JUDGMENT U.C. Dhyani, J. 1. By means of present special appeal, the appellant seeks to set aside the impugned judgment and order dated 24.02.2014, passed by learned Single Judge, in writ petition no. 2535 of 2012 (M/S), and also seeks dismissal of writ petition filed by the respondent-petitioner. 2. In the writ petition, the petitioner prayed for direction in the nature of certiorari to quash the recovery citation dated 18.11.2012, which was issued by respondent no. 4 (Tehsildar, Tehsil Haldwani, District Nainital), enclosed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. The writ petitioner also made a prayer for restraining the respondent U.P. Financial Corporation and others from realizing the amount from the petitioner as arrears of land revenue. 3. Learned Single Judge, after considering the documents on record, and after hearing learned counsel for the parties, allowed the writ petition. The impugned citation dated 18.11.2012, passed by respondent no. 4 was therefore quashed, vide judgment and order dated 24.02.2014. Aggrieved against the same, present special appeal was filed on behalf of the U.P. Financial Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Corporation’). 4. The principal challenge to the recovery citation, by the writ petitioner (respondent herein) was on the ground that the recovery was time barred. The petitioner took a term loan of Rs. 24,000/- from the Corporation in the year 1981 for establishing a confectionary unit. He was, however, granted a total loan of Rs. 20,000/-. According to the petitioner, regular installments were paid by him to the Corporation from time to time. He, however, received a letter from the Corporation on 02.08.2009, whereby the Corporation demanded a sum of Rs. 13,850/- as principal and Rs. 51,151/- as interest thereon. Thus, a total sum of Rs. 71,001/- was outstanding against the petitioner. Since, according to the Corporation, the petitioner did not pay the amount, therefore, recovery proceedings under the provisions of the U.P. Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972 (as applicable to the State of Uttarakhand) were initiated against him. The money was to be recovered from the petitioner as arrears of land revenue. Recovery citation was issued on 18.11.2012. 5. It is the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant has been writing letters to the respondent regarding said loan from time to time. The first letter in this regard was issued on 11.08.1982 and the last was dispatched on 18.12.1986. Recovery citation was issued on 18.11.2012. 5. It is the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant has been writing letters to the respondent regarding said loan from time to time. The first letter in this regard was issued on 11.08.1982 and the last was dispatched on 18.12.1986. After a span of 17 years, the next letter was issued by the appellant to the respondent on 11.11.2003, although two letters were written in between, in the year 2004 and 2005 also. 6. It is also the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that no time period is fixed for realization of the outstanding dues. Learned counsel referred to Section 32G of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 to show that where any amount is due to the Financial Corporation in respect of any accommodation granted by it to any industrial concern, the Financial Corporation or any person authorized by it in writing in this behalf, may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the State Government for the recovery of the amount due to it, and if the State Government or such authority, as that Government may specify in this behalf, is satisfied, after following such procedure as may be prescribed, that any amount is so due, it may issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector, and the Collector shall proceed to recover that amount in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant also contended that the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 has overriding effect in view of Section 46B of the said Act. The same is being reproduced here-in-below for reference: “46B. Effect of Act on other laws. –The provision of this Act and of any rule or orders made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in the memorandum or articles of association of an industrial concern or in any other instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act, but save as aforesaid, the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other law for the time being applicable to an industrial concern.” 8. Assuming for the sake of arguments that no time limit was prescribed for realization of the outstanding dues against the defaulters, the fact remains that realization of such dues cannot be deferred for the period ad infinitum. This fact is under no dispute that the citation was issued against the respondent after a gap of 17 years. Although several letters were written by the appellant to the respondent from time to time, but this fact is on record that the citation was issued for realizing the outstanding dues against the respondent as arrears of land revenue only after an interregnum of 17 years. 9. It was held in Narendra Kumar and Another vs. Collector, Bulandshahar and Others, 2004 Allahabad Law Journal 2235, that although the U.P. Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972, does not prescribe a time period, yet the fact remains that the period should be reasonable period. The observations made by Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in this respect are quoted by learned Single Judge at internal page no. 5 of the judgment under appeal. We are not inclined to repeat those observations made by Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in our judgment. 10. Other rulings of Maharashtra State Financial Corporation vs. Ashok K. Agarwal and Others, (2006) 9 SCC 617 and State of Kerala vs. V.R. Kalliyanikutty, AIR 1999 SC 1305 were also quoted by learned Single Judge in the judgment under appeal to arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings initiated against the petitioner (respondent herein) are highly belated and, therefore, cannot be permitted to be initiated, after such a long span of 17 years. It will be useful to quote paragraph 12 of the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in Narendra Kumar’s case (supra). The same is being reproduced hereunder: “The law of limitation makes available a right of defence with the debtor to claim that after the expiry of period of limitation the remedy to recover the amount by the creditor from him had become time barred. The Act has been enforced for speedy recovery of dues of the State Government, U.P. Financial Corporation etc. as mentioned in the Act. It has not been enacted with a purpose to enlarge the limitation nor the rights of the creditor had been enlarged to recover claims of sum due that had become time barred. The Act has been enforced for speedy recovery of dues of the State Government, U.P. Financial Corporation etc. as mentioned in the Act. It has not been enacted with a purpose to enlarge the limitation nor the rights of the creditor had been enlarged to recover claims of sum due that had become time barred. It is a settled law, that no one can extend the period of limitation by taking advantage of his own wrong. The Apex Court in Sharda Devi vs. State of Bihar, (2003) 3 SCC 128 , while considering the Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which does not provide any limitation for making reference held as under (para 29) : “No period of limitation for exercise of any statutory power is prescribed, the power can nevertheless be exercised only within the reasonable period, what is a reasonable period in a given case shall depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.” The reasonable period would be the period during which the suit could have been filed. Since the respondents slept over the matter for eighteen years, the recovery of loan in 2000 was barred by the time. No effort has been made by the respondents to establish that the cause of action for recovery survived after eighteen years.” 11. Above proposition of law is squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case. 12. As a consequence thereof, we are unable to take a view contrary to what was taken by learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition of the petitioner (respondent herein). No interference is called for in the judgment under challenge. The special appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed.