Judgment : 1. This Criminal Appeal is preferred by accused No.1—Abu Salem Qayoom Ansari @ Abu Salem against the judgment dated 18-11-2013 in C.C.No.3 of 2006 passed by III Additional Special Judge for CBI cases, Hyderabad, whereunder the learned Judge convicted him for the offences under Sections 120B, 419, 120B r/w 420, 468 and 471 IPC but acquitted him of the charge under Section 12(1) of Passport Act, 1967 and sentenced: (i) to suffer RI for a period of seven years and pay fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default SI for three months for the charge u/s.120B; (ii) to suffer RI for a period of one year for the charge u/s.419 IPC; (iii) to suffer RI for a period of seven years and pay fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default SI for three months for the charge u/s.120B r/w 420 IPC. (iv) to suffer RI for a period of one year and pay fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default SI for three months for the charge u/s.468 IPC; (v) to suffer RI for a period of one year for the charge u/s.471 IPC All the substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently. 2. The facts which led to file this appeal can be stated thus: The Inspector of CBI/SPE, Hyderabad laid charge sheet in RC.No.34(A)/2002, CBI, Hyderabad against altogether 10 accused before the trial Court in which Abu Salem Qayoom Ansari @ Abu Salem (A1); Sameera Jumari @ Neha Asif Jafari (A2); Monica Bedi @ Sana Malik Kamal (A3); Chamundi Abdul Hameed (A6); Faizan Hameed Sultan (A10) were shown as absconders. The charge sheet was taken on file in C.C.No.3/2005 and NBWs. were issued against A1, A2, A6 and A10. Later it appears that A3, A5, A7 and A8 were tried by the learned Special Judge for CBI cases, Hyderabad and sentenced which was upheld by the High Court and the Supreme Court. So far as A1 is concerned, the case against him was split up from main case—C.C.No.3/2005 and numbered as CC.No.3/2006 and tried with which we are concerned now. 3. So far as A1 is concerned, the case against him was split up from main case—C.C.No.3/2005 and numbered as CC.No.3/2006 and tried with which we are concerned now. 3. The prosecution case is thus: a) A1 to A3 with the assumed names as stated supra, obtained passports from Regional Passport Office (RPO), Secunderabad during the year 2001 by furnishing false documents with the connivance of A4—G.Srinivas, passport clerk, (D2 Section) in the office of Superintendent of Police, Kurnool District, Kurnool; A5—Shaik Abdul Sattar, Head Constable, Special Branch, Kurnool; A6—Abdul Hameed, unauthorised passport agent of Kurnool. On source information, the Inspector, CBI, Hyderabad registered a case and issued FIR on 20-09-2002. On the same facts another case was registered in I Town Police Station, Kurnool on 21-09-2002 in Cr.No.103/2002 against A4 to A7 for the offences under Sections 417, 420, 120B IPC and Section 12 of Passport Act, 1967 and later on 23-10-2002 the case was transferred to CBI, Hyderabad. b) More vividly, A10—Faizan Hameed Sultan owner of M/s.Faizan Enterprises, Mumbai was involved in recruiting people for jobs abroad. He gave 10 passport sized photographs of A1 to A3 and their fake names and documents to A9—Noorullah Abdul Khaleeq and asked him to obtain three passports for A1 to A3 from Kurnool. A9 has relatives in Kurnool. He visited Kurnool in March, 2001 and entrusted the work of securing passports for A1 to A3 to one A6— Ch.Abdul Hameed, an unauthorised passport agent. c) The further case of the prosecution is that at the instance of A6, A7—Mohammed Younus, Mandal Revenue Inspector of MRO Office, Kurnool issued false residential certificates in the assumed names of A1 to A3 (vide Ex.P11—certified copy of residential certificate of A1). Further, A6 procured fake transfer certificate purported to have been issued by the Head Master, ZPP High School, Pedapadu, Kurnool District in the name of A1 (vide Ex.P17—certified copy of transfer certificate of A1), and two fake marks sheets in the names of A2 and A3 purported to have been issued by the Head Master, Hanuman Higher Elementary School as a proof of their dates of birth. Later, it was revealed that transfer certificate was not issued by ZPP High School to A1 and Hanuman Higher Elementary School was not in existence. (vide Ex.P16). Later, it was revealed that transfer certificate was not issued by ZPP High School to A1 and Hanuman Higher Elementary School was not in existence. (vide Ex.P16). d) It is the further case of the prosecution that after procuring above documents, A6 got filled passport applications of A1 to A3 through PW1—Abdul Gaffar, a clerk in Taj Mahal Beedi Company, Kurnool (vide Ex.P1 and P2—certified copies of passport application and passport registration form of A1). Later they were filed in RPO, Secunderabad wherefrom personal particulars forms were sent to the Office of SP, Kurnool for verification of antecedents of the applicants and the same were received in the Office of SP, Kurnool on 31-05-2001 and 08-06-2001. A4—G.Srinivas who was dealing Assistant in the Special Branch (known as D2) handed over the personal particulars of A1, A2 and A3 to A5—S.A.Sattar, who is a writer/Head Constable in Special Branch instead of to concerned area Head Constable i.e. PW15—P.Subba Raju for field verification of antecedents. A5 submitted fake field verification report (vide Ex.P21 and 21A relating to A1) along with the statement of six fictitious persons as alleged neighbours in respect of character and conduct of A1 to A3. On receipt of these reports, A4 despatched them to RPO, Secunderabad under the covering letter of SP dated 28-06-2001 (vide Ex.P19). e) The further case of the prosecution is that on the strength of these reports, RPO issued passport No.B5804689 dated 08-08-2001 to A1 in the name of