JUDGMENT Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya,J.: - Heard Sri Shikhar Anand, learned counsel for the revision applicant-Food Corporation of India and perused the impugned order dated 08.07.2014, passed by the District Judge, Barabanki whereby application moved by opposite party nos.1 and 2, who are the decree holders, for restoration of the execution case no.1 of 1992 has been allowed and order dated 19.07.2003, passed by learned court below dismissing the execution case for non-prosecution has been set-aside. 2. Learned counsel for the revision applicant has very strenuously argued this case on the strength of judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Damodaran Pillai and others vs South Indian Bank Ltd., reported in AIR 2005 SC 3460 , wherein it has been categorically held that the provisions of Section 5 of Limitation Act on the proceedings drawn under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'Code') are expressly excluded and hence, in such proceedings, inherent powers of the Court for condonation of delay etc. cannot be invoked. He has further submitted that the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 106 (3) of the Code stipulate that an application under sub-rule (1) of Rule 106 of Order XXI of the Code for setting aside ex parte order etc. can be entertained only if it is filed within 30 days from the date of order, in case the order is passed in absence of the applicant who applies for execution of the case. 3. He has also stated that the reasons indicated by the learned court below for allowing the application of restoration moved by opposite party nos. 1 and 2 and setting aside the order dated 19.07.2003 dismissing the execution case for non-prosecution are not tenable for the reason that the date of knowledge of the said order has been taken into account by the learned court below whereas in terms of the provision of sub-rule (2) of Rule 106 of Order XXI of the Code, an application can be made under sub-rule (1) of Rule 106 of Order XXI of the Code only within 30 days from the date of order. 4. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments made by learned counsel for the revision-applicant and perused the impugned order dated 08.07.2014, passed by the District Judge, Barabanki. 5. 4. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments made by learned counsel for the revision-applicant and perused the impugned order dated 08.07.2014, passed by the District Judge, Barabanki. 5. At the first look, the arguments being made by learned counsel for the revision-applicant appear to be very attractive, however, in the considered opinion of the Court, the same merits rejection. 6. An order was passed enhancing the amount of compensation on 30.05.1990 on a reference made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. For executing the aforesaid order dated 30.05.1990, the execution case bearing no. 1 of 1992 was filed by opposite party nos. 1 and 2. In the execution proceedings, attachment order was passed by the executing court against the revision applicant-judgement debtor which was challenged by the revision applicant before this Court by way of filing a writ petition bearing W.P. No. 3121 (M/S) of 1999, wherein an interim order was passed on 22.11.1999 staying the attachment of the property of the revision-applicant as ordered by the executing court. 7. It appears that after passing of the aforesaid interim order, the matter did not proceed regularly before the executing court and on 05.10.2002, an order was passed in absence of the decree holders-opposite party nos. 1 and 2 whereby the executing court required the parties to the proceedings to clarify as to whether the amount under the order dated 30.05.1990, passed on the reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act has been deposited or not. The execution case was, however, dismissed for non-prosecution on 19.07.2003. 8. It is worthwhile to notice at this juncture that a clear finding has been recorded by the learned court below that after passing of the interim order by this Court in the aforesaid writ petition on 22.11.1999, the proceedings of the execution case were deferred. However, the dates were being fixed in the case. The said finding has been recorded by the learned court below on the basis of perusal of the record. The learned District Judge has also recorded a finding that even on 05.10.2002 the order, requiring the parties to clarify as to whether the amount under the order dated 30.05.1990 has been deposited or not, was passed in absence of the decree holders. The learned District Judge has also recorded a finding that even on 05.10.2002 the order, requiring the parties to clarify as to whether the amount under the order dated 30.05.1990 has been deposited or not, was passed in absence of the decree holders. The learned court below has recorded a categorical finding that after deferring the proceedings of the execution case on the basis of interim order passed by this Court on 22.11.1999, the record does not reveal that parties were ever given any notice to appear. On the basis of detailed discussion, an emphatic finding has been recorded by the court below that on 19.07.2003 when the execution case was dismissed for non-prosecution, the date in the case was not fixed and proceedings already stood deferred. Thus, the finding recorded by the court below is that the date in the execution proceedings was not fixed on 19.07.2003, neither had either of the parties any notice of the said date. The conclusion arrived at by the learned court below to the aforesaid effect is based on perusal of the record of the execution case. 9. I have no reason to deviate from the said finding recorded by the District Judge while passing the impugned order. 10. In view of the aforesaid finding recorded by the learned court below and the discussions made above, the question which now needs to be considered by this Court is as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Damodaran Pillai and others (supra) has any application. 11. So far as the principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Damodaran Pillai and others (supra) is concerned, there cannot be any quarrel. However, one very distinguishing feature needs to be noted by this Court in this case at this juncture which has been noticed by the District Judge while passing the impugned order. The learned District Judge has relied upon a judgement of this Court in the case of Arjun Prasad vs Smt Ameer Jahan Begum reported in 2007 (103) RD 679 . The learned District Judge has relied upon a judgement of this Court in the case of Arjun Prasad vs Smt Ameer Jahan Begum reported in 2007 (103) RD 679 . The court below has also relied upon the judgement of High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Khoobchand Jain and another vs Kashi Prasad and others, reported in AIR 1986 Madhya Pradesh 66 (though the citation has wrongly been given in the impugned order as 2005 (61) ALR page 205). 