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2014 DIGILAW 2595 (MAD)

K. E. Ramesh v. Salona Cotspin Ltd.

2014-08-13

C.T.SELVAM

body2014
Judgment : 1. This revision is preferred against two concurrent judgments of the Courts below convicting the petitioner for offences under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and sentencing the petitioner to undergo four months S.I. and fine of Rs.1,000/- in default one month S.I. 2. The petitioner faced trial for offences under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in S.T.C.No.2033 of 2006 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate I, Coimbatore. The complainant company is engaged in yarn business. The complainant's case was that the petitioner has purchased yarn and towards payment therefor, issued a cheque for Rs.2,67,500/- dated 17.11.2005. On presentation of the cheque and return thereof unpaid, the complainant caused statutory notice, followed the procedure envisaged under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and preferred the complaint. 3. Before the trial Court, the prosecution examined one witness and eight exhibits were marked. None were examined on behalf of the defence nor were any exhibits marked. 4. On appreciation of materials before it, the trial Court rendered a finding of conviction and sentenced the petitioner to undergo four months S.I. and fine of Rs.1,000/- in default one month S.I. There against, the petitioner has filed C.A.No.366 of 2008 before learned District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court III, Coimbatore, which came to be dismissed under judgment dated 12.01.2009. Against such finding, the present revision has been filed. 5. Heard learned counsel for petitioner and learned counsel for respondent. 6. This Court finds no error in the factual findings of the Courts below. The only question that requires consideration is whether the complaint initiated by one Sekar, informed to be the then Manager of the complainant, without a specific authorisation, stood validated pursuant to the recording of the sworn statement of the person authorised under Board Resolution of the Company and further prosecution of the case by him. In the instant case, the sworn statement of one Mahesh Kumar Agarwal has been recorded. Upon his examination as PW-1, the prosecution exhibits have been marked. The Board Resolution of the complainant company dated 31.10.2006 has been marked as Ex-P7. The same informs that PW-1 was the person authorised to effect prosecution on behalf of the complainant company. 7. In the instant case, the sworn statement of one Mahesh Kumar Agarwal has been recorded. Upon his examination as PW-1, the prosecution exhibits have been marked. The Board Resolution of the complainant company dated 31.10.2006 has been marked as Ex-P7. The same informs that PW-1 was the person authorised to effect prosecution on behalf of the complainant company. 7. The Apex Court in M.M.T.C. Ltd. and another vs. M/s. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. and another [ AIR 2002 SC 182 ]has informed that the complaint cannot be quashed merely because the complaint was signed and presented by a person, who is neither an authorized agent nor a person empowered under the Articles of Association or by any resolution of the Board to do so. Paragraph Nos.11 and 12 of such judgment reads as follows: “11. This Court has as far back as, in the case of Vishwa Mitter v. O.P.Poddar reported in (1983) 4 SCC 701 , held that it is clear that anyone can set the criminal law in motion by filing a complaint of facts constituting an offence before a Magistrate entitled to take cognizance. It has been held that no Court can decline to take cognizance on the sole ground that the complainant was not competent to file the complaint. It has been held that if any special statute prescribes offences and makes any special provision for taking cognizance of such offences under the statute, then the complainant requesting the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence must satisfy the eligibility criterion prescribed by the statute. In the present case the only eligibility criterion prescribed by Section 142 is that the complaint must be by the payee or the holder in due course. This criterion is satisfied as the complaint is in the name and on behalf of the appellant Company. 12. In the case of Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshvanand reported in [ 1998 (1) SCC 687 ], it has been held by this Court that the complainant has to be a corporeal person who is capable of making a physical appearance in the Court. It has been held that if a complaint is made in the name of a incorporeal person (like a company or corporation) it is necessary that a natural person represents such juristic person in the Court. It has been held that if a complaint is made in the name of a incorporeal person (like a company or corporation) it is necessary that a natural person represents such juristic person in the Court. It is held that the Court looks upon the natural person to be the complainant for all practical purposes. It is held that when the complainant is a body corporate it is the de jure complainant, and it must necessarily associate a human being as de facto complaint to represent the former in Court proceedings. It has further been held that no Magistrate shall insist that the particular person, whose statement was taken on oath at the first instance, alone can continue to represent the company till the end of the proceedings. It has been held that there may be occasions when different persons can represent the company. It has been held that it is open to the de jure complainant company to seek permission of the Court for sending any other person to represent the company in the Court. Thus, even presuming, that initially there was no authority, still the Company can, at any stage, rectify that defect. At a subsequent stage the Company can send a person who is competent to represent the company. The complaints could thus not have been quashed on this ground.” 8. In decision in Haryana State Cooperative Supply and Marketing Federation Limited vs. Jayam Textiles and another [ 2014 (4) SCC 704 ], the Apex Court has held that 'procedural defects and irregularities, which are curable, should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice. Procedure, a handmaiden to justice, should never be made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice, by any oppressive or punitive use.' 9. In the instant case, the complainant is a company. The complaint had been preferred by one Sekar, who was the Manager thereof. The prosecution has been carried forward by a person duly authorized by the company as evidenced by Ex.P7. In the circumstances, this Court finds no error in the judgments under challenge. 10. This Criminal Revision shall stand dismissed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.