Ramil Kamil Mallik and two more passports in the assumed names of A2 and A3 and the same were despatched by speed post to their respective addresses indicated in the passport applications on 24-08-2001 (vide Ex.P24 and P24A—speed post booking journal and relevant entry dated 24-08-2001 relating to A1). f) The passports were received at the head post office through speed post. Passports of A2 and A3 are concerned, on 23-08-2001 two speed posts containing passports addressed to the assumed names of A2 and A3 were entrusted to PW18—Babu Miyan, Postman of beat No.2 for delivery. However, A8—Gokari Sahib, Postman, Head Post Office, Kurnool approached him and collected those two speed post articles along with third one by giving his acknowledgements on the delivery list falsely representing that he knew the addressees and he would personally deliver the articles while going home. However, A8—Gokari Sahib, Postman, Head Post Office, Kurnool approached him and collected those two speed post articles along with third one by giving his acknowledgements on the delivery list falsely representing that he knew the addressees and he would personally deliver the articles while going home. g) While so, on 27-08-2001 another speed post article containing passport in the assumed name of A1 was entrusted to A8 for delivery and in turn he delivered it to one Aslam Khan, Cashier Hotel Elite, Kurnool where A6 was working. A6—Hameed sent two covers to A9—Noorullah on 23-08-2001 and 27-08-2001 through courier service (vide Ex.P28 Sl.No.254– daily sales register of Professional Couriers). That is how the crime was perpetrated. h) The further case of the prosecution is that the Investigating Officer of the day examined the witnesses at various places, collected documents, obtained sanction orders for prosecution of accused public servants, A4, A5, A7 and A8 for prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 from the concerned authorities. He obtained sample signatures and handwritings of A4, A5, A7 and A8 in the presence of mediators and sent the standard and suspected signatures to the Government Examiner of Questioned Documents (GEQD) for comparison and report. He received the handwriting expert opinion. One of the Investigating Officers obtained letter Rogatory from trial Court to Portugal authorities on 26-12-2005. Pursuant to letter Rogatory, he received reply to letter Rogatory with copies of records from Portugal through Interpol. Thereafter, the Investigating Officer filed the charge sheet for the offences under Sections 120B r/w 420, 468, 471 r/w 468 IPC and 12(1) (b) and 12(2) of Passport Act, 1967 and 13(2) r/w 13(1) (d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Since, at the time of filing charge sheet A1 and A3 were detained in Portuguese, Lisbon they were brought to India on 11-11-2005 under extradition proceedings dated 28-03-2003. i) The case against A1 was split up from the main case in C.C.No.3/2005 and on his appearance the trial Court framed charges under Sections 120B, 120B r/w 420, 468, 471 and 419 IPC and under Section 12(1) of Passport Act, 1967 and trial was conducted. j) During trial PWs.1 to 39 were examined and Exs.P1 to P51 were marked on behalf of the prosecution. j) During trial PWs.1 to 39 were examined and Exs.P1 to P51 were marked on behalf of the prosecution. k) A perusal of the judgment would show that trial Court considering the evidence placed on record came to the conclusion that A1 applied for passport with fake identities and fake address with his real photos and with the conspiracy of revenue, police and postal employees could secure the passport. In this regard, trial Court rejected the argument of A1 that the prosecution could not prove by cogent evidence that A1 had submitted passport application and obtained passport with the conspiracy of other accused. The trial Court held that A1 is concerned, he was the ultimate beneficiary in obtaining passport with false identify, false address, false educational and residence certificate which resulted in issuing passport and the other accused entered into criminal conspiracy and played their roles. Thus, the trial Court held that prosecution could able to prove the guilt of A1 for the offence under Section 120B, 419, 120B r/w 420, 468 and 471 IPC. However, the trial Court acquitted A1 for the charge under Section 12 of Passport Act, 1967. Hence, the appeal. 3) Heard arguments of Sri S. Pasbola and Mr.S.Pradeep Kumar, learned counsel for appellant and Sri P.Kesava Rao, learned Special Standing Counsel for CBI (Spl.S.C.) 4) Vehemently fulminating the judgment of trial Court, learned counsel for appellant submitted the following points. a) Firstly, he argued that prosecution utterly failed to establish the criminal nexus between A1 and other accused. It failed to establish the criminal conspiracy among the accused in procuring passport for A1 with false particulars. Expatiating it, learned counsel would argue that no evidence is placed on record to show that appellant/A1 knew the other accused and they worked for him under his instructions and he met or contacted them to file an application for obtaining passport and instructed them to procure residential certificate and transfer certificate with bogus particulars. Learned counsel submitted that prosecution failed to establish that appellant/A1 signed on Exs.P1 and P2 passport applications, he either personally or through his authorised agent submitted those applications in RPO, Secunderabad, he personally applied for residential certificate and transfer certificate with false information and most importantly he received the passport from A9 or A10 after it was despatched by A6. Learned counsel submitted that prosecution failed to establish that appellant/A1 signed on Exs.P1 and P2 passport applications, he