JUDGMENT Hon’ble Mrs. Ranjana Pandya, J.—This revision has been preferred against the Judgment and order of the Sessions Judge, Jaunpur passed on 1.12.1989 in Criminal Appeal No. 7 of 1989, Murli v. State of U.P., upholding the Judgment and order dated 9.3.1989 passed by L.C.C.I, Jaunpur in Criminal Case No. 2722/88, State v. Murli Harijan, under Section 354 I.P.C., Village Bhadkhin P.S. Sureri, District Jaunpur convicting the revisionist under Section 354 I.P.C. and sentencing him to undergo three months simple imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- with defaulting clause. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the revisionist developed an enormous liking for Nirmala Devi a Harijan lady. The accused is also Harijan. He used to pass remarks on Nirmala Devi. On 8.9.1988 at about 6 p.m. when Nirmala went to fetch fodder in a field, the accused went there and molested her by touching her breasts. He also tried to make her onermous lie down. But, she shouted for help on which two ladies Chamela Devi and Durgawati, who were present in the nearby fields, rushed to Nirmala Devi. On seeing the witnesses, the revisionist fled away from the spot. Next day, the complainant came to Jaunpur and gave an application to the S.P. Jaunpur and on his direction, the case was registered and, ultimately, the revisionist was tried. 3. The prosecution examined P.W. 1 Nirmala Devi, P.W. 2 Chamela Devi, P.W. 3 Ram Narayan Yadav and closed the evidence. The accused in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. denied the occurrence and stated that he was implicated due to enmity. 4. The learned Magistrate, after perusal of the evidence, found the revisionist guilty under Section 354 I.P.C. and sentenced him to undergo three months simple imprisonment and pay fine to the extent of Rs. 100/- with defaulting clause. 5. Feeling aggrieved the revisionist preferred an appeal (bearing No. 7 of 1989), which was also dismissed on 1.12.1989 by the Sessions Judge, Jaunpur against which the present revision has been preferred before this Court. 6. None was present on behalf of the revisionist in the revised list. Heard learned A.G.A. and perused the Record. 7. 100/- with defaulting clause. 5. Feeling aggrieved the revisionist preferred an appeal (bearing No. 7 of 1989), which was also dismissed on 1.12.1989 by the Sessions Judge, Jaunpur against which the present revision has been preferred before this Court. 6. None was present on behalf of the revisionist in the revised list. Heard learned A.G.A. and perused the Record. 7. It is settled principle of law that the revisional jurisdiction is not as wide as the appellate jurisdiction and under the revisional jurisdiction, the High Court is required to exercise its powers where there is material irregularity or manifest error of law or procedure, or there is misconception or misreading of evidence or where the Court below has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it or has exercised the jurisdiction wrongly and perversely or where the facts admitted or proved do not discloses any offence. 8. As a broad proposition, the interference of revisional Court may be justified in cases (i) where the decision is grossly erroneous (ii) where there is no compliance with the provision of law (iii) where the finding of fact affecting the decision is not based on evidence on record (iv) where the material evidence of parties has not been considered (v) where the Court below has misread or mis-appreciated the evidence on record (vi) where the judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or perversely. 9. In exercise of revisional jurisdiction the Court may not exercise jurisdiction to reassess the evidence and reappraisal of evidence is not permissible within the revisional jurisdiction. Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of State of Kerela v. Putthumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, AIR 1999 SC 981 , has held that “the High Court while hearing revision does not work as an appellate Court and will not re-appreciate the evidence, unless some glaring mistake is pointed out to show that injustice has been done”. 10. In the case of Jagannath Chaudhary v. Ramayan Singh, AIR 2002 SC 2229 , Hon’ble Apex Court has held that “revisional jurisdiction is normally to be exercised only in exceptional cases where there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on point of law resulting in miscarriage of justice”. 10. In the case of Jagannath Chaudhary v. Ramayan Singh, AIR 2002 SC 2229 , Hon’ble Apex Court has held that “revisional jurisdiction is normally to be exercised only in exceptional cases where there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on point of law resulting in miscarriage of justice”. Similarly In the case of Munni Devi v. State of Rajasthan and others, AIR 2002 SC 107 , it was held by Hon’ble Apex Court that “while exercising the revisional power the High Court has no authority to re-appreciate the evidence in the manner as the trial Court and appellate Courts are required to do”. 11. In another case case of State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale and others, AIR 1993 SC 1126 , it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that “ generally speaking, concurrent findings of fact arrived at by two Courts below are not to be interfered with by the High Court in absence of any special circumstances or unless there is any perversity.” 12. Considering the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction it is apparent that the evidence recorded by trial Court and reappreciated by the appellate Court is not required to be reappreciated again on the point raised by the learned counsel for the revisionist. The appellate Court has given findings after detailed discussions. The findings of facts recorded by two Courts below may not be interfered with in this revision. 13. Learned Court below have considered all aspects of the matter and have come to the conclusion that there were no latches on the part of prosecution and the case was proved beyond doubt. In the statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the accused has denied the total proceedings but has not alleged that why he has been falsely implicated. 