Judgment 1. This Civil Revision Petition has been filed to set aside the fair and decretal order, dated 10.03.2011, passed by the learned Principal District Munsif, Tenkasi, in I.A.No.100 of 2011 in O.S.No.15 of 1998. 2. The petitioner is the second defendant, whereas the respondent is the plaintiff in the suit in O.S.No.15 of 1998 on the file of Principal District Munsif Court, Tenkasi. 3. The respondent filed the suit in O.S.No.15 of 1998 against one Resavu Mohammed and the petitioner herein, seeking for the relief of declaration that the second and third schedule property belongs to the plaintiff by way of prescription and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff's enjoyment of pathway and for mandatory injunction against the petitioner to remove the wall and latrine mentioned as suit third schedule property. 4. According to the petitioner on receipt of suit summons, the petitioner and the said Resavu Mohammed entered appearance through counsel. A compromise was arrived at between the petitioner, the respondent and the said Resavu Mohammed in the presence of Panchayathars. On such compromise, the respondent agreed to withdraw the suit filed by her. At that time and even now, the petitioner is living in Tiruppur. The petitioner believed the representations of the respondent that she would withdraw the suit as promised in the presence of the Panchayathars. The petitioner also submitted that as per the said compromise, the Deed of Exchange was registered as Document No.52 of 1998 on 19.01.1998, wherein the second schedule of the above said deed, the property belonging to the petitioner was shown as common wall. Contrary to the said promise, the respondent did not withdraw the suit, but obtained ex-parte decree on 27.04.1998. The respondent did not take steps to execute the decree for twelve years and filed E.P.No.41 of 2010 in O.S.No.15 of 1998, for implementing the said ex-parte decree. On receipt of the notice in the Execution Petition, the petitioner entered appearance on 30.06.2010 and after verification of the records through her counsel, she filed an application on 26.07.2010 to set aside the ex-parte decree along a petition for condoning the delay of 4435 days in filing to set aside the ex- parte decree. The petitioner has stated that the matter was compromised between the parties in the presence of Panchayathars and the respondent agreed to withdraw the suit. The petitioner has stated that the matter was compromised between the parties in the presence of Panchayathars and the respondent agreed to withdraw the suit. In view of the said compromise, Deed of Exchange was registered on 19.01.1998 as Documents No.52 of 1998. According to the petitioner, the delay in filing the application to set aside the ex-parte decree is neither wilful nor wanton, but due to the circumstances stated above. 5. The respondent denied all the averments made by the petitioner. She has stated that the petitioner and the first defendant entered appearance and sought time for filing written statement. The suit was adjourned to 22.04.1998, for filing written statement. Since the petitioner and the other defendants did not file the written statement, they were set ex-parte and the suit was posted for ex-parte evidence on 27.04.1998. On 27.04.1998, the respondent gave evidence and proved her claim. Based on her evidence, the ex-parte decree was passed on that date. Subsequently, the respondent filed E.P.No.41 of 2010. The petitioner entered appearance on 30.06.2010 in the Execution Petition. At the request of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the E.P. was adjourned to 26.07.2010, 18.08.2010, 20.09.2010 and 21.10.2010, for filing counter. Only after 21.10.2010, the petitioner has come forward with the present application and therefore, the reason given by the petitioner for condoning the delay is not valid and legal and the application is devoid of merits. 6. In the said application, the petitioner examined herself as P.W.1 and marked documents Exs.P1 to P4. The respondent did not examine herself and file any documents. The learned Judge considering the pleadings and the documents cited and relied on by the parties came to the conclusion that the petitioner has not explained the delay properly. The learned Judge held that the petitioner entered appearance in the Execution Petition on 30.06.2010 and filed petition to condone the delay in filing the application to set aside the ex-parte decree on 26.07.2010 and therefore, there is a delay of 26 days in filing the application to set aside the ex-parte decree from the admitted date of knowledge. The learned Judge dismissed the application holding that the petitioner did not give sufficient reason to condone the delay. 7. Heard Mr.S.P.Maharajan, learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner and Mr.M.P.Senthil, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 8. The learned Judge dismissed the application holding that the petitioner did not give sufficient reason to condone the delay. 7. Heard Mr.S.P.Maharajan, learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner and Mr.M.P.Senthil, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondent reiterated the averments made in the affidavit and in the counter affidavit. 9. