Judgment 1. The appellants are original defendant nos.1 to 5, respondent no.1 is original plaintiff and respondent no.2 to 17 are original defendant nos.6 to 21. In present case also they are referred in the same capacity. 2. Learned advocates for both the sides have agreed to dispose of the appeal finally as it is pending since April-2012 and therefore, the appeal is finally decided by this judgment. 3. The order dated 13/03/2012 by the 7th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Surat below Exh.5 in Special Civil Suit No.294 of 2010 is under challenge. By the said order below application for interim relief, the trial court has restrained the defendants from alienating in any manner and to disturb the possession of the suit property from the plaintiff. The suit property is very well described in the plaint as well as in the impugned order which is land admeasuring 4200 sq. mtr in Surat district bearing revenue survey no.28/3 with new revenue survey number as survey no.45/3 in TP scheme 29 wherein it is known as final plot no.91. However, detailed description and nature of property is not material at present and hence it is referred as suit property only. 4. The plaintiff's case is to the effect that suit property was finally owned and hold by one Maganbhai Ambaram which was thereafter mutated in the name of Dahyabhai Lalabhai in the year 1947. The details about such prior ownership is not material at present. Said Dahyabhai has expired on 05/12/1971 and present defendants nos.1 to 20 are his legal heirs being his grand children and their family members. It is further contended by the plaintiff that all defendant nos.1 to 20 had on different dates executed an agreement to sell of their share of such jointly acquired suit property against consideration which was paid by him by account payee cheque. It is further contended that all such agreements to sell, copies of which are produced before the trial court, were notarized before the notary and according to such agreement to sell, defendants have to get permission from the competent authority for sale of such property in favour of the plaintiff and on getting such permission, sale deed is to be executed. 5. 5. Since at present we are concerned with the interim relief mainly for protecting possession of the plaintiff, minute and detailed information of all such agreements to sell are not material. However, it is to be recollected that all such agreements to sell were executed on 30/05/2006 wherein it is categorically endorsed by all the defendants that they have handed over the possession of the suit property to the plaintiff against consideration and for execution of sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, they all have appointed defendant no.21 as their power of attorney and that on getting clearance from the revenue authority to sell the suit property, defendants shall executed the sale deed of the suit property through their power of attorney holder i.e. defendant no.21. 6. It is further contended by the plaintiff that though there was agreement to sell in their favour since 30/05/2006, in the year 2008 defendant nos.1 to 5 only had entered into one another agreement to sell in favour of some third party namely Ketan Ranjitbhai Patel who had in turn filed Regular Civil Suit No.319 of 2009 for specific performance of such agreement to sell and there in also plaintiff has applied and joined himself as a litigant. 7. It is further contended that after defendants have handed over the possession to the plaintiff in the year 2006, the plaintiff has constructed a boundary wall in the year 2007 to protect the property in question and therefore, it is contended that even on the date of the suit, the possession is of the plaintiff and hence the plaintiff has prayed for specific performance of the agreement to sell as well as to protect his possession with alternative relief for compensation to the tune of Rs.1,92,00,000/-. 8. Out of 21 defendants in the suit, 11 defendants have appeared before the Court and amongst them, 1 to 5 i.e. present appellants have filed reply and resisted the suit as well as injunction application. 8. Out of 21 defendants in the suit, 11 defendants have appeared before the Court and amongst them, 1 to 5 i.e. present appellants have filed reply and resisted the suit as well as injunction application. Therefore, when suit property was jointly owned as co-parceners by all the defendants and when, though by separate documents but on the same day, all of them have entered into an agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff and thereafter if out of 20 defendants, only five defendants are defending the suit on different grounds including non execution of agreement to sell, it is clear that only defendant nos.1 to 5 are not accepting the agreement to sell and objecting the performance of their part of contract based upon agreement to sell executed by them in favour of the plaintiff. 9. The other technical defence are to the effect that the land being protected under the Tenancy Act, it cannot be sold and, therefore, there cannot be agreement to sell, the alleged agreements to sell are unregistered document, they have not received any consideration and that a joint co-parceners' property cannot be dealt with separately by co-parceners and there cannot be a decree for part performance by some coparceners only who are not objecting the suit, in absence of partition. 10. Both the parties have produced relevant documents on record which include copies of agreement to sell, affidavit, copy of suit by Ketan Ranjitbhai Patel, copies of several bills to show that some construction was carried out, copies of bills of security service to show that for the property, security was deputed. 11. Perused the record available by both the parties, impugned judgment and cases referred by the appellant. 