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2014 DIGILAW 2581 (MAD)

Rajamanickkam v. Mandratharasi

2014-08-12

S.VIMALA

body2014
Judgment 1. The plaintiff is the appellant. He is the first defendant's sister's husband. The second defendant is the grandson of the first defendant. 2. The parties are referred to as per the nomenclature assigned to them in the trial court. 3. The plaintiff filed a suit in O.S.No.88 of 1996 for specific performance based upon the sale agreement, dated 11.06.1993. The suit was decreed, directing the first defendant to execute the sale deed within a period of two months. Aggrieved over that, the defendants filed an appeal in A.S.No.15 of 1999. The said appeal was allowed and thereby, the decree of the trial court came to be set-aside. Hence, the second appeal by the plaintiff. 4. The above second appeal has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law:- “1. Whether the findings of the lower appellate court are vitiated by its failure to consider the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 4 corroborated by documentary evidence Exs.A-3 to A-9 and the allegation in the reply notice, A-11? 2. Whether the findings of the lower appellate court are vitiated by its failure to take into consideration the proved and admitted facts cumulatively and draw the legal inferences thereon?” Brief facts:- 5. The first defendant, in order to pay the debt incurred towards the marriage of her daughter, borrowed a sum of Rs.36,000/- from the plaintiff and as she was not able to repay, she executed an agreement to sell the suit property (Northern 12½ cents out of 25 cents in R.S.No.52/3 in Kodugur) on 11.06.1993. As the first defendant did not execute the sale deed, the plaintiff issued a notice, for which the first defendant gave a reply stating that she had executed a settlement deed in favour of the second defendant on 26.07.1996, thereby denying the truth and validity of the sale agreement. She was also trying to interfere with the possession and enjoyment of the suit property. Hence, the suit for specific performance and injunction was filed. 6. The written statement filed by the first defendant was adopted by the second defendant and the contentions in the written statement are as follows:- 1. The relationship between the parties is admitted. 2. The first defendant did not execute any sale agreement in favour of the plaintiff; she did not borrow Rs.36,000/- at any point of time; she did not agree to sell the suit property. 3. The relationship between the parties is admitted. 2. The first defendant did not execute any sale agreement in favour of the plaintiff; she did not borrow Rs.36,000/- at any point of time; she did not agree to sell the suit property. 3. The plaintiff was assisting the first defendant and when the first defendant constructed a house in the suit property, the plaintiff obtained the signature of the first defendant on the ground that those signatures are required for the purpose of obtaining electricity connection and other facilities; utilising those papers, the sale agreement has been concocted. 4. The plaintiff had been staying in a part of the house; taking advantage of that, the plaintiff has created several documents like, Kist receipts, house tax receipts, etc., and planning to grab the property. 5. After the death of his first wife, the plaintiff married Dhanabakiyam, as his second wife, and to conduct that case, the plaintiff demanded money and the first defendant handed over jewels of her daughter; that was not redeemed by the plaintiff; on account of that, there was enmity between the plaintiff and the first defendant and as an offshoot, the suit agreement has been fabricated. 7. The trial court framed the following issues:- 1. Whether the first defendant executed the sale agreement, dated 11.06.1993? 2. Whether possession was given to the plaintiff based upon the sale agreement and whether plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the suit property? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the suit for specific performance? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunction? 5. To what other reliefs, the parties are entitled to? 8. The trial court relied upon the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 and decreed the suit. Relying upon Exs.A-2 to A-9, it was held that the plaintiff was in possession and enjoyment of the suit property and therefore, the plaintiff is also entitled to an order of injunction. Observing that the reply notice given by the first defendant is found to be true and also relying upon the evidence given by P.Ws.1 to 4, the plaintiff was held entitled to the relief of specific performance. 9. Observing that the reply notice given by the first defendant is found to be true and also relying upon the evidence given by P.Ws.1 to 4, the plaintiff was held entitled to the relief of specific performance. 