JUDGMENT : S. Pujahari, J. - This Jail Criminal Appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Ad hoc Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-2, Cuttack in Sessions Trial No. 235 of 2003. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-2, Cuttack in the impugned judgment held the appellant guilty of the charge under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short "IPC") and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. The prosecution placed before the trial Court a case that on 11-9-2002 night, B. Balakrishna (hereinafter referred to as "the deceased") along with his wife (P.W. 4), his one month old daughter and his sister (P.W. 1), the informant in this case, had been to the house of his first cousin-T. Sulapuri, at Tinikonia Bagicha, Cuttack to attend his grandson's birth ceremony. While they were returning therefrom to their house in the said night by walking on the road at about 10 p.m. near Redstar Club of Sutahat New Colony Club, Cuttack, the appellant accosted with the wife of the deceased addressing her as 'Madam' and thereafter made an attempt to snatch away the necklace from her neck. Seeing the same, when the deceased made protest, the appellant tussled with him and in course of the tussle, the appellant brought out a knife from his waist and stabbed the belly of the deceased with a knife which he was carrying then. The deceased, his wife and his sister raised shout and hearing their shout, when people nearby came to intervene, the appellant fled away from the spot, but the deceased with the injuries sustained chased him. The wife of the deceased and the informant came to their house and intimated the aforesaid fact to the other inmates, as such, the male members in their family proceeded to the rescue of the deceased and found the deceased was lying with the injuries near Moonlight School, wherefrom he was shifted to the City hospital and therefrom to S.C.B. Medical College and Hospital, Cuttack. But, the deceased succumbed to the injuries there. The matter was reported to the police at Cantonment Police Station, Cuttack by the informant (P.W. 1) orally in the same night which was reduced into writing (Ext. But, the deceased succumbed to the injuries there. The matter was reported to the police at Cantonment Police Station, Cuttack by the informant (P.W. 1) orally in the same night which was reduced into writing (Ext. 1) by the police and Cantonment P.S. Case No. 64 of 2002 was registered, matter was investigated and on completion of investigation, police found substance in the information and placed charge-sheet against the appellant for commission of an offence under Section 320 of IPC. The learned S.D.J.M. (S), Cuttack took cognizance on the police report for the said offence and committed the case to the Court of Sessions. 2. Placing reliance on such case of the prosecution, which was also supported by material evidence collected during the investigation, charge under Section 302 of IPC was framed against the appellant. As the appellant denied the said charge, the prosecution adduced evidence both oral as well as documentary and also exhibited Material Objects to bring home the charge. 3. On the other hand, the appellant who had taken a plea of denial and false implication, did not adduce any independent-rebuttal evidence in support of his plea. 4. It appears that the trial Court, relying on the evidence adduced by the prosecution, more particularly the expert opinion disclosing that the deceased died a homicidal death vide post-mortem report, Ext. 5 and also the version of the eye-witnesses, i.e. P.W. 1, the informant and P.W. 4, who are the sister and wife of the deceased respectively, has returned the judgment and order of conviction and sentence, as stated earlier. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant though does not dispute the finding of the trial Court that the death of the deceased was homicidal one, but assails the finding that the appellant authored such death of the deceased. He submits that since the evidence of the P.Ws. 1 and 4, on which, reliance has been placed by the trial Court to come to a conclusion that the appellant authored such death of the deceased by inflicting the blow with a knife on the belly of the deceased, is unworthy of credence, inasmuch as the said witnesses are interested witnesses being the family members of the deceased and also their version is full of material contradictions, the impugned judgment based on such evidence is unsustainable in the eye of law. Otherwise also, he submits that even if the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses is acceptable, but there being material that the appellant dealt single blow by a knife causing injuries which resulted in the death of the deceased with an intention to cause his death, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of IPC has no sanction of law. Therefore, he submits to set aside the judgment and order of conviction and sentence recorded under Section 302 of IPC or alternatively alter the conviction to one under Section 304, Part I of IPC and modify the sentence. 6. In response, learned counsel appearing for the State submits that as the aforesaid two eye-witnesses are the close relations of the deceased, it is fallacious to say that they are interested witnesses and their version as such is liable to be discarded. Presence of the aforesaid witnesses at the spot being acceptable and believable, when they have come out with a version that the appellant had dealt a blow to the deceased which resulted in the death of the deceased, there is no apparent reason to discard their such testimony. They being the relations, the same is more guarantee of truth to their version, inasmuch as they are the last persons to spare the real assailants substituting the appellant that too when the appellant was unknown to them and had no reason to rope him in this case falsely. Furthermore, he submits that mere being no material contradictions in the version of the witnesses and they having remained consistent in the substratum of the prosecution case in their version and there being no inter se contradiction in their version with regard to the appellant dealing the fatal blow to the deceased, the contention advanced assailing the version to be unworthy of credence also without substance. Since in this case, the appellant had dealt a blow by a deadly weapon causing fatal injuries, the same attracts the ingredients of charge under Section 302 of IPC is also the submission of the learned counsel for the State. Therefore, he submits, the judgment and order of conviction and sentence as returned by the trial Court needs no interference of this Court in this appeal. 