Judgment : These two writ petitions are disposed of through this common order. Affidavits in support of the writ petitions, counter affidavits, reply affidavits and reply to the reply affidavits have been filed. The controversy is the order abolishing two posts of Assistant Executive Engineers (AEEs, for short) in the Nizam’s Institute of Medical Sciences (NIMS, for short), Hyderabad, resulting in the cessation of the employment of the petitioners in each of the cases. The writ petitioner in W.P.No.4297 of 2001 would be referred to hereinafter as the first petitioner. The writ petitioner in W.P.No.4337 of 2001 would be referred to hereinafter as the second petitioner. 2. Both the petitioners were appointed as AEEs/Junior Engineers by the NIMS in 1991 after due selection by the Selection Committee. There have been three posts of AEEs in the NIMS. They are the posts meant to maintain buildings of NIMS and also participate in the construction of the buildings. NIMS also has an honourary Technical Advisor, who is not its employee. It is the case of the petitioners that they made complaints against the conduct of the Technical Advisor that the Technical Advisor was allotting work to a specific contractor by name U. Venkateswara Rao on nomination basis. It would appear that petitioners wrote dissent notes on 2 or 3 occasions for allotment of work to the said Venkateswara Rao. It is the case of the petitioners that the Technical Advisor bore grudge against the petitioners as the petitioners were in the way of Technical Advisor allotting works to a contractor of his choice. The petitioners were placed under suspension on one occasion allegedly on the advice of the Technical Advisor when they suggested to ignore the Technical Advisor’s recommendations to allot works to contractor Venkateswara Rao. The petitioners further alleged that the works were allotted to contractor-Venkateswara Rao after the petitioners were placed under suspension and that after completion of those works, the petitioners were reinstated without any enquiry and any action. It is alleged that the matters relating to the suspension were silently buried thereafter. 3. It is the case of the petitioners that on the advice of the Technical Advisor, the management of NIMS decided to dispense with the services of the petitioners. It is alleged that the matters relating to the suspension were silently buried thereafter. 3. It is the case of the petitioners that on the advice of the Technical Advisor, the management of NIMS decided to dispense with the services of the petitioners. They alleged that as it was not easy to terminate the services of the petitioners, the management adopted the method of abolishing two posts of AEEs and to terminate the services of the petitioners on the basis of the principle of ‘last come first go’ allowing the other AEE alone to remain in the office. 4. On 19.01.2001, NIMS issued show cause notice to the petitioners stating that enough work is not available for three Engineers and that it decided to abolish two posts of AEEs held by the petitioners. It is contended by Sri M. Surendra Rao, learned senior counsel representing the second petitioner that the very attempt of NIMS to abolish the two posts of AEEs was with a view to get rid off the petitioners. He pointed out that the conduct of the Technical Advisor was not satisfactory as can be seen from the vigilance repot dated 27.08.2002. The basis of the vigilance report was the complaint lodged by the first petitioner herein on the irregularities committed during the construction of the Millenium Block in the premises of the NIMS. The Director General, Vigilance and Enforcement opined that the Director of NIMS solely depended on the Technical Advisor ignoring the opinion of the AEEs and that favour was shown on the contractor leading to a loss of over Rs.37 lakhs to the Government. 5. The learned senior counsel referred to another report of a subsequent Director General of the Vigilance and Enforcement dated 25.03.2010. Again, it was found that there were short comings on the part of various officials of NIMS including the Technical Advisor. It would appear that there was discussion in the Assembly also where the Government agreed that there were various mistakes in the construction of the Millenium Block. 6. As things stood thus, the Technical Advisor submitted a note regarding the construction of VVIP paying room block. In the note, it was recorded that both the petitioners resorted to commissions and omissions and that it would be advisable to terminate or dismiss the two petitioners from service. The Technical Advisor signed the note on 02.01.2001. 