ORDER 1. Advocate Mathews J. Nedumpara has filed an application/praecipe dated 14th October, 2014 requesting that I (this Court) should recuse myself from hearing all the matters in which Advocate Nedumpara appears for one of the parties. 2. In an order dated 1st August, 2014, made in the above Official Liquidator's report, this Court had commented on the conduct of Advocate Nedumpara. In paragraphs 56 to 70 of the said order this Court observed: (i) That Advocate Nedumpara was addressing the Court in an aggressive, discourteous and offensive manner; that he was not willing to listen to the Court and kept addressing and making remarks that were most inappropriate; (ii) That it was clear to the Court that this was nothing but a stalling tactic to ensure that matter on the Official Liquidator's Report did not proceed; (iii) That he was disrespectful and offensive in the manner in which he addressed the Court and that his tone and tenor was accusatory; (iv) That he resolutely refused to address even a single query from the Court, or address the court on the merits of the Official Liquidator's report that was before the Court; (v) That his demeanour was obstructive and intended to interfere with the administration of justice and lower the dignity and authority of the Court; (vi) That such conduct constituted sufficient reasons to issue a show cause notice for criminal contempt, or to be dealt with immediately and summarily as contempt in the face of the Court. (vii) However, in paragraph 70 of the order this Court only issued a warning to Advocate Nedumpara that the Court would not tolerate this conduct and that if such conduct was repeated, the Court would be constrained to act. 3. Thereafter, the Court received a letter from Advocate Nedumpara dated 29th September, 2014, requesting this Court to recuse itself "......from hearing the above Petition and from all matters where I am the counsel for the parties......." on the ground that having regard to the observations made in the order dated 1st August, 2014, his client felt "......that your Lordship has some kind of disaffection for me". Advocate Nedumpara also stated that having regard to the observations in the order he felt "difficulty or embarrassment in appearing before Your Lordship". 4. Advocate Nedumpara also stated that having regard to the observations in the order he felt "difficulty or embarrassment in appearing before Your Lordship". 4. On 10th October, 2014, Advocate Nishant Sangle, instructed by Advocate Nedumpara appeared before the Court for the ex-Directors of R-Tec Systems in liquidation and stated that as Advocate Nedumpara was appearing in the matter, the Court should recuse itself. R-Tec Systems was not the Company/client represented by Advocate Nedumpara in relation to the order of 1st August, 2014. By an order dated 10th October, 2014, the Court rejected the oral request to recuse itself and gave time to the ex-Directors to file their reply to the Official Liquidator's report by 14th October, 2014. 5. On 14th October, 2014, Advocate Navaneetha Krishnan submitted a praecipe/ application on behalf of Advocate Nedumpara praying that this Court should recuse itself from hearing the matter. Advocate Krishnan submitted that the Court should peruse the application and pass a written order. By an order dated 29th October, 2014, this Court recorded, inter alia, the aforesaid facts/events and noted that "...... the question whether a party and/or his Advocate can insist on a Judge recusing himself from a particular matter....." was of some importance and appointed Mr. Aspi Chinoy, Senior Advocate, as amicus curiae to assist the Court at the time of hearing of the Application dated 14th October, 2014, and adjourned the hearing to 11th November, 2014. Accordingly, the Application of Advocate Nedumpara is today taken up for hearing. 6. The Advocates appearing in some of the matters against Advocate Nedumpara are also present before the Court to oppose the application of Advocate Nedumpara and to submit that they as well as their clients do not agree that this Court should recuse itself from the matters concerning them and their clients only because Advocate Nedumpara and/or his clients so chooses. 7. Advocate Nedumpara has, in his Application/praecipe dated 14th October, 2014 (which appears to have been made on behalf of Advocate Nedumpara and also his client), stated: (i) That it is a fundamental principle of law that the Court should be independent, impartial, free of any bias, affection or ill will and justice should not only be done, but it should undoubtedly and manifestly be seen to be done. Reliance was placed on the decision of Lord Hewart in R. vs. Sussex Justices, (1924) 1 KB 256. Reliance was placed on the decision of Lord Hewart in R. vs. Sussex Justices, (1924) 1 KB 256. (ii) That the correct test is the existence of a "reasonable suspicion of bias and not a real likelihood of bias". Reliance was placed on the decision in the case of Ranjit Thakur vs. Union of India and Others, (1987) 4 SCC 611 . (iii) That the Applicant/Advocate Nedumpara "holds Justice Kathawalla in high esteem and in no way doubts or questions his ability to dispense impartial, independent and fair justice in no way tainted by consideration of ill will or malice." (iv) That Advocate Nedumpara was, however, duty bound to bring to the Notice of the Court "the embarrassment" he faces to appear before the Court. (v) That the Applicant "....does not wish to go at length into the reasons why he apprehends that he would be denied a fair deal and the decision of this Hon'ble Tribunal is likely to be vitiated by bias and prejudice not only towards him but towards his Counsel as well." (vi) That the objection on the ground of impartiality or bias ought to be raised at the earliest point of time lest it should be taken that the same has been waived. (vii) That Advocate Nedumpara's client, having come to know of the observations made in the order dated 1st August, 2014, was worried "......about how the Court would treat his Counsel without having any prejudiced mind...." and as he did not intend to change his Counsel, it was submitted that the Court may recuse the matter and all other matters where Advocate Nedumpara appeared as Counsel. 