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2014 DIGILAW 259 (UTT)

Suresh Chandra @ Suresh Pal v. Sarna Devi

2014-06-18

U.C.DHYANI

body2014
JUDGMENT U.C. Dhyani, J. 1. By filing the present writ petitions, the petitioners seek to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned judgment dated 19.08.2009, passed by Addl. District Judge/IV F.T.C. Dehradun, in Rent Control Appeal no. 95 of 2006. 2. Respondent no. 1 filed a release application in the court of Prescribed Authority/Civil Judge (Senior Division), Dehradun under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (as applicable in Uttarakhand) for the need of her son, daughter-in-law, widowed daughter and her grand children. Learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) dismissed such release application, vide judgment and order dated 05.06.2006. Aggrieved against the judgment, passed by the Prescribed Authority/Civil Judge (Senior Division), in P.A. Case No. 53 of 2001, titled as Smt. Sarna Devi vs. Suresh Chandra alias Suresh Pal and others, a rent control appeal, bearing no. 95 of 2006, was preferred by the landlady. The appeal was allowed by learned Addl. District Judge/IV F.T.C. Dehradun, vide order dated 19.08.2009. The judgment and order dated 05.06.2006, passed by Civil Judge (Senior Division) in P.A. Case no. 53 of 2001, was set aside. The appellant was directed to comply with second proviso to Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). Feeling aggrieved against the impugned judgment and order dated 19.08.2009, two separate writ petitions were filed on behalf of the petitioners, which are being decided by this common judgment and order for the sake of brevity and convenience. 3. Smt. Sarna Devi is the owner of property situated at 202, Block II, Chukhuwala, Dehradun. The petitioners are the tenants in their respective portions. Whereas Suresh Chandra is the tenant in portion ‘A’ Sukhbir Singh is the tenant in portion ‘B’ as shown at the foot of the application for release. In the release application, it was stated that Suresh Chandra is carrying the business of making and selling of furniture at the monthly rent of Rs. 50/-. Another writ petitioner Sukhbir Singh is a tenant in one room on a monthly rent of Rs. 100/-. It was the case of landlady in her release application, that she has a large family and she has to support her son, daughter-in-law, widowed daughter and her two children and two married daughters, who often visit her. 50/-. Another writ petitioner Sukhbir Singh is a tenant in one room on a monthly rent of Rs. 100/-. It was the case of landlady in her release application, that she has a large family and she has to support her son, daughter-in-law, widowed daughter and her two children and two married daughters, who often visit her. She urgently required additional accommodation to provide proper and comfortable living rooms and kitchens etc. for her children, who are facing great inconvenience and hardship on account of shortage of accommodation. The release application was contested by the tenants-writ petitioners, who filed their written statements, wherein they admitted their tenancy, but denied the claim of the landlady. 4. According to the tenants-writ petitioners, the claim of the landlady was not bona fide and the release application was moved mala fide with the intention to harass the tenants and evicting them. 5. The Prescribed Authority, on considering the claims and counter-claims, rejected the release application of the landlady, which application was moved under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. It is the contention of learned counsel for the respondent-landlady that it is a settled position of law that the bona fide requirement means that the need must be honest. It is not a mere desire or wish, and while deciding this question, the court would not look into the broad aspects without getting swayed away by any consideration. According to learned counsel, the crucial date for deciding the bona fide requirement of landlady is the date of her application for eviction. Reliance was placed upon the rulings of G.C. Kapoor vs. Nand Kumar Bhasin and Another, 2002 (1) SCC 610 . 6. This fact is under no dispute that the property mentioned in portion ‘A’ and portion ‘B’ is under the tenancy of the writ petitioners and is governed by the provisions of Act no. 13 of 1971. 7. The word ‘require’ implies something more than a mere wish or desire or impulse on the part of the landlord. Although the element of need is present in both the cases, the real distinction between the word ‘desire’ and ‘require’ is in the insistence of the need. There is an element of ‘must have’ in the case of ‘require’. It is not present in the case of mere desire. 8. Although the element of need is present in both the cases, the real distinction between the word ‘desire’ and ‘require’ is in the insistence of the need. There is an element of ‘must have’ in the case of ‘require’. It is not present in the case of mere desire. 