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2014 DIGILAW 2692 (MAD)

M. Elumalai v. S. Rajaram

2014-08-18

S.VIMALA

body2014
JUDGMENT S. VIMALA, J. 1. Resolution of dispute through agreeable and amicable settlement is a innovative and revolutionary democratic method contributed by India to the World Jurisprudence. In Lok Adalat, as it is popularily called, i.e. people's court, the litigants are at the centre stage, mutually negoitating, as to what each of them want. Since the litigants on both sides get what they wanted, it is said there are no victors and vanquished and, thus, no rancour. Experiment of Lok Adalat as an alternate mode of dispute settlement has come to be widely adopted in India, as a viable, economic, efficient and informal one. Such being the case, after settlement, whether one of the parties can be permitted to deprive the benefit of the compromise to the other party, by contenting, that there is no provision for execution and there is no direction to execute the sale deed, is the issue raised. 1.1 Lok Adalat is another alternative to Judicial Justice said the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P.T. Thomas vs. Thomas Job, Appeal (Civil) 4677 of 2005. When the enactment aims for speedy justice, still the litigants have developed a taste for prolonged litigation and procrastinate some how or other and this case is a classic one. 1.2 Whether the compromise decree should provide for a separate clause in providing for execution of sale deed by the seller and if not whether the decree would become inexecutable? 1.3 Whether the decree passed in the Lok Adalat can be executed only when it contains an express clause providing for execution of the decree and not otherwise? These are the specific issues raised in the revision petition. 2. The defendants are the revision petitioners. 3. The plaintiff/respondent filed a suit for specific performance of the suit agreement dated 27.03.2010 under which defendants are alleged to have agreed to sell the suit property under the terms and conditions stipulated therein. 4. By the Joint Memo of compromise filed by the parties to the suit, Lok Adalat has passed a decree. The Joint Memo filed by the parties reads as under: "The parties to the case entered into a compromise before the Lok Adalat. "The terms of the compromise is that the Defendants are agreed to decree the suit as pray for without cost. The plaintiff is agreed to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs. The Joint Memo filed by the parties reads as under: "The parties to the case entered into a compromise before the Lok Adalat. "The terms of the compromise is that the Defendants are agreed to decree the suit as pray for without cost. The plaintiff is agreed to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs. 82,64,280/- (Rupees Eighty Two Lakhs Sixty Four Thousand and Two Hundred and Eighty only) within three months from this date. The defendants are agreed to surrender all the original documents to the plaintiff within the three months time. If the plaintiff is not paid the balance sale consideration that this compromise will be stand concealed. It is prayed that the full court fee may be refunded to the plaintiff." 5. It is based upon this compromise decree an Execution Petition has been filed in E.P. No. 1 of 2014 in O.S. No. 15 of 2012. The Execution Petition was filed by the plaintiff/ decree holder directing the defendants/Judgment Debtor to execute the sale deed in accordance with the decree and to deliver vacant possession of the suit property. This Execution petition has been returned on the ground that there is no provision in the compromise decree providing for filing of the Execution Petition and that the Execution Petition seeking registration of sale deed is not maintainable, (without having a separate clause in the compromise decree to execute and register the sale deed). 5.1. The Execution Petition has been resubmitted with an endorsement that necessary application under Section 152 C.P.C. is filed to cure the defect in the certified copy of the decree. The decree holder had been under the impression that the decree had to be amended incorporating the clause providing for execution and registration of sale deed by the judgment debtor. Later on the Execution Petition has been numbered and the judgment debtors did not file any counter and they were set ex-parte. The Court by the order dated 11.03.2014 has ordered production of draft sale deed by the decree holder by, 20.03.2014. In the mean time, the Judgment Debtors have filed petition under Section 47 C.P.C. and it has been returned. 6. The defendants have filed this revision petition contending that the execution petition ought not have been taken on file and the orders passed in the Execution petition are liable to be set aside. 7. In the mean time, the Judgment Debtors have filed petition under Section 47 C.P.C. and it has been returned. 6. The defendants have filed this revision petition contending that the execution petition ought not have been taken on file and the orders passed in the Execution petition are liable to be set aside. 