8. In his oral submissions, Advocate Nedumpara reiterated that he had full faith in the impartiality and lack of bias of this Court. He however submitted that as his client "for good or bad reason" felt an apprehension "howsoever unfounded it be", it was his sacred duty as a lawyer to bring the matter to the notice of the Court and seek recusal of this Court from the matter. 9. Advocate Nedumpara also submitted (as part of his written submissions) before this Court as follows: (i) That the allegations of apprehensions of bias are based only on the observations made regarding Advocate Nedumpara in the order dated 1st August, 2014. Apart from the said order there is no other basis alleged for the apprehension of bias. 9. Advocate Nedumpara also submitted (as part of his written submissions) before this Court as follows: (i) That the allegations of apprehensions of bias are based only on the observations made regarding Advocate Nedumpara in the order dated 1st August, 2014. Apart from the said order there is no other basis alleged for the apprehension of bias. (ii) That the laws enacted during the British era, the common law, have taken special care to statutorily provide for a scenario emerging out of disqualification of a Judge. (iii) That Section 202(3)(a) of the Government of India Act, 1935, provides that if a Judge of a Federal Court is disqualified from hearing a particular case and without him a coram cannot be constituted, the Governor General shall appoint a Judge of a High Court to act temporarily as a Judge of the Federal Court until that case has been heard and determined. (iv) That under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, if an application for transfer of a case is filed in the High Court, then the Court before which the trial is going on shall forthwith forebear itself from proceeding with it any further. Since the said provision, which was enacted to provide for an impartial Judge, meant a lot of practical difficulties, the said provision was not retained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which repealed the 1898 Code. (v) That a Seven Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in re: The Special Courts Bill vs. Unknown AIR 1979 SC 478 was pleased to hold that the Special Court Bill, 1978, is unconstitutional since it compels a person accused to submit to the jurisdiction of a Judge whose impartiality could be suspect because if he were to recuse there is another Court to which the case could be transferred; and In Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and Others vs. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Others, AIR 1959 SC 308 , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court took the view that even where a Judge is apprehended to be influenced by the departmental bias, he is disqualified. In the said judgment, reference to the judgment in Rex v. Sussex Justices; Ex-parte Mc Carthy (supra) and certain other English decisions were made which in unmistakable terms took the view that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and seemingly be done. 10. Mr. In the said judgment, reference to the judgment in Rex v. Sussex Justices; Ex-parte Mc Carthy (supra) and certain other English decisions were made which in unmistakable terms took the view that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and seemingly be done. 10. Mr. Sharan Jagtiani, appearing for the Official Liquidator in the above Official Liquidator's Report opposed the recusal application. He submitted that the request for recusal and the apprehension expressed is an abuse of process, is unjustified and does not merit consideration. The rule against bias forms part of the principle of natural justice requiring that a court passing a judgment is composed of impartial persons acting fairly. The crucial element for application of this principle is that it protects a litigant/party before a court from miscarriage of justice. The reasonable apprehension of bias must therefore be an apprehension of the litigant/party. Although the praecipe filed by Mr. Nedumpara states that his clients would bear this apprehension, the reasons stated are on account of the Advocates difficulty and embarrassment. No party or litigant has put its oath (by affirming an Affidavit or otherwise to this apprehension of bias). In this regard, Mr. Jagtiani relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ranjit Thakur vs. Union of India and Others (supra). Mr. Jagtiani also submitted that the principle of real likelihood of bias has been recently applied by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Subrata Roy Sahara vs. Union of India, (2014) 8 SCC 470 , where the Hon'ble Supreme Court rejected the request for recusal as the alleged apprehension was absolutely unfounded. Mr. Jagtiani also relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramon Services Pvt. Ltd. vs. Subhash Kapoor and Others, (2001) 1 SCC 118 to submit that if an Advocate does not want to appear before a particular court, professional decorum requires that he gives up his engagement to enable a litigant to engage another Advocate. 11. Without prejudice to his above submissions, Mr. Jagtiani submitted that the Company Petition before a Company Judge comprises of various stages. There is an important element of continuity of a proceeding before the Company Judge while dealing with matters relating to winding up of a Company. This facilitates expeditious disposal of matters. 