14. Section 360 of the Code relates only to persons not under 21 years of age convicted for an offence punishable with fine only or with imprisonment for a term of 7 years or less, to any person under 21 years of age or any woman convicted of an offence not punishable with sentence of death or imprisonment for life. The scope of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act is much wider. It applies to any person found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. The scope of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act is much wider. It applies to any person found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Section 360 of the Code does not provide for any rule for Probation Officers in assisting the Courts in relation to supervision and other matters while Probation of Offenders Act does make such a provision. While Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act states that the persons found guilty of an offence and dealt with under Section 3 or 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attached to conviction of an offence under any law, the Code does not contain parallel provision. Two statutes with such significant differences could not be intended to co-exist at the same time in the same area. Such co-existence would lead to anomalous results. The intention to retain the provisions of Section 360 of the Code and the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act as applicable at the same time in a given area cannot be gathered from the provision of Section 360 or any other provision of the Code. Therefore, by virtue of Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, where the provisions of the Act have been brought into force. The provisions of Section 360 of the Code are wholly inapplicable. 15. Enforcement of Probation Act in some particular area excludes the applicability of the provisions of Section 360, 361 of the Code in that area. Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act reads as follows : “3. The provisions of Section 360 of the Code are wholly inapplicable. 15. Enforcement of Probation Act in some particular area excludes the applicability of the provisions of Section 360, 361 of the Code in that area. Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act reads as follows : “3. Power of Court to release certain offenders after admonition.—When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable under Section 379 or Section 380 or Section 381 or Section 404 or Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860) or any offence punishable with imprisonment for not more than two years, or with fine, or with both, under the Indian Penal Code, or any other law, and no previous conviction is proved against him and the Court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence, and the character of the offender, it is expedient so to do, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Court may instead of sentencing him to any punishment or releasing him on probation of good conduct under Section 4 release him after due admonition. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, previous conviction against a person shall include any previous order made against him under this section or Section 4.” 16. Thus, this was the duty of the learned trial Court who failed in granting probation of the accused, but the Appellate Court in its wisdom granted probation to the accused. 17. Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act reads as follows : “4. Thus, this was the duty of the learned trial Court who failed in granting probation of the accused, but the Appellate Court in its wisdom granted probation to the accused. 17. Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act reads as follows : “4. Power of Court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct.—(1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the Court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the Court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour: Provided that the Court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the Court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond. (2) Before making any order under sub-section (1), the Court shall take into consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer concerned in relation to the case. (3) When an order under sub-section (1) is made, the Court may, if it is of opinion that in the interests of the offender and of the public it is expedient so to do, in addition pass a supervision order directing that the offender shall remain under the supervision of a probation officer named in the order during such period, not being less than one year, as may be specified therein, and may in such supervision order, impose such conditions as it deems necessary for the due supervision of the offender. (4) The Court making a supervision order under sub-section (3) shall require the offender, before he is released, to enter into a bond, with or without sureties, to observe the conditions specified in such order and such additional conditions with respect to residence, abstention from intoxicants or any other matter as the Court may, having regard to the particular circumstances, consider fit to impose for preventing a repetition of the same offence or a commission of other offences by the offender. (5) The Court making a supervision order under sub-section (3) shall explain to the offender the terms and conditions of the order and shall forthwith furnish one copy of the supervision order to each of the offenders, the sureties, if any, and the probation officer concerned. 18. Thus, I find no illegality, impropriety or irregularity in the order under revision. The conviction of the revisionist is liable to be upheld but in spite of sentencing him to imprisonment at once, he needs to be given the benefit of Section 4 Probation Act. Accordingly, the revision is liable to be partly allowed. 19. Revision is partly allowed. The Judgment passed by the appellate Court in Criminal Appeal No. 7 of 1989 and also the Judgment passed by the L.C.C.I, Jaunpur in Criminal Case No. 2722/88 as far as it relates to sentencing the accused Murli to undergo simple imprisonment and pay a fine of Rs. 100/-is set aside. The revisionist shall get the benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. He shall file two bonds to the Rs. 20,000/- coupled with personal bonds stating that he shall keep peace and not commit any offence during the period of one year and will be of good behaviour. If there is breach of any of the aforesaid conditions, he will subject himself to undergo sentence before the Magistrate as per Rules. The bonds aforesaid be filed by the accused persons within two months from the date of the Judgment. —————