either personally or through his authorised agent submitted those applications in RPO, Secunderabad, he personally applied for residential certificate and transfer certificate with false information and most importantly he received the passport from A9 or A10 after it was despatched by A6. The prosecution equally failed to establish either he was in possession of the passport or travelled abroad using the same. The passport which he allegedly procured by dubious methods was never found in his possession which was evident from the answers furnished to the Investigating Officer by the Portugal authorities in the letter Rogatory and the prosecution failed to produce the said passport in the Court. Thus, except for few photos with his faint resemblances found on Ex.P1 and P2 passport applications, which is a weak piece of evidence, absolutely there is no other evidence to connect appellant/A1 with the case. In this regard learned counsel argued that no parallel can drawn between the case of appellant/A1 and the case of A3—Monica Bedi, since the facts in that case are different inasmuch as she was caught travelling with the passport which she obtained by dubious methods. He argued that when the prosecution rests on circumstantial evidence to prove the criminal conspiracy among A1 and other accused, it must be able to prove all the suspicious circumstances like a chain and that must unerringly establish the guilt of accused giving no scope for his innocence. He submitted in this case vital missing link is the connection between A1 and other accused. He relied upon the following decisions on the guidelines for proof of criminal conspiracy. 1. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru (2005 SCC (Crl) 1715). 2. P.K.Narayanan v. State of Kerala (1995 SCC (Crl) 215). 3. Sanjiv Kumar v. State of H.P. (1999 SCC (Crl) 127). 4. Saju v. State of Kerala (2001 SCC (Crl) 160). 5. Baldev Singh v. State of Punjab (2009) 3 SCC (Crl) 66). 6. Tanviben Pankajkumar Divetia v. State of Gujarat (1997 SCC (Cri) 1004). 2. P.K.Narayanan v. State of Kerala (1995 SCC (Crl) 215). 3. Sanjiv Kumar v. State of H.P. (1999 SCC (Crl) 127). 4. Saju v. State of Kerala (2001 SCC (Crl) 160). 5. Baldev Singh v. State of Punjab (2009) 3 SCC (Crl) 66). 6. Tanviben Pankajkumar Divetia v. State of Gujarat (1997 SCC (Cri) 1004). b) Secondly, learned counsel argued that in view of the order of Honourable Supreme Court of Justice, Portugal, the Extradition Order dated 28-03-2003 of the Government of Portuguese since stood terminated, the trial Court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the trial and hence the conviction and sentence passed by it are without jurisdiction. c) Thirdly, learned counsel argued that as per Extradition Proceedings dated 28-03-2003 issued by Ministry of Justice, Portugal, the Sovereign Government of Portugal while extraditing the appellant/A1 to India has consented for his trial in the present case for the offences under Sections 120B, 420 and 471 IPC only, but none else. India being a requesting State shall abide by the Extradition Order in view of Section 21 of Extradition Act, 1962. However, in gross infraction of Section 21(c) of the said Act, he was additionally tried, convicted and sentenced for the offences under Sections 419 and 468 IPC and, therefore, the entire trial is vitiated. He relied upon the following decision on the principle that a fugitive tried on extradition decree cannot be tried in respect of an offence which does not form part of decree. DayaSingh Lahoria v. Union of India (2001) 4 SCC 516 ). He thus prayed to allow the appeal. 5 a) Per contra, supporting the judgment of the trial Court learned Spl.S.C. firstly argued that the prosecution by overwhelming evidence established the conspiracy of different accused in procuring the passport for A1 in his assumed name. The appellant/A1 could not shatter the evidence on record in his cross-examination to establish that passport was not procured by dubious methods. His only contention was that he has nothing to do with the alleged conspiracy among different accused in procuring passport and he was not all the holder of the said passport. Conspiracy being hatched in secrecy, it can only be established by circumstantial evidence and in this case the prosecution could establish two main circumstances: 1) that a passport was obtained by illegal means and 2) that the said passport was obtained for the benefit of appellant/A1. Conspiracy being hatched in secrecy, it can only be established by circumstantial evidence and in this case the prosecution could establish two main circumstances: 1) that a passport was obtained by illegal means and 2) that the said passport was obtained for the benefit of appellant/A1. That being so, learned standing counsel would argue, being the beneficiary of criminal act, the appellant/A1 cannot plead ignorance by contending that he is absolutely nothing to do with the conspiracy among other accused. He could not even remotely suggest or establish that the other accused or some one else hatched a plan to implicate him in a case and that was why they took all the pains to procure the passport in his assumed name. He submitted that when the appellant/A1 failed to show such preponderance of probability, he can be presumed as part of the conspiracy and he can be held liable for the acts of co-conspirators because he is the sole beneficiary of illegal fruit. He relied upon the following decisions on the appreciation of circumstantial evidence on criminal conspiracy: 1. KeharSingh v. State (Delhi Admn.) (1988) 3 SCC 609 ). 2. Monica Bedi v. State of A.P. (2011) 1 SCC 284 ). 3. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan guru (1 supra) 4. Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay ( AIR 1961 SC 1762 ). 