11. Without prejudice to his above submissions, Mr. Jagtiani submitted that the Company Petition before a Company Judge comprises of various stages. There is an important element of continuity of a proceeding before the Company Judge while dealing with matters relating to winding up of a Company. This facilitates expeditious disposal of matters. Allowing requests for recusal at a belated stage in the process of winding up takes up valuable judicial time of a new Judge. In cases such as these, it is a mala fide attempt to delay matters. This important aspect ought to be considered by this Court before entertaining a request for disturbing the assignment of the Company Judge. Again, the office of the Official Liquidator works with a limited number of Officers who handle multiple matters. Allowing unjustified requests for recusal of the Company Judge will entail creating a parallel machinery to be set up by the Office of the Official Liquidator in other Courts for specific matters. Mr. Jagtiani therefore submitted that the request for recusal ought to be rejected. 12. Mr. Chetan Kapadia, appearing for the Petitioners M/s. Tata Capital Finance and Services Ltd. in Arbitration Petition No. 1249 of 2013, has vehemently opposed the application made by Advocate Nedumpara seeking recusal of his matters before the Court. He has submitted that Advocate Nedumpara substantially practices commercial law and represents defaulters in recovery proceedings. Delay in disposal of such proceedings immensely benefits Advocate Nedumpara's clients. Advocate Nedumpara therefore seeks recusal of matters by the Judges on the basis of unfounded insinuations, calculated psychological offences and thereby indulging in bench hunting and bench hopping. Advocate Nedumpara by his conduct is able to avoid adverse orders being passed in proceedings against his defaulter clients and/or against the assets which constitute security given by his defaulter clients. 13. Mr. Kapadia has submitted a compilation, inter alia, containing (I) orders passed by the Single Judges and Division Benches of this Court setting out the conduct of Advocate Nedumpara in the matters that he appears, (ii) resolutions passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Mumbai, resolving not to take up any matters where Advocate Nedumpara and/or his Juniors appear and (iii) criminal complaints filed against Advocate Nedumpara by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Mumbai for serious offences. Mr. Mr. Kapadia has from the said compilation of documents/orders pointed out as follows: (i) That three of the Division Benches and three Single Judges of this Court have recused themselves in matters where Advocate Nedumpara has appeared. (ii) The Division Bench comprising of A.H. Joshi and M.L. Tahaliyani, JJ. has whilst recusing itself vide order dated 22nd May, 2013 in Writ Petition (L) No. 1272 of 2013 recorded the conduct of Advocate Nedumpara and his client as follows: "1. An affidavit in answer to query put by the Court is filed. 2. In the affidavit the Petitioner has used language as his Advocate's opinion, expressing impropriety on the part of court in putting questions to the petitioner. The language exhibits total lack of etiquettes of drafting and lack of respect to the court akin to insinuation. 3. Since the litigant and counsel do not respect the court and express anguish with discourteous language, it is considered necessary that this bench should not hear this case. Hence we recuse. 4. Liberty to move before the appropriate court." (iii) That by an order dated 18th September, 2012, a Single Judge of this Court has issued suo motu criminal contempt notices against Advocate Nedumpara. (iv) That by an order dated 20th June, 2013, a Division Bench of this Court have issued suo motu criminal contempt notices against Advocate Nedumpara. (v) That by an order dated 9th April, 2014, passed by a Division Bench of this Court it has been observed that Advocate Nedumpara has made reckless, irresponsible and contemptuous allegations against the Bench and the opponents. After recording an apology of Advocate Nedumpara which is noted as 'belated', the Division Bench has expressed in paragraph 13 that a message goes to all advocates including M/s. Nedumpara & Nedumpara so that in future, this Court has no occasion to observe anything or initiate any proceedings. Mr. Kapadia submitted that the aforesaid observations are in the context of an attempt on the part of the juniors of Advocate Nedumpara to approach one of the members of the Bench at his residence and the apologies were for addressing a letter thereafter to the Hon'ble Chief Justice making allegations against the learned Judge who refused to give a hearing to the juniors at his residence. (vi) That by an order dated 1st October, 2014, a Division Bench of this Court rejected the request for recusal made by Advocate Nedumpara. (vii) That Advocate Nedumpara addressed letters to the President of India, Vice President of India, Prime Minister of India, Home Minister of India. Chief Minister of Maharashtra, Minister for law and justice, Leader of Opposition, etc. making wild, baseless, contemptuous allegations against the Constitutional functionaries of this Court. (viii) That a Resolution dated 19th May, 2014 was passed by all three learned Presiding Officers of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Mumbai (DRT) resolving that no matters of Advocate Nedumpara or his juniors be listed before them. The Resolution is reproduced hereunder: "A very unfortunate and shocking situation has been created today by Advocate Mr. Mathews J. Nedumpara along with his juniors Mr. Navneet Krishnan, Mr. Nishant, Ms. Rohini and alleged clients in the open Court Hall of DRT-I, II, III and that to the extent that the smooth functioning of the Tribunal has come to