12. Prima facie it is clear and certain that out of 20 coparceners of the suit property, at least 10 co-parceners have practically admitted the execution of agreement to sell both in favour of the plaintiff, since they have remained absent before the trial court and have not defended the suit and injunction application. Therefore, though their admission may not be permitted as admission for the entire suit property, it becomes clear from the defendants' version that there was no execution of agreement to sell at all in favour of the plaintiff, cannot be accepted as gospel truth. Therefore, though their admission may not be permitted as admission for the entire suit property, it becomes clear from the defendants' version that there was no execution of agreement to sell at all in favour of the plaintiff, cannot be accepted as gospel truth. To that extent, at least prima facie it can be said that there is triable issue between the plaintiff and defendants. Similarly for the same reason, when such admitted documents confirm that possession of the property was handed over to the plaintiff in the year 2006, coupled with some facts which confirms that possession of the suit property is with the plaintiff since 2006 onwards, prima facie, it is established that possession of the suit property is of the plaintiff since year 2006 and therefore, irrespective of any other legal and technical issues, possession of the plaintiff cannot be snatched away or disturbed without following due process of law. Even if plaintiff fails in his suit, considering the fact that plaintiff has paid consideration by cheque and has produced the relevant evidence before the trial court, it can not be said that plaintiff is not entitled to alternative relief of compensation, even though he is entitled to a decree of specific performance but the court refuses to pass such decree, since it is discretionary. However, once it is proved that plaintiff has paid some amount towards consideration for alienating the suit property in any manner and when defendants have accepted such amount and handed over the possession of the property to the plaintiff, now possession of the plaintiff is certainly required to be protected. 13. Since above is a settled legal position, so far as protection of possession of a person is concerned, irrespective of any other technicalities, there is no illegality or irregularity in the impugned order which protects the possession of the plaintiff and, therefore, no interference is called for in such appeal. 14. However, before parting with the matter, even if we consider all other aspects and arguments from both the sides, for the following reasons, there would be no change in final determination and that appeal deserves dismissal. 15. The defendant has relied upon judgment of this Court in the case between Ashwinkumar Manilal Shah vs. Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel reported in AIR 2001 Guj. 15. The defendant has relied upon judgment of this Court in the case between Ashwinkumar Manilal Shah vs. Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel reported in AIR 2001 Guj. 90 and submitted that pursuant to provisions of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, no agreement to sell or sale deed can be executed and can be enforced. However, as discussed above at present we are concerned with the lawful possession of the plaintiff rather than the reliefs in the plaint and hence even if such citation may have some relevance in the final determination of the suit, at present it does not help the appellants to succeed in the appeal. 16. The defendants-appellants have also relied upon the case between Somiben @ Chimiben D/o Naranbhai Kalabhai and another vs. Ukabhai Naranbhai Patel Karta of HUF & ors, reported in 2010 (2) GLH 663 and submitted that conduct of parties and delay in filing the suit will not permit the plaintiff to get equitable relief under Order 39 Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure. However, in present case the defendants have failed to point out the delay or otherwise and therefore this judgment is neither applicable nor helpful to the defendants-appellants. 17. The defendants have also relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Rameshbhai Chaturbhai Prajapati and Ors. vs. Minaxiben Wd/o. Rasiklal Tilakram & ors. reported in 2011 (2) GLH 760 and submitted that when there is a prohibition under the law to deal with any property like Tenancy Act and ULC Act, the suit cannot be entertained. However, as discussed herein above, at present we are not concerned with the right of the plaintiff to continue with the possession which is handed over by the defendants on their own by executing agreement to sell in presence of notary against acceptance of consideration by cheque and therefore, this judgment is not helpful to the defendants-appellants at present. 18. However, as discussed herein above, at present we are not concerned with the right of the plaintiff to continue with the possession which is handed over by the defendants on their own by executing agreement to sell in presence of notary against acceptance of consideration by cheque and therefore, this judgment is not helpful to the defendants-appellants at present. 18. So far as grievance regarding undivided ancestral property is concerned, when defendants say that in absence of partition in metes and bounds , part of the property cannot be dealt with, defendants have failed to realize that irrespective of either legality and technicality they have already handed over the possession to the plaintiff and when plaintiff is in possession of the property, all such issues are required to be dealt with only at the time of final hearing of the suit and not at present. 19. In view of foregoing discussion, I do not see any substance in the arguments on the law point or on the point of limitation, to hold that the plaintiff is not entitled to interim relief as granted by the trial court. 20. The perusal of the impugned judgment also makes it clear that trial court has dealt with the subject in detail. The trial court has referred all the pleadings, documents and case law referred by the parties. The trial court has also discussed the material evidence and legal issues so as to arrive at the conclusion to allow the application for interim relief so as to protect the possession of the plaintiff. 21. Therefore, I do not see any illegality or irregularity in the impugned judgment and there is no substance in the appeal and hence the same deserves to be dismissed. 22. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the appeal hereby is dismissed. 23. In view of the order passed in main appeal, no order is required to be passed in Civil Application No.4664 of 2012 and the same is therefore, disposed of accordingly.