7. Therefore, he submits, the judgment and order of conviction and sentence as returned by the trial Court needs no interference of this Court in this appeal. 7. Before addressing the contention of me counsel for the parties with regard to the sustainability of the finding of the trial Court that the appellant authored the death of the deceased, it would be apposite to mention here that here in this case, the deceased died of homicidal death sustaining injuries on his belly is not disputed by the defence in any manner. The doctor conducting the postmortem examination due to his non-availability could not be examined, but another doctor (P.W. 10) who was his colleague and acquainted with his signature and handwriting, has proved the post-mortem examination report, Ext. 5 containing the post-mortem finding on the body of the deceased as noticed by him and also his opinion. From the same, which is proved by P.W. 10, it emerges that the deceased died of haemorrhage and shock arising out of the ante-mortem injuries caused on the belly of the deceased and the death is homicidal one. 8. It appears that such expert opinion is based on the features noticed by the doctor conducting the autopsy and also findings recorded by him. Nothing has been brought to our notice that this doctor while conducting autopsy had not bestowed the required care and caution or the opinion is contrary to the features noted in the dead body of the deceased or the medical science nor could we find the same on perusal of the evidence in this regard. Therefore, the finding of the trial Court in this regard is based on acceptable expert opinion, hence needs no interference. 9. Now, coming to the contentious issue with regard to the author of such homicidal death. Therefore, the finding of the trial Court in this regard is based on acceptable expert opinion, hence needs no interference. 9. Now, coming to the contentious issue with regard to the author of such homicidal death. There is no manner of doubt that here in this case, the informant, P.W. 1 and P.W. 4 are the close relations of the deceased being respectively his sister and wife, but both of them have categorically stated in their evidence that when they along with the deceased were returning from their relation's house to their home in the relevant night, the appellant passed a comment to P.W. 4 and came near her and made an attempt to snatch the gold necklace, the deceased-husband of P.W. 4 made protest and there was tussle between them and then the appellant said to have dealt a blow by a knife to the belly of the deceased and fled away from the spot being chased by the deceased. Then, both of them come to their house and intimated the matter in their house, wherefrom the male members proceeded towards the spot and in search of the deceased, they found near the spot the deceased sustaining injuries was lying on the ground and therefrom he was taken to hospital, where he succumbed to the injuries. Their such version also gets corroboration from the medical evidence at Ext. 6, which speaks that the deceased had sustained injuries on his belly and the injuries were possible by stab blows. The contention that since the P.Ws. 1 and 4 are close relations of the deceased, they are interested witnesses and their version is unworthy of credence, appears to be fallacious, inasmuch as there is no proposition of law that relatives are interested witnesses and, as such, untruthful witnesses. Term "Interested" postulates that a person concerned must have some direct interest in seeing that the accused is somehow or the other convicted either because he had some animus with the accused or for some other reasons. Close relative who is a natural witness, therefore, is not necessarily an interested witness is well settled in law. The aforesaid proposition of law has been well settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a number of decisions, such as AIR 1977 SC 472 (Mst. Dalbir Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1996) 1 SCC 614 (Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar). 10. The aforesaid proposition of law has been well settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a number of decisions, such as AIR 1977 SC 472 (Mst. Dalbir Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1996) 1 SCC 614 (Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar). 10. Relationship would not result in the mechanical rejection of the testimony of the witnesses. Settled norms of appreciation of evidence require that the evidence of such witnesses is to be assessed with caution. (See, (2007) 2 SCC 310 : ( AIR 2007 SC 676 ) (Amitsingh Bhikamsing Thakur v. State of Maharashtra). Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of witness. It is more often than not that a relation would not conceal actual culprit and make allegations against an innocent person. Foundation has to be laid if plea of false implication is made. In such cases, the Court has to adopt a careful approach and analyse evidence to find out whether it is cogent and credible. (See, AIR 2002 SC 3633 (Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa)). When the natural presence of the relation in the scene of crime is acceptable, his evidence cannot be rejected merely because he happens to be a relation of the deceased, inasmuch as near relatives will be the last persons to leave out the real culprits and implicate those who have not participated in the crime. (See, (1993) Supp 4 SCC 218 : (1993 AIR SCW 2661) (Ram Asrey v. State of U.P.). 11. Keeping in mind the aforesaid, when the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 4, as stated earlier, is scrutinized, it is found that they are natural witnesses and they have no animosity with the appellant and to see that he is implicated and punished in this case. The same is fortified from the fact that they are unknown to the appellant and it is only when the deceased uttered the name of the appellant during course of such tussle they could know the name of the appellant and his name, as such, finds place in the FIR, Ext. 1. They have also identified the appellant in Court to be the perpetrator of the crime. P.W. 1 states the reason of such tussle while the appellant made an attempt to snatch the gold necklace of P.W. 4. No doubt, some discrepancy occurs with regard to snatching of gold necklace in the version of P.Ws. 1. They have also identified the appellant in Court to be the perpetrator of the crime. P.W. 1 states the reason of such tussle while the appellant made an attempt to snatch the gold necklace of P.W. 4. No doubt, some discrepancy occurs with regard to snatching of gold necklace in the version of P.Ws. 1 and 4, but such discrepancy in the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 4 is trivial. In substratum, both the witnesses