court, on the basis of counter affidavit, vehemently opposed the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that the Criminal Appeal No. 1585 of 2002 was listed on 18.11.2002 as a fresh case in Court no. 22 at serial no. 12 before Hon'ble Mr. Justice Imtiyaz Murtaza and on that date the petitioner was posted and working as Bench Secretary and was wholly responsible for receiving and sending back the record to the Section. She also submitted that the petitioner had received the record of criminal appeal from the section. He being the custodian of the record was under duty to have ensured safety of the record. Further submission is that the reference to the Uttar Pradesh Government Servant Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1999 is wholly irrelevant. She stated that in Narayan Dattatarya Ramteerathakhar Vs. State of Maharashtra and others [ AIR 1997 SC 2148 ] the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that a preliminary enquiry has nothing to do with the enquiry conducted after issue of charge-sheet. The preliminary enquiry is only to find out whether disciplinary enquiry should be initiated against the delinquent. Once regular enquiry is held under the Rules, the preliminary enquiry loses its importance and remains of no consequence. 22.
The preliminary enquiry is only to find out whether disciplinary enquiry should be initiated against the delinquent. Once regular enquiry is held under the Rules, the preliminary enquiry loses its importance and remains of no consequence. 22. It is also submitted that the enquiry was conducted as per rules, statements were recorded in the presence of petitioner and he was allowed to cross-examine the witnesses but he did not do so. Further opportunity of oral enquiry and personal hearing was provided to the petitioner. The petitioner is trying to evade his responsibility by highlighting some so called practical problems being faced by the Bench Secretaries in their functioning. Further the findings recorded by the enquiry officer are based on material brought on record. Since the enquiry officer after due enquiry and upon consideration of the entire material on record had found the petitioner guilty of misconduct within the meaning of Rule 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956, as such the findings recorded by the enquiry officer cannot be faulted with. 23. It is also the submission of learned counsel for the respondents that the enquiry officer after considering the material available on record had given cogent reasons in support of his findings holding the petitioner guilty of the charges. Further the representation/appeal of the petitioner dated 29.01.2005 was placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice and his Lordship Hon'ble the Chief Justice after considering the facts and circumstances of the case rejected the representation/appeal of the petitioner vide his Lordship's order dated 11.8.2005. Further the confirmation of the petitioner was deferred keeping in view the penalty imposed upon him. 24. It is also the submission of learned counsel for respondents that mere conclusion of period of probation does not lead to automatic confirmation, but a specific order is needed to be passed confirming the probationer as has been held in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Baldev Singh Khosla [ 1996(9) SCC 190 ]. She relied on para 4 and 5 of the said judgment. Smt. Chandra also disputes the argument of the petitioner and submitted that there is no such thing as double jeopardy in service jurisprudence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chairman, State Bank of India & others Vs.
Baldev Singh Khosla [ 1996(9) SCC 190 ]. She relied on para 4 and 5 of the said judgment. Smt. Chandra also disputes the argument of the petitioner and submitted that there is no such thing as double jeopardy in service jurisprudence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chairman, State Bank of India & others Vs. Golak Bihari Dehury [1997(7) SCC 63] has held that non-consideration for promotion during currency of enquiry/disciplinary proceedings/ punishment does not violate Article 16 of the Constitution of India. The denial of promotion during the currency of the penalty is merely a consequential result thereto. 25. With regard to placement of the petitioner as Bench Secretary Grade-III in the pay scale of Rs.12000-16,500/- it is submitted that vide order dated 18.11.2005 of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice a three members committee was constituted to consider the placement of the Bench Secretaries working in the establishment of the High Court at Allahabad and Lucknow Bench under the Allahabad High Court Bench Secretaries (Conditions of Service) Rules, 2005 (hereinafter referred as new rules). It is pointed out that before the commencement of new rules the Bench Secretaries working in the establishment of this Court were governed by the 1976 Rules. Under Rule 5(2) of the new Rules, the criteria for all promotional posts of the Bench Secretaries in various categories has been given as seniority subject to rejection of unfit and keeping in view the said provisions the petitioner was found unfit for being placed in the next higher post due to the punishment awarded to him as stated above. 26. Lastly it has been submitted that the Registrar General vide order dated 26.12.2004 had awarded punishment of withholding of one increment for two years. The petitioner was accordingly informed vide Court's letter no.41/Accounts (A-1 dated 05.01.2005). The factum of imposition of punishment also stood recorded in the character roll of the petitioner and was accordingly informed vide letter dated 17.01.2005 through the Registrar, High Court, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied the petitioner preferred an application for setting aside the order dated 26.12.2004 awarding punishment of withholding one increment for two years and incorporating this fact into his character roll. The request of the petitioner was duly considered and rejected by Hon'ble the Chief Justice vide order dated 11.08.2005 and the petitioner was accordingly informed vide letter dated 12.08.2005. 27.
