Judgment : R. Sudhakar, J. 1. This appeal is filed by the assessee challenging the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Chennai 'D' Bench, dated 12.2.2013 made in ITA No.2129/Mds/2013 for the assessment year 2007-2008, raising the following substantial question of law: “1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in dismissing the appeal by not condoning the delay of three years two months and three days in preferring the appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax? 2. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal ought to have condoned the delay where the Tribunal had already discussed the merits of the case and adjudged in the appellant's favour for the previous assessment years 2004-05, 2005-06 and 2006-07? 2.1. The brief facts of the case are as under: The assessee is engaged in the business of warehousing and transportation. For the assessment year 2004-2005, the Tribunal, by order dated 21.7.2011 made in I.T.A.No.266/Mds/2010, treated the income of the assessee from letting out of warehouses as business income. For the assessment years 2005-2006 and 2006-2007, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), by order dated 13.3.2009 made in I.T.A.Nos.269 and 270/2008-09, held that warehousing income should be treated as business income. 2.2. Despite the above orders passed by the higher authorities, the department declined to treat the income of the assessee from letting out of warehouses as business income for the assessment year 2007-2008 and an assessment was made under Section 143(3) of the Act on 27.10.2009. 2.3. This assessment order ought to have been appealed by the assessee before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). However, the assessee did not file an appeal primarily on the ground that the issue as to whether the income from letting out of warehouses is income from business or income from house property was the subject matter of the appeals pending before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the Tribunal for the assessment years 2004-2005 to 2006-2007. As the issue was pending decision, the assessee thought it fit not to pursue the matter before the Assessing Officer and requested the Assessing Officer to lay his hands off or to rectify the order based on the decision that would be rendered by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the Tribunal. As the issue was pending decision, the assessee thought it fit not to pursue the matter before the Assessing Officer and requested the Assessing Officer to lay his hands off or to rectify the order based on the decision that would be rendered by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the Tribunal. The Assessing Officer, however, did not pay heed to such request and rejected the same. 2.4. Thereafter, by notice dated 21.3.2012 issued under Section 148 of the Act, the assessment for the assessment year 2007-2008 was reopened on some other grounds. Even at this stage, the assessee made a request for rectification of the original assessment order by treating the income from letting out of warehouses as business income. The said request made by the assessee did not find favour with the Assessing Officer and revised assessment order was passed on 28.12.2012. 2.5. Thereafter, on 18.2.2013, the assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) along with a petition for condonation of the delay of three years, two months and three days. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), without going into the merits of the matter, dismissed the appeal on the ground of laches. On further appeal, the Tribunal confirmed the order passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). 2.6. In such backdrop, the present appeal is filed by the assessee on the substantial questions of law, referred supra. 3. We have heard the learned counsel on either side and perused the orders passed by the Tribunal and the authorities below. 4. Before adverting to the merits of the case, it would be relevant to refer to Section 249(3) of the Act, which reads as under: “Section 249. Form of appeal and limitation.- (1) and (2) ....... (3) The Commissioner (Appeals) may admit an appeal after the expiration of the said period if he is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period.” 5. Section 249(3) of the Act empowers the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) to admit the appeal after the expiration of the prescribed period, if he is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the prescribed period. 6. Section 249(3) of the Act empowers the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) to admit the appeal after the expiration of the prescribed period, if he is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the prescribed period. 6. In the present case, we find that for the assessment years 2004-2005, 2005-2006 and 20062007, the assessee has been diligently pursuing the matter before the higher fora and has succeeded in getting a decision in its favour, holding that income from letting out of warehouses is business income. Moreover, when reopening of assessment was done, the assessee had made a specific request to the Assessing Officer to rectify the original assessment order in the light of the orders passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the Tribunal treating the income from letting out of warehouses as business income for the earlier assessment years, but such request was rejected by the Assessing Officer. 7. That apart, it is also pointed out by the learned counsel for the assessee that the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), while refusing to condone the delay, was very much aware of the order passed in the assessee's own case for the assessment years 2005-2006 and 2006-2007, wherein it was held that income from warehousing activities should be treated as business income. 8. The assessee has been continuously pursuing his appeals for the earlier assessment years on the very same issue before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the Tribunal. The same is borne out by records and the assessee's plea is bona fide. In our considered opinion, the same would constitute “sufficient cause” for not presenting the appeal within the prescribed period and, therefore, it is a fit case where the assessee is entitled to the benefit of Section 249(3) of the Act. 9. The above said view of this Court is fortified by the decision of the Supreme Court in The Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji, [1987] 167 ITR 471 (SC), wherein it has been held as under: “The expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose of the existence of the institution of courts. .... .... When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.” In such view of the matter, we allow the appeal and answer the substantial questions of law in favour of the assessee. The appeal is restored to the file of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) for fresh consideration on merits. No costs.