have remained consistent to the fact that the appellant caused the injuries to the deceased when the latter obstructed the appellant from snatching away the gold necklace. Of course, it has been brought out that they had actually not seen the blow given, but during the course of tussle between the appellant and deceased, they found that the deceased sustained injuries and the appellant having a knife. The only inference that can be drawn is that it is the appellant who dealt the blow. So also, the same is fortified from the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 4 that after sustaining the injuries, the deceased shouted that the present appellant stabbed his belly. P.Ws. 1 and 4 both stated that the deceased stated that appellant gave the stab blow. Their such evidence also gets corroboration from the evidence of the doctor who found the injuries on the person of the deceased could have been caused by the knife, M.O. 1. This apart, P.Ws. 2, 5 and 6, who are the family members of the deceased, have stated that these two witnesses, such as, P.Ws. 1 and 4 on reaching their house immediately after the occurrence disclosed the incident before them that appellant-Rahim Khan attacked the deceased and thereafter they came to rescue the deceased and found him to be lying on the road wherefrom he was shifted to the hospital and succumbed to the injuries. In the cross-examination made, nothing substantial has been brought out to discard the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 4 who are the eyewitnesses to the occurrence. They are the close relations of the deceased having no animosity with the appellant. In such premises, mere is no apparent reason to discard their version that the appellant had caused the injuries to the deceased which contributed to the death of the deceased, as found in the post-mortem examination report, Ext. 5. The evidence of P.Ws. They are the close relations of the deceased having no animosity with the appellant. In such premises, mere is no apparent reason to discard their version that the appellant had caused the injuries to the deceased which contributed to the death of the deceased, as found in the post-mortem examination report, Ext. 5. The evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 4 being clear, cogent and acceptable one, which is also corroborated by the evidence as aforesaid, there is no apparent reason to discard the same. The same appears to be an acceptable version and, as such, it can very well be said that the prosecution has proved the case against the appellant that he caused the death of the deceased by inflicting injuries on the deceased. The finding recorded by the trial Court on such evidence, as such, needs no interference of this appellate Court, inasmuch as the same is supported by the acceptable evidence of close relations which is a guarantee of the truth inasmuch as they are not interested witnesses and their presence at the time of occurrence was natural one. 12. So far as me contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant in causing the death of the deceased cannot be said to have caused murder is concerned, such contention also appears to be fallacious in view of the fact that it has been proved that the appellant caused the injuries on the deceased which contributed of his death and such injury was sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause his death and mere is nothing on record to suggest that the injury inflicted was accidental or not intended. Therefore, such action of the appellant coming under clause "thirdly" of Section 300 of IPC and, as such, 'murder', inasmuch as mere is no material that the aforesaid death was caused within the exception of Section 300 of IPC. In this regard, we are fortified by a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in me case of Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in, AIR 1958 SC 465 , wherein their Lordships in me Hon'ble Apex Court have held as follows: "The prosecution must prove me following facts before it can bring a case under S. 300 "thirdly', First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that mere was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, me enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of me type, just described, made up of the three elements set out above, is sufficient to cause death in me ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. (Para 12) Once these four elements are established by me prosecution (and, of course, me burden is on the prosecution throughout), me offence is murder under S. 300 "thirdly". It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death, or that mere was no intention even to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (there is no real distinction between me two), or even that mere is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. (Para 13) Thus where no evidence or explanation is given about why me accused thrust a spear into the abdomen of the deceased with such force that it penetrated the bowels and three coils of the intestines came out of me wound and that digested food oozed out from cuts in three places, it would be perverse to conclude that he did not intend to inflict me injury that he did. (Para 15) The question whether the intention is there or not is one of fact and not one of law. Whether the wound is serious or otherwise, and if serious, how serious, is a totally separate and distinct question and has nothing to do with the question whether the prisoner intended to inflict the injury in question. (Para 16) It is true that in a given case the enquiry may be linked up with the seriousness of me injury. Whether the wound is serious or otherwise, and if serious, how serious, is a totally separate and distinct question and has nothing to do with the question whether the prisoner intended to inflict the injury in question. (Para 16) It is true that in a given case the enquiry may be linked up with the seriousness of me injury. For example, if it can be proved, or if the totality of the circumstances justify an inference, that the prisoner only intended a superficial scratch and that by accident his victim stumbled and fell on the sword or spear that was used, men of course me offence is not murder. But that is not because the prisoner did not intend me injury that he intended to inflict to be as serious as it turned out to be but because he did not intend to inflict the injury in question at all. (Para 17)" 13. Resultantly, for the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in this appeal and, accordingly, dismiss the same. The impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-2, Cuttack are hereby confirmed. P. Mohanty, J. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed