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2014 DIGILAW 272 (KER)

B. Menghani v. Union of India

2014-03-24

A.M.SHAFFIQUE, MANJULA CHELLUR

body2014
Judgment : Manjula Chellur, C.J. 1. This writ petition is filed as a public interest litigation seeking relief of writ of quo warranto declaring that appointment of fourth respondent to the post of Director, National Waterways Road, Maradu, Kochi as illegal and erroneous for contravening provisions of Regulations. 2. In brief petitioner's case is, he was working as Senior Accounts Officer with second respondent Inland Waterways Authority of India at Head Office, NOIDA, New Delhi in 2011. Fourth respondent was appointed as the Director of third respondent at Kochi in flagrant violation of Exhibit P1 Regulations of Recruitment based upon which recruitments have to be made; the eligibility criteria indicated at Exhibit P1 for direct recruitment clearly prescribes the maximum age limit for the post of Director as 45 years; fourth respondent, being 56 years at the time of appointment (Date of Birth being 17.06.1954), was not eligible to be appointed as Director. 3. As a matter of fact, the selection committee for recruiting the Director ought to consist of three members, but the selection committee selecting the fourth respondent as the Director consisted of only two members, i.e. Vice Chairman and Chief Engineer. At the time of appointment, there was no proper vigilance clearance for fourth respondent which is mandatory. The post held by the fourth respondent is a public post and his appointment being not in conformity with the existing Rules and Regulations, interest of public at large is jeo pardised. It is nothing but a mala fide exercise of power indicating manifestation of abuse of power vested in respondents 1 and 2. With these averments, petitioner sought for the following reliefs: “I. To issue a writ of quo warranto and declare that the post of Director, National Waterways Road, Maradu, Kochi682304 that is claimed to be occupied by the 4th respondent is vacant. II. To issue a writ of mandamus and command the 1st and 2nd respondents to ouster the 4th respondent from the office of Director, National Waterways Road, Maradu, Kochi-682304 and restrain him from exercising any function or duties relating to such office. III. To call for the records leading to the issuance of Exhibits P2 and P3 order appointing 4th respondent to the post of Director of the 3rd respondent and examine its legality and propriety and quash the same by issuing a writ of certiorari. IV. III. To call for the records leading to the issuance of Exhibits P2 and P3 order appointing 4th respondent to the post of Director of the 3rd respondent and examine its legality and propriety and quash the same by issuing a writ of certiorari. IV. To issue a writ of mandamus and command respondents 1 to 3 to refrain from further extending any pay or allowances of the post of Director, National Waterways Road, Maradu, Kochi-682304 to the 4th respondent. V. To pass any other and such other orders as this Honourable court deem fit to pass in the nature and circumstances of the case.” 4. Inter alia, contesting respondents 2 and 3 from Inland Waterways Authority of India have filed common objections contending as under: The writ petition is not maintainable as petitioner has no locus standi, being a Government servant working as Senior Accounts Officer, to file the present petition in the form of public interest litigation. In the absence of any legal right of the petitioner being jeo pardised, the very purpose of filing this public interest litigation indicates hidden agenda for the petitioner to approach the court. However, the post of Director not being a public post, which is dealing with day-to-day public activities, cannot be questioned by filing a public interest litigation. As a matter of fact, petitioner is facing charges of corruption under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act and proceedings were initiated before the CBI Court in C.C.No.5/2006. So far as fourth respondent, he was initially appointed as Assistant Director by direct recruitment in the year 1987, later promoted as Deputy Director in March 1993. Post of Director under direct recruitment quota became vacant since March 2006. Advertisement calling for applications was issued in the month of December 2009. Fourth respondent also applied for the said post. Short list of candidates who were called for interview including the fourth respondent were published. At the time of interview, fourth respondent was aged 55 years and 10 months. Recruitment Regulations prescribed maximum age limit of 45 years for direct recruitment. The selection committee did recommend the name of fourth respondent for appointment to the post of Director indicating age criterion. However, he was officiating as Director in charge since June 2004. At the time of interview, fourth respondent was aged 55 years and 10 months. Recruitment Regulations prescribed maximum age limit of 45 years for direct recruitment. The selection committee did recommend the name of fourth respondent for appointment to the post of Director indicating age criterion. However, he was officiating as Director in charge since June 2004. While holding the post of Deputy Director, he was discharging the duties attached to the said office and he was eligible for promotion to the post of Director since April 1998. He has all required qualifications so far as education, experience, etc. Promotions or appointments are also made on the need base requirements without compromising on educational qualifications and experience. As per Exhibit P1, the Chairman can grant age relaxation up to three years. However, there have been precedents where age relaxation up to the extent of sixteen years was given by Inland Water Authority of India Board. Therefore, the matter was placed before the Authority in the 137th Board meeting and the Board after deliberation resolved to grant age relaxation of eleven years and fourteen days. Thereafter, fourth respondent was appointed as per Exhibit P2. Inland Waterways Authority of India is basically following the Rules and Regulations of Central Government with due variation whenever felt essential. The age relaxation is not granted without any good and sufficient reason. As a matter of fact, the enquiry carried out against several persons including the fourth respondent resulted in launching Regular Disciplinary Action for minor penalty. Minor penalty of withholding of annual increment for three years with cumulative effect was indicated. An appeal came to be filed seeking exoneration from the charges. In the appeal three years was reduced to one year of withholding of increment without cumulative effect and the period of penalty ceased as on 30.06.2010. Subsequent to that date, he was appointed to the post of Director in the year 2010. The selection committee is constituted in accordance with Regulation 27 and there was no mala fides or erroneous constitution of the committee. After vigilance certificate of clearance only, he was appointed. Contending that appointment of fourth respondent was in strict compliance with the Rules and Regulations, they have sought for dismissal of the same. 5. Fourth respondent has also filed objection statement more or less on the similar lines as filed by respondents 2 and 3. 6. After vigilance certificate of clearance only, he was appointed. Contending that appointment of fourth respondent was in strict compliance with the Rules and Regulations, they have sought for dismissal of the same. 5. Fourth respondent has also filed objection statement more or less on the similar lines as filed by respondents 2 and 3. 6. The entire issue revolves around on one and only point, i.e., whether fourth respondent was eligible to be appointed to the post of Director at the age of 55 years in violation of the prescribed maximum age limit of 45 years. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that so far as writ of quo warranto any one can bring to the notice of the court that qualifications prescribed were not followed for appointment. According to him, petitioner was not a candidate who could have got the post of Director if fourth respondent was not promoted, however, as a probono publico, he has locus standi to challenge the appointment as it is in violation of Recruitment Regulations. He relies upon two decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Mor Modern Cooperative Transport Society Ltd. v. Financial Commissioner & Secretary to Govt. of Haryana and another ( (2002) 6 SCC 269 ), so also Hari Bansh Lal v. Sahodar Prasad Mahto and others ( (2010) 9 SCC 655 ). Paragraphs 11 and 14 of the judgment in the first case read as under: “11. Unfortunately, the High Court did not consider the question which directly arose before it, namely, whether the appointment of the Transport Commissioner/Traffic Manager as Chairman/member of the Regional Transport Authority was not in breach of statutory provisions. The High court did not exercise its writ jurisdiction in the absence of any averment to the effect that the aforesaid officers had misused their authority and acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the appellants. In our view the High Court should have considered the challenge to the appointment of the officials concerned as members of the Regional Transport Authority on the ground of breach of statutory provisions. The mere fact that they had not acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the appellant could not lend validity to their appointment, if otherwise, the appointment was in breach of statutory provisions of a mandatory nature. The mere fact that they had not acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the appellant could not lend validity to their appointment, if otherwise, the appointment was in breach of statutory provisions of a mandatory nature. It has, therefore, become necessary for us to consider the validity of the impugned notification said to have been issued in breach of statutory provision. 14. The next question which falls for consideration is what is the nature of the “financial interest” contemplated by the said sub-section. The expression financial interest is capable of a narrower as well as a wider meaning. In the narrower sense, it implies direct personal benefit of an economic nature. In the wider sense, it may include any interest direct or indirect which a person has in relation to the finances of the undertaking. Such an interest may be the interest of an official who manages the finances of the undertaking or on whom rests the burden of financial accountability. It is trite to say that the intention of the legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole. The court must ascertain the intention of the legislature by directing its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed but to the entire statute; it must compare the clause with the other parts of the law, and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs. The rule is of general application as even the plainest terms may be controlled by the context. The expressions used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonize with the object of the statute, and which effectuate the object of the legislature. Therefore, when two interpretations are feasible, the court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppress the mischief as the legislature envisioned. Keeping these principles in mind, we shall now consider what meaning has to be given to the expression “financial interest” in sub-section (2) of Section 68 of the Act.” Paragraph 16 of the judgment in the latter case reads as under: “16. A writ of quo warranto lies only when appointment is contrary to a statutory provision. In High Court of Gujarat v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat ((2003) 4 SCC 712) (three-Judge Benc) Hon'ble S.B.Sinha, J. concurring with the majority view held (SCC pp.730-31, paras 22-23). “22. A writ of quo warranto lies only when appointment is contrary to a statutory provision. In High Court of Gujarat v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat ((2003) 4 SCC 712) (three-Judge Benc) Hon'ble S.B.Sinha, J. concurring with the majority view held (SCC pp.730-31, paras 22-23). “22. The High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction in a matter of this nature is required to determine at the outset as to whether a case has been made out for issuance of a writ of certiorari or a writ of quo warrant. The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of quo warranto is a limited one. While issuing such a writ, the Court merely makes a public declaration but will not consider the respective impact of the candidates or other factors which may be relevant for issuance of a writ of certiorari. (See R.K.Jain v. Union of India ( (1993) 4 SCC 119 , para 74). 23. A writ of quo warranto can only be issued when the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. (See Mor Modern Coop. Transport Society Ltd. v. Govt. of Haryana ( (2002) 6 SCC 269 ).” 7. As against this learned counsel representing second and third respondents contended that Inland Waterways Authority of India Act of 1985 enables the Authority to make appointment of Secretary, such other officers and employees as it considers necessary for the efficient discharge of its functions as per Section 8(1) of the Act. He further contends that so far as the method of recruitment contemplated under the Regulations framed in terms of Section 35 of the Act, upper age limit could be relaxed under certain conditions by a Chairman, i.e., to a maximum of three years where the maximum experience prescribed is ten years. 