6. As things stood thus, the Technical Advisor submitted a note regarding the construction of VVIP paying room block. In the note, it was recorded that both the petitioners resorted to commissions and omissions and that it would be advisable to terminate or dismiss the two petitioners from service. The Technical Advisor signed the note on 02.01.2001. Soon thereafter, on 19.01.2001, NIMS issued the two petitioners from service. The Technical Advisor signed the note on 02.01.2001. Soon thereafter, on 19.01.2001, NIMS issued show cause notices as to why the two posts of AEEs should not be abolished. It is contended by the learned senior counsel for the second petitioner that NIMS considered that it would be impossible to prove any allegations against the petitioners and impossible to terminate the services of the petitioners by proving the allegations against them and that the services, therefore, could be terminated by deeming it appropriate to abolish the posts held by them and terminating their services along with the posts. 7. There is no dispute that both the petitioners are regular employees. They were selected by due selection process and were appointed on regular basis. Their services were subsequently regularized. Their probation was also declared later. Thus, evidently, both the petitioners are on the rolls of the NIMS as permanent employees; they could not have been terminated without holding any enquiry against them. It is contended by the senior counsel for the second petitioner that as NIMS was not able to establish their charge against the petitioners, it decided to terminate the services of the petitioners indirectly by abolishing the posts held by them. 8. The learned senior counsel for the second petitioner contended that the services of the petitioners cannot be terminated without due enquiry. In Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly ( (1986) 3 SCC 156 ), the Service Rules provided that the services of the permanent employee could be terminated with three months notice. The Supreme Court held that such a term in the service condition was invalid and that the services of a permanent employee cannot be terminated through a process like three months notice. In 1991, this issue was once again considered extensively by the Supreme Court. 9. The Supreme Court held that such a term in the service condition was invalid and that the services of a permanent employee cannot be terminated through a process like three months notice. In 1991, this issue was once again considered extensively by the Supreme Court. 9. Placing reliance upon Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd.’s case(1 supra), the Supreme Court reiterated that the termination of the services by three months notice on the face of such a Rule in the service condition was invalid. It is contended by the senior counsel for the second petitioner that when the services of the petitioners could not be terminated by three months notice, the same cannot be terminated by abolishing the posts. They claim that the abolition of the posts is liable to be set aside. They also submitted that the termination of the petitioners on the basis of the abolition of the posts also is liable to be set aside as a consequential relief. It is the contention of the learned senior counsel for the second petitioner on the basis of these decisions and arguments that the termination of the petitioners is bad. 10. The learned standing counsel for NIMS submitted that NIMS wanted to abolish two posts of AEEs, owing to financial constraints. He submitted that the disengagement of the petitioners was on the basis of the principle of ‘last come first go’. His main contention is that NIMS has not been receiving sufficient funds to enable NIMS to make constructions and that when there was no possibility of making constructions, the presence of two AEEs was redundant. 11. The learned senior counsel for the second petitioner, however, countered the attack of the standing counsel for NIMS regarding the constraint of funds. He produced the grants NIMS has been receiving from year to year. The grant has been increasing from year to year and has not been decreasing. NIMS cannot contend that it was suffering from financial constraints for want of grants. The claim of the petitioners that NIMS has been making extensive constructions at Bibinagar to establish a Medical University has also not been denied by the NIMS. The grant has been increasing from year to year and has not been decreasing. NIMS cannot contend that it was suffering from financial constraints for want of grants. The claim of the petitioners that NIMS has been making extensive constructions at Bibinagar to establish a Medical University has also not been denied by the NIMS. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that NIMS, which is aiming to start the Medical University and admittedly is making extensive constructions cannot be heard to say that it does not require the assistance of two AEEs and that one AEE is sufficient for his requirement. 12. I am in agreement with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners in this regard that when NIMS has been making constructions and has been receiving funds from the Government regularly, it cannot urge that NIMS has not been receiving grants from the Government and that NIMS considers the services of two AEEs as a wasteful financial expenditure. 13. The learned standing counsel for the NIMS also contended that the conduct of the petitioners was incorrigible, so much so, it is in fact necessary to terminate the services of the petitioners from service. The NIMS, however, cannot resort to colourable exercise of power by abolishing the two posts of AEEs and achieve the object of terminating the services of the petitioners. 