halt and justice delivery system has got obstructed. They have willingly and intentionally created this scenario in the open court with ulterior motive. The dignity and trust of the Tribunal has been lowered down and all the Officers and staff of the Tribunal has been offended. Presiding Officers of the Tribunals have to retire to their chambers and complaint has also been lodged with the police by the Presiding Officer of DRT-I, Mumbai in this regard. We are apprehending that this kind of bad and turbulent situation may again take place and working of the Tribunals may be disturbed. Considering the dimension and seriousness of the situation we all felt that this situation may be adverted by taking Resolution that we should not take up the matters in which the aforesaid Advocates are engaged. The litigants may engage other lawyers in the cases in which the above Advocates are engaged. Meanwhile the Registry is directed to shortlist the cases in which the above said lawyers are engaged and not to place their cases before the Tribunal. This Resolution be notified for information. Copy of this Resolution is also transmitted to Hon'ble Chairperson, DRAT-Mumbai for necessary information and needful. Dated this 19th May, 2014". (ix) That a complaint has been filed by the DRT, Mumbai, alleging criminal offences committed by Advocate Nedumpara. 14. Mr. This Resolution be notified for information. Copy of this Resolution is also transmitted to Hon'ble Chairperson, DRAT-Mumbai for necessary information and needful. Dated this 19th May, 2014". (ix) That a complaint has been filed by the DRT, Mumbai, alleging criminal offences committed by Advocate Nedumpara. 14. Mr. Kapadia placed strong reliance on the decision in Chetan Constructions Limited vs. Om Prakash, (1998) 4 SCC 577 , where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under : "17. Indeed, no lawyer or litigant can be permitted to brow beat the court or malign the presiding officer with a view to get a favourable order. Judges shall not be able to perform their duties freely and fairly if such activities were permitted and in the result administration of justice would become a casualty and Rule of Law would receive a set back. The Judges are obliged to decide cases impartially and without any fear or favour. Lawyers and litigants cannot, be allowed to "terrorize" or "intimidate" judges with a view to "secure" orders which they want. This is basic and fundamental and no civilised system of administration of justice can permit it. We certainly, cannot approve of any attempt on the part of any litigant to go "forum shopping". A litigant cannot be permitted 'choice' of the 'forum' and every attempt at "forum shopping" must be crushed with a heavy hand." 15. Relying on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Subrata Roy Sahara (supra), R.K. Anand vs. Delhi High Court (2009) 8 SCC 106 , Leila David vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2009) 10 SCC 350, Mr. Kapadia has submitted that stern action be taken against Advocate Nedumpara. 16. Mr. Aspi Chinoy, learned Senior Advocate appearing as amicus curiae in the matter first pointed out to this Court the contents of the praecipe/application dated 14th October, 2014, as reproduced in paragraph 8 hereinabove. Mr. Chinoy submitted that even in his submissions before the Court, Advocate Nedumpara reiterated that he had full faith in the impartiality and lack of bias of the Court. Advocate Nedumpara however submitted that as his client "for good or bad reason" felt an apprehension "howsoever unfounded it be", it was his sacred duty as a lawyer to bring the matter to the notice of the Court and seek recusal of the Court from the matter. Mr. Advocate Nedumpara however submitted that as his client "for good or bad reason" felt an apprehension "howsoever unfounded it be", it was his sacred duty as a lawyer to bring the matter to the notice of the Court and seek recusal of the Court from the matter. Mr. Chinoy submitted that the application for recusal is totally devoid of merit. He submitted that the allegation of embarrassment caused to Advocate Nedumpara by the observations made regarding his conduct in a judicial order cannot be a basis to seek recusal in subsequent applications in the action. He further submitted that the allegations of apprehensions of bias are based only on the observations made regarding Advocate Nedumpara in the order dated 1st August, 2014. Apart from the said order there is no other basis alleged for the apprehension of bias. Mr. Chinoy submitted that the submission of Advocate Nedumpara in Court that as his client "for good or bad reason" felt an apprehension, "however unfounded it be" it was his duty as a lawyer to seek recusal on the basis thereof, is based on an erroneous misapprehension as to the role and duty of an Advocate. Mr. Chinoy submitted that for a Court/judge to recuse himself on the basis of such an unfounded application, would be a breach of the oath of office as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. He relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Subrata Roy Sahara vs. Union of India (supra), and in particular paragraphs 10, 11, 136, 137 and 185.1 in support of this submission. Mr. Chinoy submitted that the allegation of the client's apprehensions of bias, based only on the observations made regarding Advocate Nedumpara's conduct in the judicial order dated 1st August, 2014 is ex facie unfounded and baseless. In this regard Mr. Chinoy relied on a decision of the Court of Appeal in Bahai vs. Rashidian, (1985) 1 WLR 1337. Mr. Chinoy submitted that it is well settled that notwithstanding the principle that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done, a claim that a Court/Judge is biased and should not hear a matter, cannot be based on a litigant's unfounded apprehensions, aspersions