7. The main contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner is that the compromise decree passed by the Lok Adalat did not provide for the execution of the sale deed by the Judgment Debtors; therefore, the Execution petition itself is not maintainable. The further contention is that the decree holder cannot invoke section 152 C.P.C. For the purpose of addition/inclusion of the clause providing for execution of sale deed, as Section 152 C.P.C. can be invoked only to correct clerical mistakes or errors and not to correct or to supply omission touching the merits of the case. 7.1. Whether these contentions are valid is the issue to be considered? 7.2. Admittedly, the compromise decree did not expressly direct the judgment debtors to execute the sale deed in favour of the decree holder nor it expressly provided for execution of the decree, thereby enabling the decree holder to get the sale deed executed either by seeking direction to the judgment debtors to execute the sale deed or to get it executed through Court. Therefore, whether a decree for specific performance seeking registration of the sale deed can be executed only if there is a specific clause directing the respondent to execute the sale deed, is the first issue to be answered. 7.3. The compromise decree, as extracted already, only provides for payment of sale consideration by the plaintiff/decree holder and the consequences of default and it did not provide for, what should follow after the sale consideration is paid. Whether the defendant should execute the sale deed and if not, what is the remedy open to the plaintiff are not stated. 7.4. Therefore, just because there is lacunae/omission in the compromise decree, whether the decree holder has to be left in lurch or the omission can be filled up/satisfied by allowing remedies which are consequential or implicit in it. This question can be answered only by looking into the rights and liabilities of the seller and the purchaser. 7.5. 7.4. Therefore, just because there is lacunae/omission in the compromise decree, whether the decree holder has to be left in lurch or the omission can be filled up/satisfied by allowing remedies which are consequential or implicit in it. This question can be answered only by looking into the rights and liabilities of the seller and the purchaser. 7.5. The more relevant question would be, once, the balance of sale consideration is paid by the purchaser, what are the duties and responsibilities of the seller. 7.6. In order to answer this question, the Court has to refer Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, dealing with sale and Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, dealing with rights and liabilities of buyer and Seller. 7.7. Sale is defined under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. Sale is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part paid and part promised. In order to constitute sale, there must be transfer of ownership from one person to another. A transfer of ownership by a person means a transfer by such person of his rights and interests in the property in full and permanently. The consideration for the transfer is stated to be a price which is paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised. This is a case where the entire sale consideration has been paid. Therefore, once the seller receives the entire sale consideration, the seller is bound to execute the sale deed. 7.8. Therefore, the clause providing for payment of sale consideration by the seller imposes a corresponding duty on the part of the purchaser to execute the sale deed. Therefore, there is no necessity for a separate clause in the compromise decree providing for execution of sale deed by the seller. It is implied and the seller, who takes the purchase money can have no escape from executing the Sale Deed. Even otherwise, Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act expressly direct the seller to execute the sale deed. 7.9. It is implied and the seller, who takes the purchase money can have no escape from executing the Sale Deed. Even otherwise, Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act expressly direct the seller to execute the sale deed. 7.9. Under Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, the seller has several duties and he is bound to – (a) Disclose the defect in the title, (b) Duty to preserve property and document of title (c) Duty to give possession (d) Duty to execute the conveyance on receipt of payment of consideration (e) Duty to pay public charges, rent and encumbrances (f) Delivery of document of title etc. 7.10. The relevant clause providing for execution of conveyance is Section 55(1)(d) of the T.P. Act, which reads as under: "55. Rights and liabilities of buyer and seller: In the absence of a contract to the contrary, the buyer and the seller of immovable property respectively are subject to the liabilities, and have the rights, mentioned in the rules next following or such of them as are applicable to the property sold: (1) The seller is bound – (a) To disclose to the buyer any material defect in the property or in the seller's title thereto of which the seller is and the buyer is not, aware, and which the buyer could not with ordinary care discover. (b) To produce to the buyer on his request for examination all documents of title relating to the property which are in the seller's possession or power. (c) To answer to the best of his information all relevant questions put to him by the buyer in respect to the property or the title thereto. (d) On payment or