8. In the present case, said provision was not applicable as appointment was made by the Authority, therefore, the matter was placed before the Board in its 137th meeting and the Board has authority to relax the age limit even beyond maximum of three years. Thus, after relaxing 11 years and odd, fourth respondent was appointed. According to him, such exercise by the authority is in accordance with law and therefore, there cannot be any dispute regarding appointment. He also raised challenge to the locus standi of petitioner to file the present petition. Thus, after relaxing 11 years and odd, fourth respondent was appointed. According to him, such exercise by the authority is in accordance with law and therefore, there cannot be any dispute regarding appointment. He also raised challenge to the locus standi of petitioner to file the present petition. Another relevant challenge made by him was the post of Director not being a public post, public interest litigation itself is not maintainable. For these propositions he relies upon AIR 1964 Karnataka 159 in the case of P.S.Venkataswamy Setty v. University of Mysore and others. He also relies upon (2006) 11 SCC 731 (II) in the case of B.Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply & Drainage Board Employees' Assn. and others. Paragraph 44 of the said judgment reads as under: “44. In the instant case, the power to appoint the Managing Director of the Board is vested in the Board under Section 4(2) of the Act. Neither the Act nor the Rules prescribed any mode of appointment or tenure of appointment. When the mode of appointment, tenure of appointment have been left to the discretion of the government by the Act and the Rules, and the Act makes it clear that the Managing Director shall hold office at the pleasure of the Government, the High Court could not have fettered the discretion of the Government by holding that Section 4(2) of the Act does not expressly give the power to the state Government to make ad hoc or contractual appointment. When the Act and the statutory Rules have not prescribed any definite term and any particular mode, the High Court could not have read into the stature a restriction or prohibition that is not expressly prohibited by the Act and the Rules. It is well settled that when the stature does not lay down the method of appointment or term of appointment and when the Act specifies that the appointment is one of sure tenure, the appointing authority who has the power to appoint has absolute discretion in the matter and it cannot be said that discretion to appoint does not include the power to appoint on contract basis. An appointment which is temporary remains temporary and does not become permanent with the passage of time. An appointment which is temporary remains temporary and does not become permanent with the passage of time. The finding recorded by the learned Single Judge that the appointment is bad for the reason that the appointment which was made on temporary basis has continued for nearly two years is wholly contrary to law particularly when the Act and the Rules do not stipulate maximum period of appointment. The High Court, in our view, gravely erred in issuing a writ of quo warranto when there is no clear violation of law in the appointment of the appellant.” 9. According to respondents, when the mode of appointment and tenure of appointment have been left to the authority, the authority has power to relax the age limit, therefore, in the absence of any provision either under the Act or Regulations prescribing maximum age relaxation so far as the authority is concerned, such relaxation will be at the pleasure of the authority. With these arguments they seek for dismissal of the writ petition. 10. Sri.Jaju Babu, learned counsel appearing for the fourth respondent, places reliance on two judgments to contend that qualification requirement for promotion and the power to relax rules would mean that the Authority which has authority to relax rules can extend its authority not only to individual cases alone but comprehends cases of group or class of individuals to meet a particular situation in a just and equitable manner. Therefore, by a general order, such authority can relax the prescribed qualification for promotion in the event of non availability of any qualified person for promotion. For this contention, he relies on paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 in the case of J.C.Yadav and others v. State of Haryana and others ( (1990) 2 SCC 189 ), which read as under: “6. The rule confers power on the government to dispense with or to relax the requirement of any of the rules to the extent and with such conditions as it may consider necessary for dealing with the case in a just and equitable manner. The object and purpose of conferring this power on the government is to mitigate undue hardship in any particular case, and to deal with a case in a just and equitable manner. The object and purpose of conferring this power on the government is to mitigate undue hardship in any particular case, and to deal with a case in a just and equitable manner. If the rules cause undue hardship or rules operate in an inequitable manner in that event the State Government has power to dispense with or to relax the requirement of rules. The government may in certain circumstances relax the requirement of rules to meet a particular situation. The expression “in any particular case” does not mean that the relaxation should be confined only to an individual case. One of the meanings of the expression “particular” means “peculiar or pertaining to a specified person - thing – time or place - not common or general“. The meaning of the word particular in relation to law means separate or special, limited or specific. The word 'case' in ordinary usage means 'event', 'happening', 'situation', 'circumstances'. The expression 'case' in legal sense means 'a case', 'suit' or 'proceeding in court or Tribunal'. Having regard to these meanings the expression 'in any particular case' would mean: in a particular or pertaining to an event, situation or circumstances. Rule 22 postulates relaxation of rules to meet a particular event or situation, if the operation of the rules causes hardship. The relaxation of the rules may be to the extent the State Government may consider necessary for dealing with a particular situation in a just and equitable manner. The scope of rule is wide enough to confer power on the State government to relax the requirement of rules in respect of an individual or class of individuals to the extent it may consider necessary for dealing with the case in a just and equitable manner. The power of relaxation is generally contained in the Rules with a view to mitigate undue hardship or to meet a particular situation. Many a time strict application of service rules create a situation where a particular individual or a set of individuals may suffer undue hardship and further there may be a situation where requisite qualified persons may not be available for appointment to the service. In such a situation the government ha power to relax requirement of rules. The State Government may in exercise of its powers issue a general order relaxing any particular rule with a view to avail the services of requisite officers. In such a situation the government ha power to relax requirement of rules. The State Government may in exercise of its powers issue a general order relaxing any particular rule with a view to avail the services of requisite officers. The relaxation even if granted in a general manner would ensure to the befit of individual officers. 