or mere suspicions. Mr. Chinoy submitted that it is well settled that notwithstanding the principle that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done, a claim that a Court/Judge is biased and should not hear a matter, cannot be based on a litigant's unfounded apprehensions, aspersions or mere suspicions. The law is well settled that there must be a "real likelihood of bias: i.e. whether a reasonable man, in possession of relevant information would believe that there was a likelihood of bias". Mr. Chinoy argued that Advocate Nedumpara's reliance on the test of bias as laid down in Lord Hewarts dictum in R v/s. Sussex Justices is in fact a misreading of the judgment. It was then argued that this judgment and the test of bias that is stated to have been laid down, has been considered by subsequent decisions of the English Courts and more importantly of the Supreme Court. The test, Mr. Chinoy argued is not a subjective or unfounded apprehension of bias. Mr. Chinoy relied on the judgments of. Triodos Bank NV vs. Dobbs Court of Appeal, (2005) EWCA 468 at para 43 Pg. 3; S. Parthasarthi vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1974) 3 SCC 459 and Chandra Kumar Chopra vs. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 369 . Mr. Chinoy therefore submitted that the application seeking recusal be rejected. 17. Advocate Nedumpara in rejoinder submitted that on the principle of recusal canvassed by him and the learned amicus curiae there is hardly any difference. He has submitted that without giving any disrespect to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the decision in Sahara's case (supra) is a widely criticized one. He has stated that he is immensely grateful to the amicus curiae for the advice he gave him in the open court and even privately and to quote Prophet Mohammad, "Happy is the person who finds fault with himself instead of finding fault with others", to quote Jesus Christ, "Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam out of thine own eye; and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye" and to quote Bheeshma Pitamaha "Faults mustard seed small of others, you can see well, your own as large as melon you see not." He submitted that he will take the advice of Mr. Aspi Chinoy to heart, that he will introspect and he will correct himself wherever he has gone wrong. Referring to the submissions of Mr. Kapadia, more particularly the compilation of the orders/complaints tendered by him in Court, he has submitted that till date he has sought recusal only by one of the Division Benches of this Court and thereafter by the present application. All the other Judges have on their own recused themselves in matters in which he is appearing. He has attributed the said recusals as well as issuance of the show cause notices against him by Judges, to the complaints that he filed against them and/or their "disaffection towards him". He has submitted that four of his lady juniors went to the residence of one of the Hon'ble Judges since they were shocked by the forcible dispossession of an 80 year old lady and they wanted to enter her home and secure her medical prescription. As regards DRT Complaints, he has submitted that there is a group of lawyers in the DRT who work against him and it is under the influence of such lawyers that the DRT has lodged criminal complaints against him and his juniors and it is also under the pressure of such vested interests that the DRT has passed resolutions banning him and his colleagues from appearing before them. He has submitted that he is justified in seeking recusal of this Court in all the matters in which he appears. 18. I have considered the above submissions advanced by the Learned Advocates appearing for the parties a well as the learned amicus curiae. 19. Advocate Nedumpara has repeatedly submitted that the allegations of apprehension of bias against this Court are based only on the observations made regarding him in the order dated 1st August, 2014. Apart from the observations made in the said order, there is no other basis alleged for the apprehension of bias. Advocate Nedumpara has also repeatedly submitted that as his client "for good or bad reason" felt an apprehension "however unfounded it be", it was his duty as a lawyer to seek recusal on the basis thereof. Advocate Nedumpara seems to carry a completely erroneous understanding as to the role and duty of an Advocate. 20. Advocate Nedumpara has also repeatedly submitted that as his client "for good or bad reason" felt an apprehension "however unfounded it be", it was his duty as a lawyer to seek recusal on the basis thereof. Advocate Nedumpara seems to carry a completely erroneous understanding as to the role and duty of an Advocate. 20. No advocate who understands his responsibility as an officer of the Court is ever expected to say that because his client for "good or bad reason" has an apprehension of bias qua a Judge and however unfounded the apprehension of bias may be, it is his duty to seek recusal on the basis thereof. If at all his client has any "unfounded" apprehension of bias qua a Judge for "bad reason", it is the duty of the Advocate to dissuade his client's apprehension and in the event of failure to do so, to return papers if it causes any embarrassment to the Advocate. If lawyers are allowed to misunderstand their role and duties towards their clients and to make such applications seeking recusal of matters before the Courts of law on unfounded apprehension of bias, the same would result into a complete collapse of the working of the judicial system in the country. 