tender of the amount due in respect of the price, to execute a proper conveyance of the property when the buyer tenders it to him for execution at a proper time and place. (e) Between the date of the contract of sale and the delivery of the property, to take as much care of the property and all documents of title relating thereto which are in his possession as an owner of ordinary prudence would take of such property and documents. (f) To give, on being so required, the buyer, or such person as he directs, such possession of the property as its nature admits. (f) To give, on being so required, the buyer, or such person as he directs, such possession of the property as its nature admits. (g) To pay all public charges and rent accrued due in respect of the property up to the date of the sale, the interest on all encumbrances on such property due on such date, and, except where the property is sold subject to encumbrances, to discharge all encumbrances on the property then existing. (2) The seller shall be deemed to contract with the buyer that the interest which the seller professes to transfer to the buyer subsists and that he has power to transfer the same: Provided that, where the sale is made by a person in a fiduciary character, he shall be deemed to contract with the buyer that the seller has done no act whereby the property is encumbered or whereby he is hindered from transferring it. The benefit of the contract mentioned in this rule shall be annexed to, and shall go with, the interest of the transferee as such, and may be enforced by every person in whom that interest is for the whole or any part thereof from time to time vested. (3) Where the whole of the purchase-money has been paid to the seller, he is also bound to deliver to the buyer all documents of title relating to the property which are in the seller's possession or power: Provided that – (a) Where the seller retains any part of the property comprised in such documents, he is entitled to retain them all. (b) Where the whole of such property is sold to different buyers, the buyers of the lot of greatest value is entitled to such documents. But in case (a) the seller, and in case (b) the buyer, of the lot of greatest value, is bound, upon every reasonable request by the buyer, or by any of the other buyers, as the case may be, and at the cost of the person making the request, to produce the said documents and furnish such true copies thereof or extracts therefrom as he may require; and in the meantime, the seller, or the buyer of the lot of greatest value, as the case may be, shall keep the said documents safe, uncancelled and undefaced, unless prevented from so doing by fire or other inevitable accident. (4) The seller is entitled – (a) To the rents and profits of the property till the ownership thereof passes to the buyer. (b) Where the ownership of the property has passed to the buyer before payment of the whole of the purchase-money, to a charge upon the property in the hands of the buyer, any transferee without consideration or any transferee with notice of the non-payment, for the amount of the purchase-money, or any part thereof remaining unpaid, and for interest on such amount or part from the date on which possession has been delivered. (5) The buyer is bound – (a) To disclose to the seller any fact as to the nature or extent of the seller's interest in the property of which the buyer is aware, but of which he has reason to believe that the seller is not aware, and which materially increases the value of such interest. (b) To pay or tender, at the time and place of completing the sale, the purchase-money to the seller or such person as he directs: Provided that, where the property is sold free from encumbrances, the buyer may retain out of the purchase-money the amount of any encumbrances on the property existing at the date of the sale, and shall pay the amount so retained to the persons entitled thereto. (c) Where the ownership of the property has passed to the buyer, to bear any loss arising from the destruction, injury or decrease in value of the property not caused by the seller. (d) Where the ownership of the property has passed to the buyer, as between himself and the seller, to pay all public charges and rent which may become payable in respect of the property, the principal moneys due on any encumbrances subject to which the property is sold, and the interest thereon afterwards accruing due. (6) The buyer is entitled – (a) Where the ownership of the property has passed to him, to the benefit of any improvement in, or increase in value of, the property, and to the rents and profits thereof. (6) The buyer is entitled – (a) Where the ownership of the property has passed to him, to the benefit of any improvement in, or increase in value of, the property, and to the rents and profits thereof. (b) Unless he has improperly declined to accept delivery of the property, to a charge on the property, as against the seller and all persons claiming under him, to the extent of the seller's interest in the property, for the amount of any purchase-money properly paid by the buyer in anticipation of the delivery and for interest on such amount; and, when he properly declines to accept the delivery, also for the earnest (if any) and for the costs (if any) awarded to him of a suit to compel specific performance of the contract or to obtain a decree for its rescission. An omission to make such disclosures as are mentioned in this section, paragraph (1), clause (a) and paragraph (5), clause (a), is fraudulent." 