8. It was held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Malpe Vishwanath Aditya and Others vs. State of Maharastra, 1998 (2) SCC 1 , that the need of social legislation like Rent Control Act is to strike a balance between rival interests. The law ought not to be unjust to one and give a disproportionate benefit or protection to another section of the society. While the shortage of accommodation makes it necessary to protect the tenants to save them from exploitation, but at the same time, the need to protect the tenants is coupled with an obligation to ensure that the tenants are not conferred with a benefit disproportionately larger than the one required. 9. Section 21(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, requires that a premise should be bona fidely required by the landlord. The need of landlord, therefore, should not be dishonest and an application should not be filed by the landlord or landlady with an ulterior motive. It should not be a device to evict a tenant. The question of bona fide requirement is to be objectively decided by a court and its decision should not depend on the subjective satisfaction of the landlord or the tenant. 10. Learned lower appellate court while rendering the impugned judgment did not find favour with the judgment rendered by the Prescribed Authority, who held that the need of the landlady was not bona fide and she has sufficient accommodation available with her. Learned lower appellate court was of the view that the Prescribed Authority, while considering the application for release under Section 21 of the Act, has to consider only whether the building sought to be released is bona fidely required by the landlord / landlady or not? The Prescribed Authority has not to consider as to whether the accommodation already in occupation of the landlady was sufficient for her need or not? The Prescribed Authority has not to consider as to whether the accommodation already in occupation of the landlady was sufficient for her need or not? Every owner of a building has a right to occupy his or her own building and as such the legislature contemplated that when the building is vacant or is likely to fall vacant and the landlord/landlady requires the said building for his/her bona fide need, then the said premises should be released to his or her favour. This is the consideration which has to be weighed while deciding a release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972. 11. Learned lower appellate court did not find favour with the inference of the Prescribed Authority that there was no bona fide need or comparative hardship in favour of the landlady. It cannot be expected from two growing male children to live with their mother in the same room, who have attained majority during the pendency of eviction proceedings. Their dates of birth were 22.01.1988 and 08.04.1990. They also need some privacy. The mother also requires some privacy. Three grownups cannot conveniently live together in one room. One of the son of the landlady is married. Learned lower appellate court took into account all these aspects to hold that the landlady had no other alternative accommodation. The tenants-writ petitioners did not lead any evidence, which could show that they ever attempted to make a search for an alternative accommodation or ever attempted to seek allotment of any accommodation. There was, therefore, inaction on the part of the tenants in searching for an alternative accommodation by seeking allotment or otherwise searching for an accommodation for them. Non-availability of alternative accommodation to the tenants in itself is no good ground to reject the application of the landlady to release her building. 12. Lower Appellate Court, therefore, find cogent reasons to allow the appeal of the landlady and in setting aside the order of Prescribed Authority, whereby her application for release was dismissed. 13. This Court has considered the elements which are required to be considered for release under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. This Court is, therefore, of the opinion that the findings arrived by the learned lower appellate court are not perverse. The reasons are sound. No interference is called for in the same. This Court is, therefore, of the opinion that the findings arrived by the learned lower appellate court are not perverse. The reasons are sound. No interference is called for in the same. 14. The writ petitions lack merit and are liable to be dismissed. 15. At this stage, learned counsel for the writ petitioners seek 1½ years time to vacate the premises on behalf of their clients. 16. Both the writ petitions are dismissed. The writ petitioners-tenants are, however, given 1½ years time to vacate the premises in dispute and to handover the vacant possession of the same to the landlady (respondent no. 1). All the pending applications, accordingly, also stand disposed of.