Judgment : M. Jaichandren, J. 1. Heard Mr. D. Malaichamy, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, Mr. M. Govindan, the learned Special Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the respondents 1 to 3 and Mr. R. Murali, the learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the fourth respondent. 2. Since common issues are arising for the consideration of this Court, all the Writ Appeals are heard together and a Common Judgment is being passed. 3. These Writ Appeals have been filed against the Common Order passed by the learned Single Judge, dated 26.06.2012, made in W.P.(MD)Nos.7450 to 7455 of 2012. 4. The Petitioners, in the Writ Petitions, in W.P.(MD)Nos.7450 to 7455 of 2012, are the appellants in the present Writ Appeals. The Writ Petitions had been filed praying for the issuance of Writs of Mandamus to direct the respondents therein to regularize the services of the petitioners, notionally, either from 20.07.1975 or from 04.11.1976, so as to enable them to get enhanced retirement benefits. 5. The petitioners had been employed under the fourth respondent Corporation and they had retired from service, on attaining the age of superannuation. They had prayed for regularising their services, notionally, in order to get the enhanced pensionary benefits. Inspite of several representations made by the petitioners, they had not been promoted to the next higher posts, inspite of vacancies arising in the higher posts. It is the claim of the petitioners that they should have been given their due promotions, during the years 1975 – 1976, depending upon the vacancies, which had arisen at the relevant point of time. 6. It is the contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that the appellants had been making several representations, continuously, seeking the reliefs, as prayed for by them. As such, the dismissal of the Writ Petitions, by the learned Single Judge, by his Common Order, dated 26.06.2012, on the ground of laches, cannot be sustained. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants had relied on the following decisions in support of his contentions :- (i). Bangalore City COOP.Housing Society Ltd., State of Karnataka, reported in 2012 (3) SCC 727 . Paragraph Nos.47 and 48, read as follows:- 47. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants had relied on the following decisions in support of his contentions :- (i). Bangalore City COOP.Housing Society Ltd., State of Karnataka, reported in 2012 (3) SCC 727 . Paragraph Nos.47 and 48, read as follows:- 47. Hidayatullah, C.J, who agreed with Bachawat and Mitter, JJ, in Tilokchand case noted that no period of limitation has been prescribed for filing a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution and proceeded to observe: [SCC p.116, para 11]. "11. Therefore, the question is one of discretion for this Court to follow from case to case. There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit. A case may be brought within the Limitation Act by reason of some article but this Court need not necessarily give the total time to the litigant to move this Court under Article 32. Similarly, in a suitable case this Court may entertain such a petition even after a lapse of time. It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are when and how the delay arose." 48. The ratio of the aforesaid decision is that even though there is no period of limitation for filing petitions under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner should approach the Court without loss of time and if there is delay, then cogent explanation should be offered for the same. However, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down or a straitjacket formula can be adopted for deciding whether or not this Court or the High Court should entertain a belated petition filed under Articles 32 of Article 226 of the Constitution and each case must be decided on its own facts. (ii). In M. Sudakar Vs. Manoharan and others, reported in 2011 (1) SCC 484 , it had been held as follows :- "14. The power to mould relief is always available to the Court possessed with the power to issue high prerogative writs. In order to do complete justice, it can mould the relief, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. In the facts of a given case, a writ petitioner may not be entitled to the specific relief claimed by him but this itself will not preclude the writ court to grant such other relief which he is otherwise entitled. In order to do complete justice, it can mould the relief, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. In the facts of a given case, a writ petitioner may not be entitled to the specific relief claimed by him but this itself will not preclude the writ court to grant such other relief which he is otherwise entitled. Further, delay and laches do not bar jurisdiction of the court. It is a matter of discretion and not of jurisdiction. The learned Single Judge had taken note of the relevant facts and declined to dismiss the Writ Petition on the ground of delay and laches." 7. The learned counsel had also submitted that the subsisting rights of the appellants, which are substantial in nature, cannot be affected, on the ground of laches. He had further submitted that, as an investigation into the representations made by the appellants had been going on, the claims made by them cannot be rejected on the ground of laches. Further, as the appellants have a continuos cause of action, the claims made by them cannot be rejected on the ground of laches. In fact, the appellants have been making representations, continuously, agitating their rights. In such circumstances, the order passed by the learned Single Judge ought to be set aside and a direction has to be issued, by this Court, to the respondents, to consider the claims of the appellants and to grant the reliefs, as expeditiously as possible. 8. The learned Special Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the respondents 1 to 3 had submitted that the learned Single Judge had passed the order, dated 26.06.2012, in W.P.(MD) Nos.7450 to 7455 of 2012, rejecting the claims made by the appellants, on the ground of laches. The learned Single Judge had rightly held that it would not be open to the appellants to seek the reliefs, as prayed for by them, after a long delay of several years. Therefore, the learned Single Judge had rightly dismissed the Writ Petitions on the ground of laches. 9. The learned Single Judge had rightly held that it would not be open to the appellants to seek the reliefs, as prayed for by them, after a long delay of several years. Therefore, the learned Single Judge had rightly dismissed the Writ Petitions on the ground of laches. 9. In view of the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, the learned Special Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the respondents 1 to 3, the learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the fourth respondent, and on a perusal of the records available, we are of the considered view that the appellants have not shown sufficient cause or reason for this Court to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge, dated 26.06.2012, made in W.P.(MD)Nos.7450 to 7455 of 2012. The cause of action for the appellants to file the Writ Petitions, in W.P.(MD)Nos.7450 to 7455 of 2012, is said to have arisen, during the years 1975 – 1976. While that being so, the appellants had filed the above Writ Petitions, seeking their reliefs, after a long delay of several years, without adducing proper reasons for such delay. Further, nothing has been placed before this Court to substantiate their claims that they have been making several representations to the authorities concerned, claiming their service benefits. In such circumstances, we are of the considered view that the present Writ Appeals deserve to be dismissed, as they are devoid of merits. 10. In the result, the present Writ Appeals stand dismissed, confirming the Common Order, dated 26.06.2012, made in W.P.(MD)Nos.7450 to 7455 of 2012. No costs.