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner relied on the following Judgments: (i) Tamil Nadu Defence Officers Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Vs. R. Sakkubai [ 2012 (2) LW 37 ], wherein in paragraph Nos.6 and 7, it has been held as follows:- "6. In this case, it is seen from paras 3 to 5 of the affidavit filed in support of the application it has been stated, in detail, various steps taken by the counsel who was engaged by the revision petitioner to trace the bundle for ascertaining the reason for passing the ex parte decree and according to the revision petitioner, only on 13.10.2008, they were able to get the certified copies of the ex parte decree and thereafter, the application was filed to condone the delay. Further, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner also, in all fairness, admitted that the application could not be filed immediately on receipt of the notice in E.P.No.28 of 2008 as he was not sure about the reason for passing the ex parte decree and therefore, he took steps to get the certified copy of the order and only thereafter, he filed the application. 7. Therefore, considering the submission of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that because of his advice, the application was not filed immediately on receipt of notice in the execution proceedings, in my opinion, the party should not suffer for the inaction on the part of the counsel. Hence, I am inclined to set aside the order of the court below on condition of payment of Rs.3000/= to the respondent herein by the revision petitioner within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. ....." (ii) M/s. T.V.Sundaram Iyengar & Sons Ltd. Vs. S.Raghunathan [ 2008 (1) LW 494 ], wherein in paragraph No.7, it has been held as follows:- "7. ....." (ii) M/s. T.V.Sundaram Iyengar & Sons Ltd. Vs. S.Raghunathan [ 2008 (1) LW 494 ], wherein in paragraph No.7, it has been held as follows:- "7. It is pertinent to point out that generally a party does not stand to benefit by filing an application late and refusing to condone the delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the nascent stage and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the litigants. A pedantic approach should not be made by the Court of law while dealing with the condonation of delay matters. On the other hand, the courts of law are to adopt a pragmatic approach. In this connection, it is not out of place to make a mention that when substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim any vested right in injustice being done because of non deliberate delay. As a matter of fact, a party does not stand the benefit by resorting to delay. Per contra, he runs a serious risk. It cannot be again said that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." (iii) N.P.Srinivasan Vs. S.Santhalakshmi [2013 (2) TNCJ 666 (MAD)], wherein in paragraph Nos.13 to 15, it has been held as follows:- "13. No doubt the delay of 1828 days is enormous and the respondent is bound to satisfy the Court with sufficient cause for condoning the said delay. Going by the pleadings of the respective parties before the Court below as well as specific finding rendered by the learned Judge, satisfying with the reasons adduced by the respondent, more particularly on the ground of non-service of summons, in my considered view, it is to be held that the respondent had discharged her burden of proving sufficient cause, even though the delay was for a long period. 14. At this juncture, it is useful to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 1998 (7) SCC 123 (N.Balakrishnan Vs. M.Krishnamurthy), wherein it is observed at paragraph 9 as follows: "9. 14. At this juncture, it is useful to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 1998 (7) SCC 123 (N.Balakrishnan Vs. M.Krishnamurthy), wherein it is observed at paragraph 9 as follows: "9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court." 15. The said decision was considered in a recent decision of the Apex court in Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai ( 2012 (5) SCC 157 ), wherein it is observed at paragraph 24 as follows:- "24. What colour the expression "sufficient cause" would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay." (iv) Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [ 2002 (3) SCC 195 ], wherein in paragraph Nos.11 and 12, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:- "11. The Court further observed in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 which run thus: (SCC pp. 127-28) 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words ?sufficient cause? under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari [ AIR 1969 SC 575 : 1969 (1) SCR 1006 and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality [ 1972 (1) SCC 366 ]. 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. (emphasis added) 12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute sufficient cause or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way." (v) Mrs.Mallika Vs. The Salem Highway Officials Co-op House Building Society Ltd., and Others [2013 (1) TNCJ 998 (MAD)], wherein in paragraph No.11, it has been held as under:- "11. It is settled principle of law that the length of delay is not the criterion to allow the application filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act, but the exposition of sufficient cause alone is a criterion. If the intention of the applicant reflects his dilatory tactics to prolong and protract the suit then the doctrine of liberal approach cannot be applied by this court by exercising it's discretionary powers. If the delay appears to have been caused on account of genuine reasons and sufficient cause has been shown, then there may not be any difficulty to condone the delay by applying the principle of "liberal approach". However, the court itself is having discretionary power, either to allow or dismiss the application which is filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act and therefore, keeping in view of the above facts, this court is of considered view that the doctrine of liberal approach can be exercised in this case on some conditions." (vi) N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy [ 1998 (7) SCC 123 ,], wherein in paragraph Nos.9 and 10, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:- "9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. 10. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause." 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that as per the ratio laid down in the above Judgments, the petitioner has given sufficient cause for condoning the delay and the learned Judge has committed irregularity in dismissing the application. 11. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent argued that the petitioner has filed the application only with a view to drag on the proceedings and the petitioner has not given any valid reason and the reason given by her is not sufficient to condone the delay of 4435 days. 12. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the respondent relied on the following Judgments: (i) K.V.Lakshmipathy (Deceased) and Others Vs. J.Senthamizh Selvi and Another [2014 (2) MWN (Civil) 19], wherein in paragraph No.38, it has been held as follows:- "38. The learned Single Judge of this Court, after having referred to catena of decisions, has also observed in A.Muthusamy v. Muniammal and others, 2006 (1) CTC 187 , that on a conspectus reading of the above principles set out in the various Judgments, it is sell settled that a liberal approach should be extended while considering the Application for condonation of delay. Sufficient caution has been exhibited to note that wherever there is lack of bona fides or attempt to hoodwink by the part concerned who, has come forward with an implication for condonation of delay, in such cases, no indulgence should be shown by condoning the delay applied for. It is also clear to the effect that it is not the number of days of delay that matters, but the attitude of the party which caused the delay. It is also clear to the effect that it is not the number of days of delay that matters, but the attitude of the party which caused the delay. In other words, when the Court finds that the party who failed to approach the Court within the time stipulated comes forward with an explanation for condoning the delay, the Court if satisfied that the delay occasioned not due to the deliberate conduct of the party, but due to any other reason, then by sufficiently compensating the prejudice caused to the other side monetarily, the condonation of delay can be favourably considered." (ii) Subramanian and Another Vs. K.Veerakumar [2014 (2) MWN (Civil) 74], wherein in paragraph Nos.15 and 16, it has been held as follows:- "15. As pointed out by the respondent in the counter filed in I.A.No.1175 of 2009, the petitioner participated in the proceedings before the Revenue Court at Bhavani by appearing before the said Court in T.R.No.20 of 2007 on 29.06.2009, 06.07.2009, 28.08.2009, 07.09.2009 and 14.09.2009. That apart, the second petitioners had participated in the proceedings in O.S.No.284 of 2007, on the file of the District Munsif Court, Bhavani on several dates between the period 04.06.2009 and 11.09.2009. Apart from that in another suit in O.S.No.308 of 2007, the second petitioner has appeared and given oral evidence in the said suit during the period from 16.06.2009 to 31.08.2009. That apart affidavits have been filed in other suits and oral evidence have also been given on 01.09.2009, 07.09.2009, 09.09.2009 and 14.09.2009. Further, in the final decree proceedings in the present suit also, the petitioners have entered appearance through counsel and filed counter. Therefore, the plea raised by the petitioners in the affidavit stating that on account of ill-health, they could not contact their counsel and only on 02.12.2009, they were able to contact their counsel lacks bona fide. That apart their conduct clearly shows gross negligence and their actions were deliberate in not defending the matter. In such circumstances, the trial Court was fully justified in rejecting the petition. Further, the petitioners were unable to establish before the Court about the sickness by producing any record or evidence. 16. Thus the petitioners having been guilty of gross negligence and laches, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the petitioners have not shown sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition fails and it is dismissed. Further, the petitioners were unable to establish before the Court about the sickness by producing any record or evidence. 