21. In fact, it is no part of an Advocate's duty to support/advance allegations of bias which are made by a client for good or bad reason: on the basis of unfounded surmises and suspicions and/or on the basis of a client's mere apprehension of bias "however unfounded it be". Nor can any such application made on the basis of such unfounded apprehensions or good or bad surmises, be justified on the basis of the dictum that justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done. 22. The Court has in its order dated 1st August, 2014, made certain observations as set out in para 2 hereinabove with regard to the conduct of Advocate Nedumpara. Advocate Nedumpara did not dispute the factual observations about his conduct as recorded in the Order dated 1st August, 2014. In matters heard by Courts, the Courts wherever necessary may reprimand an Advocate with regard to his conduct/behaviour in Court and/or with regard to the manner in which he conducts the matter. Advocate Nedumpara did not dispute the factual observations about his conduct as recorded in the Order dated 1st August, 2014. In matters heard by Courts, the Courts wherever necessary may reprimand an Advocate with regard to his conduct/behaviour in Court and/or with regard to the manner in which he conducts the matter. The Courts in their judicial orders, wherever necessary may also make certain observations about the manner in which a matter is conducted and may record its findings in this regard. However, the same cannot be a basis for a party or its Advocate seeking recusal in subsequent applications in the action on the ground that the party and/or his Advocate apprehends bias or the Advocate or his client is embarrassed in appearing before the Court. I am fortified in this view by the English decision of Bahai vs. Rashidian (supra). In this case, the Court of Appeal has pointed out that: "The fact that a judge has determined issues in the action and in so doing has expressed views on the conduct of the parties and of the witnesses, neither constitutes bias, nor the appearance of bias in relation to subsequent applications in the action" (Pg. 1342-H) - Sir John Donaldson MR. "A Judge properly exercising his judicial function, e.g. by criticizing the conduct of a party's solicitor in the course of his judgment on a matter which he considers relevant to his decision cannot by that process be said to be biased." (Pg. 1346-F): Balcombe LJ)". If an Advocate is embarrassed about appearing before the Court, he is always free not to accept the brief or return the same before a particular Court but he cannot insist that since he wants to appear in a matter which is placed/assigned to a Judge before whom he is not comfortable or embarrassed to appear, it is the Judge who should pass a blanket order and recuse himself from all the matters in which he appears. If such a submission is accepted and allowed, all the litigants desirous of avoiding a Judge or a Bench from hearing their matters would brief the lawyer who has sought and obtained such a blanket order of recusal. Alternatively, another way to engage in such "forum shopping" would be to express a completely unfounded apprehension of bias and expect a particular Judge to recuse himself/herself. Alternatively, another way to engage in such "forum shopping" would be to express a completely unfounded apprehension of bias and expect a particular Judge to recuse himself/herself. If the Court allows itself to be susceptible to such measures or practices, it will, in my opinion, seriously undermine the functioning of the system of justice and the institution of the Courts. Advocate Nedumpara's request seeking recusal on this ground therefore cannot be accepted and is hereby rejected. 23. In the case of Subrata Roy (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with a recusal application based on (i) the embarrassment felt by Counsel in canvassing submissions before the Bench of the Supreme Court, in view of the earlier orders of that Court (Para 2 page 510 and (ii) the clients alleged apprehensions of prejudice (para 8 page 513). The Court held that none of the allegations even remotely demonstrated bias. In fact, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 10 at page 513 of its judgment held that: "In our understanding, the oath of our office required us to go ahead with the hearing and not to be overawed by such submissions. In our view not hearing the matter, would constitute an act in breach of our oath of office". In the said decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court also referred to the judgment of the Delhi High Court dated 4th October, 2007 in the case of R.K. Anand1, where Justice Manmohan Sarin held that the path of recusal was very often a convenient and a soft option. However, the oath of office taken under Article219 of the Constitution of India enjoined a judge to do his duty faithfully and to the best of his knowledge and judgment. In a case where unfounded allegations of bias were sought to be made with a view to forum hunting/bench preference, or browbeating the court, then, succumbing to such pressure would tantamount to not fulfilling the oath of office. The Supreme Court further pointed out that the said decision of Delhi High Court whereby Justice Manmohan Sarin declined to withdraw from the hearing of the case was assailed before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court further pointed out that the said decision of Delhi High Court whereby Justice Manmohan Sarin declined to withdraw from the hearing of the case was assailed before the Supreme Court. The same was upheld by the Supreme Court and in paragraph 263 of the judgment reported in (2009) 8 SCC 106 the Supreme Court had held: "......it correctly sums up the court's response in the face of a request for recusal made with a view to intimidate the court or to get the better of an inconvenient judge or to obfuscate issues, or to cause obstruction and delay the proceedings or to frustrate or delay the course of justice". 