7. The State of Haryana was formed in March 1966, prior to that it was part of the State of Punjab. The service rules relating to Public Works Department as applicable to the State of Punjab were made applicable to Haryana. Rule 6(b) which prescribes qualification for appointment to Class I service lays down that no person shall be appointed to the service by promotion from Class II service unless he has completed eight years' service in Class II and has passed departmental examination prescribed under Rule 15. None of the appellants had completed eight years' service in Class II. In fact no other member of Class II service possessing the requisite qualifications was available for selection to Class I post. The respondent no doubt possessed the requisite qualification with regard to the eight years length of service in class II but he did not possess requisite education qualification. Thus, no qualified officer of Class II service was available for promotion to Class I service although a number of vacancies were existing in class I service. Having regard to these facts the Selection Committee made recommendation for the relaxation of Rule 6(b) in favour of the appellants, who were found otherwise suitable. The Public Service Commission also agreed with the recommendation made by the Selection Committee. The non-availability of suitable Class II officers in Engineering Department possessing the necessary and prescribed qualifications for promotion to Class I posed a problem for the State Government, as on account of the large scale expansion of Engineering Department a number of posts in Class I service were lying vacant. A similar situation prevailed in the Building and Road Branch of Public Works Department. A similar situation prevailed in the Building and Road Branch of Public Works Department. In the circumstances, the State Government with a view to meet the particular situation decided to relax the qualifying length of service to such officers who had completed four years of service in Class II, it therefore relaxed the requirement of Rule 6(b) to the extent that a member of Class II service having four years' service was qualified for being considered for promotion to Class I service. These facts would clearly show that the relaxation had been granted to particular individuals with a view to meet the situation, which was in public interest. We find no legal infirmity in the order of relaxation. 8. In B.S.Bansal v. State of Punjab ((1978) 2 SLR 553 (P&H HC) a bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that if the power of relaxation could be exercised in order to meet a general situation, then the whole purpose of the rule would be frustrated and the government would be armed with an arbitrary power which could cause great hardship to some officers. We have already referred to the relevant facts which show that in the instant case, power of relaxation was exercised by the State Government to met a particular situation, it did not result into any injustice or cause hardship to any one. If power of relaxation is exercised on extraneous consideration for oblique purposes of mala fide, the court has power to strike down the same but exercise of power of relaxation to meet a particular situation cannot be held to be arbitrary or illegal. In B.S.Jain v. State of Haryana ((1981) 1 SLR 233 (P&H HC) the High Court set aside the promotions made in pursuance of the relaxation granted under rule 22 placing reliance on the decision of the Division Bench in B.S.Bansal case. In B.S.Jain v. State of Haryana ((1981) 1 SLR 233 (P&H HC) the High Court set aside the promotions made in pursuance of the relaxation granted under rule 22 placing reliance on the decision of the Division Bench in B.S.Bansal case. On appeal, this Court in Ashok Gulati v. B.S.Jain (1986 Supp CC 597), observed that the findings of the High Court that the State Government could not have relaxed the condition of passing the departmental professional examination by taking recourse to Rule 22 which conferred power of relaxation on the State Government could hardly be sustained.” He also places reliance on M.P.John v. Union of India and others, an unreported decision of this Court to contend that unless it is shown that relaxation is illegal warranting interference, in the absence of any mala fides against the authority, the minimum qualification prescribed can be relaxed having regard to the sound and adequate background and experience of a particular candidate. 11. With the above arguments and the law declared by the Apex Court and other High Courts, we have to consider the case on hand with reference to the facts of the present case. It is not in dispute that fourth respondent is working with second respondent since 07.09.1987. Way back in 1993, he was promoted as Deputy Director. According to respondents, fourth respondent was eligible for promotion to the post of Director from April 1998 onwards. Since 2004, he was officiating as Director in charge and was discharging the duties attached to the post of Director, though he was not promoted as Director. Since 01.03.2006, the post of Director under direct recruitment quota was lying vacant. As a matter of fact, since September 2008 he was drawing the pay scale of Director. It is not in dispute that he is holding masters degree in Engineering and has gained considerable experience in Inland Waterways Terminal Section. In December 2009, advertisement was given for direct recruitment to the post of Director. Including the fourth respondent, four persons were called for interview. At the time of interview, fourth respondent was aged about 55 years and odd. Though selection committee recommended his name, but for the age limit, the recommendation was forwarded to the authority under the Act as Recruitment Regulations prescribed maximum age limit of 45 years. 