Judgment : 1. This Writ Petition is directed against the order dated 19.03.2013, whereby and whereunder the District Collector, Kanyakumari District, placed the petitioner under suspension pending initiation of disciplinary proceedings. BRIEF FACTS: 2. The petitioner is a Vocational Instructor appointed by the Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department. While he was functioning as Insurance Teacher at Government Tribal Residential Higher Secondary School, Pechiparai, in the district of Kanyakumari, he was suspended from service. The suspension order was issued by the District Collector on 19.03.2013. The order is challenged primarily on the ground that the District Collector is not authorised to suspend the employees of Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department. 3. According to the petitioner, while he was proceeding to the Office of the Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department at Nagercoil, he found the students of XII Standard waiting to board bus. He took the students and dropped them at the Office of District Collector. He was not aware the actual reason for their journey to the District Collectorate. Subsequently, he came to know that those students were there to plead on behalf of the Headmaster, against whom, disciplinary proceedings were initiated by the District Collector. It is the grievance of the petitioner that without giving an opportunity to explain his position, the District Collector, who is an incompetent authority, suspended him from service. 4. The District Collector, in his counter-affidavit, justified the action taken against the petitioner. According to the District Collector, the petitioner took 8 students of the Institution studying in XII Standard, to the District Collectorate, notwithstanding the fact that the annual examination was fast approaching. Since it was a serious misconduct, immediate action was taken to initiate disciplinary proceedings and pending such enquiry, to suspend him from service. The Director of Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department, vide proceedings dated 20.03.2013, ratified the action taken by the District Collector. Subsequently, disciplinary proceedings were initiated and charge memo was issued to the petitioner. According to the District Collector, he is the officer in-charge of the District and as such, it is his duty to take appropriate action against the subordinate officers of all the Departments. SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS: 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the District Collector has nothing to do with the officers of Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department. He is neither the appointing authority nor the disciplinary authority. SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS: 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the District Collector has nothing to do with the officers of Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department. He is neither the appointing authority nor the disciplinary authority. According to the learned counsel, the subsequent ratification of the action taken by the District Collector would be of no effect, in view of the fact that the initial action was without jurisdiction. The learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Bar Council of Delhi v. Surjeet Singh [ 1980(4) SCC 211 ]; Marathwada University v. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan [ 1989(3) SCC 132 ]; Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa v. Manubhai Paragji Vashi [ 2012(1) SCC 314 ]; and Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation v. Subhash Sindhi Co-operative Housing Society [ 2013(5) SCC 427 ] in support of his contention that in case the original action is bad in law, subsequent ratification would not cure the illegality. 6. The learned Government Advocate, by placing reliance on the proceedings of the Director of Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department, dated 20.03.2013, submitted that action taken by the Collector had the subsequent approval of the concerned Department and as such, the impugned order is not liable to be set aside. DISCUSSION: 7. There is no dispute that the petitioner is an officer of Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department. It is also not in dispute that the District Collector has no disciplinary jurisdiction over the petitioner. 8. The only question that arises for consideration is as to whether the proceedings dated 20.03.2013, ratifying the action taken by the District Collector, would cure the initial defect of suspension of the petitioner by an incompetent authority. 9. The District Collector is the representative of the Government. He is the officer in-charge of all the Departments within his district. The District Collector, having found that the petitioner took the Scheduled Tribe students of Government Tribal Residential Higher Secondary School to the Collectorate just five days before the public examination, took swift action. The Child Welfare Committee, Kanyakumari District, took cognizance of the matter and an F.I.R. was registered against the petitioner on 19.03.2013 at Nesamony Nagar Police Station. 10. The District Collector immediately after placing the petitioner under suspension, informed the matter to the Director, Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department. The Child Welfare Committee, Kanyakumari District, took cognizance of the matter and an F.I.R. was registered against the petitioner on 19.03.2013 at Nesamony Nagar Police Station. 10. The District Collector immediately after placing the petitioner under suspension, informed the matter to the Director, Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department. The Director in turn, by his proceedings dated 20.03.2013, ratified the action taken by the District Collector. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in Marathwada University v. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan [ 1989(3) SCC 132 ]. In Marathwada University's case, the very power to take disciplinary action against an officer delegated by Executive Council to Vice Chancellor was in contravention of the statutory provision. The action taken by the Vice Chancellor against the officer was subsequently ratified by the Executive Council. The Supreme Court, having found that the very delegation itself was in violation of the statutory provision, held that the action was void ab initio and as such, it cannot be ratified. The said judgment has no application to the facts of the present case. 12. In Bar Council of Delhi v. Surjeet Singh [ 1980(4) SCC 211 ], the Supreme Court found that notwithstanding the absence of power under the Bar Council Act, the State Bar Council introduced a provision in Rule 3(j) of the Delhi Bar Council Election Rules. It was approved later by the Bar Council of India. The Supreme Court held that the approval of the Bar Council of India can make the Rule made by the State Bar Council valid and effective only if the Rule made is within the competence of the State Bar Council, otherwise not. It was further held that mere approval of the Bar Council of India to a Rule ultra vires, the State Bar Council cannot make the Rule valid. Nor has it the effect of a Rule made by the Bar Council of India. The facts of the present case are totally different. 13. The action taken by the District Collector placing the petitioner under suspension was ratified by the Director, Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department, the very next day i.e., on 20.03.2013. Subsequently, the Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department initiated disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. The charge memo issued to the petitioner dated 22.04.2013 clearly shows the initiation of disciplinary proceedings. The action taken by the District Collector placing the petitioner under suspension was ratified by the Director, Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department, the very next day i.e., on 20.03.2013. Subsequently, the Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department initiated disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. The charge memo issued to the petitioner dated 22.04.2013 clearly shows the initiation of disciplinary proceedings. The order impugned in this Writ Petition should be seen, in the light of the subsequent disciplinary proceedings and the ratification proceedings dated 20.03.2013. Since the action was subsequently ratified by the Director, Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department, it would cure the initial defect. The order passed by the District Collector would at least be operative from the date on which it was ratified by the disciplinary authority. Therefore, I do not find any merit in the contention taken by the petitioner. THE PRECEDENT: 14. The nature and scope of an action for ratification came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Mining Corpn. v. Sunil [ 2006(5) SCC 96 ]. The Supreme Court, after analyzing the earlier decisions, held that ratification would relate back to the earlier date and it would be equivalent to a prior authority to perform such act. The observation reads thus: "7. The High Court was right when it held that an act by a legally incompetent authority is invalid. But it was entirely wrong in holding that such an invalid act cannot be subsequently "rectified" by ratification of the competent authority. Ratification by definition means the making valid of an act already done. The principle is derived from the Latin maxim ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur, namely, "a subsequent ratification of an act is equivalent to a prior authority to perform such act". Therefore ratification assumes an invalid act which is retrospectively validated. 8. In Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta the services of the General Manager of a company had been terminated by the Chairman of the Board of Directors pursuant to a resolution taken by the Board at a meeting. It was not disputed that meeting had been improperly held and consequently the resolution passed terminating the services of the General Manager was invalid. However, a subsequent meeting had been held by the Board of Directors affirming the earlier resolution. The subsequent meeting had been properly convened. It was not disputed that meeting had been improperly held and consequently the resolution passed terminating the services of the General Manager was invalid. However, a subsequent meeting had been held by the Board of Directors affirming the earlier resolution. The subsequent meeting had been properly convened. The Court held: (SCC pp.546-47, para 14) "Even if it be assumed that the telegram and the letter terminating the services of the appellant by the Chairman was in pursuance of the invalid resolution of the Board of Directors passed on 16.12.1953 to terminate his services, it would not follow that the action of the Chairman could not be ratified in a regularly convened meeting of the Board of Directors. The point is that even assuming that the Chairman was not legally authorised to terminate the services of the appellant, he was acting on behalf of the Company in doing so, because, he purported to act in pursuance of the invalid resolution. Therefore, it was open to a regularly constituted meeting of the Board of Directors to ratify that action which, though unauthorised, was done on behalf of the Company. Ratification would always relate back to the date of the act ratified and so it must be held that the services of the appellant were validly terminated on 17.12.1953." The view expressed has been recently approved in High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. P.P. Singh. 9. The same view has been expressed in several cases in other jurisdictions. Thus in Hartman v. Hornsby it was said: " 'Ratification' is the approval by act, word, or conduct, of that which was attempted (of accomplishment), but which was improperly or unauthorisedly performed in the first instance." 15. In the upshot, I dismiss the Writ Petition. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are also dismissed. No costs.