5. State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa (1996) 4 SCC 659 ). 6. State of H.P. v. Krishan Lal Pardhan (1987) 2 SCC 17 = AIR 1987 SC 773). b) Secondly, learned Spl.S.C. argued that the contention of appellant that in view of the termination order passed by the Supreme Court of Justice, Portugal, the Extradition Order dated 28.03.2003 was terminated and thereby his trial is without jurisdiction is farfetched in view of the clarification already given by Hon’ble Apex Court in the decision reported inAbu Salem Abdul Qayoom Ansari vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (2013 (3) ALT (Cri) 385). c) Thirdly, learned Spl.S.C. argued that the trial Court has not committed any error in trying the appellant/A1 for the offences under Sections 419 and 468 IPC though those offences were not specifically mentioned in the Extradition Order. He argued that there is no violation of Section 21 of Extradition Act, 1962 either. c) Thirdly, learned Spl.S.C. argued that the trial Court has not committed any error in trying the appellant/A1 for the offences under Sections 419 and 468 IPC though those offences were not specifically mentioned in the Extradition Order. He argued that there is no violation of Section 21 of Extradition Act, 1962 either. He submitted that the facts presented by the Indian Government before Portugal Government include those two offences apart from the offence for which he was extradited. Further those two offences are “lesser offences” than the offences for which he was extradited. As such the trial Court was right in trying him for those two offences along with other offences for which he was extradited. He relied upon the decision reported in Abu Salem Abdul Qayoom Ansari vs. State of Maharashtra (2011) 11 SC 214 =(2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 125) and argued that when the present appellant/A1 made a similar contention against the additional charges framed against him by the Designated Court, Mumbai, Hon’ble Apex Court turned down his contention and held that an accused can be indicted not only for the offence for which he has been extradited but also for the additional offences which provide for lesser punishment than that of those which are specifically mentioned in the extradition order. Learned Spl.S.C. further argued that in a subsequent order (13 supra) Hon’ble Apex Court though allowed the prosecution to withdraw the additional charges however declared that the ratio in the earlier decision (14 supra) holds good. In the light of above decisions rendered in his own case, he argued, the appellant’s contention has no substance. He thus prayed for dismissal of the appeal. 6) In view of the above rival contentions, the points for determination in this appeal are: 1) Whether the prosecution could establish the guilt of appellant/A1 beyond reasonable doubt? 2) Whether the trail of appeallant/A1 by the trial Court is without jurisdiction in view of the alleged termination of extradition order dated 28-03-2003? 3) Whether the trial of appellant/A1 for the offences under Sections 419 and 468 IPC is in violation of Extradition Order dated 28-03-2003 and Section 21 of Extradition Act, 1962? 7) POINT No.1: a) It should be noted that case against A1 is based on circumstantial evidence since there is no evidence showing his direct participation in the crime. 3) Whether the trial of appellant/A1 for the offences under Sections 419 and 468 IPC is in violation of Extradition Order dated 28-03-2003 and Section 21 of Extradition Act, 1962? 7) POINT No.1: a) It should be noted that case against A1 is based on circumstantial evidence since there is no evidence showing his direct participation in the crime. Both parties cited decisions rendering guidelines as to how to establish criminal conspiracy and related offences when the case rests on circumstantial evidence. b) In the following decisions cited by the appellant it was held thus: i) In NavjotSandhu @ Afsan Guru’s case(1 supra) it was held that the gist of agreement is to out break the law. Agreement is essential. Mere knowledge or discussion of the plan is not per se enough. It is not necessary that all the conspirators should participate from the inception to the end of conspiracy. Some may join conspiracy after the time when such intention was first entertained by any of them and some other may quit from the conspiracy. All of them cannot but be treated as conspirators. ii) In P.K.Narayanan’s case (2 supra) it was held that essence of criminal conspiracy is that an agreement to do an illegal act and such an agreement is proved either by direct or circumstantial evidence or by both and it is a matter of common experience that the direct evidence to prove conspiracy is rarely available. Mere suspicion and surmises or inferences unsupported by cogent evidence not sufficient. iii) In Saju’s case (4 supra) it was observed that to attract Section 120B it has to be proved that all the accused had intention and they had agreed to commit the crime. It is not necessary that each member to a conspiracy must know all the details of conspiracy. It has to be established that the accused charged with criminal conspiracy had agreed to pursue a course of conduct which he knew was leading to the commission of a crime by one or more persons to the agreement of that offence. Besides the fact of agreement the necessary mens rea of the crime is also required to be established. iv) In Baldev Singh’s case (5 supra) it was held that mere knowledge or discussion is not sufficient for an offence under Section 120B IPC. Besides the fact of agreement the necessary mens rea of the crime is also required to be established. iv) In Baldev Singh’s case (5 supra) it was held that mere knowledge or discussion is not sufficient for an offence under Section 120B IPC. v) In Tanviben Pankaj Kumar Divetia’s case (6 supra) it was held that chain of circumstances must lead to the only inference of guilt of the accused. Suspicion should not be allowed to take the place of legal proof. c) In the following decisions cited by the respondent it was held thus: i) In Kehar Singh’s case (8 supra) it was held that agreement between parties is essential to constitute criminal conspiracy and physical manifestation of agreement is necessary. Even in the absence of express agreement, thought sharing of unlawful design is sufficient. ii) In Monica Bedi’s case (9 supra) it was held that the conviction of A3 for whose benefit the entire conspiracy was hatched is sustainable. iii) InMajor E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay’s case (10 supra) it was held that it is not necessary all the parties should agree to do a single illegal act. It may comprise commission of number of acts. iv) In State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa’s case (11 supra) it was held that when the ultimate offence consists of a chain of actions, it would not be necessary for the prosecution to establish that each of the conspirators had the knowledge of what the collaborator would do, so long as it is known that the collaborator would put the goods or service to an unlawful use. v) In State of H.P. v. Krishan Lal Pardhan’scase (12 supra) it was held that if pursuant to the criminal conspiracy the conspirators commit several offences, then all of them will be liable for the offences even if some of them had not actively participated in the commission of offences. 8) In the light of above guidelines, it has now to be seen whether prosecution could establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. a) The facts and evidence would show that the offence was perpetrated in four stages: 1) Procuring residential and transfer certificate for A1 by providing false information. 8) In the light of above guidelines, it has now to be seen whether prosecution could establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. a) The facts and evidence would show that the offence was perpetrated in four stages: 1) Procuring residential and transfer certificate for A1 by providing false information. (vide evidence of PW6, PW7, PW9, PW10 and PW11 and Exs.P11, P15, P17, P18) The aforesaid oral and documentary evidence would clearly show that Ex.P11—residential certificate and Ex.P17—transfer certificate were obtained in the assumed name of A1 by providing false information. The evidence of PW7, MRO, Kurnool will show that on his verification through Panchayat Secretary it was revealed Ramil Kamil Mallik (assumed name of A1) whose residential certificate was issued at the address H.No.17/106, R.K.Talkies Street, Kurnool was not residing in the said house. Similarly the evidence of PW9 would reveal that transfer certificate bearing No.KU 950556 of Ramil Kamil Mallik on ZP High School, Pedapadu, Kurnool was not furnished by DEO, Kurnool and the original of Ex.P17 was not issued by ZP High School, Pedapadu, Kurnool as the serial number of the certificate was not tallied with the record of DEO 2) Submission of passport applications of A1 with fake certificates to RPO, Secunderabad. (vide evidence of PWs.1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 and Exs.P1 and P2) The aforesaid oral and documentary evidence would show that on the request of A6—an unauthorised passport agent, Kurnool, PW1 filled Ex.P1 and P2 passport application forms in the assumed name of A1 and affixed his photographs provided by A6. PW2, UDC in RPO, Secunderabad deposed that he checked Ex.P1 with reference to particulars covered by transfer certificate and residential certificate and affixed rubber stamp and put his initial. PWs.3 to 5 deposed about the procedure of verification of passport applications and issuance of passports. Apart from PW1 PW12 also deposed that A6 was a passport agent and he used to get the passport applications filled up through her by paying amounts. Added to it PW38 who is the son-in-law of A6 also deposed that his father-in-law informed him by phone that by mistake he obtained two passports in the name of A1 and A3. 3) Verification of personal particulars/antecedents by Special Branch in SP’s office, Kurnool and despatch to RDO, Secunderabad. Added to it PW38 who is the son-in-law of A6 also deposed that his father-in-law informed him by phone that by mistake he obtained two passports in the name of A1 and A3. 3) Verification of personal particulars/antecedents by Special Branch in SP’s office, Kurnool and despatch to RDO, Secunderabad. (vide evidence of P.Ws.13, 14, 15, 22, 33 and Exs.P19, P20, P21, P21A, P22, P23 and P31) When the aforesaid oral and documentary evidence is perused, the evidence of PW22 would show that the passport verification particulars received in SP Office will be entered in passport entering register and after sorting them taluq-wise, they will be allotted to concerned Head Constables for verification of antecedents. The Head Constable will accordingly conduct physical verification and take signatures of two respectable persons of the locality to show that they are acquainted with the applicant. The Head Constable will also enquire in the concerned police station with regard to applicant and then he will submit his enquiry report. Thereafter, enquiry report along with covering letter will be sent to RPO, Secunderabad. He stated that Ex.P21 is the enquiry report given by A5—Abdul Sattar with his signature i.e. Ex.P21A. Ex.P31 is the covering letter prepared by A4. Then the evidence of PWs.13, 14, and 15 would show that the duty of antecedents verification of appellant/A1 was entrusted by A4 to A5 instead of PW15—P.Subba Raju who is also Head Constable in Special Branch. A5 made false verification and submitted his report under Ex.P21. The verification report was despatched to RPO, Secunderabad. Thus, the role of A4 and A5 was delineated in the above oral and documentary evidence. 