9. The first appellate court, while dealing with the genuineness or otherwise of the signature, as found in the sale agreement, has compared the admitted signature of the first defendant with that of disputed signature in the sale agreement and came to the conclusion that the signature in the sale agreement is a forged one and thus, held that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of specific performance. 10. Challenging the dismissal of the suit, the plaintiff has filed the second appeal. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff contended that: (a) the production of the original title deed Ex.A-2 from the custody of the plaintiff; (b) the payment of property tax and electricity charges under Exs.A-3 to A-9; (c) the admission by the first defendant that the plaintiff was helpful in purchasing the suit property and that he was also helpful during the marriage of the daughter of the first defendant, are all factors which would probablise the contention of the plaintiff that the first defendant executed the sale agreement in favour of the plaintiff, in consideration of Rs.36,000/-, which was paid to the first defendant through the plaintiff, for the marriage of the first defendant's daughter. 12. Whether these contentions could be accepted as true, is the main issue to be considered. 13. Admittedly, the first defendant is the sister of the plaintiff's wife. The plaintiff helped the first defendant in not only purchasing the suit property under Ex.A-2, but also helped her during the marriage of the first defendant's daughter. The plaintiff believes that the relationship between the parties and the help rendered by him to the first defendant would strongly speak in favour of the plaintiff's case. But, unfortunately, it is not so. 14. When it is admitted that the first defendant is a widow, who utilised the help from the plaintiff, as her sister's husband, whether that nexus would have made the first defendant to execute the sale agreement or the nexus would have been mis-utilised by the plaintiff to the extent of grabbing the property from the first defendant. 15. 14. When it is admitted that the first defendant is a widow, who utilised the help from the plaintiff, as her sister's husband, whether that nexus would have made the first defendant to execute the sale agreement or the nexus would have been mis-utilised by the plaintiff to the extent of grabbing the property from the first defendant. 15. In respect of the suit for specific performance, the first requirement of the plaintiff is to prove that the sale agreement is true and genuine. So far as this aspect is concerned, this Court also compared the admitted signature of the first defendant with that of the disputed signature and it is crystal clear that the signature in the sale agreement is a forged one. Therefore, based upon the forged document, the plaintiff cannot seek equitable relief of specific performance. 16. It is contended that the first defendant herself has admitted the signature in the sale agreement. But, on a perusal of the entire evidence, it is clear that she has no-where admitted her signature in the sale agreement. 16.1. The production of the title deed in respect of the suit property is strongly relied upon to show the probability that the sale agreement must be a true document. In any transaction, between two parties, with reference to the sale agreement, the production of the original title deed from the hands of the agreement holder would be of great importance and relevance. But, so far as this case is concerned, it is the specific evidence of the first defendant that the plaintiff had obtained the original title deed from her, on the pretext of obtaining patta in respect of the suit property. 16.2. This version of the first defendant should be true, because even before the completion of the sale (as asked for by the plaintiff) the plaintiff had produced land tax receipts-Exs.A-3 and A4, electricity card-Ex.A-5, house tax receipts-Exs.A-6, A-7 and A-8 and receipt issued by the electricity board-Ex.A-9, which stand in the name of the plaintiff. It is not known, how the house tax receipts and the electricity card could stand in the name of the plaintiff, when it is not even his claim that he is the owner of the property. Admittedly and allegedly, he is only an agreement holder and not the owner. It is not known, how the house tax receipts and the electricity card could stand in the name of the plaintiff, when it is not even his claim that he is the owner of the property. Admittedly and allegedly, he is only an agreement holder and not the owner. When it is stated by the first defendant that the plaintiff obtained her signature in blank papers on the ground of obtaining electricity connection and house tax receipts, this statement stands probablised by the fact that the plaintiff might have misutilised the signature obtained in the blank paper and got the electricity card and property tax in his name, though not being the owner of the property. Consequentially, when the signature, as found in the sale agreement is found to be fabricated, the inference is that, as stated by the first defendant, the signatures obtained in the blank papers might have been used as a model to forge the signature in the sale agreement. 