JUDGMENT S. PUJAHARI, J. : This writ petition has been filed by the petitioners with a prayer to issue a writ of mandamus directing the opposite parties to pay compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lacs) on account of death of one Bhadra Santa in electrocution arising out of the negligence of the opposite parties in maintaining the electric transmission line. 2.Facts relevant for disposal of the writ petition are as under : On 22.08.1997, deceased-Bhadra Santa had been to village Bhanjaguda to work as a daily labourer. After the day’s work, when he was returning to his village-Jhadabandhaguda in the district of Nabarangpur, on the way, his umbrella came in contact with the live electric transmission line which was hanging low between the two poles because of poor maintenance on the part of the opposite parties, responsible for maintenance of transmission and supply of electricity in that locality, as a result of which the deceased got electrocuted and died at the spot. The aforesaid unnatural death of the deceased is attributable to the negligence of the opposite parties, inasmuch as due to their poor maintenance the poles tilted during the rain and storm and live electric wire hanged low which resulted in the death of the deceased. The deceased was aged about thirty years at the time of his death and he was the sole bread winner, having a monthly income of Rs.2000/-, out of which he was contributing Rs.1,500/- to the maintenance of his family per month. The petitioner No.1 is the wife of the deceased and the petitioner Nos.2, 3 and 4 are his three minor sons. The petitioners, as such, claim compensation amount of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakh) from the opposite parties which according to them modest and made the prayer as stated earlier. 3.In the counter affidavit filed by the opposite parties, it has been denied that the opposite parties are negligent in maintaining electric transmission line and the deceased died of electrocution, so also the deceased was a labourer and the petitioners are being legal heirs as his wife and sons, entitled to the compensation. 3.In the counter affidavit filed by the opposite parties, it has been denied that the opposite parties are negligent in maintaining electric transmission line and the deceased died of electrocution, so also the deceased was a labourer and the petitioners are being legal heirs as his wife and sons, entitled to the compensation. A specific plea has also been taken that even if it is held that the deceased died of electrocution, but the same being and act of God, inasmuch as the electric poles are tilted on account of rain and storm, not due to the negligence on the part of the opposite parties, the opposite parties have no liability to pay the compensation. 4.During the course of hearing, it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners, placing reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of Parvati Palai v. Chairman-cum-Managing Director, GRID Corporation of Orissa Ltd. and another, reported in, 2006 (Supp-I) OLR 1114 that in view of averment that the deceased died of electrocution, supported by ample materials vide Annexures-1, 2 and 3, i.e., the U.D. F.I.R., postmortem examination report and final report in the U.D. case and alternatively it is also admitted by the opposite parties that the deceased had died of electrocution, the petitioners are entitled for compensation, inasmuch as the death of the deceased is attributable to the negligence of the opposite parties, which undisputedly maintain the transmission lines and the defence of act of God is not available to the opposite parties to avoid the liability. Furthermore, it is also contended that even if the case involves in disputed question of fact, the same being not involving a complex question of disputed fact, looking into the affidavit filed and material on record, the Court can adjudicate on the same, and as such, the contention raised with regard to maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of disputed question of fact is devoid of merit. Since due to the negligence of the opposite parties, the accident occurred and the petitioners lost their sole bread winner, they are entitled to compensation of Rs. 2 lakhs, which is modest considering that he is a labourer, with interest and the opposite parties, as such, be directed to pay the same, is also the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 2 lakhs, which is modest considering that he is a labourer, with interest and the opposite parties, as such, be directed to pay the same, is also the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 5.In response, though the factum of death of the deceased in electrocution has not been disputed by the learned counsel appearing of the opposite parties, but it has been submitted that the liability being one under tort, the compensation is payable only in the event of proof of death of the deceased due to negligence by the petitioners. The said negligence being a disputed question of facts, the same cannot be adjudicated here in this writ petition. Therefore, this writ petition claiming compensation is liable to be dismissed, more particularly when there is no material showing that the death of the deceased occurred on account of any negligence on the part of the opposite parties and the petitioners have an alternative forum. 6.In this case, as revealed from the contention of the writ petition supported by an affidavit that the deceased died of electrocution. Such contention of the petitioners is supported by Annexure-1 - U.D. F.I.R. lodged, Annexure-2 - the postmortem examination report, so also Annexure-3 the final report submitted in the U.D. case disclosing that the matter was enquired into and the deceased was found to have died of electrocution when he came in contact with live electric wire. It is not disputed in this case that the opposite parties, more particularly the then Grid Corporation and now the opposite party No.3 are responsible for transmission of the electricity and also maintenance of the transmission line in the locality. Furthermore, though a contention was raised with regard to the death of the deceased, but the same was not seriously disputed and alternative plea has been taken that even if the deceased died of electrocution, the opposite parties are not liable to pay the compensation. From the pleadings of the parties and the materials placed and also looking into the submission during the time of hearing, there is no serious dispute in this case that the death of the deceased has occurred on account of electrocution when his umbrella came in contact with the electric transmission line maintained by the opposite parties. From the pleadings of the parties and the materials placed and also looking into the submission during the time of hearing, there is no serious dispute in this case that the death of the deceased has occurred on account of electrocution when his umbrella came in contact with the electric transmission line maintained by the opposite parties. The fact that the petitioners are the legal representatives of the deceased, which is supported by an affidavit, also not disputed and the deceased was the labourer and the claim of compensation also appears to be modest, is also not seriously disputed in this case. However, learned counsel for the petitioners has seriously disputed the payment of the compensation in a petition under Article 226 of the constitution in view of the fact that the liability, if any, being tort, the same can only be saddle with the opposite parties only on proof of negligence contributing to the death of the deceased. The said negligence being a disputed question of facts, cannot be adjudicated in this writ petition, is the submission of the learned counsel for the opposite parties. 