4) Receiving passport in speed post and sending it to the destination. (vide evidence of P.Ws.16, 17, 18 and 20 and Exs.P24, P24A, P25 and P26) The aforesaid oral and documentary evidence would show that RPO, Secunderabad has sent passport of A1 in his assumed name under Ex.P24 and 24A and after receiving the same in head post office, Kurnool A8 delivered the same to A6 and A6 despatched the same to A9—Noorullah Abdul Khaleeq. b) Thus, as stated supra, offence was perpetrated in the above four stages. b) Thus, as stated supra, offence was perpetrated in the above four stages. A close analysis of the concerned oral and documentary evidence would show that the prosecution could establish that passport was procured in the assumed name of Ramil Kamil Malik by furnishing false information with the connivance of different accused in different Government departments and despatched to A9— Noorullah Abdul Khaleeq. The defence side could not shatter this evidence. Of course, the main thrust of defence appears to be that A1 has nothing to do with the entire episode even assuming passport was obtained illegally. Hence, it has to be seen whether role of A1 could be established or not. 9 a) The role of A1 is concerned, the prosecution strongly argued that appellant/A1 is not simply a participant at one stage but he is the sole beneficiary as the passport was procured in his assumed name. On the other hand, the contention of appellant/A1 is that except showing few photographs on Exs.P1 and P2 applications containing his faint resemblances, the prosecution could not establish his nexus with other accused, his participation at any stage of the crime and more importantly his possessing the so-called passport or using the same to travel and hence, he cannot be called as beneficiary under the crime. b) On a careful analysis of facts and evidence, I am unable to countenance the argument of appellant/A1. It should be noted that photographs affixed on Exs.P1 and P2 belong to appellant/A1. PW37 who is a known person and friend of appellant/A1 identified the photographs on Exs.P1 and P2 as that of appellant/A1. Of course, it was suggested to him that he never met A1 and that he was identifying photographs at the instance of CBI, but he denied the same. His evidence would clearly show that appellant/A1 is a known person to this witness. So, there can be no doubt that the photographs on Exs.P1 and P2 belong to him. Even otherwise, the appellant/A1 did not suggest to any of the relevant witnesses that the photographs do not relate to him. Hence, it is clear that the photos on Exs.P1 and Ex.P2 belong to him and Exs.P1 and P2 forms submitted with those photos for his benefit but in his assumed name. Even otherwise, the appellant/A1 did not suggest to any of the relevant witnesses that the photographs do not relate to him. Hence, it is clear that the photos on Exs.P1 and Ex.P2 belong to him and Exs.P1 and P2 forms submitted with those photos for his benefit but in his assumed name. Added to it, PW38 who is the son-in-law of A6 deposed that A6 informed him that he obtained two passports in the names of two wrong persons (Abu Salem—A1 and Monica Bedi—A3). This would also show that appellant/A1 is the beneficiary under the crime. In this regard, argument of appellant/A1 that some one without his knowledge or connivance might have procured a passport to implicate him in a case cannot be accepted for the reason that he could not show any of the other accused as his enemies who have tried to implicate him in the case. So it can be confirmatively said that appellant/A1 is the beneficiary of the passport. When a person takes benefit out of a crime, he cannot plead that he is not a part of conspiracy. Added to above, from the evidence of PWs.2 and 3 the possibility of appellant/A1 submitting Exs.P1 and P2 in the RPO, Secunderabad cannot be ruled out. PW2, verification clerk in the RPO, Secunderabad deposed that when application for passport is submitted the applicant has to be present and in the absence of applicant an authorised person with authorisation letter has to be present. He deposed that he verified the original of Ex.P1 application in the assumed name of A1. He admitted that he does not remember whether the applicant shown in Ex.P1 was present or not while submitting application. In the cross-examination he stated that there was no authorisation letter with Ex.P1. Then PW3, Public Relation Officer, RPO, Secunderabad also deposed in similar lines and stated that generally applicant shall present at the time of presenting application for passport. Some times applicant absent but somebody will come with authorisation letter of the applicant. He further stated that at present there is a system of receiving applications for passport through post but during the relevant period there was no system of receiving applications for passport through post. c) So, it is clear from the evidence of PWs.2 and 3 that either appellant/A1 or his authorised agent must have been present for submitting Exs.P1 and P2. c) So, it is clear from the evidence of PWs.2 and 3 that either appellant/A1 or his authorised agent must have been present for submitting Exs.P1 and P2. We do not find any endorsement on Exs.P1 and P2 to the effect that application was submitted by the authorised agent of the applicant. Further, as submitted by PW2 no authorisation letter was enclosed with Exs.P1 and P2. From this an inference can be drawn that appellant/A1 might have submitted Exs.P1 and P2 in RPO, Secunderabad. So, from the facts and evidence on record it can be said that prosecution could establish the guilt of