7.10. A Perusal of the clause (d) of the Section 55(1) of the Transfer of Property Act, would go to show that, once the buyer has performed his part of the contract viz. payment of the entire sale consideration, then it is the duty of the seller to execute the conveyance. In other words, the conveyance must follow on payment of entire sale consideration. After the receipt of sale consideration, without executing the sale deed if the seller keeps the sale consideration what is the nature and character of the money in the hands of the seller? The seller may become guilty of criminal breach of trust or may become liable for misappropriation of money etc. depending upon the intention exhibited on the part of the defendant. Without realising his duty to execute the conveyance, the seller strangely claims that the decree should provide for same expressly. The duty to execute the sale deed has been provided for already under Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, the decree need not expressly provide for execution of sale deed. 7.11. When the Court grants decree for specific performance, it promises to do all such things, as parties would have been bound to do, had this been done without the intervention of the Court. Therefore, the contention that there shall be an express clause providing for execution of sale deed is unreasonable. 8. 7.11. When the Court grants decree for specific performance, it promises to do all such things, as parties would have been bound to do, had this been done without the intervention of the Court. Therefore, the contention that there shall be an express clause providing for execution of sale deed is unreasonable. 8. The next question to be considered in this C.R.P. is whether a decree passed in Lok Adalat can be executed only if the decree expressly provides for execution. 8.1. Admittedly, there is no specific clause for execution in the compromise decree. Then, what is the value to the decree. This is the second issue to be answered. 8.2. In order to appreciate this contention, it is necessary to look into the object and purpose of introduction of Alternate Dispute Resolution system. ADR (Alternate Dispute Resolution) system has been an integral part of our historical past. The concept of Lok Adalat (Peoples' Court) is an innovative Indian contribution to the world jurisprudence. The institution of Lok Adalat in India, as the very name suggests, means, People's Court. Lok stands for people and the term Adalat means court. India has a long tradition and history of such methods being practiced in the society at grass roots level. In ancient times the disputes were used to be referred to panchayat which were established at village level. Panchayat’s used to resolve the dispute through arbitration. It has proved to be a very effective alternative to litigation. This very concept of settlement of dispute through mediation, negotiation or through arbitral process known as decision of Nyaya-Panchayat is conceptualized and institutionalized in the philosophy of Lok Adalat. It involves people who are directly or indirectly affected by dispute resolution. The evolution of movement called Lok Adalat was a part of the strategy to relieve heavy burden on the Courts with pending cases and to give relief to the litigants who were in a queue to get justice. The advent of Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 gave a statutory status to Lok Adalats, pursuant to the constitutional mandate in Article 39-A of the Constitution of India. It contains various provisions for settlement of disputes through Lok Adalat. 8.3. The advent of Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 gave a statutory status to Lok Adalats, pursuant to the constitutional mandate in Article 39-A of the Constitution of India. It contains various provisions for settlement of disputes through Lok Adalat. 8.3. It would be appropriate to refer 238th Report on Amendment of Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads thus:- "2.3 With the introduction of these provisions, a mandatory duty has been cast on the civil courts to endeavour for settlement of disputes by relegating the parties to an ADR process. Five ADR methods are referred to in section 89. They are: (a) Arbitration (b) Conciliation (c) Judicial settlement (d) Settlement through Lok Adalat (e) Mediation. 2.4 Arbitration as well as Conciliation are governed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (AC Act, for short) which superseded the previous Arbitration Act of 1940. The arbitration unlike conciliation is an adjudicatory process. Once a civil dispute is referred to arbitration, the case will go outside the stream of the court permanently and will not come back to the court. However, in contrast, a dispute referred to conciliation which is a non-adjudicatory process, does not go out of the domain of the court-process permanently. If there is no amicable settlement, the matter reverts conciliation. This legal position is no longer in doubt in view of the recent judgment of Supreme Court in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Cherian Varkey Consturction Co. Pvt. Ltd. In the case of