ORDER : Ranjana Prakash Desai, J. The State of Rajasthan is aggrieved by Judgment and Order dated 10/11/2003 of the High Court of Rajasthan by which the respondent shave been acquitted of the charge under Section 8 read with Section 21 of the Narcotic Drug and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 ('the NDPS Act'). The respondents were convicted by the Special Judge, N.D.P.S. Case, Udaipur under Section 8 read with Section 21 of the NDPS Act and sentenced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment each with fine of Rs.1,00,000/- each and, in default, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. 2. According to the prosecution, on 27/6/2001, the District Superintendent of Police received secret information which he conveyed to PW-1 Suresh Chandra, Additional Superintendent of Police, City, Udaipurat 5.10 p.m. The information was to the effect that five persons would be coming in a white colour Indica Car with 2Kg. brown sugar and they would be handing over the said brown sugar to someonein Udaipur at 7.00 p.m. Acting on this information, the raiding party headed by PW-1 Suresh Chandra left the police station. They stopped one white colour Indica Car at 6.54 p.m. when it was coming from Dabok side to Udaipur. The appellants who were occupying the car were informed that their personal search and search of their vehicle was to be conducted. According to the prosecution, provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act were followed and search was conducted. Brown sugar was recovered from the plastic bags lying in the car. Necessary procedure was followed, samples were taken and after completion of the investigation, the appellants came to be charged, tried and convicted, as aforesaid. As noted earlier, their conviction and sentence having been set aside by the High Court, the State of Rajasthan has come in appeal before this Court. 3. One of the reasons which persuaded the High Court to set aside the order of conviction and sentence is that there is nothing on record to establish that the officers who conducted the search and seizure were empowered officers as required by Sections 41 and 42 of the NDPS Act. 4. 3. One of the reasons which persuaded the High Court to set aside the order of conviction and sentence is that there is nothing on record to establish that the officers who conducted the search and seizure were empowered officers as required by Sections 41 and 42 of the NDPS Act. 4. Learned counsel for the State of Rajasthan strenuously contended that though the prosecution did not produce any material to show that the officers were empowered, there was, in fact, a notification authorising all Inspectors of Police and Sub-Inspectors of Police post Station House Officers to exercise the powers mentioned under Section 42 of the NDPS Act. Learned counsel contended that unfortunately, it was not brought on record. Counsel has drawn our attention to the judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Bheru Lal, (2013) 11 SCC 730 where the said notification is quoted. Counsel submitted that, therefore, the High Court was wrong in holding that the officers were not empowered officers as required by Sections 41 and 42 of the NDPS Act. Therefore, the impugned order deserves to be set aside and the respondents deserve to be convicted in accordance with law. Counsel submitted that in any case, this Court may set aside the impugned order and remit the matter to the trial court so that the State can bring on record the said notification. 5. We are not impressed by the submissions of learned counsel. Firstly, we are dealing with a criminal appeal against acquittal. We must bear in mind that the presumption of innocence of the accused is strengthened by the order of acquittal and, unless the impugned order of acquittal is found to be perverse, it should not be interfered with. It was necessary for the prosecution to bring the concerned notification on record. The prosecution has failed to do so. The incident took place way back on 27/6/2001. The notification on which reliance is placed by learned counsel is of 16/10/1986. One does not really know whether from 1986 to 2001, the notification was ever recalled or any other further notification was issued. It would be really unfair for this Court to set aside the impugned judgment at this distance of time and send the matter back to the trial court for retrial. Pertinently, this point was not raised before the High Court. It would be really unfair for this Court to set aside the impugned judgment at this distance of time and send the matter back to the trial court for retrial. Pertinently, this point was not raised before the High Court. It is not even taken in the appeal memo filed in this Court by the State. 6. In such circumstances, we are unable to set a side the impugned order on this count and convict the respondents or to remit the matter to the trial court for retrial. 7. The criminal appeal is, therefore, dismissed. Appeal dismissed.