the accused for the offences under Sections120B, 420, 419 and 471 IPC. This point is answered accordingly. POINT No. 2 1) This point is concerned, it should be noted that apart from the present case the appellant/A1 was involved in some other cases one of which was in RC-1 (S/93)/CBI/STF, Mumbai (known as Bombay Blast Case No.1 of 1993). In connected Crl.A.No.415-416 of 2012 arose out of the said case, the present appellant/A1 raised similar jurisdictional issue before the Honourable Apex Court which was turned down by the Apex Court in its judgment dated 05-08-2013 in Abu Salem Abdul Qayyum Ansari v. CBI (vide 13 supra). The facts in nutshell are adumbrated herein for better appreciation of point in issue now. a) After series of bomb blasts took place on 12-03-1993 in the city of Bombay causing the death of 257 persons and injuries to some others and loss of property worth Rs.27 crore crime was registered in RC-1(S/93)/CBI/STF and investigation was carried out and present appellant/A1 was shown in the charge sheet as absconding accused (A-139) and Red Corner Notice was issued through Interpol for his arrest. b) Later on knowing that the appellant/A1 entered in Portugal in the assumed name of Arsalan Mohsin Ali on a Pakistani passport and was detained therein on 18-09-2002, the Indian Government in December, 2002 submitted a request for his extradition in 9 criminal cases including the Bombay Blast Case and also in the present case. c) Seeking extradition the Deputy Prime Minister of India assured to the Government of Portugal that if the appellant/A1 is extradited for trial in India he would neither be conferred with death penalty nor be subjected to imprisonment for a term beyond 25 years. c) Seeking extradition the Deputy Prime Minister of India assured to the Government of Portugal that if the appellant/A1 is extradited for trial in India he would neither be conferred with death penalty nor be subjected to imprisonment for a term beyond 25 years. Accordingly, on 28-03-2003 Ministry of Justice, Portugal passed an extradition order permitting him to be tried for the offence under Section 120B r/w 302 IPC; Section 3(2) of TADA. However, the said order declined his extradition under Section 25(1-A) and 1(B) of Arms Act, 1959; Sections 4 and 5 of Explosive Substances Act, 1908; Section 5 and 6 of TADA and Section 9-B of Explosives Act, 1884. Additionally Ambassador of India in Lisbon gave further assurance on 25-05-2003 that Abu Salem will not be prosecuted for the offence other than those for which his extradition has been sought and he would not be re-extradited to any third country. d) Accordingly, on 11-11-2005 appellant/A1 was brought to India and produced before the Designated Court, Mumbai in BBC No.1/1993. The said Court framed charges though some of which were not covered by the extradition order. While so, prosecution filed MA No.144/2006 seeking separation of trial of appellant/A1.He also filed MA No.160/2006 seeking production of relevant record of extradition and sought joint trial with other accused. The Designated Court allowed the petition of prosecution. It was held that assurances were given with respect to sentences which could be imposed and not with respect to offences with which he could be tried. e) Challenging the above orders appellant/A1 filed Crl.A.No.990 of 2006 and writ petition before the Supreme Court of India. He contended that extradition order was violated and he was charged with the offences other than those for which he was extradited. f) In addition to above, the appellant/A1 also filed petition before the Court of Appeal, Lisbon alleging violation of Doctrine of Speciality. The Court of Appeal expressed its inability to enquire into the matter. So, he went in appeal to Supreme Court of Justice, Portugal and by order dated 13-07-2007 it remitted the matter to Court of Appeal to enquire into the alleged violation. The Court of Appeal adjourned the matter till Supreme Court of India passed order in Crl.A.No.990 and writ petition filed by him. So, he went in appeal to Supreme Court of Justice, Portugal and by order dated 13-07-2007 it remitted the matter to Court of Appeal to enquire into the alleged violation. The Court of Appeal adjourned the matter till Supreme Court of India passed order in Crl.A.No.990 and writ petition filed by him. g) While so, the Supreme Court of India in its order dated 10-09-2010 (vide 14 supra) held that the appellant/A1 could be tried for the additional charges, since the punishment for those charges is lesser than the punishment for the offences for which he was extradited. Accordingly, his appeal and writ petition were dismissed. Subsequent to the above order, the Court of Appeal, Lisbon in its judgment dated 14-09-2011 took a contrary view and held that the extradition order ought to be terminated for violation. Aggrieved, the Union of India preferred appeal before the Supreme Court of Justice, Portugal but the same was dismissed. Hence, the Union of India preferred appeal before the Constitutional Court of Portugal which has held that the termination order be referred to the political power instances through the central authority, in order for the Portuguese State to take the attitude it deems to be the most convenient, through diplomatic channels. 