12. Including the fourth respondent, four persons were called for interview. At the time of interview, fourth respondent was aged about 55 years and odd. Though selection committee recommended his name, but for the age limit, the recommendation was forwarded to the authority under the Act as Recruitment Regulations prescribed maximum age limit of 45 years. 12. There was departmental enquiry against the fourth respondent as already stated above and penalty was reduced to one year by the Appellate Authority which ceased as on 30.06.2010. Subsequent to this, vigilance clearance was given. On 13.04.2010 selection committee recommended the name of fourth respondent for filling up the post of Director (direct recruitment). On 26.04.2010 offer of appointment was given to the fourth respondent. On 12.08.2010, Board granted age relaxation of 11 years and 14 days to the fourth respondent. On 27.08.2010, fourth respondent was appointed as the Director. It is further contended that no financial burden was on the authority as fourth respondent was already drawing the pay scale of Director from 2008 onwards. On adhoc basis fourth respondent worked as Director in Patna office, thereafter as Director in charge till May 2009 and till August 2010 as Director in charge at Regional Office, Ernakulam. According to respondents, the Board (Authority) has power to grant age relaxation under Sections 5(A)(3) and 8(1) of the Act. 13. Then coming to the locus standi of the petitioner, as this seems to be one of the grounds of challenge, apparently, petitioner was not a competitor to the post of Director. He was not one of the candidates who were interviewed and would have been successful in the selection. Therefore, so far as fourth respondent is concerned, he has no animosity or hidden agenda. Then coming to the CBI enquiry, registration of a case resulting in dismissal of the petitioner from service, can it be a ground to refuse the allegations made by the petitioner, especially when the allegation is that without eligible criterion fourth respondent was appointed as Director by the respondent Authority. Till date, no law says either by way of a statute or precedent that a person who is convicted of a crime or dismissed from service has no locus standi to challenge the appointment of a person on the ground of want of qualification. We find no good reason to opine in negative so far as locus standi of the petitioner. 14. We find no good reason to opine in negative so far as locus standi of the petitioner. 14. Then coming to the main controversy, eligible qualification and criterion, we have the Act as well as Regulations. Section 2 of the Act deals with various definitions applicable to the dispute in question. Authority is defined at Section 2(b), which means the Inland Waterways Authority of India is constituted under Section 3 of the Act. In the pleadings, parties have referred to this Authority as Board though there is no Board as such referred to in the entire Act. Regulations means Regulations made by the Authority under the Act. Sub-section (3) of Section 3 indicates who shall be the members which constitute the Authority, which is mentioned at clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d), which read as under: “3(3)(a) a Chairman; (b) a Vice Chairman; (c) not more than three full-time members; and (d) not more than three part-time members to be appointed by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette.” 15. Sections 4 and 4(A) refer to the term of office and other conditions of service of the members and also the disqualification for being appointed as a member. 16. Sections 5(1) and (2) refer to the powers of the Chairman and Vice Chairman. Section 5(A)(3) refers to the decision by a majority of votes of the members present on all questions which come up before any meeting of the Authority. 17. Sections 8(1) and (2) are relevant which refer to appointment of Secretary and such other officers and employees, which read as under: “8(1) The Authority may appoint the Secretary and such other officers and employees as it considers necessary for the efficient discharge of its functions under this Act. (2) The terms and conditions of service of the Secretary and other officers and employees of the Authority shall be such as may be determined by regulations.“ 18. Chapter IV Section 14 of the Act deals with functions and powers of the Authority. Chapter VI Section 25 refers to the powers of Central Government to issue directions wherein the Authority is under obligation to follow the directions on questions of policy issued by the Central Government in writing from time to time without prejudice to the provisions of the Act while discharging the functions and duties by the Authority under the Act. Chapter VI Section 25 refers to the powers of Central Government to issue directions wherein the Authority is under obligation to follow the directions on questions of policy issued by the Central Government in writing from time to time without prejudice to the provisions of the Act while discharging the functions and duties by the Authority under the Act. However, the proviso provides an opportunity to the Authority, as far as practicable, to express its view before any direction is given by the Central Government and the decision of the Central Government whether a question is one of policy or not shall be final. 19. Section 29 refers to delegation of powers by the Authority, which reads as under: “29. The Authority may by general or special order in writing, delegate to the Chairman or any other member or to any officer of the Authority, subject to such conditions and limitations, if any, as may be specified in the order, such of its powers and functions under this Act (except the powers under section-35) as it may deem necessary“. This clearly indicates, all powers could be delegated except the powers under Section 35. 20. Section 31 also is relevant which says, all members, officers and other employees of the Authority to be public servants, which reads as under: “31. All members, officers and other employees of the Authority shall be deemed, when acting or purporting to act in pursuance of any of the provisions of this Act, to be public servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code.