14. The learned standing counsel for NIMS submitted that in 2008 and 2010, when NIMS notified for temporary appointment of Engineers, the petitioners obtained interim directions from the Court restraining NIMS from filling up of the posts. He also submitted that when the petitioners were engaged for a period of six months on temporary basis under the powers vested under Section 40 of the NIMS Act, the petitioners did not discharge their duties satisfactorily. This allegation once again shows that NIMS wants to dispense with the services of the petitioners, for one reason or the other. In such a background, where the abolition of the posts on the ground of non-receipt of grants is not justified, it would be appropriate to set aside the order abolishing posts of two AEEs and grant consequential reliefs. 15. The learned senior counsel for the second petitioner contended that Courts do not interfere with the policy decision of the instrumentality of the State in abolishing posts. In Dr. 15. The learned senior counsel for the second petitioner contended that Courts do not interfere with the policy decision of the instrumentality of the State in abolishing posts. In Dr. N.C. Singhal v. Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 29 ), it was noticed in para 18: “Creation and abolition of posts is a matter of government policy and every sovereign government has this power in the interest and necessity of internal administration. The creation or abolition of post is dictated by policy decision, exigencies of circumstances and administrative necessity. The creation, the continuance and the abolition of post are all decided by the government in the interest of administration and general public (see M. Ramanatha Pilai v. State of Kerala ( AIR 1973 SC 2641 )). The court would be the least competent in the face of scanty material to decide whether the government acted honestly in creating a post or refusing to crate a post or its decision suffers from mala fide, legal or factual.” 16. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that it would not be appropriate for the Courts to go into the policy decision of NIMS to abolish the posts. In State of Haryana v. Navneet Verma ((2008) 2 SCC 65), the Supreme Court held that the power of Government to abolish the posts in good faith is not amenable to judicial review. In the present case, the ground on which the posts are sought to be abolished is the non-availability of funds, which is proved to be incorrect. Further, the note of the Technical Advisor is that it would be appropriate to terminate the services of the petitioners or to dismiss them from service, which was soon thereafter followed by the abolition of the posts of two AEEs leading to the automatic termination of the petitioners from service. I am afraid that the abolition of the posts of two AEEs in this case is mala fide and is aimed at the termination of the petitioners from service. The Courts certainly shall interfere with such activity on the part of an instrumentality of the State. 17. Indeed, it was noticed by the Supreme Court in Avas Vikas Sansthan v. Avas Vikas Sansthan Engineers Association (2006) 4 SCC 132 ) that when posts are abolished, the displaced employees would not be entitled to alternative employment. The Courts certainly shall interfere with such activity on the part of an instrumentality of the State. 17. Indeed, it was noticed by the Supreme Court in Avas Vikas Sansthan v. Avas Vikas Sansthan Engineers Association (2006) 4 SCC 132 ) that when posts are abolished, the displaced employees would not be entitled to alternative employment. However, where the very abolition was motivated and a colourable exercise of the discretion, the abolition of the posts is liable to be set aside. As already pointed out, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. In Samundra Devi v. Narendra Kaur (VIII (2008) SLT 182), it was noted: “………. It is well settled that what cannot be permitted to be done directly, cannot be permitted to be done indirectly.” 18. It is clear that the services of the petitioners would not have been terminated without due enquiry. The services of such petitioners cannot be terminated by abolishing the posts, more so, where the very abolition is found motivated. Consequently, the petitioners are entitled to the claim made by them. 19. Both the writ petitions are accordingly allowed. The impugned proceedings abolishing the posts of two AEEs in NIMS are set aside with a consequential direction to NIMS to restore the services of both the petitioners. The petitioners shall be reinstated into service within 4 (four) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The petitioners are entitled to continuity of service and attendant benefits. The petitioners, however, shall not be eligible for any back wages for the period they were out of employment. Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in this writ petition shall stand closed. No costs.