JUDGMENT 1. This Civil Revision Petition has been filed by the petitioner against the order dated 04.09.2010 made in I.A.No.137 of 2009 in O.S.No.2 of 2001 on the file of the Principal District Court, Villupuram. 2. The Petitioner is the plaintiff in O.S.No.2 of 2001 on the file of the Principal District Court, Villupuram. The petitioner filed the suit for permanent injunction restraining the respondent from infringing the Plaintiff's Trademark, "Srivalli Jewellery" by using the plaintiff's Trademark as part of the offending Trade Mark "Villupuram Srivalli Vilas Nagai Maligai" or any other similar or deceptively similar trade mark or obvious imitations thereof in any of the articles of the respondent or in their bills, invoices, stickers, vouchers, packing materials, posters, sign boards, name boards, brochures, advertisements in any media or in advertisement materials. 3. Since the respondent/defendant did not file his written statement, he was set ex-parte and an ex-parte decree was passed on 05.11.2008. Thereafter, the respondent/defendant filed an application in I.A.No.137 of 2009 to condone the delay of 94 days in filing the application to set aside the ex-parte decree dated 05.11.2008. The petitioner filed a detailed counter and contested the application. The learned Principal District Judge allowed the application imposing costs of Rs.1237.50. Aggrieved by the said order, the present revision is filed. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the respondent. 5. The learned counsel for he petitioner submitted that the suit was filed in the year 2001 and the counsel for the respondent took several adjournments for filing counter in the application filed for interim injunction and also for filing written statement. But ultimately when the suit came up for hearing on 13.12.2001, the defendant was absent and his counsel reported "no instructions" and hence, the respondent was set ex-parte and decree was passed against him. Thereafter, on 18.02.2002, the said ex-parte decree was set aside. 6. Subsequently the suit was adjourned for filing written statement, but the respondent did not file his written statement, so the second time, the respondent was set ex-parte on 23.09.2003. Even though the respondent was set ex-parte on 23.09.2003, the ex-parte decree was passed only on 05.11.2008, i.e., after nearly 5 years , but till then the respondent neither took any steps to set aside the ex-parte order nor filed his written statement. Even though the respondent was set ex-parte on 23.09.2003, the ex-parte decree was passed only on 05.11.2008, i.e., after nearly 5 years , but till then the respondent neither took any steps to set aside the ex-parte order nor filed his written statement. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that in the affidavit filed in support of the condonation delay application, the respondent has made false and vague allegations and he has not shown sufficient cause for condoning the delay. Hence, the order of the court below is liable to be set aside. 7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the suit arises under the provisions of Tamil Nadu Merchandise Trade Mark Act and ex-parte decree would have serious impact on the business of the respondent. The learned Principal District Judge has considered the entire case and rightly allowed the petition only to give opportunity to the respondent to defend his case. It is represented by the learned counsel for the respondent that he had already filed his written statement and he is ready to get along with the suit. Since the discretionary power has been exercised in favour of the respondent, the same need not be interfered by this Court in the revisional Jurisdiction. 8. In AIR 1998 SC 3222 [N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy], wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: "It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, ,much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or per verse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior Court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior Court to come to its own finding even untramelled by the conclusion of the lower Court. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactis, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer cause would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the Courts. So, a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when Courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the Court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss." (emphasis supplied) 9. It is seen from the records that an exparte decree was passed against the respondent in the year 2001. It would be a salutary guideline that when Courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the Court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss." (emphasis supplied) 9. It is seen from the records that an exparte decree was passed against the respondent in the year 2001. Subsequently in the year 2003, he was again set ex-parte and for nearly 5 years, respondent did not take any steps to set aside the ex-parte order and only after an exparte decree passed on 05.11.2008, the respondent has taken out an application to set aside the ex-parte decree, that too with a delay of 94 days. The trial Court has exercised its discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the respondent in condoning the delay. In the light of the Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court referred above, I am not interfering with the impugned order. However, considering the conduct of the respondent, the learned Principal District Judge ought to have imposed heavy costs. Accordingly, the cost of Rs.1237.50 imposed on the respondent is enhanced to Rs.16,237.50/-(Rupees Sixteen thousand two hundred thirty seven and fifty paise only). 10. In the result, the Civil Revision petition is dismissed and the order dated 04.09.2010 made in I.A.No.137 of 2009 in O.S.No.2 of 2001 is confirmed subject to the condition that the respondent shall pay cost of Rs.15,000/-(Rupees Fifteen thousand only) to the petitioner within a period of six weeks from today. On such compliance, the learned Principal District Judge, Villupuram, shall dispose the suit on merits and in accordance with law on or before 31.04.2014.