16. Thus the petitioners having been guilty of gross negligence and laches, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the petitioners have not shown sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition fails and it is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed." (iii) G.V.Lakshminarayanan and Others Vs. M.E.Devarajan (Deceased) and Others [2014 (2) MWN (Civil) 7], wherein in paragraph No.6, it has been held as follows:- "6. ..... From the above it is clear, limitation for filing Cross-Objection is one month from the date of the service of Notice on the Respondents in the Appeal namely, the Petitioners herein. Whereas in this case, the Petitioners were served on 13.4.2007. Therefore, the time ended on 13.5.2007. For more than two years, the Petitioners were in deep slumber and woke up suddenly only on 6.7.2009 and filed the Petition for Cross-Appeal. The Petitioners cannot take their own sweet time to file the Cross-Appeal according to their whims and fancies, especially to drag on the proceedings. As the facts narrated above would undoubtedly make it very crystal clear that the Petitioners intended to prolong the matter by misusing and abusing the provisions of law." (iv) A.Govindasamy and another Vs. S.Saravanakumar [2014 (2) MWN (Civil) 378], wherein in paragraph No.24, it has been held as follows:- "24. The inordinate delay of more than 11 years was sought to be explained by simply stating that there was a compromise between herself and the father of the decree holder, without even pleading that the decree holder was involved in that compromise. Even after filing such an application supported by an affidavit, which does not contain acceptable explanations to show that she was prevented by a reasonable cause from filing an application to set aside the ex-parte decree in time, she was not prepared to get on with the enquiry and she made a further attempt by filing I.A.No.136/2012 for amending the affidavit filed in I.A.No.615/2010. The nature of amendments sought for were also discussed supra. After the dismissal of the amendment application I.A.No.136/2012, the learned trial judge, namely the I Additional Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, by a detailed order dated 05.09.2013, dismissed I.A.No.615/2010 holding that the inordinate delay of 4137 days was not explained with satisfactory reasons. The nature of amendments sought for were also discussed supra. After the dismissal of the amendment application I.A.No.136/2012, the learned trial judge, namely the I Additional Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, by a detailed order dated 05.09.2013, dismissed I.A.No.615/2010 holding that the inordinate delay of 4137 days was not explained with satisfactory reasons. The said order of the learned I Additional Subordinate Judge, which is the subject matter of the challenge made in C.R.P.(NPD) No.4258/2013 filed under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, cannot be assailed as order passed in exercise of the jurisdiction not conferred on the trial court or failing to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on the trial court or an order passed with illegality or material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction. The findings of the trial court in this regard, cannot be assailed as perverse and it cannot be viewed as an order patently erroneous leading to miscarriage of justice. On the other hand, by the dismissal of the said application I.A.No.615/2010, the learned trial judge has chosen to prevent abuse of process of court. Viewed from any angle, the order passed by the trial court dismissing I.A.No.615/2010 cannot be termed either infirm or defective warranting interference by this court in exercise of its power of revision." (v) V.Radhakrishnan Vs. P.Radhakrishnan [ 2013 (4) LW 515 ], wherein in paragraph No.6, it has been held as follows:- "6. ..... According to the petitioner, he came to know about the dismissal of those applications only in the month of June 2007. Except stating so in the affidavit, he has not proved the same by examining any independent witness or marking any documents. On the other hand, he examined himself as P.W.1. As rightly pointed out by the learned senior counsel for the respondents, a perusal of his deposition, as P.W.1, would show that he has not stated anywhere that he came to know about the exparte order only in June 2007. Further, it is his case that his health was seriously affected due to Asthma and Anxiety in the year 2001 and hence he was not able to move from home and he was taking treatment. No doubt, the petitioner had marked the Medical Certificate issued by the doctor and examined him as P.W.2. Further, it is his case that his health was seriously affected due to Asthma and Anxiety in the year 2001 and hence he was not able to move from home and he was taking treatment. No doubt, the petitioner had marked the Medical Certificate issued by the doctor and examined him as P.W.2. From the evidence of the doctor as well as by perusing the said Medical Certificate, it could be seen that the petitioner was suffering from Asthma and Anxiety for continuous period. But, at the same time, that itself cannot be a ground or reason to hold that the petitioner was reasonably prevented from filing applications before the court, continuously for a period of 2,121 days. Certainly, such ailment, even assuming that the petitioner has suffered continuously, cannot be construed as the valid reason for condoning such abnormal delay of 2,121 days. The petitioner further contended that his counsel failed to intimate the stage of the case and therefore, he was not in a position to file the applications in time." (vi) Chitra Vs. K.Saravanan [ 2013 (4) CTC 397 ], wherein in paragraph No.7, it has been held as follows:- "7. No doubt, it is not necessary that each and every delay has to be explained. But at the same time, when the delay is enormous, it is for the petitioner to show sufficient cause by acceptable material evidence and prove the same. When her own Counter filed as early as on 01.11.2006 goes contrary to her statement made in the present Petition, the Court below has rightly rejected by the Application by exercising its discretionary power. Since the delay is enormous and it is also proved by the other side that the Petitioner had knowledge about the ex parte order as early as in the month of November 2006 itself, I find that the Order passed by the Court below does not warrant any interference. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is liable to be dismissed." (vii) Mariappan Vs. Prema and Others [2013 (2) MWN (Civil) 374], wherein in paragraph Nos.8 and 9, it has been held as follows:- "8. The facts in the said case are different from the facts of the present case. In the present case, in earlier occasion also there was a delay of nearly 6 months and the Court condoned the delay on Application. Prema and Others [2013 (2) MWN (Civil) 374], wherein in paragraph Nos.8 and 9, it has been held as follows:- "8. The facts in the said case are different from the facts of the present case. In the present case, in earlier occasion also there was a delay of nearly 6 months and the Court condoned the delay on Application. In the present occasion also, the Defendants have come forward with Application for condonation of delay of 183 days. They have not shown sufficient reasons for the delay in approaching the Court within the statutory time specified. When the 2nd Defendant was unable to contact his Advocate, there is no embargo for the Defendants 1 & 3 to contact their Advocate. Further, the period of illness is absent in the Application. Under these circumstances, the Petitioner could not take recourse to the benefit of the above said decision of the Honourable Supreme Court. The delay of six months on the part of the Petitioner shows their indifference towards the Court proceedings, because the case was in part heard stage. PW1 was examined in chief and was to be cross-examined by the Defendants and at that stage, they were absent. 9. The Court expects the parties to be vigilant and sensitive on the proceedings of the Court and when the case was in the part heard stage, it is the duty of the parties to follow the conduct of the case and contact their Advocate also to know about the stage of the case. But, the Defendants have failed to follow the proceedings because of their lethargic attitude. It is well settled principle that the length of the delay is not material, but whether the delay has been sufficiently explained has to be looked into. " 13. I have carefully perused the materials on record, the order of the learned Judge and the Judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the parties. 14. The petitioner examined as P.W.1 and substantiated her claim that she was residing in Tiruppur even before filing of the suit. She also filed the Deed of Exchange, dated 19.01.1998, to substantiate her claim and the matter was compromised between the petitioner and the respondent and the respondent did not give any explanation as to why no action was taken for twelve years. She also filed the Deed of Exchange, dated 19.01.1998, to substantiate her claim and the matter was compromised between the petitioner and the respondent and the respondent did not give any explanation as to why no action was taken for twelve years. She did not let any evidence to deny the contention of the petitioner that the suit was compromised and she agreed to withdraw the suit. The learned Judge failed to consider this aspect. Further, the learned Judge has erred in holding that the petitioner filed application to set aside the ex-parte decree after a delay of 26 days from the date of admitted knowledge. This conclusion is factually wrong. The petitioner entered appearance in the E.P. on 30.06.2010 and filed application to set aside the ex-parte decree on 26.07.2010, which is within 30 days from the date of knowledge. Further, in the Judgments referred to above, it is clearly held that the Courts must be liberal in considering the application for condoning the delay and the length of delay is not the criteria, but the reason given for the delay is the only criteria. The Court must consider whether the party has given sufficient reason to set aside the ex-parte decree. The Courts must consider whether the action of a party lacks bona fide or the action of the party is to drag on the proceedings. In the present case, the petitioner has examined herself and substantiated her claim. The learned Judge rejected the Deed of Exchange filed by the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner was not a party to the said Deed. But the respondent has not given any reason as to why the Deed of Exchange was executed between herself, the respondent and Resavu Mohammed and why she did not file the E.P. for almost twelve years. Therefore, the reason given by the petitioner for condonation of delay is acceptable one and the petitioner has given valid and sufficient reason for condoning the delay. 15. For the above reasons, I hold that the learned Judge has failed to exercise her power properly in the light of the well settled judicial pronouncements. Therefore, the fair and decretal order, dated 10.03.2011, passed by the learned Principal District Munsif, Tenkasi, in I.A.No.100 of 2011 in O.S.No.15 of 1998, warrants interference by this Court. 15. For the above reasons, I hold that the learned Judge has failed to exercise her power properly in the light of the well settled judicial pronouncements. Therefore, the fair and decretal order, dated 10.03.2011, passed by the learned Principal District Munsif, Tenkasi, in I.A.No.100 of 2011 in O.S.No.15 of 1998, warrants interference by this Court. Hence, the civil revision petition is allowed and the order, dated 10.03.2011, passed by the learned Principal District Munsif, Tenkasi, in I.A.No.100 of 2011 in O.S.No.15 of 1998, is set aside. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.