24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Sahara Judgment has also referred to the judgment in the case of Jaswant Singh vs. Virendra Singh (1995) Supp 1 SCC 384 at para 33 thereof, where the Court had held that casting uncalled for aspersions on Judges tended to bring the authority and administration of law into disrespect. A lawyer cannot use language either in pleadings or in arguments, which is either intemperate or unparliamentary. These safeguards are not for the protection of any judge individually, but are essential for maintaining the dignity and decorum of courts and for upholding the majesty of law. 25. In fact, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Sahara judgment held that "We therefore also commend to all courts, to similarly repulse all baseless and unfounded insinuations, unless of course, they should not be hearing a personal matter, for reasons of their direct or indirect involvement." (Para 137 page 602). The Hon'ble Supreme Court concluded the said decision by holding that ".....calculated psychological offensives and mind games adopted to seek recusal of judges need to be strongly repulsed. We deprecate such tactics and commend a similar approach to other courts, when they experience such behavior" (Para 185.1 pg. 638). 26. The allegation of Advocate Nedumpara's client's apprehension of bias, is based only on the observations made regarding Advocate Nedumpara's conduct in the judicial order dated 1st August, 2014. It is well settled that notwithstanding the principle that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done, a claim that a Court/Judge is biased and should not hear a matter cannot be based on an Advocate's view of his client/s unfounded apprehensions, aspersions or mere suspicions. It is well settled that notwithstanding the principle that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done, a claim that a Court/Judge is biased and should not hear a matter cannot be based on an Advocate's view of his client/s unfounded apprehensions, aspersions or mere suspicions. No client or litigant has put his oath to this expressed apprehension of bias. Even if that had been done, it would, in circumstances such as this, still not suffice as it would continue to be an unfounded apprehension of bias. The law is well settled that there must be a real likelihood of bias i.e. whether a reasonable man, in possession of relevant information would believe that there was a likelihood of bias. 27. In S. Parthasarthi vs. State of A.P. (supra), the Supreme Court held as under: "The tests of "real likelihood" and "reasonable suspicion" are really inconsistent with each other. We think that the reviewing authority must make a determination on the basis of the whole evidence before it whether a reasonable man would in the circumstances infer that there is real likelihood of bias. The court must look at the impression which other people have. This follows from the principle that justice must not only be done but seen to be done. If right minded persons would think that there is real likelihood of bias on the part of an inquiring officer, be must not conduct the enquiry; nevertheless, there must be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture would not be enough. There must exist circumstances from which reasonable men would think it probable or likely that the inquiring officer will be prejudiced against the delinquent. The court will not inquire whether he was really prejudiced. If a reasonable man would think on the basis of the existing circumstances that he is likely to be prejudiced, that is sufficient to quash the decision Metropolitan Properties Co, (F.G.C.) Ltd. vs. Lannon and Others, etc.(1). We should not, however, be understood to deny that the court might with greater propriety apply the "reasonable suspicion" test in criminal or in proceedings analogous to criminal proceedings." (Pg. 465 /66 para 16) 28. We should not, however, be understood to deny that the court might with greater propriety apply the "reasonable suspicion" test in criminal or in proceedings analogous to criminal proceedings." (Pg. 465 /66 para 16) 28. In Chandra Kumar Chopra vs. Union of India (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: "What is required to be seen is whether there is reasonable ground for believing that a person is likely to have been biased. A mere suspicion of bias is not sufficient. There has to be reasonable likelihood of bias". (Para 11 page 378 a). 29. This case referred to Ranjit Thakur's case (supra) (relied on in the praecipe) where it had been held that "the test of real likelihood of bias, is whether a reasonable man, in possession of relevant information, would have thought that bias was likely" (Para 21 : pg. 378 e). 30. Chandra Kumar Chopra (supra) also referred to S. Parthasarthi (supra) where it has been observed that surmises or conjectures would not be enough, there must exist circumstances from which reasonable man would think that it is probable or likely that the inquiring officer will be prejudiced against the delinquent officer." (Para 23: pg. 379 a). 