2) The above is the background history relating to the pleas of appellant/A1 touching: i) termination of the extradition order dated 28-03-2003 and ii) trial on additional charges not covered by the extradition order. The matter was not ended there. Against some of the orders of Designated Court, Mumbai appellant/A1 preferred appeals before the Supreme Court of India. CBI also filed Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions seeking clarification/modification of Supreme Court’s earlier judgment in Abu Salem Abdul Qayoom Ansari vs. State of Maharashtra (14 supra). It also sought permission to withdraw the additional charges against appellant/A1. All these matters were heard and decided on 05-08-2013 (13 supra). CBI also filed Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions seeking clarification/modification of Supreme Court’s earlier judgment in Abu Salem Abdul Qayoom Ansari vs. State of Maharashtra (14 supra). It also sought permission to withdraw the additional charges against appellant/A1. All these matters were heard and decided on 05-08-2013 (13 supra). In the said order the second point for discussion was “Whether the order of extradition dated 28-03-2003 stands annulled/cancelled as alleged by the appellant/A1?” On this point the Supreme Court of India held thus: “The Constitutional Court of Portugal has categorically held that Portuguese law does not provide for any specific consequence for violation of the Principle of Speciality and their findings may not be construed as a direction to the Union of India to return the Appellant to Portugal but shall only serve as a legal basis for the Government of Portugal, should it choose to seek the return of the Appellant to Portugal through political, or diplomatic channels, which has not been done till date according to the statement made by learned Attorney General. In view of the above discussion, it is vividly clear that the order of Extradition dated 28-03-2003 still stands valid and effective in the eyes of law. Accordingly, the second question stands responded.” So, the jurisdictional issue is concerned, the Honourable Supreme Court of India in the very case of appellant/A1 has made it clear that the extradition order dated 28-03-2003 still stands valid and effective in the eyes of law for the reasons mentioned as above. Therefore, the appellant/A1 cannot agitate again that the extradition order was terminated by the Courts at Portugal and his trial in India is without jurisdiction. This point is answered accordingly. 11) POINT No.3: a) This point is concerned admittedly the charges under Sections 419 and 468 IPC are not covered by Extradition Order dated 28-03-2003. The said order covers only offences under Sections 120B, 420 and 471 IPC for which the extraditee can be tried. However, the trial Court tried appellant/A1 for those two additional offences and convicted and sentenced as stated supra. Hence, the point is whether his trial for those offences is in contravention of Extradition Order and Section 21 of Extradition Act, 1962. The issue is no more res integra, since the Honourable Apex Court in its judgment in Abu Salem Abdul Qayoom Ansari vs. State of Maharashtra (vide 14 supra) has given clarification. Hence, the point is whether his trial for those offences is in contravention of Extradition Order and Section 21 of Extradition Act, 1962. The issue is no more res integra, since the Honourable Apex Court in its judgment in Abu Salem Abdul Qayoom Ansari vs. State of Maharashtra (vide 14 supra) has given clarification. The background history of said judgment and also the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court of India were already narrated by me in point No.2 supra. Hence, the ratio of the said judgment has to be applied to the present case. The ratio in the Supreme Court judgment (vide 14 supra) is to the effect that a fugitive/accused can be indicted not only for the offences for which he was extradited but also for the additional offences which provided for lesser punishment than that of those which are specifically mentioned in the extradition order. What is lesser offence has been explained in para-29 of the judgment. It says: "Lesser offence" means an offence which is made out from the proved facts and provides lesser punishment, as compared to the offences for which the fugitive has been extradited. b) When the above ratio is applied to the two offences under Sections 419 and 468 IPC, Section 419 IPC is undoubtedly a lesser offence than extradited offence in terms of punishment. However, Section 468 IPC is concerned, the punishment provided for that offence is 7 years and also fine. As such, the said offence is not a lesser offence than any of the extradited offences in terms of punishment. Though it is not a greater offence in terms of punishment, it is equivalent to Section 420 IPC in terms of punishment. The Trial Court defended the additional charges on the ground that the maximum punishment for those offences is not more than 7 years and they are not visited with death sentence. I am afraid, this observation is not correct in the light of Supreme Court judgment. It must be said that penal provisions require strict interpretation. Having regard to it, I hold that trial of appellant/A1 for the offence under Section 468 IPC is not legally valid and so the conviction and sentence for the said offence liable to be set aside. This point is answered accordingly. It must be said that penal provisions require strict interpretation. Having regard to it, I hold that trial of appellant/A1 for the offence under Section 468 IPC is not legally valid and so the conviction and sentence for the said offence liable to be set aside. This point is answered accordingly. 12) So, in view of discussion on points 1 to 3 supra, it is held that the appellant/A1 was rightly convicted and sentenced by the trial Court for all but for the offence under Section 468 IPC. 13) In the result, this Criminal Appeal is partly allowed and while confirming the conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court against appellant/A1 for the offences under Sections 120B, 420, 419 and 471 IPC, conviction and sentence passed by it for the offence under Section 468 IPC is hereby set aside. The fine amount if deposited under the said count shall be refunded to him.