12. It is also worth noticing that Hon'ble Supreme Court while deciding the case of Damodaran Pillai and others (supra) had taken into consideration the arguments raised by the parties. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, based its judgement on the judgement of High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Khoobchand Jain and another (supra), and expressed its view that the judgement in the case of Khoobchand Jain and another (supra) did not have any application in the facts and circumstances of the case of Damodaran Pillai and others (supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said judgement has clearly noticed that in the case of Khoobchand Jain and another (supra), the execution application was dismissed on a day which was not fixed for hearing and thus, the said order of dismissal was not passed in terms of sub-rule (2) of Rule 105 of Order XXI of the Code. 13. The judgement of this Court in the case of Arjun Prasad (supra) has taken into consideration a situation where the date on which the execution case was dismissed in default or for non-prosecution was not a date where the Court proposed to apply mind or to hear the parties. It has been held in the said case by this Court that such date cannot be treated as the date for hearing within the meaning of Rule 105 (2) of Order XXI of the Code and the Court further observed that application for restoration in such a case would lie under Section 151 of the Code and not under Rule 106 of the Code. 14. Similar view has been taken by the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Khoobchand Jain and another (supra). 15. 14. Similar view has been taken by the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Khoobchand Jain and another (supra). 15. In the instant case as well, a categorical finding has been recorded by the learned court below that no date in the execution case was fixed on 19.07.2003 when the execution case was dismissed for non-prosecution. The tenor of the impugned order has to be appreciated in the background facts of the case as well. Admittedly, against the order of attachment passed by the executing court on 06.11.1999, the judgement debtor-revision applicant had preferred a writ petition bearing W.P.No. 3121 (M/S) of 1999 wherein an interim order was passed on 22.11.1999 staying the attachment order. After passing of the stay order on 22.11.1999, it appears that though the date before the executing court was being fixed in the execution case, however, no substantive proceedings were ever conducted. The learned District Judge in the impugned order has, thus, recorded a categorical finding, on the basis of perusal of record of the case, that the proceedings of the execution case were deferred after passing of the interim order by this Court on 22.11.1999 and further that on 05.10.2002 when the court required the parties to clarify as to whether the amount under the order dated 30.05.1990 has been deposited or not, was passed in absence of the decree holder. 16. The aforesaid conspectus of the fact as recorded by the District Judge makes it abundantly clear that no date on 19.07.2003 was fixed before the executing court in the execution case no. 1 of 1992, neither was any notice, nor information for appearance to the parties given after passing of the interim order by this Court on 22.11.1999. It is only after dismissal of the writ petition by this Court on 11.03.2011 that the opposite party nos.1 and 2 came to know about the order dated 19.07.2003. 17. It is also relevant to notice that writ petition filed by the judgement debtor-Food Corporation of India, namely, Writ Petition No. 3121 (M/S) of 1999 was dismissed on the statement made by learned counsel appearing for the judgement debtor that since the amount which has been directed to be paid in terms of the award dated 30.05.1990 under the Land Acquisition Act has already been paid, hence the writ petition had been rendered infructuous. 18. 18. The words 'impugned award' were ordered to be substituted by the words 'impugned order' by this Court on an application for correction by means of order dated 01.12.2011. 19. In view of the finding recorded by the learned court below that no date on 19.07.2003 in the execution case was fixed, it can safely be held that the judgement of this Court in the case of Arjun Prasad (supra) and the judgement of Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Khoobchand Jain and another (supra) are fully applicable. The distinguishing feature in the case of Khoobchand Jain and another (supra) has been noticed by Hon'ble Supreme Court while deciding the case of Damodaran Pillai and others (supra). 20. In view of above discussions, the finding recorded by the learned court below that the order dated 19.07.2003 dismissing the execution case for non-prosecution is an order under Section 151 of the Code and hence, the provisions of Section 5 of Limitation Act will be applicable, in my view, is correct and does not call for any interference by this Court in the instant case. 21. At this juncture, learned counsel for the revision-applicant has attempted to impress upon the Court by making another submission taking a clue from the provisions contained in sub-rule (2) of Rule 105 of the Order XXI of Code. According to him, the said provision does not make a distinction between the order passed dismissing the execution case for non-prosecution or in default 'on the day fixed' or 'on any other day'. However, while appreciating the said submission, the entire sub-rule (2) of Rule 105 needs to be noticed. According to sub-rule (2), the executing court is empowered to make an order to dismiss the execution application on the day fixed or on any other day 'to which the hearing may be adjourned'. 22. In the instant case, in view of the clear finding recorded by the court below that no date on 19.07.2003 was fixed and further that after passing of the interim order dated 22.11.1999, no intimation/information of any other date was ever furnished to the parties, the submission of learned counsel for the revision applicant on the basis of the aforementioned provisions of sub-rule (2) of Rule 105 of the Order XXI of the Code is erroneous and the same deserves to be rejected. 23. 23. Thus, in view of the discussions made and reasons given above, this Court does not find any ground to interfere in the impugned order dated 08.07.2014, passed by the learned District Judge, Barabanki in Misc. Case No.8 of 2012. 24. The revision petition is hereby dismissed.