arbitration, if there is no pre-existing arbitration agreement, the parties to suit can agree for arbitration by filing a joint memo or application and the court can then refer the matter to arbitration and such arbitration will be governed by the provisions of the AC Act. The award of the arbitrators is binding on the parties and is enforceable as if it is a decree of the court, in view of what has been said in section 36 of the AC Act. If any settlement is reached in the arbitration proceedings, then – When the matter is settled through conciliation, the settlement agreement shall have the same status and effect as if it is an arbitral award (vide Section 74 of AC Act) and therefore it is enforceable as a decree of the court by virtue of section 36 of the AC Act. Similarly, when a settlement takes place before the Lok Adalat, the award of the Lok Adalat is deemed to be a decree of a civil court under section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (for short, LSA Act) and executable as such. 8.4. Sections 21 and 22 of the Legal Services Authority Act, provides answer to this issue, which reads as under: "Award of Lok Adalat — (1) Every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court or, as the case may be, an order of any other court and where a compromise or settlement has been arrived at, by a Lok Adalat in a case referred to it under sub-section (1) of section 20, the court-free paid in such case shall be refunded in the manner provided under the Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870). (2) Every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall lie to any court against the award. "22. POWERS OF LOK ADALATS (1) The Lok Adalat shall, for the purposes of holding any determination under this Act, have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely – (a) the summoning and enforcing the attendance of any witness and examining him on oath; (b) the discovery and production of any document; (c) the reception of evidence on affidavits; (d) the requisitioning of any public record or document or copy of such record or document from any Court or Office; (e) such other matters as may be prescribed. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers contained in sub-section (1), every Lok Adalat shall have the requisite powers to specify its own procedure for the determination of any dispute coming before it. (3) All Proceedings before a Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) and every Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for the purpose of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2) of 1974). 8.5. 8.5. It would be appropriate to refer the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, rendered in the case of K.N. Govindan Kutty Menon vs. C.D. Shaji, Civil Appeal No. 10209 of 2011, and in the said case, it has been held as follows:- "Every award of a Lok Adalat including an order recording a settlement between the parties in a cheque bounce case under 138 NI Act, is deemed a civil court decree, and as such it is executable by a civil court." The relevant observation in the case, referred to supra, reads as under:- "Section 21 of the Act, which we have extracted above, contemplates a deeming provision, hence, it is a legal fiction that the award of the Lok Adalat is a decree of a civil court. In the case on hand, the question posed for consideration before the High Court was that when a criminal case referred to by the Magistrate to a Lok Adalat is settled by the parties and award is passed recording the settlement, can it be considered as a decree of civil court and thus executable by that court? After highlighting the relevant provisions, namely, Section 21 of the Act, it was contended before the High Court that every award passed by the Lok Adalat has to be deemed to be a decree of a civil court and as such executable by that court. Unfortunately, the said argument was not acceptable by the High Court. On the other hand, the High Court has concluded that when a criminal case is referred to the Lok Adalat and it is settled at the Lok Adalat, the award passed has to be treated only as an order of that criminal court and it cannot be executed as a decree of the civil court. After saying so, the High Court finally concluded an award passed by the Lok Adalat on reference of a criminal case by the criminal court as already concluded can only be construed as an order by the criminal court and it is not a decree passed by a civil court and confirmed the order of the Principal Munsiff who declined the request of the petitioner therein to execute the award passed by the Lok Adalat on reference of a complaint by the criminal court. On going through the Statement of Objects and Reasons, definition of Court, legal service as well as Section 21 of the Act, in addition to the reasons given hereunder, we are of the view that the interpretation adopted by the Kerala High Court in the impugned order is erroneous. (1) In view of the unambiguous language of Section 21 of the Act, every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court and as such it is executable by that Court. (2) The Act does not make out any such distinction between the reference made by a civil court and criminal court. (3) There is no restriction on the power of the Lok Adalat to pass an award based on the compromise arrived at between the parties in respect of cases referred to by various Courts (both civil and criminal), Tribunals, Family court, Rent Control Court, Consumer Redressal Forum, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and other Forums of similar nature. (4) Even if a matter is referred by a criminal court under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and by virtue of the deeming provisions, the award passed by the Lok Adalat based on a compromise has to be treated as a decree capable of execution by a civil court. (18) In view of the above discussion and ultimate conclusion, we set aside the order dated 23.09.2009 passed by the Principal Munsiff Judge in an unnumbered execution petition of 2009 in CC No. 1216 of 2007 and the order of the High Court dated 24.11.2009 in Writ Petition (C) No. 33013 of 2009. Consequently, we direct the execution court to restore the execution petition and to proceed further in accordance with law." 8.6. It would be beneficial to refer the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in P.T. Thomas's Case (cited supra) where-under the benefits of Lok Adalat itself and the duty of the Court in giving fair and reasonable interpretation to the decree passed by the Lok Adalat have been highlighted: "Benefits Under Lok Adalat: 1. There is no Court fee and if Court fee is already paid the amount will be refunded if the dispute is settled at Lok Adalat according to the rules. 2. The basic features of Lok Adalat are the procedural flexibility and speedy trial of the disputes. There is no Court fee and if Court fee is already paid the amount will be refunded if the dispute is settled at Lok Adalat according to the rules. 2. The basic features of Lok Adalat are the procedural flexibility and speedy trial of the disputes. There is no strict application of procedural laws like Civil Procedure Code and Evidence Act while assessing the claim by Lok Adalat. 3. The parties to the dispute can directly interect with the Judge through their Counsel which is not possible in regular Courts of law. 4. The award by the Lok Adalat is binding on the parties and it has the status of a decree of a Civil Court and it is non-appealable which does not causes the delay in the settlement of disputes finally. In view of above facilities provided by the Act Lok Adalats are boon to the litigating public they can get their disputes settled fast and free of cost amicably. 8.7. Comparing the compromise decree contemplated under the Civil Procedure Code with that of the award passed by the Lok Adalat and the finalty attached to it, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- In Punjab National Bank vs. Lakshmichand Rah, AIR 2000 Madhya Pradesh 301, 304, the High Court held that "The provisions of the Act shall prevail in the matter of filing an appeal and an appeal would not lie under the provisions of Section 96 C.P.C. Lok Adalat is conducted under an independent enactment and once the award is made by Lok Adalat the right of appeal shall be governed by the provisions of the Legal Services Authorities Act when it has been specifically barred under Provisions of Section 21(2), no appeal can be filed against the award under Section 96 C.P.C." The Court further stated that "It may incidentally be further seen that even the Code of Civil Procedure does not provide for an appeal under Section 96(3) against a consent decree. The Code of Civil Procedure also intends that once a consent decree is passed by Civil Court finality is attached to it. Such finality cannot be permitted to be destroyed, particularly under the Legal Services Authorities Act, as it would amount to defeat the very aim and object of the Act with which it has been enacted, hence, we hold that the appeal filed is not maintainable. Such finality cannot be permitted to be destroyed, particularly under the Legal Services Authorities Act, as it would amount to defeat the very aim and object of the Act with which it has been enacted, hence, we hold that the appeal filed is not maintainable. "The truth is, a judgment by consent is intended to put a stop to litigation between the parties just as much as is a judgment which results from the decision of the Court after the matter has been fought out to the end. And I think it would be very mischievous if one were not to give a fair and reasonable interpretation to such judgments, and were to allow questions that were really involved in the action to be fought over again in a subsequent action." To the like effect are the following observations of the Judicial Committee in Kinch vs. Walvott, 1929 AC 482 at p.493 (D) - First of all their Lordships are clear that in relation to this plea of estoppel it is of no advantage to the appellant that the order in the libel action which is said to raise it was a consent order. For such a purpose an order by consent, not discharged by mutual agreement, and remaining unreduced, is as effective as an order of the Court made otherwise than by consent and not discharged on appeal." The same principle has been followed by the High Courts in India in a number of reported decisions. Reference need only be made to the cases of Secy. of State vs. Ateendranath Das, 63 Cal 550 at p. 558 (E); Bhaishanker vs. Moraji, 36 Bom 283 (F) and Raja Kumara Venkata Perumal Raja Bahadur vs. Thatha Ramasamy Chetty, 35 Mad 75 (G). In the Calcutta