7.In the case of Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee, AIR 1970 SC 802 , it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition merely because in considering petitioner’s right to relief question of fact may fall to be determined, inasmuch as under Article 226 of the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues of law and fact. Where, however, the petition raises complex question of fact, the Court may decline to try a petition under Article 226 of the constitution. In the case of Century Spinning & Mfg. Co. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal Council, AIR 1971 SC 1021 , the Hon’ble Apex Court have held that merely because a question of fact is raised, especially when the same is elementary, the High Court will not be justified in requiring the party to seek relief by somewhat lengthy, dilatory and expensive process of civil suit. In the case of Babu Bhai v. Nandalal, AIR 1974 SC 2105 , the Hon’ble Apex Court have held that in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. In the case of Babu Bhai v. Nandalal, AIR 1974 SC 2105 , the Hon’ble Apex Court have held that in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. But, when the petition raises complex questions of fact which may, for their determination, require oral evidence to be taken and on that account the High Court is of the view that the disputed statement may not be appropriately tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try the petition. If, however, on consideration of the nature of the controversy, the High Court decides that it should go into a disputed question of fact, the same can be done. Therefore, the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the opposite parties that in this case since the petitioners are to prove the negligence on the part of the opposite parties, which is a sine-qua-non, to get the compensation and the same is a disputed question of fact and cannot be decided in the writ petition, appears to be unsustainable, more particularly when the petitioners in this case are not required to prove the aforesaid fact to get the compensation, inasmuch as the liability of the opposite parties to pay the compensation is the strict liability, for which no negligence on their part is required to be proved by the petitioners. The aforesaid has also been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari and others, AIR 2002 SC 551 , wherein compensation was claimed for the death of one workman, who while proceeding on the road died of electrocution when he came in contact with a live electric wire lying on the road as the transmission maintained by the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board had snapped. The defence taken by the Board that the same was due to the act of one Hari Gaikwad who had taken wire from the main supply line in order to siphon the energy for his own use and the said act of pilferage was done clandestinely without even the notice of the Board, was not accepted extending the doctrine “strict liability” laid down in the case of Rylands v. Fletcher, 1868 Law Reports (3) HL 330. In the case of Shail Kumari (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraphs-7, 8, 12 and 14 have held as follows : “7. It is an admitted fact that the responsibility to supply electric energy in the particular locality was statutorily conferred on the Board. If the energy so transmitted causes injury or death of a human being, who gets unknowingly trapped into it the primary liability to compensate the sufferer is that of the supplier of the electric energy. So long as the voltage of electricity transmitted through the wires is potentially of dangerous dimension the managers of its supply have the added duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of such energy or to see that the wire snapped would not remain live on the road as users of such road would be under peril. It is no defence on the part of the management of the Board that somebody committed mischief by siphoning such energy to his private property and that the electrocution was from such diverted line. It is the look out of the managers of the supply system to prevent such pilferage by installing necessary devices. At any rate, if any live wire got snapped and fell on the public road the electric current thereon should automatically have been disrupted. Authorities manning such dangerous commodities have extra duty to chalk out measures to prevent such mishaps. 8.Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known, in law, as “strict liability”. It differs from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way i.e. the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But, such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions. 12. In M.C. Mehta v.Union of India this Court has gone even beyond the rule of strict liability by holding that “where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm is caused on any one on account of the accident in the operation of such activity, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate those who are affected by the accident, such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions to the principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.” 14. The Privy Council has observed in Quebee Railway, Light Heat and Power Company Limited v. Vandray and others., [1920 Law Reports Appeal Cases 662] that the company supplying electricity is liable for the damage without proof that they had been negligent. Even the defence that the cables were disrupted on account of a violent wind and high tension current found its way through the low tension cable into the premise of the respondents was held to be not a justifiable defence. Thus, merely because the illegal act could be attributed to a stranger is not enough to absolve the liability of the Board regarding the live wire lying on the road.” 8.This Court also in reported decision in the case of Parvati Palai (supra), wherein one of us was a party, has also held as follows : “6. Almost in similar facts a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Nirmala Nayak and others v. Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Grid Corporation of Orissa, Ltd., and another (O.J.C. No.6339 of 1997, disposed of on 13.4.2005) granted compensation to the claimants. In that context, the learned Judges discussed the relevant legal aspects. In that context, the learned Judges discussed the relevant legal aspects. In that context, the learned Judges discussed the relevant legal aspects. In that context, the learned Judges discussed the relevant legal aspects. Since the legal question is covered by the decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court as mentioned above, following the said ratio, this Court also in this case grants compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand) to the petitioner having regard to the fact that the deceased was the only earning member of the family and there are several dependents on the deceased...” 9.In view of the aforesaid, the opposite parties are liable to pay the compensation without proof of negligence on their part. 10.It is not disputed in this case that the amount of compensation claimed to be modest. In such view of the matter, we allow this writ petition and direct the opposite parties, more particularly, the WESCO, represented through the opposite party No.3 to pay an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakhs) as compensation with interest at the rate of 6% per annum till the payment is made. The payment be made within eight weeks hence by depositing an Account Payee cheque in the name of the petitioner No.1. Needless to say that on payment of the aforesaid compensation amount, the Registrar (Judicial) shall keep 90% of the compensation amount in a fixed deposit account in the name of the petitioner No.1 for a period of six years with quarterly interest being payable to her and handover the rest amount to the petitioner No.1, on proper identification. Petition allowed.