The request of the petitioner was duly considered and rejected by Hon'ble the Chief Justice vide order dated 11.08.2005 and the petitioner was accordingly informed vide letter dated 12.08.2005. 27. We have considered the submissions made by the parties counsel and perused the records. 28. From the record we find that the petitioner was posted as Bench Secretary in Court no. 22 on 18.11.2002. He was responsible official for receiving the records and for sending back the same to Criminal Section after hearing. It is admitted fact that the petitioner did receive the said record in Court no. 22 and the said criminal appeal was heard and orders were passed by the Hon'ble Court. On the relevant date Sri S.R.H. Zafri, Ashok Kumar, Private Secretaries and Sri Sanjay P.A. were attached in Court no. 22. 29. Sri S.R.H. Zafri in his written statement had submitted that since Hon'ble Mr. Justice Imtiyaz Murtaza was holding Court only on 18.11.2002 and there was no further sitting of His Lordship in the week, all the files were transcribed by him immediately in which dictation was given to him and these files were handed over to the peon and no file remained lying with him. If any file was missing the Bench Secretary should have reported the matter immediately. If any file is missing it was handy work of the Bench Secretary to whom each and every file was handed over and who for obvious reason might have kept the file with him for gains. 30. The petitioner in his statement stated that there was a practical problem of checking the files at the time of returning back to the Section because some Personal Assistants/Private Secretaries return some files on the same day and some files on the next day. The petitioner further stated that it was very difficult for him to check the back date files from the list. He admitted that on 18.11.2002 he was working as Bench Secretary in Court no.22 and on that very date Criminal Appeal No. 1585 of 2002 was listed at serial no.
The petitioner further stated that it was very difficult for him to check the back date files from the list. He admitted that on 18.11.2002 he was working as Bench Secretary in Court no.22 and on that very date Criminal Appeal No. 1585 of 2002 was listed at serial no. 12 in fresh list and in the said appeal order was passed by the court to release the appellant on bail and at the relevant point of time Sri Zafri had taken down the dictation of the order as he remained present in Court from 10.20 to 11.30 or 12.00 and during this period he was taking dictation in the Court. Sri Zafri had stated that he had taken down dictation in 13 files i.e. 3676, 1589, 549, 2100, 2107, 2115, 2114, 2103, 2112, 2101, 2116, 2108 of 2002 which were noted in his diary. 31. Thus, it is established that paper book of Criminal Appeal No. 1585 of 2002 was received by the petitioner in Court no. 22 on 18.11.2002 as admitted by him and that it was his responsibility to send back the files to the section which were received by him in Court and as such the delinquent official was the custodian of the said record in Court no. 22 on 18.11.2002. 32. In view of the admitted factual situation, we have no hesitation to say that the power of judicial review is extremely limited. Admittedly certain accusations were made against the delinquent officer and enquiry was conducted resulting into passing of punishment order by the competent authority. Several orders have been challenged by means of the present writ petition. The writ Court normally should not go into disputed question of facts, hence there is limited scope of judicial review. 33. On the point of judicial review, this Court in the case of Ramesh Chandra Vs. The U.P. Cooperative Institutional Service Board Lko.& Ors. [ 2014 (32) LCD 1294 ] in paragraph nos. 11, 12, 13 and 14 has held as under: 11. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Madras vs. G. Sundaram AIR 1965 SC 1103 has held that: - "7.