case after referring to the English decisions the High Court observed as follows: "On this authority it becomes absolutely clear that the consent order is as effective as an order passed on contest, not only with reference to the conclusion arrived at in the previous suit but also with regard to every step in the process of reasoning on which the said conclusion is founded. When we say "every step in the reasoning" we mean the findings on the essential facts on which the judgment or the ultimate conclusion was founded. When we say "every step in the reasoning" we mean the findings on the essential facts on which the judgment or the ultimate conclusion was founded. In other words the finding which it was necessary to arrive at for the purpose of sustaining the judgment in the particular case will operate as estoppel by judgment." The Civil Procedure Code contains the following provisions: "Order 23 Rule 3 provides for compromise of suit where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, written and signed by the parties. The Court after satisfying itself about the settlement, it can convert the settlement into a judgment decree." The High Court, in our view, has failed to note that the courts attempt should be to give life and enforceability to the compromise award and not to defeat it on technical grounds. This is a fit case, in our view, where the Respondent ought to have been directed to execute the sale deed by the extended time, if necessary. The High Court is also not correct in holding that the Court has no jurisdiction to extend the time. In our view, the learned Subordinate Judge has rightly extended the time for depositing the money which the High Court has wrongly interfered with. We direct the Respondent herein to execute the sale deed within two weeks from today failing which the Appellant could get the sale deed executed though court as stipulated in the award. The respondent is now entitled to withdraw Rs. 9.5 lakhs from the Sub-Court Alapuzha. 8.7. Section 21 of Legal Services Authority Act and the dictum laid down in P.T. Thomas's case referred to above, would go to show that the decree passed in the Lok Adalat is deemed to be the decree passed by the Civil Court and therefore, it is an executable decree. The decree holder has rightly filed the Execution Petition. 9. It is the grievance of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that the description of the property as given in the Execution Petition would amount to fraud being played upon the Court, as the extent of property as described in the Execution Petition is larger than the description of property as mentioned in the plaint. 9.1. 9. It is the grievance of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that the description of the property as given in the Execution Petition would amount to fraud being played upon the Court, as the extent of property as described in the Execution Petition is larger than the description of property as mentioned in the plaint. 9.1. The description of property as mentioned in the plaint as well as in the Execution Petition is placed in the comparative table to appreciate the contention raised. 9.2. The comparison of schedule of property in the suit as well as in the Execution Petition would go to show that the boundaries, patta number, survey number are same excepting the extent of property. In the plaint, in the property description, there is an insertion, which is shown in the bracket, which is missing in the Execution Petition. Therefore, there seems to be an inadvertent omission in describing the property in the Execution Petition and it does not appear to be intentional with a view to grab more property. Therefore, the mistake can be corrected by permitting the decree holder to amend the schedule of property which would tally with the description of property as made in the plaint. DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY PLAINT EXECUTION PETITION Land measuring (19729 Sq. ft. out of 29212 Sq. Ft. Excluding 50221 Sq. ft.) acre 0.67 cents comrpised in S. No. 16 covered in Patta no. 447 of Periasekkadu, Madhavaram village, Madhavarm Taluk, Thiruvallur District – BOUNDED ON NORTH BY – LAND IN S. NO. 18, SOUTH BY – LAND IN S. NO. 209 AND 206 EAST BY – GRAMANATTAM LAND WEST BY – LAND IN S. NO. 140 Land measuring acre 0.67 cents comrpised in S. No. 16 covered in Patta no. 447 of Periasekkadu, Madhavaram village, Madhavarm Taluk, Thiruvallur. District – BOUNDED ON NORTH BY – LAND IN S. NO. 18 SOUTH BY – LAND IN S. NO. 209 AND 206 EAST BY – GRAMANATTAM LAND WEST BY – LAND IN S. NO. 140 10. For the foregoing discussions, the Executing Court is directed to permit the decree holder to amend the description of property/schedule of property in such a way that it would tally with the description of property as described in the plaint. 10.1. 209 AND 206 EAST BY – GRAMANATTAM LAND WEST BY – LAND IN S. NO. 140 10. For the foregoing discussions, the Executing Court is directed to permit the decree holder to amend the description of property/schedule of property in such a way that it would tally with the description of property as described in the plaint. 10.1. In the result, excepting the above direction with reference to amendment in the description of property in the decree, in all other respects, this Civil Revision Petition stands dismissed. No costs.