17. It is vehemently contended that the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 4 is very cogent in speaking about the sale agreement and therefore, the evidence cannot be brushed aside. 17.1. This contention cannot be accepted as Courts are not functioning merely to read the evidence and accept it as true. The function of the Court is to interpret the evidence in proper perspective and to accept it or to reject it, depending upon the value to be attached to it. The evidence of P.Ws.1 to 4 are not cogent and are contradictory on several important aspects. 18. The next contention is that the plaintiff had been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property and that would probablise the truthfulness of the sale agreement. 18.1. No doubt, the plaintiff had been in possession and enjoyment of the property for some time, even according to the case of the first defendant. But in what capacity he was in possession, is the issue to be considered. Whether he was in permissive possession or he was in possession in his own right in pursuance of the sale agreement is an issue. 18.2. The first defendant has stated in her evidence that the first defendant was staying in Kudikadu Village and when his house got demolished, he was in possession of the house in the suit property for sometime. 18.2. The first defendant has stated in her evidence that the first defendant was staying in Kudikadu Village and when his house got demolished, he was in possession of the house in the suit property for sometime. Therefore, it is clear that the plaintiff has conceived an idea to grab the property even at the time of entry into the house and that is why, he has obtained the property tax itself in his own name, when he is admittedly not the owner of the property. 19. It is the contention of the first defendant that there was no necessity for her to borrow any money and the plaintiff has no wherewithal to lend money. 19.1. This contention is probablised by the admission made by P.W.2 that the first defendant was not under a necessity to borrow money. Moreover, the recitals under Ex.A-1 itself would go to show that the plaintiff was not in a position to get the document registered, meaning thereby that he has no money to get the document registered. If that is true, then the question is, whether the plaintiff could have got money to the extent of Rs.36,000/- which has been paid to the first defendant under various occasions. 19.2. The evidence available on record would go to show that the plaintiff could not have advanced Rs.36,000/- under the alleged sale agreement. There is contradiction in the evidence of P.W.1, with regard to payment of Rs.36,000/- and the contradiction is between the averment made in Ex.A-1 sale agreement and evidence of P.W.1 before the Court. In the sale agreement, it is stated that the first defendant had borrowed amount on promissory note and to discharge the promissory note, the plaintiff had paid a sum of Rs.36,000/-. While giving evidence, P.W.1 has stated that he sold his land and he himself discharged the debt borrowed by the first defendant. Nobody has been examined to speak about the discharge of the debt under the promissory note. Therefore, it is clear that the alleged sale agreement could not be a true document. 19.3. While giving evidence, P.W.1 has stated that he sold his land and he himself discharged the debt borrowed by the first defendant. Nobody has been examined to speak about the discharge of the debt under the promissory note. Therefore, it is clear that the alleged sale agreement could not be a true document. 19.3. The witness, P.W.2 has gone to the extent of saying that at the time when the suit property was purchased by the first defendant, the purchase money was paid by the plaintiff and the document was obtained in the name of the first defendant, thereby implying that the title vests with the plaintiff and not with the first defendant. 19.4. This evidence brings the cat out of the bag and would go to show that even at the time of purchasing the property, a plan had been conceived to grab the property from the first defendant. When this evidence is considered along with the evidence of the first defendant, where she has stated that the plaintiff, being a court bird, having rich experience in conducting cases, might have concocted the sale agreement easily. In other words, the contention of the first defendant is that, the plaintiff has purchased the litigation towards his plan to purchase the property. 19.5. This contention cannot be easily brushed aside considering the overall facts and circumstances and especially the plaintiff having manoeuvered to obtain documents in his own name even before getting success in his attempt to get the property in his name. 20. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the well considered judgment of the first appellate court does not require any interference. Hence, the second appeal has no merits and it is dismissed with costs throughout. Consequently, the connected CMP is closed.