31. Chandra Kumar Chopra (supra) then holds that: "From the aforesaid pronouncement of law, it is discernible that mere suspicion or apprehension is not good enough to entertain a plea of bias. It cannot be a facet of one's imagination. It must be in accord with the prudence of a reasonable man. The circumstances brought on record would show that it can create an impression in the mind of a reasonable man that there is real likelihood of bias". (Para 25 page 379 e) "It is worth noting that despite the sanctity attached to the non biased attitude of a member of a tribunal or a court and in spite of the principle that justice must not only be done but must seen to have been done, it is to be scrutinized on the basis of the material brought on record whether someone makes wild, irrelevant and imaginary allegations to frustrate a trial, or it is in consonance with the thinking of a reasonable man, which can meet the test of real likelihood of bias." 32. In N.K. Bajpai vs. Union of India and Another (supra), the Court reiterated the real likelihood test. In N.K. Bajpai vs. Union of India and Another (supra), the Court reiterated the real likelihood test. The Court referred to Lord Hewart's dictum in R. vs. Sussex Justices and observed that "However, later the courts there felt that too heavy a reliance upon the Hewart aphorism in instances of alleged bias produces the danger that the appearance of bias or injustice becomes more important than the absence of actual bias, the doing of justice itself. It is, therefore, of importance that perceived bias is not too readily inferred, such as to negate the doing of justice." The Court also noted that in Porter vs. Magill the House of Lords had laid down that the test is, "... whether the fair mined observer, having considered the facts, would consider that there was a reasonable possibility that the tribunal was biased" (Paras 46 and 47 pg. 677). 33. In present times, a huge number of disputes are brought before the Courts for adjudication. The monetary stakes involved in the matters are also very substantial. In other cases, personal status of parties is involved, and these matters are invariably emotionally charged. The demands of the litigants over their Advocates have seemingly increased. Many dishonest/ desperate litigants along with some lawyers, who are not as honest as they are expected to be, leave no stone unturned to avoid a Judge that they perceive to be inconvenient or unfavourable or to obfuscate issues or to delay the proceedings and frustrate the course of justice. To achieve this end, they attempt to criticize judges, cast uncalled for aspersions on Judges with the intention that the Judge so attacked will give up the matter. A judge who is showered with criticisms and insinuations, though baseless, may be inclined to recuse himself so as to stay out of harm's way of the baseless suspicion or allegation or to avoid being unpopular or to just avoid taking over the burden of a matter which is intentionally made heavier by litigants and/or their Advocates. However, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Subrata Roy's case (supra), a Judge who prefers the recusal route despite knowing that the criticisms/insinuations made against him are baseless, would not be true to his oath of dispensing justice without fear or favour. However, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Subrata Roy's case (supra), a Judge who prefers the recusal route despite knowing that the criticisms/insinuations made against him are baseless, would not be true to his oath of dispensing justice without fear or favour. In my view, a Judge would be failing in his duty if he endeavours to become popular amongst the members of the bar or members of the public by avoiding difficult situations or following the route of appeasement. A Judge accepts judgeship to dispense justice without fear or favour and not to attain popularity of any kind. Again, he will not be true to his oath if he feels that it is convenient to recuse himself from a matter rather than facing a lawyer or a litigant who gives him sleepless nights by criticizing him or casting aspersions on him which are totally incorrect and untrue. In this regard, the observations made in the case of Triodos Bank NV vs. Dobbs (supra) are apposite: "It is always tempting for a judge against whom criticisms are made to say that he would prefer not to hear further proceedings in which the critic is involved. It is tempting to take that course because the judge will know that the critic is likely to go away with a sense of grievance if the decision goes against him. Rightly or wrongly a litigant who does not have confidence in the Judge who hears his case will feel that if he loses, he has in some way been discriminated against. But it is important for a judge to resist the temptation to recuse himself simply because it would be more comfortable to do so. The reason is that If judges were to recuse themselves whenever a litigant whether it be a represented litigant or a litigant in person criticized them (which sometimes happens not infrequently) we would soon reach the position in which litigants were able to select judges to hear their cases, simply by criticizing all the judges that they did not want to hear their case. It would be easy for a litigant to produce a situation in which a judge felt obliged to recuse himself simply because he had been criticized whether that criticism was justified or not." 34. It would be easy for a litigant to produce a situation in which a judge felt obliged to recuse himself simply because he had been criticized whether that criticism was justified or not." 34. I am therefore of the view that the grounds on which the Application of recusal is made by Advocate Nedumpara and his client are wholly baseless and unfounded. I have no doubt that the present Application seeking recusal of this Court, to borrow the language of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is to avoid this Court, obfuscate issues, delay the proceedings and frustrate the course of justice. The Application is therefore rejected. I have decided not to deal with the compilation of documents relied upon by Mr. Kapadia in support of his contention. Instead I would rather join Mr. Chinoy, the Learned Amicus Curiae, in advising Advocate Nedumpara to introspect and find fault with oneself before finding faults with others. I may end by expressing a sincere hope that the assurance given by Advocate Nedumpara to this Court that he takes the advice of Mr. Aspi Chinoy to heart, that he will introspect and correct himself wherever he has gone wrong, is fulfilled in the right spirit.