JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal is directed against the order dated 04.10.2013 passed by the learned Single Judge in SBCWP No.5000/2004, whereby the said writ petition preferred by the respondent has been allowed in part and the appellants have been directed to treat the respondent's period of suspension commencing from 25.05.2000 to 20.03.2001 as a period spent by him on duty, while declaring his entitlement for complete wages, allowances and other applicable benefits. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the respondent, while working as a Clerk at Jodhpur Main Branch of UCO Bank, was D.B. Civil Special Appeal (W) No.1208/2013, UCO Bank & Ors. v. Sumnesh Vyas suspended by the disciplinary authority vide order dated 25.05.2000 on contemplation of disciplinary proceedings. Later on, a charge-sheet dated 01.08.2000 was issued to the respondent, wherein he was charged for committing the act prejudicial to the interest of the Bank. The disciplinary proceedings, initiated against the respondent, were ultimately culminated in awarding a penalty of censure vide order dated 20.03.2001, however, while imposing the penalty of censure, the disciplinary authority also declared that the respondent shall not be entitled for any salary and allowance or any other benefits for the period of suspension whatsoever, except the subsistence allowance already paid to him. The suspension of the respondent was also revoked by the disciplinary authority. An appeal was preferred by the respondent against the order dated 20.03.2001 passed by the disciplinary authority, which came to be rejected by the appellate authority vide order dated 20.02.2004. 3. Being aggrieved by the orders passed by the appellate authority as well as the disciplinary authority, the respondent had preferred the aforesaid writ petition, which came to be decided by the impugned order. 4. While giving challenge to the impugned order, Mr Jagdish Vyas, learned counsel for the appellants has argued that the learned Single Judge has grossly erred in partly allowing the writ petition on the grounds that no reasons have been recorded by the disciplinary authority for denying the full wages, allowances and other benefits to the respondents for the period of suspension. 5. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that in view of the bipartite settlement regarding disciplinary procedure for workman, the disciplinary authority was not required to record reasons for denying the full wages for the period of suspension. 5. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that in view of the bipartite settlement regarding disciplinary procedure for workman, the disciplinary authority was not required to record reasons for denying the full wages for the period of suspension. It is also contended that the reasons recorded by the disciplinary authority, while awarding punishment, could be taken as reasons for denying salary, allowances and other benefits for the period of suspension but the learned Single Judge has not taken into consideration this aspect of the matter and erred in directing the respondents to grant the said benefits to the respondent. It is further contended that once the learned Single Judge has found that the penalty of censure has rightly been awarded by the disciplinary authority, there was no reason to interfere with the declaration of the disciplinary authority relating to non-entitlement of the respondent for salary, allowances or other benefits for the period of suspension. 6. The learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation v. M. Prabhakar Rao, (2011) 8 SCC 155 . 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants and perused the material placed on record as well as the impugned order. 8. The learned Single Judge, while allowing the writ petition in part, has taken into consideration the clause (b) of para 12 of the bipartite settlement and observed that the said clause provides a broad discretion to the management to treat a workman on duty during the period of suspension, if he has been subjected to a punishment other than the dismissal. The learned Single Judge has further observed that in the instant matter, as the disciplinary authority has not recorded any reason to deprive the respondent from the benefits of salary and other allowances for the period of suspension, the order passed by the disciplinary authority is suffering from non-application of mind. 9. We are in perfect agreement with the observations made by the learned Single Judge as now it is well settled that any decision, passed by authority affects anybody prejudicially, should contain reasons. Recording of the reasons, while exercising discretion is always necessary to demonstrate that the decision maker exercised discretion on relevant grounds and not on extraneous consideration. 10. In Kranti Associates Private Limited & Anr. Recording of the reasons, while exercising discretion is always necessary to demonstrate that the decision maker exercised discretion on relevant grounds and not on extraneous consideration. 10. In Kranti Associates Private Limited & Anr. v. Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors., (2010) 9 SCC 496 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has emphasised necessity of recording reasons by the decision making authority and held as under: "47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds: (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior Courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the life blood of judicial decision making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. (k) If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or rubber-stamp reasons' is not to be equated with a valid decision making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision making not only makes the judges and decision makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor.) (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain EHRR , at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford , wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions". (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "Due Process". 11. Taking clue from the above decision, if we examine the order dated 20.03.2011, then there is no doubt that the disciplinary authority had not recorded any reason for denying the salary and other allowances or any other benefits for the period of suspension to the respondent, and as such up to that extent, the order passed by the disciplinary authority suffers from non-application of mind. 12. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants in Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation v. M. Prabhakar Rao (supra) is of no help to the appellants as in that case, the disciplinary authority had given a specific finding to the effect that the suspension of the employee was not wholly unjustified. However, in the present case, no reasons whatsoever have been recorded by the disciplinary authority. Therefore, the facts of the above cited case are quite distinguishable from that of this case. 13. However, in the present case, no reasons whatsoever have been recorded by the disciplinary authority. Therefore, the facts of the above cited case are quite distinguishable from that of this case. 13. In view of the above, we do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is hereby dismissed.Appeal dismissed. *******