The U.P. Cooperative Institutional Service Board Lko.& Ors. [ 2014 (32) LCD 1294 ] in paragraph nos. 11, 12, 13 and 14 has held as under: 11. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Madras vs. G. Sundaram AIR 1965 SC 1103 has held that: - "7. It is well settled now that a High Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot sit in appeal over the findings of fact recorded by a competent Tribunal in a properly conducted departmental enquiry except when it be shown that the impugned findings were not supported by any evidence. It was so held in State of Orissa v. Murlidhar, AIR 1963 SC 404 , where it was said at p. 408: "Whether or not the evidence on which the Tribunal relied was satisfactory and sufficient for justifying its conclusion would not fall to be considered in a writ petition. That in effect is the approach initially adopted by the High Court at the beginning of its judgment. However, in the subsequent part of the judgment the High Court appears to have been persuaded to appreciate the evidence for itself, and that, in our opinion, is not reasonable or legitimate." 8. Similar view was emphatically expressed in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Rama Rao, AIR1968 SC 1728, wherein it was said at p. 1726: "The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant; it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.
But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution." 9. It is, therefore, clear that the High Court was not competent to consider the question whether the evidence before the Tribunal and the Government was insufficient or unreliable to establish the charge against the respondent. It could have considered only the fact whether there was any evidence at all which, if believed by the Tribunal, would establish the charge against the respondent. Adequacy of that evidence to sustain the charge is not a question before the High Court when exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. This view was reiterated in Union of India v. H. C. Goel,." 12. In State Bank of India vs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde (2006) 7 SCC 212 Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that: - "13. We are, therefore, clearly of the view that the High Court was erred both in law and on facts in interfering with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority by acting as a court of appeal and re- appreciating the evidence. 22. In the case of T.N.C.S. Corpn. Ltd. and Ors. (appellants) v. K. Meerabai (respondent) (2006) 2 SCC 255 such plea had been rejected by this Court. It was pointed out at page SCC 267 para 29 as under: "29. Mr. Francis also submitted that a sum of Rs. 34,436.85 being 5% of the total loss of Rs. 6,88,735/- is sought to be recovered from the respondent and that the present departmental proceedings is the only known allegation against the respondent and there was no such allegation earlier and, therefore, a lenient view should be taken by this Court and relief prayed for by both the parties can be suitably moulded by this Court. We are unable to agree with the above submission which, in our opinion, has no force. The scope of judicial review is very limited. Sympathy or generosity as a factor is impermissible. In our view, loss of confidence is the primary factor and not the amount of money mis-appropriated.
We are unable to agree with the above submission which, in our opinion, has no force. The scope of judicial review is very limited. Sympathy or generosity as a factor is impermissible. In our view, loss of confidence is the primary factor and not the amount of money mis-appropriated. In the instant case, respondent employee is found guilty of mis- appropriating the Corporation funds. There is nothing wrong in the Corporation losing confidence or faith in such an employee and awarding punishment of dismissal. In such cases, there is no place for generosity or mis-placed sympathy on the part of the judicial forums and interfering therefor with the quantum of punishment awarded by the disciplinary and Appellate Authority." 13. The Supreme Court recently in Nirmala J. Jhala vs. State of Gujarat and another (2013) 4 SCC 301 ) after considering all the previous judgments has again reiterated the principle of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings and has held that in the departmental enquiry, the nature and standard of proof is not at par with the quasi judicial and quasi criminal proceedings; the principle of preponderance is applicable and not the doctrine of proof beyond reasonable doubt. 14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further considered the parameter of the Court's power of judicial review of administrative action or decision. The relevant portion of the judgment of Nirmala J. Jhala (supra) is reproduced below: - "The decisions referred to hereinabove highlights clearly, the parameter of the Court's power of judicial review of administrative action or decision. An order can be set-aside if it is based on extraneous grounds, or when there are no grounds at all for passing it or when the grounds are such that, no one can reasonably arrive at the opinion. The Court does not sit as a Court of Appeal but, it merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. The Court will not normally exercise its power of judicial review unless it is found that formation of belief by the statutory authority suffers from malafides, dishonest/corrupt practice. In other words, the authority must act in good faith. Neither the question as to whether there was sufficient evidence before the authority can be raised/examined, nor the question of re-appreciating the evidence to examine the correctness of the order under challenge.