“ 21. Section 33 refers to the powers of Central Government to supersede the Authority in the case of grave emergency the Authority is unable to discharge the functions and duties imposed on it by or under the provisions of the Act or where Authority has persistently made default in complying with any direction issued by the Central Government under the Act. 22. Section 34(1) refers to the power of the Central Government to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act by notification in the Official Gazette. Section 34(2) indicates for what all subjects the rules provide for. It refers to the terms of office and other conditions of service of the members of the Authority, the powers and duties of the Chairman and Vice Chairman, etc. Section 34(2) indicates for what all subjects the rules provide for. It refers to the terms of office and other conditions of service of the members of the Authority, the powers and duties of the Chairman and Vice Chairman, etc. It does not refer to the terms and conditions of service of employees and other officers. Sub-section (1) of Section 35 empowers the Authority to make Regulations with previous approval of the Central Government consistent with the Act to carry out the purposes of the Act. Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 35 refers to the terms and conditions of service of Secretary and other officers and employees of the Authority referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act. 23. Regulations framed by the Authority by virtue of Section 35 of the Act provides the procedure for various matters. Regulation 3(h) of the Inland Waterways Authority of India Notification defines Selection Committee as under: “Selection Committee means the Committee constituted by the Chairman for the selection of candidates by means of a competitive examination of interview or both for appointment to posts for direct recruitment.” Regulation 3(g) defines Departmental Promotion Committee, 3(h) defines Selection Committee and 3(o) defines Selection Post. Regulation 4 refers to the process of appointments, i.e. by promotion or transfer of employees or by transfer and deputation or by direct recruitment. Regulation 5 deals with Method of Recruitment, which reads as under: “The method of recruitment the qualification in respect of age, education, training, requirements of minimum experience, essential and/or desirable, classification of posts as selection posts or non-selection posts and other matters connected with the appointments to various posts shall be as shown in the schedule annexed to these Regulations; Provided that the prescribed upper age limits may be relaxed: (i) by the Chairman upto a maximum of 3 years where the minimum experience prescribed is 10 years or more and upto a maximum of 2 years where the minimum experience prescribed is 5 to 9 years; if there is shortage of suitable candidates or if selected candidate is highly qualified than required under the Regulations: Provided further that the prescribed qualifications regarding experience for good and sufficient reasons, to be recorded in writing, be relaxed by the Chairman , if a candidate is otherwise found suitable and well qualified.” 24. Regulation 20 deals with Direct Recruitment, how appointment to the posts in different classes by direct recruitment shall be made in accordance with the procedure contemplated. Sub-regulation (i) says that while advertising a vacancy in the newspapers or notifying a vacancy to the Employment Exchange it should be clearly indicated whether the vacancy or the number of posts, if the number of vacancies are more than one, is or are reserved for candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes or any other specified group. This clearly indicates even with regard to the candidates coming through direct recruitment who have the benefit of relaxation relating to age. 25. Regulation 25 empowers the selection committee to send a panel of approved candidates for appointment to various posts which reads as under: “Panel of approved candidates for appointment. The Selection Committee, may recommend, in the order of merit, as adjusted by it, the names of the selected candidates to be kept in the panel for consideration for appointment to posts earmarked for direct recruits. Such a panel would normally be valid for a period of 12 months from the date on which it is finalised. In any case, it should cease to be in force on the expiry of a period of one year and six months from the date on which it is finalized or when a fresh panel is prepared, whichever is earlier.” Sub-regulation (i) of Regulation 27 refers to the assistance to the appointing authority, which reads as under: “27. Selection Committe: (1) There shall be a Selection Committee for each category of posts duly constituted by the Chairman and the main functions of such Committee shall be to advise and assist the appointing authority in the matter of making selection of candidates for appointment to different posts bt direct recruitment.” 26. Schedule to these Regulations indicates various categories of posts and separate columns are indicated for various essentials. Sl.No.25 in the schedule deals with the post of Director. This is classified as Group A post. The post is a selection post. Column No.6 refers to maximum age limit of 45 years and Column No.7 deals with essentials regarding education and experience. 27. The above statute and Regulations made thereunder clearly indicate and define the process of appointment to the post of Director. This is classified as Group A post. The post is a selection post. Column No.6 refers to maximum age limit of 45 years and Column No.7 deals with essentials regarding education and experience. 27. The above statute and Regulations made thereunder clearly indicate and define the process of appointment to the post of Director. One has to now analyse the factual situation to understand whether there is violation of the provisions of the above procedure. Two judgments are relied upon by the learned counsel for petitioner, relevant paragraphs of which are already quoted above. In MOR Modern Cooperative Transport Society's case (supra), the appellant Society was operating a stage carriage in a particular district and the permit was issued by the concerned Regional Transport Authority by virtue of notification. Appellant challenged the notification dated 27.03.1998 whereunder Transport Commissioner was appointed as the Chairman of the Regional Transport Authority. This came to be superseded by another notification dated 31.12.1998 appointing Secretary, Regional Transport Authority as Chairman and Traffic Manager of Haryana Roadways as member of RTA. Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that appellant failed to show that such appointment had adversely affected appellant's business by another notification dated 20.02.2001 superseding the earlier notification in which Transport Commissioner was appointed as Chairman of the RTA. Before the Supreme Court, challenge was that both Chairman and member who are none other than Transport Commissioner and Traffic Manager working in the office of the General Manager, Haryana Roadways have financial interest in the Government undertaking, i.e. Haryana Roads, therefore appointment of such a person as member of the State or Regional Transport Authority was illegal. Supreme Court held that Transport Commissioner is overall in charge of the State undertaking which is departmentally managed and is also accountable to the Government for its performance and the profits earned or losses suffered by the undertaking. Their Lordships opined that by virtue of Section 68 of the Motor Vehicles Act, no person who has any financial interest, whether as proprietor, employee or otherwise in any transport undertaking, shall be appointed or continued to be a member of RTA. Transport Commissioner having no personal financial interest in the State undertaking is of no consequence so long as the said person is directly connected with the management or operation of the transport undertaking. Transport Commissioner having no personal financial interest in the State undertaking is of no consequence so long as the said person is directly connected with the management or operation of the transport undertaking. Therefore, both Transport Commissioner and Traffic Manager were held to have interest in the undertaking and accordingly their appointments were quashed. 28. What we gather from the above judgment is that it is the duty of the court to ascertain the intention of the legislature by referring to various clauses to be construed, however the entire statute must be taken into consideration and compare the clauses with other provisions and thereafter the clauses have to be interpreted. The expressions in the statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute which effectuate the object of the legislature. 29. In the present case, the above principle has to be applied in understanding the entire selection process of direct recruitment method so far as the post of Director. Question is whether qualifications and essentials required for the said post, especially age limit and its relaxation by the Chairman has to be understood by reading the entire statute and other clauses. No where in the statute such age relaxation so far as the post of Director by direct recruitment is mentioned. By virtue of delegation of powers and channel of submission of files, Authority has entrusted the responsibility of recruitment to the Chairman so far as Group A candidates. It says full powers. Therefore, contention of the respondents, in the absence of any specific power of the Authority to relax the required qualifications and its unbridled power, is rejected. 30. So far as Hari Bansh Lal's case (supra), it refers to public interest litigation. After referring to various decisions, their Lordships opined that if the Authority had not acted in any manner prejudicial to the interest of the appellant, it would not be a matter of consideration to opine whether appointment was validly done or not. Their Lordships further opined that in a public interest litigation by way of writ of quo warranto the only consideration has to be whether appointment is contrary to the statutory provisions. In the absence of violation of statutory provisions, it cannot go into the suitability or otherwise of a candidate for appointment to a particular post. Their Lordships further opined that in a public interest litigation by way of writ of quo warranto the only consideration has to be whether appointment is contrary to the statutory provisions. In the absence of violation of statutory provisions, it cannot go into the suitability or otherwise of a candidate for appointment to a particular post. Choosing a suitable candidate is an administrative function and the court need not interfere with the same. 31. So far as the judgments referred to by Mr.Santharam, learned standing counsel for respondent Authority, Venkataswamy Setty's case (supra) pertains to the appointment of six posts of Professors and twelve posts of Readers in various subjects of study. In the writ petition, validity of appointment came to be challenged. According to them, the required qualification for the said posts was deficit. Their Lordships while analysing various aspects of the matter considered the question whether nature of posts held by the contesting respondents is such that a writ of quo warranto can be asked for to remove them from the respective posts and whether petitioner is competent to move the court for issuance of such writ. In that context, their Lordships opined that position or office held by the respondents cannot be described as a public office, therefore, the case will not be one for quo warranto in the strict sense but will be one for some other type of appropriate order, writ or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution subject to the condition that petitioner has to establish that he has some personal interest in the matter which the law recognises as sufficient. In other words, by referring to this case, arguments of the learned counsel for petitioner was it must be a public office, i.e., appointment to the post of Director, which is under challenge, must be a post created under the statute. While referring to various sections, Section 31 of the Act was referred to wherein all members, officers and other employees of the Authority shall be deemed to be public servants. In the light of such provision in the said section itself and when the post of Director is indicated in the Schedule of Regulations which is formed under Section 35 of the Act, we fail to understand how this argument of the respondent Authority can be sustained. 32. In the light of such provision in the said section itself and when the post of Director is indicated in the Schedule of Regulations which is formed under Section 35 of the Act, we fail to understand how this argument of the respondent Authority can be sustained. 32. Another judgment referred to by Mr.Santharam (B.Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply & Drainage Board Employees' Assn. and others (supra) is a case where power of the Government to make contractual appointment until further orders was the subject matter of challenge. It was held that so far as the power to appoint the Managing Director of the Board, neither the Act nor the Rules prescribed any mode of appointment or tenure of appointment. In such situation, mode of appointment and tenure of appointment has to be held as left to the discretion of the Government and when the Act makes it clear that the Managing Director shall hold office at the pleasure of the Government, it has to be opined that State Government has power to make adhoc or contractual appointment. Courts cannot read out a statute, a restriction or provision that is not expressly prohibited. According to learned counsel, in the absence of imposition of any such restriction or power of the Authority to relax the age so far as the post of Director, the challenge made by the petitioner is not sustainable. 33. As already stated above, though the Authority is the appointing authority under the Act, the Act and the Regulations if read as a whole, clearly indicate such powers are delegated to the Chairman and appointment so far as Director is concerned, if it is by way of direct recruitment, selection committee prepares a panel of candidates and then the appointing authority, i.e., the Chairman, appoints them. 34. In the present case, Regulation 5 of the Notification clearly indicates, Chairman has power to relax the age by three years in a case where the experience required is ten years. The maximum age limit being 45 years, another three years could be the maximum relaxation application, i.e., 48 years. None of the provisions indicate that Authority has superseding power over the powers exercised by the Chairman. Under certain circumstances, as already indicated, only Central Government has superseding power over the Authority under the Act. The maximum age limit being 45 years, another three years could be the maximum relaxation application, i.e., 48 years. None of the provisions indicate that Authority has superseding power over the powers exercised by the Chairman. Under certain circumstances, as already indicated, only Central Government has superseding power over the Authority under the Act. Therefore, the facts of the present case are entirely different from the facts of the cases referred to by learned standing counsel appearing for the Authority. 35. So far as I.N.Subba Reddy v. Andhra University and others ( AIR 1976 SC 2049 ), an occasion arose before the Apex Court to consider the terms and conditions of service of University Teachers under Section 19(c)(iii) of the Andhra University Act with reference to the powers of Syndicate under clause (c)(iii) of the Act. While considering powers of the Syndicate to fix the emoluments of the teachers of the University and to define their duties and conditions of service, their Lordships opined that the expression 'conditions of service' means all those conditions which regulate the holding of a post by a person right from the time of his appointment till his retirement and even beyond it. The facts of the present case are entirely different. We are not concerned with termination of service of a University teacher. We are considering whether a writ of quo warranto for alleged violation of the provisions pertaining to appointment of Director can be issued or not. This has no application to the facts of the case referred to above. 36. Mr.Jaju Babu, learned counsel appearing for party respondent relies upon C.K.Saleem Kumar v. State of Kerala (2004 (2) KLT 177) to contend that there is no second opinion so far as the law laid down by the Apex Court. In the said case, their Lordships clearly indicated that in public interest litigation cases, court cannot adjudicate service matters because only an aggrieved person can file public interest litigation in service matters. The law declared by the Apex Court is public interest litigation is not maintainable in service matters except in cases for issue of writ of quo warranto questioning the appointment on the ground of violation of statutory provisions. 37. We have already narrated paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 in J.C.Yadav's case (supra). Their Lordships were considering Rule 22 of Haryana Service of Engineers Class I PWD (Public Health Branch) Rules. 37. We have already narrated paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 in J.C.Yadav's case (supra). Their Lordships were considering Rule 22 of Haryana Service of Engineers Class I PWD (Public Health Branch) Rules. Rule 22 empowered Government to relax requirement of rules. Government by virtue of this rule had unrestricted and unbridled power to relax the requirement of rule depending upon the necessity for dealing with the case in a just and equitable manner. Here, there is no such power vested with the Authority except Chairman having such power under Regulation 5. Neither the statute nor the Regulations vests the Authority with such unbridled and unrestricted power. 38. On going through the facts of the unreported Division Bench judgment of this Court and on comparison of the same with the facts of the present case, it is seen that challenge was against the appointment of fourth respondent to the post of Director (Marketing) in Fertilizes and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. The contention was that fourth respondent was not qualified for appointment as Director as he was not possessing the experience as prescribed under Exhibit P2 notification, i.e., at least two years' experience in Marketing during the last ten years. Their Lordships, after referring to the stipulation at Exhibit P2 notification, opined that minimum qualification prescribed can be relaxed in the case of internal candidates with sound and adequate background and experience. Based on such factual situation, the Bench opined that appointment of fourth respondent was in terms of Exhibit P2 notification, therefore there was no illegality warranting interference by the court. 39. Coming to the facts of the present case, the main challenge is on the ground of maximum age restriction under Regulations to contend that fourth respondent being 55 years of age at the time of appointment, even extension of three years by way of relaxation provided under Regulation 5 will not save the appointment of fourth respondent. The maximum age relaxation provided under the Regulations which is a subordinate legislation and in the absence of Regulations not being inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, we are of the opinion, one cannot travel beyond the provisions of Regulations so far as appointment of fourth respondent as Director by direct recruitment method. 40. In the light of above discussion and reasoning, the appointment of 4th respondent, as Director through direct recruitment method, is held illegal. 40. In the light of above discussion and reasoning, the appointment of 4th respondent, as Director through direct recruitment method, is held illegal. As his term as Director is going to expire by 30.06.2014, his appointment as Director till date shall be treated as incharge arrangement. However, after appointment as Director 4th respondent must have discharged his duties as Director till date and so far as consequences of duties discharged by 4th respondent till date, they shall not be illegal or ineffective by virtue of his appointment being held as illegal. So far as monetary benefits and other emoluments paid to him till date will not be affected by virtue of above order. The Writ Petition is disposed of as above.