In other words, the authority must act in good faith. Neither the question as to whether there was sufficient evidence before the authority can be raised/examined, nor the question of re-appreciating the evidence to examine the correctness of the order under challenge. If there are sufficient grounds for passing an order, then even if one of them is found to be correct, and on its basis the order impugned can be passed, there is no occasion for the Court to interfere. The jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. This apart, even when some defect is found in the decision- making process, the Court must exercise its discretionary power with great caution keeping in mind the larger public interest and only when it comes to the conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the Court should intervene." In light of the decisions cited hereinabove we do not find any reason or ground to hold that the finding of facts recorded by the Enquiry Officer are in any manner perverse so as to warrant any interference in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 34. As far as confirmation of the petitioner as Bench Secretary Grade-II is concerned, we have already discussed the report of the Hon'ble Committee which was approved by Hon'ble the Chief Justice. In accomplishment the committee examined the matter and submitted its report dated 23.3.2005 recommending therein interalia that the confirmation of Sri Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi (petitioner herein), Officiating Bench Secretary Grade-II, who was not found fit for confirmation as he was punished, be deferred for one year. 35. In light of the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, we also come to the conclusion that three members committee was constituted to consider the placement of Bench Secretaries, as discussed earlier, we do not find any reason to interfere with the conclusion arrived at by the competent authority. 36. As far as Rule 5(2) of the new rules is concerned, the criteria for selection for all promotional posts of the Bench Secretaries in various categories has been given as seniority subject to rejection of unfit.
36. As far as Rule 5(2) of the new rules is concerned, the criteria for selection for all promotional posts of the Bench Secretaries in various categories has been given as seniority subject to rejection of unfit. The report of the Hon'ble Committee was considered and the placement of Bench Secretaries was approved by Hon'ble the Chief Justice and orders were accordingly issued. The minimum standard for consideration whether a person is fit for being placed in the higher grade were laid down by the Hon'ble Committee and in order to judge the fitness in all respect the Hon'ble Committee laid down certain criteria and the petitioner was found unfit for being placed in the higher grade. We find no reason to find fault with it. 37. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner in connection with the confirmation does not seem to be justified. The Service Rules, 1976 provides the period of probation of one year which could be extended to a maximum of three years, as the case may be, subject to fulfilling the conditions laid down thereunder. The confirmation after expiry of probation period does not lead to automatic confirmation. 38. Normally there is always criteria for judging fitness in light of character roll entries recorded in the service book of the delinquent employee. It is for the competent authority to decide the case of promotion of petitioner keeping in view the minor punishment, major punishment or adverse remark or remarks about the integrity recorded in the character roll of the employee concerned. In the light of the available records it is for the competent authority to judge the criteria regarding promotion of the petitioner. That exercise has been done by the Competent Authority under the impugned order wherein we do not find any illegality whatsoever. The impugned orders therefore do not require any interference in this writ petition. 39. For the afore discussed reasons as well as on facts and circumstances of the case enumerated hereinabove, we do not find any merit in the writ petition, which is liable to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed. 40. No orders as to cost.